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# CIVILIZATION:

An Historical Review  
of its Elements.

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BY

Charles Morris



# CIVILIZATION

AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF ITS ELEMENTS

BY

CHARLES MORRIS

AUTHOR OF "THE ARYAN RACE," "A MANUAL OF CLASSICAL LITERATURE," ETC.

VOLUME I

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CHICAGO

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1890



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## PREFACE.

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THE present work makes no pretense to be a history of civilization, in the ordinarily accepted sense of the term, but is offered rather as an outline view of its elements, with some attempt to set forth the philosophy of human progress, and indicate the evolutionary steps by which the world of man has passed upward from primitive savagery to modern enlightenment. The field covered is a broad one; each of the topics treated would have made a volume in itself, if handled with any width of historical illustration, and it has been necessary, while seeking to omit no subject of importance, to deal with all concisely. Each topic has been considered separately, so as to form, to some extent, a distinct treatise. This was an essential resultant of the nature of the subject. Civilization, though a grand whole, is made up of many discrete parts. Originally these were closely combined, simplicity of relations being the distinguishing characteristic of the social aggregate of the far past. Diversity of relations has succeeded this ancient simplicity, the various elements of civilization have become widely separated, and, though they continue linked one to another by many lines of connection, each has gained a position and a

history of its own. The separate treatment which this has necessitated has produced, perhaps, some degree of repetition, but in no other way could a clear picture of the whole diversified scene have been drawn. It has been the aim of the author to make his work at once interesting and instructive, and to enable those who lack time or opportunity to peruse separate works on the several topics here treated, to gain from these pages some general conception of what man has thought and done in his long march down the ages. If this purpose shall prove to be in any satisfactory degree accomplished, he will feel fully repaid for the labor involved.

PHILADELPHIA, 1890.

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# CIVILIZATION;

## AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF ITS ELEMENTS.

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### CHAPTER I.

#### FIRST STEPS TOWARDS CIVILIZATION.

MAN began life as a savage. Such is the record of science, and of all traditions which can lay any claim to historical accuracy. Relics of primitive man have been of late years discovered in many parts of the earth, and they everywhere indicate a gradual progress from very crude to more advanced conditions. The most ancient of these relics consist of rudely chipped stones, adapted to warlike and domestic purposes. The bones of animals, wrought into like implements, are also found. The stage of savagery indicated by these implements still persists in some parts of the earth, while in certain existing tribes even this slight degree of manufacturing ability is wanting. Elsewhere ages of civilization have supervened, but underlying this civilization are found traces of progress from the state of the primitive savage to that of cultured man.

The oldest traditions and historical annals of mankind point to a similar primitive savagery. Some nations, indeed, claim a superior origin, and offer us absurd chronologies, and legends of incredible social conditions;

but the general verdict of antique literatures is against the truth of these legends. Thus the Vedas of India and the Zend Avesta of Persia describe a culture of a very barbaric type. The annals of China take us still further back, and speak of the fathers of the nation as a horde of savage wanderers, without horses, clothing or fire, dwelling in forests, and living on the spoils of the chase, or on such unpalatable food as roots and insects. The record of original man given in Genesis yields no higher conception. He is described as naked and ignorant, destitute of all arts and all industries, subsisting on fruits, and devoted to the care of fruit trees. Other records, legends, and traditions of mankind point to a similar condition of early man, and coincide with the evidences obtained by scientific investigation. Alike in tradition, in history, and in archæological discovery, man makes his first appearance upon the earth as an uncultured savage.

The fact that this crude condition was, ages ago, succeeded in certain regions by a more advanced state, while in other regions it still persists, does not prove that these regions were peopled at different periods. For human advancement is in some countries so favored, and in others so opposed, by natural conditions, that the greatest diversity in the existing stages of progress may be accordant with an equal antiquity. Yet it can scarcely be claimed that the earth was simultaneously peopled, in all its parts, by human beings. Most probably man's earliest seat was a contracted one, and his outspreading the result of a migratory movement which may have consumed ages in extending to the more remote regions of the earth.

As to the locality in which man first appeared upon the earth there is great diversity of opinion, though most authorities believe it to have been on some of the islands of the Indian ocean, or in Southern Asia. That his original seat was somewhere in the tropics is strongly indicated by his physical structure. Man is the one naked animal. All other creatures, even those native to the hot suns of the tropics, are clothed in hairs or feathers, in a thick skin, or in a scaly or bony coat of mail. Man is, of all animals, the most unfitted to endure chilling winds or equatorial suns. His native residence would seem to be under the thick shadows of tropical forests.

To-day we find him dwelling in all climates, from the equator to the polar regions. Yet he continues as unprotected by nature as he could have been in his origin. Man, in fact, is still in a measure a tropical animal, for he has carried tropical conditions with him in all his migrations. Artificial clothing, habitation, and the use of fire, have enabled him to preserve his native temperature in the coldest regions, while the change in food, from cooling fruits to heat-making fats, has proved an efficient aid in the adaptation to frigid climates.

The general possession of the earth by mankind may have been nearly or quite completed before civilization anywhere appeared. The seeds of civilization germinate with exceeding slowness. The increase in human population takes place with considerable rapidity. The earth lay before primitive man "where to choose." Increase in numbers, need of subsistence, warlike aggression, and a restless spirit of adventure, all led him to

explore new localities, and to spread over unpeopled regions

But there were many foes to battle with in the original migration. Chilling airs, savage beasts, poisonous serpents, difficult deserts and morasses, impenetrable thickets, pathless forests, rugged mountains, all lay in the way of early man. Clothing and habitation were necessary to the endurance of extremes of climate, the arms and arts of the hunter to the subjection of wild beasts; new sources of food had to be discovered and new means of obtaining it devised; the possession of fire was an absolute requisite, and the device of language for mutual communication little less requisite, ere man could fully assert his mastery over the savage animal tribes and the wild conditions of nature. And in these necessary preliminaries to any widespread migration we have undoubtedly the first declared steps made by mankind from primitive savagery towards civilization.

Some writers believe that the earliest migrants were fishermen. Fish can be taken with less danger and difficulty than wild beasts, and water courses offer highly favorable lines of progress into new regions. Vegetable food could be readily obtained in the fertile river valleys. The obstacles of mountains and deserts might be avoided. A floating log would carry the adventurous traveler easily past very difficult shore regions. Fish were in all probability exceedingly abundant and easily caught. Yet the life of the fisherman is not without its dangers, its hardships, its need of shrewdness and agility and of the employment of weapons, and thus may have served as a useful training school for the more difficult life of the hunter. We offer these

but as suggestions as to the conditions of the original migration. The subject is an interesting one, and worthy of a fuller treatment.

Man was probably from an early period both herbivorous and carnivorous in his habits, though the former habit may have predominated. But, as one result of migration, the human race became divided into specially herbivorous and carnivorous sections. One portion of mankind remained in warm regions, where fruits were abundant throughout the year, where the climate rendered vegetable food desirable, and where the tropical heats induced an indolence unfavorable to the active life of the hunter. Another portion inhabited regions where vegetable food could be obtained only during the summer, where the climate made animal food desirable, and where the wintry chill encouraged active exercise, and rendered the chase a source of enjoyment as well as of food. Between these two sections of mankind lay a third, which in some degree combined the characteristics of both. Its locality was a wide belt of land, the border region of the tropic and temperate zones, which yielded vegetable food for a considerable portion of, though not for all the year, while it also offered an abundance of nutritious animal food. This region was the birthplace of civilization. Within it all the early civilizations arose, if we except that of China, which apparently originated in a colder latitude.

If now we consider more closely the three sections of mankind here indicated we cannot but reach certain significant conclusions. Men do not devise civilization. They grow into it as unconsciously as the seed grows into the tree. It is doubtful if any man, in the primi-

tive ages, ever deliberately thought out some scheme to make mankind more comfortable, though many may have taken steps to benefit themselves individually. Hard necessity was the whip which drove man out of his primitive habits. The possessions which we have already indicated, clothing, fire, habitation, weapons, and implements, came into use and became perfected by steps of tedious slowness. A happy accident, or occasionally an intelligent effort, may have shared in their origination or perfecting, but they became generally employed only as their utility became generally apparent. The radicals in those days doubtless had the conservatives to contend with in a much fuller sense than they have now.

The necessity of improved conditions bore principally upon the hordes migrating to colder climates. The dwellers in the tropics had little need of fire, clothing, or habitation, or of other food than that freely offered by nature. They needed weapons only for defense, and the trees and thickets of their native forests presented usually a safe retreat from danger. Thus there was nothing to induce any rapidity of progress. In some regions of the tropics, it is true, the infertility of the soil, the abundance of food animals, or special peril from wild beasts, may have acted as a spur to the savage inhabitants. Yet we are somewhat at a loss to decide how much of the slight advancement which tropical man now presents is due to his own exertions, and how much to information received from abroad.

The other two sections of mankind became hunters through sheer necessity. Those particularly who inhabited the colder latitudes could have derived little subsistence from the sparse products of their uncultivated

plants. The dwellers in the intermediate region were better provided with vegetable food, yet they needed supplies of winter food, which could only be obtained by the arts of the hunter. Perhaps we might justly consider man as at first principally a fruit-eating animal; then a fruit and fish-eating; and eventually as divided into fruit-eating, fish-eating, and flesh-eating classes.

But in the two regions just named—the semi-frigid and the semi-tropical—there were strong influences tending to cause progress in unlike directions. The one class subsisted principally on animal food, the other largely on vegetable food. In the one must have arisen a disposition to preserve and protect for its own use the most available animals. In the other this disposition was largely directed toward plants. The early hunters had two classes of animals to contend with, the docile herbivora, and the savage carnivora. It was to their interest to protect the former from the assaults of the latter, and to herd them for their own purposes. So the increase of vegetable food was probably aided by like efforts to encourage the growth of useful plants, and to hinder that of pernicious weeds. From the first tendency gradually arose the domestication of animals; from the second, that of plants. Thus extra-tropical man naturally separated, in his continued progress, into two distinct sections, the flesh-preserving or pastoral tribes, and the plant-preserving or agricultural tribes.

The period of human development of which we have here spoken is one that has left no record of its existence. It far antedated history or tradition, and we



might not be safe in asserting its existence but that each step in its progress still somewhere persists. As in the development of an animal the stages of its ancestral conditions are indicated in the embryo, so every step of the ancestral progress of mankind may be indicated in some existing human condition.

We must, of course, credit the prehistoric races with the same passions, desires and instincts which now move mankind. They must have felt a disposition to increase and husband their stores of food. They must have desired greater comfort, in improved clothing, habitation and implements. They must have had some sense of the beautiful, and have made efforts at ornamentation. They had a natural desire to preserve their own wealth, and an inclination to obtain that of others. They were affected by cupidity, ambition, love and hatred. The inclination to manufacture and to exchange must have existed, together with the desire for personal independence and for authority over others. These are some of the most vigorous influences which now move mankind, and similar influences must always have acted upon the human race. To the interworkings of such natural desires and tendencies all history and all civilization are due.

From the fruit-eating developed the agricultural, from the hunting developed the shepherd tribes, yet these important steps of progress were not easily or everywhere made. Important sections of mankind are yet in one of the two earlier stages, and extensive regions of the earth have but recently been rescued from primitive savagery by civilized migration. In fact, favoring climatic conditions are not the only requisites to such

steps of progress. Agricultural and shepherd habits are not likely to have originated except in localities specially adapted to their development. Nor is it very difficult to conceive the character of these adaptations. Shepherd tribes seem to have arisen in only a single region of the earth, the deserts of Asia and perhaps of Northern Africa. Agricultural tribes were probably more widespread in their origin, though it is not impossible that there was a single birthplace of eastern agriculture, from which the art spread widely through Asia and Africa. As to the original region of western agriculture, we are in ignorance. It probably had at least two points of origin, one in North and one in South America, the former culminating in the Mexican, the latter in the Peruvian civilization.

Whether man shall progress from the hunter to the shepherd stage depends on several circumstances. There are necessary the presence of readily domesticated animals, and of natural conditions suitable to the purposes of the herder. A degree of scarcity of these animals, rendering the product of the chase variable and precarious, would be a favorable circumstance. The forest regions, which of old included a great portion of the earth's surface, are unsuited to shepherd habits, and adapted only to the purposes of the hunter. In short, the domestication of food animals was most likely to arise on treeless plains, and particularly in regions whose sparse pasturage so greatly reduced the possible animal population that indiscriminate hunting must have led to complete exhaustion. In the grassy prairie region of America, with its vast herds of bison, domestication was not necessary. There was little danger of exhaus-

tion by the Indian methods of hunting. In the wide plains of South America pasturage was unlimited. In that country, moreover, the only animal suitable to domestication was the mountain-loving llama, and the first discoverers of Peru found that these animals were shepherded on the slopes of the Andes. In Southern Africa the broad and partly barren plains were traversed by vast herds of antelopes, swift in motion and wild in habits, not suited to domestication, and obviating its necessity by their numbers. Only in the desert regions of Asia did conditions exist specially favorable to the development of the shepherd mode of life. There were broad, level, treeless plains, with few water-courses and sparse pasturage. But a more important feature of these plains was that they were the native home of the animals best suited to domestication, the slow-moving ox, the docile sheep, the long-enduring camel, the swift and intelligent horse. There, too, were few carnivorous animals, and the conditions seemed almost as if prepared by nature for the evolution of the habits of the nomadic shepherds, such as still persist in these regions.

We may conjecture the steps of progress from hunting to herding habits. Hunters are proverbially reckless in their destruction of animal life. As skill increased and weapons grew more efficient, the wild herds of the Asiatic plains must have considerably decreased in numbers. A necessity arose for a change in the mode of life, or for migration to more favored localities. Perhaps both results followed. Europe may have been overrun by the primitive hunters of Asia, as it was overrun long afterwards by the Asiatic shepherd nomads. In the hunting of herbivorous animals, the young must

have been often taken alive. These were easily tamed, and may have occasionally served as food in times of scarcity. Their life habits being little changed in captivity, they doubtless continued prolific, and the number of tame animals may in this manner have constantly increased. Thus the hunters of wild oxen and sheep could readily, without intention or prevision, have become, in time, possessed of an easily available and abundant store of food in their domesticated animals. This, of course, may not have been the exact method in which the shepherd followed the hunter life, but it is a not improbable method. It is very certain that a tribe of savage hunters did not conclude that it would be wise to increase their food supply by the domestication of animals. Savages do not reason themselves into civilized habits. They drift into them. Chance and accident are prolific causes of human advancement. But the advantage of a new condition, once perceived, is very seldom forgotten. Men drift forward, but they do not often drift backward. New ideas need to be hammered into the human mind, but once there they cling firmly. And the spread of a new idea is often remarkably rapid. That which may have taken centuries in its evolution needs but years for its dissemination. The seeds of new thought are flung with a free hand over the earth, and readily take root.

Thus the idea of domesticating animals, once attained, may have spread rapidly. Other animals were brought into subjection; fresh tribes perceived the advantage of the new industry; or the original tribes, better supplied with food and increasing in numbers, supplanted their weaker neighbors, and extended the domain of

their art by warlike aggression. The domestication of animals must soon have made its way to the agricultural districts, though it is possible that it began there, and spread thence to the desert regions. But the strictly nomad shepherd life developed only on the broad deserts of Central and Southern Asia, and these regions became the centers of those remarkable nomad migrations which have so greatly affected civilization.

If, now, we consider the origin of agriculture, we cannot well avoid a somewhat similar conclusion. The primitive savages of the sub-tropical zone doubtless lived largely on fruits during the fruit season, but during the remainder of the year were forced to subsist on the uncertain product of the chase, on roots and insects, and on nuts and such dried fruits as could be found. Here, also, sharp necessity and seeming accident may have been the moving causes to advanced conditions. Possibly the eating of dried fruits suggested the drying of fruits for winter food. But agriculture had its rise in a different direction, if we may judge from the early history of the art. It most probably began in the cultivation of the grains.

It might seem as if only incipient starvation could first have induced man to search the grasses for their seeds, to cleanse these from their harsh husks, and use them as food. Yet the agricultural art of the Eastern continent appears to have had this humble origin. The wheat, the barley, the rice, and the other grain plants of the East were originally humble grasses. The maize of America is also a grass, though one that offered, in its native state, a more abundant supply of food. To the cultivation of these grasses we must look

for the first step in all the civilizations which have ever arisen upon the earth.

These grass seeds possess certain highly important characteristics. They are not only palatable and nutritious, but they are capable of being preserved through the winter in an unchanged state. By their storage a supply of vegetable food, extending throughout the entire year, could be obtained. Probably this important fact was more slowly recognized than that of the suitability of the herbivorous animals to domestication. Yet the seed-eating tribes must have frequently gathered more food than was necessary for their immediate wants, and by slow steps the needs of the next day, the next week, the next month, and eventually, of the whole year, may have been provided for.\* Certainly this final result could not have been an original one. As hunters drifted into pastoral habits, so seed-eaters must have drifted into habits of economy and prevision.

But the practice of agriculture involves far more than does the simple process of animal domestication. The latter is gained once and for all. It is a single step of progress, while agriculture requires a thousand steps. Thus the herders may have attained their ultimate phase of industrial life while the farmers were still in their incipient stages of development. Many centuries may have passed while the various processes

\*The first stage in the development of grain agriculture is practiced to-day by some of the Australian tribes, who sweep up from the ground the fallen seeds of wild rice and other grasses, clean them of sand and husks, crush them between stones, and bake them into bread. Probably this has been practiced for centuries, yet no second step has been taken. The idea of planting the seeds seems never to have occurred to their minds. This instance indicates that the early stages in the development of agriculture may have been of interminable slowness.

of gathering and storing grain, of seed-planting, of weeding the grain fields, of watering the plants, and the numerous incidental arts, were being devised. But that degree of progress once attained, agriculture was fairly instituted. There was nothing to hinder its continual unfoldment into its present state.

And with the development of agriculture began the civilization of mankind. All civilizations are agricultural in their origin. No shepherd tribe ever advanced beyond the barbarian stage of progress. Agriculture has invaded the desert oases, yet its civilized arts have never, except in a slight degree, been adopted by the surrounding nomads, who retain unto the present day almost their original ideas and stage of industry.

There is another class of mankind which to some extent combines the characteristics of the hunters, the herders, and the farmers. This is the class of mountaineers. They present no sharp lines of demarkation in their habits. The mountaineer is at once hunter, herder, and farmer. He thus possesses characteristics alike of the wandering and the settled tribes, together with others peculiar to his mountain residence. In the mountain regions a degree of civilization superior to that of the nomads, but inferior to that of the true agriculturists, may have early appeared.

If, now, we ask for the cause of the great difference in the development of the nomad and the settled races, the answer will not be difficult to give. The intellectual needs of the two modes of life widely differ. The wandering herder may continue mentally obtuse, and yet be fully adapted to all the actual demands upon him. He is not troubled about provision for the future.

The animals upon which he lives are hardy, docile, and easily managed, can endure the vicissitudes of the seasons, and increase in numbers rapidly enough to supply any probable drain. Their keepers need only to drive them from pasture to pasture, and attend to the simple duties of the herdsman's life. Physical energy here replaces mental. The intellectual demands are of the most crude and superficial character.

It is the same with the home duties. The nomad home is necessarily a simple tent, which must be small in size, and cannot possess any diversity of utensils. This home life is reduced to its simplest condition, beyond which it is unlikely to progress. There is little opportunity for adornment, for increase of comfort, or for multiplication of culinary utensils. The necessity of frequent transportation rigidly reduces the tent and its furniture to the lightest weight and the most portable forms, so that any marked improvement in domestic comforts or conveniences becomes impossible.

The other requisites of civilization are equally forbidden. There can arise no extensive and permanent communities. The tribal or patriarchal organization is necessarily developed and retained, while the isolation of each tribe is very apt to produce hostile relations between the inhabitants of various sections of their desert home. It is impossible that any intricate political organization can appear, or any general code of laws develop. Law is never more than unwritten custom, and has little that is tangible, and nothing that is inviolable. And the sense of personal freedom developed by the wandering life is fatally opposed to the growth of any centralized government. The only extensive polit-



ical aggregations that have ever appeared among nomads have arisen through the conquests of warlike tribes, led by some specially able chief. Of such character were the conquests of Genghiz and of Timur. They were nations centralized at first by terror, and afterwards by mutual desire for rapine and bloodshed. But these great organizations had none of the elements of national unity. Each was merely a confluence of tribes, unwelded together, and sure to fall asunder as soon as they should cease to have common interests or common terrors. Yet it is probable that they attained the highest degree of political unity of which the pure nomad is capable.

Thus the family, the industrial, and the political relations of nomads are alike crude and incapable of any high development. Religion is in a similarly simplified condition, since the lack of social organization opposes its development. No compact and learned priesthood can arise. Religion cannot advance under these circumstances, since the opportunity for and incitement to deep thought, which is the basis of religious progress, does not exist. No high type of faith can appear, nor can a high type impressed from without avoid sinking into a mere physical superstition.

Thus the circumstances attending the nomad life have hindered any advance beyond the barbarian condition. But the simplicity and ease of attainment of this condition render it probable that the nomad races very early gained a minor degree of advancement, since which period their progress has been very limited. High civilization could never have arisen among fruit-eating, hunting, or herding tribes.

There remain for consideration the agricultural tribes. It is at once evident that these are exposed to conditions exceedingly more complex. Their food supply is subjected to constantly varying dangers. Storms, drought, insect enemies,—a thousand perils surround it. Constant watchfulness and labor are necessary, with incessant observation of the phenomena of climate and season. Prevision is unceasingly demanded. Vegetable food cannot be trusted, like animal food, to reproduce and preserve itself, but needs careful planting, weeding, harvesting, threshing, and storing. It is exposed at every step of its growth to foes, and the mind is actively exercised to save it from peril. The uncertainty of rain renders irrigation often necessary. The variation in overflow of streams requires banking, ditching, and transportation of water. Failure of crops leads to close economy and long preservation of food. Thus endless calls for mental acumen arise in the field life of the farmer.

In his home life a like complexity appears. The possession of a permanent home incites to solidity of erection, efforts at ornamentation, diversity of furniture, and the invention of articles conducive to comfort and enjoyment. There is, therefore, a constant inducement to the exercise of taste and ingenuity.

But if we leave the farmer as an individual, and consider the agriculturists collectively, new civilizing tendencies are apparent. Political organization may indefinitely develop. In fertile countries the population becomes dense. A diversity of occupations appears. Many puzzling questions of human relations occur, which must be settled either hostilely or peacefully. The vari-

able laws of custom soon become insufficient, and need to be replaced by fixed and general laws. Nor can men readily fly from the operation of these laws. They are tied to the land to which they owe their support, and must conform to the rules of the society of which they form part. Thus a recognition of the necessity and the authority of law arises. This is a necessary preliminary condition to the formation of strong central governments, and the patriarchal system of the nomads is here replaced by the gradually growing despotism of the settled state, and subsequently by the gradually growing democracy.

Wealth also is gained. Trade arises. Cities are built and peopled. Diversified industries spring up. Leisure gives men time to think. Literature is born. Religion continually develops. A learned and well-organized priesthood replaces the early physical by intricate metaphysical systems. Government is divided between church and state, the one controlling the people by moral, the other by physical force. Finally government is divorced from church and state, and falls into the hands of the people, while the idea of force is replaced by that of duty,—the obligation of every man to conform to political and moral laws.

Such is, very briefly, the principle of human progress. It began in the practice of agriculture. It has culminated in the city, which is a direct and necessary outgrowth of agricultural life, and is the foster home of all the higher phases of human culture.

We have here considered but what seem the more probable lines of human advancement from the primitive savage to the existing enlightened condition of mankind.

Doubtless hundreds of influences of which we know nothing may have been actively at work, and important agencies, every trace of which has vanished, may have aided the growth of civilization. But the lines of progress here indicated very probably existed, however much they may have been affected by incidental influences; and the history of agriculture points with a sure finger to the use and preservation of the edible grains for food as the most important step in the progress of mankind from savagery towards enlightenment. The seeds of humble grasses may be looked upon, by a somewhat strained metaphor, as the seeds of civilization.

## CHAPTER II.

### PRIMITIVE SEATS OF CIVILIZATION.

FOR the birth of civilization several favoring conditions appear to have been necessary, if we may judge from the character of the regions in which it first arose. Among these were the existence of a highly fertile soil, of indigenous grain-bearing plants, and of natural defences against the destructive incursions of savage hordes. Undoubtedly, in the course of time, some degree of culture arose in every locality. All men are possessed of certain powers of thought, and are exposed to exigencies which induce mental action. The hunting, the pastoral, and the mountain-dwelling tribes must each have felt needs and experienced perils which could only be overcome by the exercise of intelligence, and the productions of a primitive industrial art. But simple appliances answered these purposes, and there was little incitement to any but the very slowest rate of progression.

Agriculture, for the reasons already given, induces a more rapid intellectual advance. And it produces secondary conditions which specially aid this progress. Perhaps the chief of these conditions is density of population. The populations of forests, deserts and mountains must necessarily be sparse. Those of fertile agricultural regions may become very dense, since the food-producing powers of the latter are far in excess of those of the

former districts. A second condition is fixity of population. The settled replaces the wandering life. From these two conditions arise others, such as inequality of wealth, separation into laboring and leisure groups, diversity of office and authority, and the growth of thinking and governing classes. To the classes last named all the higher results of civilization are due, and the conditions requisite to the existence of such classes can never fully arise among sparse and isolated wandering tribes.

In four regions of Africa and Asia physical conditions favoring such a state of population partly or fully exist, and in these four regions, and there alone in the eastern continent, a primitive civilization appeared. These regions are the districts of Egypt, Babylonia, India, and China. It is, however, very uncertain whether civilization was indigenous in all four of these districts, for it is quite possible that the knowledge of agriculture, to which their civilizations are due, may have been gained in one district only, and have been thence communicated to the inhabitants of the others. From this point of view it is of interest to seek to discover which of the four peoples mentioned first emerged from barbarism.

Many authors give this honor to Egypt, and not without good reason. But if we should take the chronologies of the native historians as evidence, the claims of Egypt would be left decidedly in the background. For the modest Egyptian annalists claim only some 25,000 years for their early kings, while the Babylonians count backward more than 470,000 years, and according to Chinese writers, between the first appearance of man in China and the date of Confucius there

was an interval of something over 2,267,000 years. In India there is no pretence of ancient historical annals, but the religious chronologies are still more extravagant in their claims. If, however, we come down to sober history, some more definite comparison of the antiquities of these four nations can be made.

In the Chinese annals Confucius places the reign of Yaou at 2356 B. C. There are vague records of mist-covered reigns which extend a thousand years further back, but these earlier annals are destitute of historical authenticity, and even the Confucian chronology cannot be relied upon. At the date above given China is credited with considerable progress in civilization. In early Hindoo chronology we find no authentic dates. The first historical notice of India goes back to some 800 years before Christ, and there is reason to believe that the Phœnicians traded with India in the days of Solomon, 1000 B. C. But beyond that period all is in the dark, and no one can closely indicate the era of the Aryan descent into the valley of the Indus. Babylonian chronology presents us with some interesting monumental inscriptions. A recently discovered record yields a date of about 3750 B. C., at which remote period a well-developed civilization existed. But this inscription cannot be accepted without corroborative evidence. Egyptian chronology is still more unsettled, estimates of the date of the reign of Menes ranging from 5702 B. C. to 2617 B. C., an awkward difference of opinion of over 3000 years. It is possible that the one estimate is as extravagantly high as the other is low, and the real date of Menes may be between 3000 and 4000 B. C. Yet no assertions of this kind can be confidently made,

and the question must await further evidence. Egypt, however, has one form of testimony to its great antiquity which no other nation possesses in equal degree. This consists in a consecutive series of monuments, many of them inscribed with the names of their builders, and some yielding long lists of preceding kings. These ran back through many dynasties, and, significantly, the earliest of them, the great pyramids, are the most stupendous, and indicate an important development in national organization, and very considerable progress in the industrial arts, at as early a date as the Fourth Dynasty of Egyptian Kings.

The claim of Egypt to the greatest antiquity among the civilized nations of the earth, admitted by many historians, is to some extent sustained by other considerations. Egypt is, in fact, of all the countries named, the best adapted by nature to the growth of a native civilization. One of the requisites to this is safety from hostile assault during the primitive stages of progress. Nomadic races naturally tend to warlike habits. Agricultural races incline to peace. Their wars are more the work of the kings than the desire of the people. Thus the primitive agriculturists could scarcely have made any rapid progress without some natural protection from the hostility and cupidity of the pastoral wanderers.

All the nations mentioned were partially protected by nature, Egypt particularly so, its defences being almost complete. China had impassable mountains to the south, wide deserts to the west, and the sea to the east. But on the north it lay open to assault from the fierce Mongolian nomads. India had a mountain barrier to the north. But southward dwelt the



remnant of the fierce aborigines, undyingly hostile to their conquerors. Babylonia had the sea to the south and the desert to the west, but was open to assault from the north and east. This region, indeed, was but poorly defended by nature, and its dynasties and races suffered several changes. But Egypt was protected in all directions. Northward the Arabian desert closed its gates. To the east and the west also lay barren deserts. Its most pregnable quarter was the south, and from this direction we hear of the earliest wars. The blast of war between Egypt and Ethiopia frequently sounds through the mists of the remote past. Yet even from this quarter the danger was slight. A country which was all length and no breadth, extending in width but a few miles on each side of a central river whose cataracts and unnavigable reaches cut off ready approach by water, was difficult of access and easily defended. The primitive Ethiopian savages were little likely seriously to disturb the growing civilization on the northern Nile.

As for the requisites of agricultural progress, Egypt specially possessed them. Various edible grains, and wheat and barley in particular, are indigenous to Southern Asia, and probably to Egypt. Wheat, the most valuable of the grains, was of old, and still is, the most important field product of that country. Egypt is favored in other particulars. It contains few of the dangerous wild beasts which elsewhere afflict the farming classes. Nor could it ever have sustained very large numbers of food-yielding animals. Probably the hunting stage was not of long duration there, and the partial exhaustion of animal life may have rendered, at an

early date, some form of agriculture necessary. Finally must be noted the fact that Egypt was perhaps the best adapted of all known countries to the natural development of agriculture. In that rich soil there was no occasion for artificial fertilization. The river annually fertilized it. The country was rainless, but this was far from being a disadvantage, since the annual overflow of the Nile fully irrigated the soil, while the subsequent hot suns produced a seldom-failing harvest. Agriculture was of the simplest. In its more advanced stages little more was done than to break the ground with a hoe or a rude plow, to scatter the seeds upon the fertile soil, tread them into the river mud by the feet of driven cattle, and trust to time and the sun for the harvest.

Thus, if we may judge from these specially favoring circumstances, Egypt was probably the earliest agricultural nation, since agriculture there was almost as simple a process as the domestication of animals in the desert, while the workers in the fields were in little danger from warlike assault. But an important secondary conclusion arises from this. For the very reason that the early development of agriculture was favored, its later progress was retarded in Egypt. The art retains there to-day much of its original simplicity. The causes which aided its rise have checked its development. Some effort to equalize the water supply was made, by the aid of canals, dykes, and sluices, but there was no need of any extensive works of this kind, except to increase the width of fertile ground, nor of any intricate planting or harvesting machinery. Yet, though agricultural art but slowly improved, the very

great food production nourished a large population, and caused that aggregation of wealth and specialization of a leisure class which are the necessary preliminaries to civilization. The sluggishness of the agricultural art would not hinder the full development of the other arts, and these may have very early unfolded on Egyptian soil.

In Babylonia the natural conditions were less favorable. The soil on the lower Tigris and Euphrates is as fertile as that of Egypt, edible grains are indigenous, and the rivers are subject to annual overflow. But this overflow is not nearly so regular as that of the Nile, and in some years it becomes a desolating flood. The Euphrates, if left to itself, would pour the mass of its waters over the low plain to the west, and leave its eastern banks almost dry. At present most of its waters, except in the flood season, are thus exhausted, and the pestilential "Chaldean marshes" replace the smiling harvest fields of the past. The same conditions doubtless existed in prehistoric times, and to render the river waters useful a considerable advance on the primitive Egyptian agriculture was necessary. The wide marshes needed to be reduced by embankment, by which means alone could the river be forced to overflow equally both its banks. The constant encroachments of the desert could only be avoided by extensive systems of canals. Channels were dug in all directions, some of them connecting the Tigris and Euphrates across the intermediate level, and some in the western lowlands. One, in particular, extended along the western border of the country, and formed a fixed limit to the desert. Minor irrigating canals led through all the

fields, and the native fertility of the soil was remarkably enhanced by this abundance of water.

The development of agriculture was, therefore, more difficult in Babylonia than in Egypt, and it is possible that a knowledge of the art of irrigation was brought from Egypt to Babylonia, instead of originating independently in each country. These countries are not widely separated, and between them lies a desert inhabited by wandering tribes, whom we know to have frequently extended their journeys from the one settled land to the other. Thus a knowledge of the agricultural processes of the Egyptians, and specimens of their products, could hardly have failed to be conveyed to the Babylonians. And it is quite possible that natives of Egypt may have migrated at an early period to the banks of the Euphrates, discovered there conditions resembling those of their native Nile, and taught the rude inhabitants the art of Egyptian agriculture.

There is, indeed, a much easier pathway for civilized travelers from Egypt to Babylonia than that across the Arabian desert. Syria and Palestine adjoin these countries, with but narrow desert reaches intervening, and we have interesting historical evidence that as early as 2000 B. C., these states were well known to each other, and intercourse took place between them. For at that period the Hebrew patriarch, Abraham, left Ur of the Chaldees with his family and possessions, and journeyed first to Palestine and thence to Egypt. It is not, then, an unwarranted inference that the Babylonians learned the advanced stages of the art of agriculture from the Egyptians, their countries being alike rainless in the summer season, alike subject to tropical summer heats and

mild winters, alike watered by overflowing and fertilizing rivers, and differing only in that the slight artificial irrigation needed in Egypt had to be improved upon in Babylonia, until it became a bold and widespread system of embankments and ramifying canals. That there was very early intercourse between the two countries we have historical reasons to believe.

But the intermediate Syrian highlands were also possessed of fertile valleys, and were subject to rains which replaced the river floods of the neighboring countries. Egyptian and Babylonian emigrants may have settled among the aborigines of this country, adapted their agricultural knowledge to its different conditions, and unfolded sources of food which the early inhabitants would long have failed to discover. At all events, we have evidences of the existence of Syrian kingdoms that reach very far back in history. Abraham found Syria occupied by many small settled states. Unfortunately Genesis gives us very little information as to the degree of civilization in these states. But there is other evidence indicating that the Canaanites and Phœnicians then dwelling there had previously migrated from Babylonia, or from a contiguous district on the Arabian Gulf, had overcome the preceding inhabitants, and had established the states which were found there by the fathers of the Jewish race.

If now we turn to the two other early civilized states, we meet with facts which render it uncertain whether these civilizations were indigenous, and which make it at least possible that they were secondary outgrowths from Egyptian civilization. For we possess evidence that the fathers of the Hindu and the Chinese

racés were immigrants into the countries in which their descendants now dwell. We know that the Hindus came from the Central Asian region known as Bactria, the highland country to the east of Persia. Similar evidence exists regarding the Chinese. Investigation has proved that they were not sons of the soil, but were immigrants from other lands. Some authors believe that they came from the region to the south-east of the Caspian Sea, and that they crossed the headwaters of the Oxus, and made their way eastward until they entered China by following the course of the Yellow River, while some recent philologists find interesting analogies between the Chinese and Babylonian languages. That they were originally a nomadic pastoral people their language proves, yet immediately upon their arrival in China they settled down as agriculturists, and raised grain for sustenance.

The Hindu and the Chinese immigrants alike found their new countries occupied by fierce barbarians, whom they dispossessed, and established agricultural communities in their stead. The vigorous fertility of the soil, and the presence of two great rivers, with rich alluvial valleys, in each country, proved the strongest inducements to this change of habits, and the fertile basins of the Hoang-ho and the Yang-tse Kiang of China, and of the Indus and the Ganges of India, soon swarmed with busy agricultural populations. There is no evidence that the aborigines of these countries had developed the art of agriculture. If they tilled the fields at all, it was probably a very crude process. But it seems more probable that the new settlers brought this art with them, and doubtless in a somewhat developed

stage, if we may judge from their rapid progress into civilization. Whether they derived their knowledge of agriculture from early intercourse with Egypt and Babylonia, or developed it anew, are questions which cannot now be answered, and must be left in the list of the unsolvable.

Whatever be the verdict as concerns agriculture, it is quite probable that instruction was derived in other arts of civilization. The active movement which we have reason to know existed between Egypt and Babylonia was not restricted to these countries. In fact, the isolation to which the Egyptians were brought by the character of their religion, their industries, and their situation, was not shared by the Babylonians. The latter were actively warlike from an early period. Their exposed situation, and probably the rumor of their wealth, seem to have brought down upon them frequent hordes from the north. Of this we have evidence in the record of several early changes of the ruling race of the country, and in its linguistic variations. Such invasions must have produced warlike habits, and may have led to return movements of invasion of barbarian countries, similar to those made in later times by the Assyrians. But the Babylonians were also actively commercial, as we know from Scriptural and other testimony. Their commerce was not restricted to the productions of the Mesopotamian region, but at a very early date extended to those of the Persian Gulf. Whether this maritime commerce reached further than Southern Arabia we do not know, though quite probably it did so. Possibly, therefore, the Babylonians preceded the Phœnicians as the com-

mercial carriers of the civilized world, and they may have distributed the rich goods which their ships brought from the south by caravans to the mountain and pastoral regions of the north and east.

Further consideration of the state of Babylonian commerce must be left to a later chapter. It is spoken of here only as evidence that considerable peaceful intercourse probably existed at an early period between the civilized nations of the south and the ruder inhabitants of the north and east. If so, it is highly probable that some of the arts of civilization were taught to these rude peoples, and the fathers of the Chinese and Hindu peoples may have thus received their first knowledge of the higher arts. In regard to agriculture, however, a fertile, rainy region may have induced experiments in husbandry as fully as a naturally irrigated one, and there may have been northern as well as southern centres of agricultural development, though scarcely of dense populations and rapid progress in civilization.

We shall briefly glance at two other primitive civilizations, those of Mexico and Peru, on the Western Continent. These, however, developed later than those of the East; and this, in connection with certain curious analogies and traditions, has led many writers to the belief that they were not truly indigenous, but were originated by emigrants from the old world.

But these were not the truly primitive American civilizations. There is reason to believe that in South America some degree of culture long preceded the Inca rule. In North America there are strong evidences of a similar culture, in the various relics of a



civilized occupancy of northern Mexico, and in the monuments of the Mound Builders of the Mississippi valley. Some have conjectured that the Mexican states arose from migrations of the Mound Builders southward, when driven from their ancient homes by invading Indian tribes. Other writers doubt this. The question, however, is one which may never be solved, since the evidence on either side is very slight. That there was, how long ago no one can say, a race of men in the valley of the Mississippi with habits differing from and considerably in advance of those of the modern Indians, cannot be reasonably questioned. But of the character or degree of this civilization we must remain largely in ignorance.

Conditions favorable to the development of agriculture exist in America, in some respects to a greater degree than in the Eastern Continent, but less so in other respects. The alluvial valleys of the lower Mississippi and its neighboring rivers, with their abundant rainfall, offered the fertility necessary to this development. And the primitive Americans possessed a grain whose merits as an article of food must have been evident from the first. The maize, with its remarkable arrangement of large, edible seeds, is very different from the eastern grain plants, in which each small seed is inclosed in a separate husk. Men would scarcely attempt to eat the latter, except in the failure of more desirable food, but the ear of corn was quite as likely to be used for food as the nuts or the fruits of trees.

It might be argued, then, that agriculture should have arisen early in America, through the culture of this grain plant. But the maize plant probably offered

abundant food through the unaided agency of nature, and the gathering and storage of the ears of corn for winter use was so easily performed and naturally suggested that it was perhaps adopted in very primitive ages. This lack of difficulty in obtaining and storing food may have been a hindrance rather than a help to further steps of progress. As in Egypt the ease of agriculture checked its high development, so in America the ease of food-getting may have acted as a check to the origin of agriculture.

Moreover, there is no locality in North America which presents the conditions for the peaceful evolution of the art of agriculture possessed by Egypt. The fertile plains and valleys of the southern United States were peculiarly open to assault. No deserts surround them; no mountain chains inclose them. They lay freely exposed to the inroads of the fierce hunting tribes of the north. Thus the growth of agriculture in North America must have been slow, and but for the possession of the easily cultivated, harvested, and stored maize, there might have been as yet no emergence from the savage state.

As the North American civilization seems to have originated in the temperate zone, and to have afterwards developed on the temperate table-land of the Mexican tropics, so the South American civilization originated in the temperate mountain region of the Peruvian tropics. This locality, as there is reason to believe, was the native home of another important and easily-cultivated food plant, the potato. The maize grew there also, so that the region possessed two abundant sources of vegetable food. At the period of the Spanish

invasion, the civilization of Peru had spread far beyond its mountain cradle, over the plains between the Andes and the ocean. Here a skilful artificial irrigation replaced the natural irrigation of Egypt, and a rainless region was rendered richly fertile by the active and intelligent labor of man.

But for the original seat of South American agriculture we need to seek the *bolsones*, or mountain pockets, of the Andes. This mountain chain, in the Peruvian region, consists of two parallel ranges, the Cordillera of the coast, and the more inland Andean range. Between these lofty mountain ridges lies an elevated and well-watered valley or plateau, more than 11,000 feet in height. It is an extensive region, walled in by the mighty mountain buttresses of the Andes and the Cordilleras, and containing its own mountains, hills, plains, valleys, lakes and rivers. Parallel and transverse ridges divide this region into separate districts, known as *bolsones*, or pockets, each with its mountain walls of defense. In one of these districts lies the remarkable mountain basin of Lake Titicaca. Tradition places the origin of the Inca race on the islands of this lake. However that be, it is evident that these naturally-fortified mountain pockets, with their temperate climate, their scarcity of herbivorous animals, their well-watered and fertile soils, and their valuable food-plants, would be favorable seats for the development of agriculture, and for the growth of a primitive civilization. But any considerable advance in civilization needs a large subject population, and this was gained through conquest. The Incas went north to the bolson of Cuzco, where they established their empire. The strong forti-

fications which still exist in the mountain passes leading to this region indicate a determined resistance to warlike aggression while their state was growing in vigor and culture. It is probable that in this original seat the sharp lines of demarkation between the Incas and their subjects were first drawn, and the principles of their remarkable political and social organization formed. Subsequently they overflowed the barriers which so far had served them for defence, conquered the inhabitants of the neighboring districts, and eventually established their peculiar policy over the whole plateau.

Before the Spanish invasion this powerful, well-organized, and vigorously warlike state had spread far to the north, south, and west, subduing all the tribes between the mountains and the ocean. What would have been its future if left to its natural development it is difficult to conjecture, though it had possibly reached its acme of power as a single state; and an internal warfare, which might have led to final division of the empire, was the favoring cause which so greatly facilitated the Spanish conquest.

If the considerations given in this chapter be well based, they lead us to the conception of at least three original seats of agricultural development: the valley of the Nile, the river valleys of the southern United States, or the uplands of Mexico, and the mountain valleys of the Andes. The art thus discovered spread to other favoring localities, by the aid of war, commerce, emigration, and the other means by which intelligence disseminates itself among barbarian populations. As a final result, either of this outspreading, or of separate origination of the art of agriculture, arose six primitive centers of

civilization : Egypt, Babylonia, India, and China, on the Eastern, and Mexico and Peru on the Western Continent.

It is hardly probable that agricultural knowledge arose independently only in the above named localities. But there is much reason to believe that an advanced agriculture, with its accompanying culture in other directions, was confined, in its first appearance, to these original seats, which became the centers of its later distribution.

## CHAPTER III.

### THE OUTGROWTH OF CIVILIZATION.

IN Macaulay's satirical prophecy, describing the civilized New Zealander of the far future, who, in the midst of a vast solitude, will take his stand on a broken arch of London Bridge, and sketch the ruins of St. Paul's, we have a humorous paraphrase of a widely-entertained idea. This is that civilization, like the tides, is subject to flood and ebb; that mental culture in the past has risen, flourished and declined, and must continue to do so in the future; and that human enlightenment is, in the very nature of things, liable to extreme fluctuations, from which no people or age can claim exemption.

It is true that institutions, either political, social or religious, have seldom remained permanent for any long period, and that change seems to be an inherent attribute both of intellectual and of physical life. There are exceptions to this rule in the institutions of barbarian life, and in those of one civilized state, that of China. In all other civilized nations, however, it holds good. But it must also be conceded that these changes have proved, on the whole, beneficial; and it may be possible to show that there has never been any actual ebb in the tide of human development, but that every step has been a step forward, even though made by

the foot of barbarism on the neck of prostrate civilization, which it seemed to crush into the earth.

In the preceding chapter we considered the origin and conditions of the earliest known civilizations. If we review the later history of these antique nations, remarkable differences appear. Two of them, China and India, have remained like two great lakes of humanity, neither fed from nor feeding the outer world, but preserving their isolation throughout the historic ages, except when the iron hand of war has broken through their barriers of seclusion. The story of Egypt was long similar. It also, during the many centuries of the old empire, remained in great measure isolated from the surrounding world, though its relations with the desert populations, and with the inhabitants of Syria and Babylonia, prevented its making this isolation complete. But at a later date, after the conquest by and the expulsion of the Shepherd Kings, Egypt entered upon a new era of her history. A period of foreign war followed her long isolation. Conquering excursions were made which extended to the Euphrates and the Tigris. Reverse raids succeeded, and Egypt became the prey of foreign conquerors. The spirit of the old civilization was destroyed by the forcible infusion of new elements. Old Egypt remained buried in her tombs and temples, and a new Egypt arose in her stead.

There are two principal methods by which civilization is disseminated—the method of war, and that of commerce. A people which fails to push outward in either of these modes, whose military history is confined to wars of defence, and whose industrial history

is internal only, may preserve a civilization unchanged for ages, but will not greatly influence or be influenced by the world without. Such is the history of China and India, and of the old empire of Egypt. But a conquering and trading nation makes a different record. The impress of its political, religious, and social institutions is stamped by war upon conquered nations; a knowledge of its industrial and intellectual attainments is instilled by trade into the minds of distant peoples; and through reflex conquest or trade it, in return, is forced or induced to adopt new customs, and saved from the stagnation which assails isolated empires.

Babylonia presents us with conditions of this kind. Its frequent hostile relations with neighboring tribes, its conquests of these tribes, and its occasional fall before conquering inroads, prevented any political or social stagnation. Its institutions must have suffered marked changes, and in return there must have been impressed upon the more barbarous tribes the advantages of the Babylonian civil and political institutions. But Babylonia seems to have been in addition an active trading nation. And the influence of commerce, as a rule, extends itself much farther than that of war. Babylonian commerce reached by sea to Southern Arabia, possibly to more distant regions, and by land to the highlands of Armenia and Persia. Whatever its extent, it could not have been without a powerful effect on the spread of civilization, teaching new arts to distant peoples, and bringing back report of their industrial habits and processes. Commerce differs from war in that it teaches the industrial instead of the political



conditions of the active nation. Both are necessary to extend outward the complete influence of any civilization. For only force will induce a people to change its institutions, while self-interest may readily induce it to change its industries.

The civilization of Egypt, Syria, and Babylonia in time spread outward in new directions, and gained new developments. A Semitic people emigrated northward from Babylonia, settled on the upper Tigris, and founded the empire of Assyria. Undoubtedly they brought with them the industrial knowledge possessed by the Babylonians. But this new country was not *natively* adapted to agricultural cultivation. From the Zagros mountains on the east a number of streams cross the Assyrian plain, and empty into the Tigris. But there is here none of the natural irrigation of Egypt and Babylonia. The soil is very fertile, if well watered, but nature has not saved man the necessity of labor in this direction. Rain seldom falls, and the streams run within, not beyond, their banks. Agriculture, if to become effective in Assyria, needed industrial conditions in advance of those possessed by the lower country. These conditions appeared. The processes of diking, canaling, sluicing, terracing of the hill-sides, etc., were carried forward to a remarkable extent. Canals were extended by tunnels, which were sometimes excavated through the solid rock. Great dams were built across the Tigris, to force its waters to overflow into the side channels. One of these dams yet remains, built of large masses of squared stones, bound together by iron clamps. By these and other processes the whole country was thoroughly irrigated, and it repaid

this labor by a remarkable fertility. Industrial art, in other directions, made great progress in Assyria, and an extensive overland commerce was instituted.

But Assyria had other relations with the neighboring populations. It was essentially warlike. Its whole history is a continued series of military raids upon the surrounding provinces. These, in time, extended further and further from their original centre, until all Babylonia and Syria, and finally Egypt, fell under the yoke of this energetic people.

The Assyrian was the first great empire of the world. It is true that Egypt had carried its arms to the Tigris, and forced all the peoples of the plain to pay tribute. But the Egyptian movements resulted in nothing that could be called an empire. They were rather temporary raids than definite conquests. Such was not the character of the wars of Assyria. Its conquests were firmly held. Revolt was treated as rebellion. The vigor of a strong hand held the subject populations in awe, and for centuries the Assyrian dominion embraced nearly the whole civilized world.

It is a remarkable region over which the Assyrian empire extended. For two or three thousand years it was the battle-ground of the world. We see successive nations marshaling their forces, and fighting for conquest or existence over this natal land of imperial dominion. It seems fitted by nature for such a destiny. In almost its whole extent it is a broad plain, desert in parts, but with extensive fertile districts. It is walled in by mountains, deserts, and seas. Eastward the Persian and Median highlands close its gates. Northward the lofty ranges of Armenia form its boundaries. Westward it is

bathed by the waves of the Mediterranean. Southward lie the sands of Arabia and the waters of the Arabian gulf. Continuous with this plain extends the realm of Egypt, with its life-giving stream flowing through a desert of barren sands.

Here civilization was born, and here it passed the days of its lusty childhood. Its first steps of outgrowth may have been from Egypt to Babylonia. Thence it extended over the Syrian plain, the hills of Palestine, and the valley of Assyria. The whole broad region became the busy home of human culture, and formed a tempting prize for the cupidity of warlike nations. Here arose agriculture, art, science, commerce and literature in their original forms. Over this broad level marched the caravans of peace and the armies of war. The clash of arms resounded at frequent intervals throughout its whole extent. The warfare of the small states into which it was at first divided was succeeded by the wars of the great states which afterwards arose. Hither marched the armies of Egypt. Here the fierce Assyrians fought out the warlike drama of their history. Here arose the rich Phœnician state, and here the Hebrew kingdom under David and Solomon attained for a short period an important political development. At a later period a new Babylonian kingdom spread over the same region. These internecine wars were succeeded by invasions from without. The Scythians poured their barbaric hordes over the Syrian plain. The Persians followed, and long held it captive. Then came the Greeks of Alexander, to win the civilized world in a battle. Its later history is a phantasmagoria of war. Successively fought over by the Romans, the later Persians, the Arabs, the later Greeks, the Crusaders,

the Mongols, and the Turks, its soil watered by rivers of blood, its harvests trod into the ground by millions of marching feet, it is no wonder that now it lies bare and desolate, at rest in the peace of ruin. Rich only in its remarkable history, it has become far too poor to excite the cupidity of mankind.

But civilization soon spread beyond this plain. Westward the ships of Phœnicia carried it to Asia Minor, Cyprus, Greece, Sicily, Spain, and in time to the far Atlantic coast. Eastward the arms and caravans of Assyria carried it into the highlands that border the Mesopotamian plain. Names of peoples soon to play a dominant part in the world's history now first emerge from the prehistoric gloom. The plateau of Media and Persia, defended by the seven-fold chain of the Zagros mountains, was traversed by the Assyrian armies, and became tributary to the great empire of the plain. How far to the east the dominion of Assyria extended it is not easy to decide. Its boundaries are vaguely defined in realms whose limits cannot be declared. But by this eastward march of the Assyrians was roused a race of mankind who were thenceforth to play the most prominent part in the history of the world. The days of dominion of the Semites of the plain were nearing their end. They had roused the Aryan lion on his native hills, and were destined soon to feel his claws.

The Aryans of Persia were not then in a low state of barbarism. They had, either indigenous or gained from without, a knowledge of agriculture, certain industrial pursuits, some degree of political organization, an active priesthood, and a considerable religious literature. Yet their condition was undoubtedly rude and their organiza-

tion imperfect when first brought into contact with civilization, and affected by the commercial enterprise and warlike energy of their vigorous neighbors. Absorbed into the weakly consolidated Assyrian empire, their organization seems to have rapidly improved. The small tribes were brought under the dominion of single active rulers, and from an earlier congeries of warring clans emerged the Median and Persian states.

The results of this consolidation were soon felt. The Medians were the first to revolt from the harsh Assyrian rule. They entered into alliance with Babylonia, then also in rebellion, and before their combined assault fell the ancient empire of Assyria. After its many centuries of proud dominion it sunk as under a lightning flash, and vanished from the earth. Its realm was divided between two of its former vassal states, Media and Babylonia. The latter held the dominion of the plain. The former ruled the Persian plateau, and extended its conquests to the west, over the mountain region of Armenia.

The progress of the Median armies continued until Asia Minor was reached. Here they encountered another strong power, which had recently arisen. As in all the regions named, so in Asia Minor a number of small states had gradually concentrated into a few larger ones, known as Phrygia, Lycia, Lydia, etc. At the time of the Median invasion the Lydians were the ruling power in Asia Minor, having gained the supremacy by their repulse of the inroad of a nomadic tribe, the Cimmerians. With this powerful kingdom the Medians and Babylonians entered into alliance.

A knowledge of the art of political consolidation was spreading. The civilized world, once divided among

the hostile realms of Egypt, Assyria, and Babylonia, became now divided among three new powers, Babylonia, Media, and Lydia. But these states were in alliance instead of in hostile relations, and the two new names which appear in this alliance signify a marked extension of the domain of civilization.

Another and still more potent name was now to enter. We first hear of the Persians as distant tributaries of the Assyrian empire. The half barbarous tribes of the Persian plateau had, probably, for a long time previously been learning the art of combination, and seem to have consolidated into a single kingdom about the time of the fall of Assyria. This kingdom became tributary to Media. The Medians were, in fact, still in a state of barbarism, and destitute of any advanced political ideas. They left their subject states as they found them, established the old "government of kings," and asked no acknowledgment of their authority beyond the one requisite of paying tribute.

A very natural consequence followed. Persia revolted, the Median army was defeated and its leader killed, and Cyrus, the Persian king, succeeded to the empire of the two peoples. There was no longer question of alliances. The Persians were as energetic and more civilized than the Medians, and were under the leadership of a vigorous ruler. The work had been largely done to his hand. He defeated the Median army and the Median empire became his. He conquered Babylon and the Babylonian empire fell into his hands. He defeated Croesus, the Lydian king, and Asia Minor was added to his empire. Egypt soon fell under the same wide sway, and one of the greatest empires ever ruled

over by a single man arose as if by the art of magic. The work of previous centuries had prepared the way for this rapid conquest. The early consolidation of the peoples of the plain, and the later aggregation of Median, Armenian and Lydian states, made the work easy for their vigorous successor, and all these extensive districts were swept with marvelous rapidity into the net of the Persian dominion.

It was the greatest empire which the world had ever seen, and was thus the more liable to fall to pieces if bound together in the old imperfect method. But Persia made a step forward in political science. Under Darius Hystaspis the kings of the conquered nations were deposed, the whole empire was divided into provinces, a fixed taxation was established, and Persian governors, called Satraps, were placed over the provinces. This was the first \* decided move towards imperial consolidation, but it was a very imperfect one. There was no effort to incorporate the conquered peoples with Persia, no establishment of uniform laws, customs, or religions. Every subject state remained intact in its internal administration, and with all its patriotic pride and intolerance of foreign dominion. Except that Persian governors supplanted the subject kings, Persian soldiers formed the nucleus of all armies, and Persian officers

\*This political idea, however, originated in Assyria, and was simply extended in Persia. In the later days of the Assyrian empire a greater consolidation than of old was effected, by the deposition of subject kings, and their replacement by Assyrian viceroys, when practicable. Political ideas never arise suddenly, but grow up by slow increments. The turbulence of subject peoples forced the Assyrians to occasional deportations of whole tribes, and to the formation of viceroys. This latter system, occasional in Assyria, became the ruling idea in Persia. In consequence the Persian empire became a more compact organization than any which had preceded it.

led all troops, the conquered peoples remained as distinct from their rulers as though they had fully retained their independence.

This sudden extension of the domain of civilization seems remarkable. For some thousands of years the primitive culture had slowly germinated on its native plain. For another thousand years great empires had been established on this plain, and history had been confined to it. But during these ages the seeds of civilization were scattered far to the east and the west, and their original slow growth was followed by a period of rapid development. From the east the Persian Highlanders descended and overthrew the older empires, whose arts and luxuries they quickly acquired, and whose organization they rapidly improved upon. But the west was now in turn to make its influence felt, and a new power to come into the field.

So far the contact of Europe and Asia had been chiefly commercial. Greece, through its nearness to Phœnicia, had been much visited by Phœnician trading vessels, and had gained a knowledge of the social and industrial culture of this active Asiatic state. Its extensive coast line peculiarly fitted Greece for commercial enterprise, and among our earliest notices of the Hellenic people are several which indicate their devotion to sea-going pursuits. They had come into active competition with Phœnicia at an early date, and seem to have quickly followed the example set them by their energetic mercantile predecessor. At first the enterprise of Greece, like that of Phœnicia in its early days, was limited to commerce with the nearest shores. Colonies were established on the neighboring coast of Asia Minor,



and the Grecian ships slowly crept into the Black Sea, and to the islands of the eastern Mediterranean, where earlier Phœnician settlements were replaced by the active enterprise of their rivals. Greek commerce in the days of Homer was in its early stage of development. Ulysses, as soon as he leaves the neighborhood of the coast of Greece, stretches out into unknown seas, peopled by "gorgons and chimeras dire," a frightful race, which could never have been imagined to exist in lands familiar to Grecian sails. Evidently, at that date, the Greek knowledge of these far-off realms came from hearsay evidence, and this of the kind which Phœnicia may have designedly spread to frighten intruders from her chosen field.

Yet Greece had certain advantages over the older state. The latter was exposed to every wave of war which swept across the Asiatic plain. Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, and Persia successively assailed the rich cities of Phœnicia. They were more than once conquered, plundered, and razed to the ground. Only the diversity and richness of the Phœnician trade enabled it to prosper under such desolating inroads. Greece was free from these perils, and soon became a more dangerous foe to Phœnicia than all the invading armies. The Hellenic race was too enterprising to be long deterred by terror, or restrained by lack of seamanship. Their ships ventured farther and farther. The most remote recesses of the Black Sea were explored. Egypt and Lybia were visited. The shores of Italy and Sicily were reached. Finally far-off Spain was discovered and colonized. Phœnician commerce had stretched far into the Atlantic, and probably visited the British Isles and the shores of Africa and Germany. Here Greece failed to follow,

but her colonizing activity in the Mediterranean rivaled that of the older state, and the high civilization which rapidly arose in Greece made its influence felt in lands then very distant.

As to the literary, artistic and social development of this active race, we have here nothing to say, except to remark that they were not indigenous in their origin, but a direct and remarkable outgrowth from pre-existing literatures, arts, and societies. But as a state, or rather as a plexus of minor states, Greece had come prominently forward, and its growing wealth soon excited the cupidity of the mighty empires of the east. The first known hostile contact of the civilizations of Europe and Asia took place at the period which we have now reached. The earlier traditional Trojan war was, if based at all on fact, but a minor conflict between semi-barbarians. But now the great Persian state, having laid civilized Asia prostrate at its feet, looked with eyes of longing on this narrow and rocky peninsula, upon which the genius of civilization had first set foot in Europe.

The armies of Darius crossed the Bosphorus, fought with the Scythians, overran Thrace and other settlements to the north, and soon became embroiled with Greece. In 500 B. C., a revolt broke out among the Ionian subjects of Persia in Asia Minor, which was aided by allies from Greece. The result was a Persian invasion of Greece. It was for a time successful, but the Greeks eventually inflicted a crushing defeat on the Persian army at Marathon. Fortunately for Greece, a revolt in Egypt, and the death of Darius shortly afterwards, saved them from the intended revenge of this monarch:

His weaker son, Xerxes, sought to carry out his plans, but the vigor, discipline, and military skill of the Greeks proved more than a match for the undisciplined myriads of Persia, and Europe was saved from its threatened subjection to Asia.

We find in these wars evidence of a new advance in civilization, which was soon to bear important fruits. The art of war had remained for many centuries almost stationary in Asia. In Greece it had rapidly advanced, keeping pace with the intellectual progress of the Hellenic race. The military and naval skill of this energetic people enabled its small army and fleet to destroy the vast but unwieldy array of Xerxes, and was soon to display still more remarkably the advantage of discipline over mere numbers. Greece, long a congeries of small states, was finally conquered by Philip of Macedonia, and consolidated into one kingdom. In 334 B. C., Alexander the Great, Philip's mighty son, crossed the Hellespont with an army of perhaps 30,000 foot and 4,000 horse, and invaded the vast Persian realm. It was the reaction of Europe against Asia. Luxury and inefficiency had weakened the throne of Persia; its army was composed of varied and ill-assorted elements, the empire itself of hostile and non-consolidated peoples. To conquer the world in that day meant merely to strike a fatal blow at the heart of this realm, so weak in all its seeming strength. This Alexander did. Three great battles, in which discipline and military genius prevailed over numbers weakened by disorganization and mediocrity, were fought, and Persia was his. He became heir to the labors of his many warlike predecessors in the east. They had, by centuries of conflict, combined all civil-

ized Asia into one great mass. Alexander had but to cut off the head of this mass, install himself in its place, and Asia remained submissive. The many subject nations, accustomed to subordination, and having no special affection for Persia, willingly transferred their allegiance to a new master, and Alexander became lord of the civilized world.

But Asia was now in new and very different hands from those by which she had been heretofore ruled. Alexander had not only military, but political genius. He instinctively perceived the best method to preserve his new conquests, and at once set in train the necessary measures. In fact, a new element of civilization had arisen in the world, and particularly in the world of Greece—the municipal. The great cities of Asia had been principally court cities, and owed their importance chiefly to the presence of the court, and the tribute that flowed thither from all the realm. But the growth of commerce and industry had inaugurated a new municipal idea, vaguely, perhaps, existing in Ur, of the Chaldees, more prominently in the commercial cities of Phœnicia, but first reaching a high degree of development in the cities of republican Greece. Here the city ceased to be the appendage of a court. It had become a definite, independent unit, inhabited by free and equal citizens, and governing itself and its dependent district without interference from exterior powers.

It was by the aid of this element that Alexander sought to Hellenize Asia. Cities having the Greek municipal government were established at frequent intervals throughout his new domain, inhabited at first by colonies of Greeks, but offering such political and social

advantages to the surrounding peoples that they rapidly flocked thither, so that many of the new cities soon became populous and important. In addition to this he abolished all political distinction between Greeks and Persians. The great offices of the empire were distributed with little reference to nationality, but with much to ability. The empire of Alexander, vast as it was, promised to become a centralized and well consolidated realm, Hellenized by the rapidly spreading influence of the Greek cities, and nationalized by the avoidance of race distinctions, and the establishment of the principle of political equality among all its diverse peoples.

This well-digested scheme was defeated by the early death of Alexander. The generals who divided his empire among themselves lacked his far-seeing genius. The old idea of a favored race at once rose again into prominence. Greeks were placed everywhere in power. A spirit of dissatisfaction speedily declared itself, which was destined to break into open revolt at the first favorable opportunity. The division of the empire aided this feeling. Hostile relations arose among the rulers of its various parts, and it would have been strange if, while they were thus occupied in cutting one another's throats, some enterprising people had not broken the chain which bound them and struck boldly for freedom.

The blow came from a district still farther eastward than any we have yet considered. Persia had extended its dominion eastward to the Indus, and northward into Central Asia, bringing under the wings of civilization several new districts, whose names we first learn in the literature of their conqueror. Prominent among these



were Parthia and Bactria, and it was in these border regions of the empire that the threatened revolt now broke out.

The Greek satrap of Bactria rebelled against the Seleucidæ, the successors of Alexander in Asia, and established a Greek-Bactrian kingdom. Parthia—inhabited by a race of probably Scythian origin—also successfully established its independence. There was a new deal in the great game of kingdoms. Parthia not only broke loose from Greek control, but rapidly overran much of the old empire of Alexander. Bactria, Persia, and the other districts to the south and west, fell into its hands, until it became a new great power in Asia. This kingdom, established by Arsaces, the successful leader of the Parthians, about 250 B. C., extended from the Indus to the Euphrates, and for four hundred years held this wide region in subjection. Civilized Asia was thus divided into two great realms, the Greek dominion of the Syrian plain, and the Parthian kingdom of the eastern highlands.

The rule of the Parthians was not favorable to the progress of civilization. They were a rude, semi-barbaric people, partly nomadic in habits, and during their centuries of control of civilized peoples they failed to accept the culture of their subjects. Fortunately they did nothing to destroy civilization. The old idea of government by subject kings, or by life viceroys, again came into vogue; each province retained its own laws and customs, and the Greek cities remained independent in their internal administration. One probable cause of this long control of a barbarian over civilized states was the elective character of the Parthian

government. The monarchy continued in the family of Arsaces, but was not hereditary. The king, doubtless chosen for ability and valor, was elected by two councils, one composed of the members of the royal family, and one of the temporal and spiritual chiefs of the nation. His rule was despotic, yet the councils remained his advisers, and had the power to depose him, which was sometimes done. The Parthians were always bold and energetic. Even the mighty power of Rome was forced to halt upon their borders, and this great empire never succeeded in making more than a temporary impression upon the Parthian realm, which successfully resisted Rome's widely-conquering armies and preserved its dominion intact.

The Parthian kingdom came to an end in 226 A. D., through a Persian revolt. Artaxerxes, or Ardeshir, the leader of the rebels, became the monarch of the new realm, his dynasty being called the Sassaniden, from Sassan, the name of one of his ancestors. The game of empire had made a new move in Asia. Persia became once more the dominant realm, and extended its borders unto almost its old limits. It developed a higher degree of civilization, particularly in its political and military institutions, successfully resisted the declining power of Rome, and for a short time ruled over its ancient provinces of Syria, Egypt and Asia Minor. This temporary conquest took place under Chosroes, or Khosru II., who reigned from 591 to 628 A. D. It was the expiring throes of the old Asiatic powers. In about ten years after the death of Chosroes, a new-risen power, the Arab, successfully invaded Persia, and the Sassaniden dynasty came to an end, after four hundred years of dominion.

We have thus briefly named and indicated the succession and character of the civilized states of Asia from the earliest dates until the seventh century of the Christian era. Until this period civilization there had steadily progressed and widened. From this period it steadily declined, until the existing half-civilized condition was reached. China and India, it is true, preserved their stage of advancement intact, except with such decay as necessarily attends stagnation. And throughout Asia a new and active form of architectural and literary development appeared. But the decline was only temporarily arrested by the intellectual activity of the Arabs. The cause, and the probable final result, of this decline will be considered in a future chapter.

While the Parthian and Persian dynasties for eight centuries controlled the east, a new and remarkably vigorous power, that of Rome, had arisen in the west. The early history of Italy presents certain analogies to that of the region already considered. As to the origin of its primitive civilization we are largely in the dark. There are, however, some good reasons for believing that its early impulses came from the east. We know that Greek influence was early felt upon the Italian soil. And we have some warrant for concluding that the Pelasgians, the traditional early inhabitants of Greece, emigrated in part to Italy. The numerous remains of Etruscan art are full of evidence of Greek influence. It is not improbable, then, that the social development of Etruria and the other early Italian states was aided and directed by the same influence. Only where Phœnician and Greek colonies existed do we find any trace of early civilization in the west. Elsewhere in



Europe dense barbarism prevailed down to the historic era.

Italy, at the earliest known period, resembled the early condition of all the regions reviewed, in being divided into numerous small states, incessantly at war with one another. These, like the minor states of Syria and Greece, comprised fortified cities, each surrounded by an agricultural district. Its subsequent history was similar. Larger states arose by the subjection of the weaker to the stronger. In this business of conquest the city of Rome proved most efficient. Despite the desperate resistance of the other states they fell, one by one, under the control of Rome, until, by the year 269 B. C., all Italy had become a Roman province. From three to four hundred years had been occupied in this domestic conquest.

But in their centuries of incessant war the fierce and semi-barbarous Romans had thoroughly learned the art. As Alexander had followed his conquest of Greece by that of Asia, so Rome followed her conquest of Italy by that of the civilized world. In one hundred and twenty years from the final subjection of Italy, all civilized Europe and Africa, and Asia to the eastern borders of Syria, lay in her hands. As in the case of the older empires, the rapid work of Rome resulted from the slower work of her predecessors. The conquest of Carthage and its dependencies gave her a broad region in northern Africa, Sicily, and Spain. The conquest of Greece and Macedonia established the Roman dominion over all southeastern Europe and Asia Minor, while at the same time the protectorate of Egypt was gained. By 63 B. C. the tide of conquest had overflowed Syria

and reached the Euphrates. Its growth in this direction ended in the extension of the empire to the Mesopotamian boundary of Parthia. There remained but the conquest of Gaul by the irresistible arms of Cæsar, and of Britain by his immediate successors, and the Roman empire was fully formed. In two hundred years from the final conquest of Italy it had spread its domain from the Atlantic on the west to the Euphrates on the east, and from Germany on the north to the Saharan desert on the south, composing the most extensive empire the world had ever known.

Civilization made its way slowly among this warlike people. They early became proficient in the military art, but the arts of peace were less rapid in their growth. Politically there was an advance, since republican institutions replaced the despotisms of the east. But a state of incessant war was inconsistent with the existence of a democracy, and its eventual fall was inevitable. If the conquering spirit of Rome had failed to end in a despotic monarchy it would have negatived the lesson taught by all the history of mankind. War necessarily paves the way for despotism.

Rome became a consolidated empire in a very different sense from any of its predecessors. The effort which Alexander had made in Asia was fully carried out in Rome. It became an empire of cities, rather than of provinces. In these the laws, language, and institutions of the governing race were established, the whole domain became thoroughly Romanized, and the unit cities were linked to the imperial centre by bonds of steel. The vigor of the laws, as fully as the arms of the legions, held together the mighty empire of the west.

But with the fall of Rome there came a marked change in the state of human affairs. Civilization, which had marched steadily onward for more than three thousand years, suddenly retrograded. Barbarism at all points broke down its barriers and overwhelmed it. All the work of the past ages seemed to vanish. The Western Empire was trodden into indistinguishable ruin. The Eastern Empire for a time held its own, but its boundaries gradually shrunk under the persistent assaults of its foes. From the deserts of Arabia a fanatical horde spread rapidly to the east and the west. Egypt, Northern Africa, and Spain fell in the west; Syria, Mesopotamia, and Persia in the east. For the moment it seemed as if all civilization would perish under this dark cloud of war. Only Constantinople, with its subject district, remained as a bulwark against barbarism. Nor was it long before this narrowed empire was invaded by a still more barbarous horde, that of the Turks. At a somewhat later date the conquest of civilization by barbarism became complete. The Mongol hordes of Genghiz Khan and of Timur overran China, India, and Southern Asia generally. The Turks conquered Constantinople. The work was finished. As an overflowing stream first fills the lowland region, while isolated hills yet stand above its waters, but finally whelms these islands beneath its flood, so had barbarism swelled above the island heights of civilization, and buried all beneath its flow.

The outlook was certainly depressing to all advanced minds. During three or four thousand years of endless effort civilization had slowly but ceaselessly widened its boundaries, until, from its narrow cradle on the Nile, it had spread from the Atlantic coast of Britain on the west

to the Pacific coast of China on the east; from the Rhine, the Danube, and the Asiatic steppes on the north, to the Sahara and the Indian Ocean on the south. The child had truly grown into a giant. Step by step, with infinite toil, it had moved on, firmly planting each step ere another was made, until now its power seemed consolidated and its triumph assured. Yet barbarism had not been at rest during this period. It, too, had been growing and consolidating. Now, with a fell swoop, it came down upon its mighty neighbor. In less than a hundred years the Western Empire utterly vanished. In less than a thousand every stronghold of civilization was trodden under the foot of the barbaric foe.

Yet this loss of civilization was but in seeming. In fact, civilization proved imperishable, and the eventual effect of its apparent overthrow by barbarian foes was to bring these barbarians under its control. It is true that wealth was dissipated, cities razed to the ground, works of art and industry destroyed, populations massacred, old institutions overturned, ancient empires crushed; but wealth, industries, institutions, empires, populations, are not civilization. They are only its results. Civilization is comprised in the ideas from which these results flow. While these ideas survive civilization still lives, and will inevitably reproduce all its lost treasures of art, industry and institutions.

The influx of barbarians did not destroy these ideas. Of the literature of the ancient world the best products survived, in the extant authors of Greece and Rome. Of the arts of sculpture and architecture the most striking examples continued to exist. All that had ever been known of agriculture was still known. In the industrial

arts there had been no essential loss. The merits and faults of the ancient social and political institutions were not forgotten. The most advanced of the old governmental systems still existed. The principles of Christianity actively survived. The ideas of civilization were still alive, though civilized societies had perished. They had new material to work on, but they could not fail to reproduce in time a culture equal to the old standard. Mankind had in no sense to begin over again. All that had been gained during long centuries of progress was still possessed in its ideal element, and civilization only awaited the inevitable period in which man would comprehend and apply these ideas, to resume its development at the level which it had of old attained, and move onward as of yore. Doubtless there was a long interregnum, but the time was by no means wasted. The ideas of cultured states were penetrating the mind of barbarism. They were like the waters of a stream which shallows as it spreads. They were covering new soil, and covered it but thinly at first. But they deepened with time. When civilization regained its old status it embraced all Europe in its sway.

The story of Asia is somewhat different. The long contact of the Romans with the barbarians of Europe had partly civilized them. It but needed to finish the work so well begun. But the Asiatic states were overthrown by uncultured tribes, far more savage than those of Europe, the sons of a desert home widely different from the fertile region of the west. In the latter agriculture had plentiful room to develop; in the former a nomadic life, with its uncultivated conditions, seemed as if predetermined by nature. Thus Asiatic culture fell before a

far more barbaric onslaught than that which desolated Europe. And yet Asiatic civilization has not suffered so utter a decline as many imagine. At its best it was far below the level of European enlightenment. China and India have not declined in the essentials of civilization, though their mental activity has lowered. Persia, Mesopotamia, and Egypt, under the Arabian dominion, declined politically, but preserved all their old industrial and literary activity. Under Turkish rule they have declined in all respects, and we are apt to look upon the Turks as incapable of attaining high civilization. Yet it should be remembered that they have been but little more than four hundred years in a settled state, and in that time have progressed more than did the Germanic conquerors of Rome in the four hundred years after its fall. And though Asiatic civilization, as a whole, has declined, its decline has been accompanied by a rise in the status of Asiatic barbarism. The Turkish race has been brought under civilized influences. Some degree of culture has invaded the oases of Turkestan. Manchooria has received the Chinese culture. Mongolia is not unaffected by its sway. And the wild tribes of Siberia and of the Kirghiz steppes have not utterly escaped the civilizing influence of Russia.

For the civilization of Southern Europe and Asia to have spread itself over the whole continent, forced its way into the heart of savagery and barbarism, and to have fully conquered part of this region and partly conquered the remainder, is a work worthy of the time occupied. We cannot justly speak of a check to the progress of civilization when we consider that it was more than thirty centuries in extending its sway over the limited region of

Southern Europe and Asia; while, in the last fifteen centuries, it has covered all Europe and America with a culture far surpassing that of the past, and strongly promises, in the next fifteen centuries, to embrace the whole world in the domain of a culture far surpassing that which now exists.

Fortunately the outflows of barbarism were not simultaneous. Civilization stoutly resisted, and only fell point after point. One barbarian conqueror yielded to its influence ere another broke in at a new quarter. The conquests of China and India were but by armies, which these populous realms swallowed up and converted into citizens. The conquerors of Europe were ripe for the influence of civilization. The Arabs were far from low barbarism. Their native culture was equal to that of many of their new subjects. When the first savage onslaught was over they proved plastic to civilizing influences, and their mental and industrial activity had much to do with arousing Europe from the stagnation of its Middle Age sleep. Politically the Arabian empire was at a low level, but socially and religiously it was in advance of many of the conquered peoples, while in agriculture, mechanics, science, architecture, literature, and philosophy it made marked advances. The Arab progress was certainly more rapid and brilliant, though far less substantial, than that of the Aryans of Europe.

The Arabian was the last of the great, long continued empires of the world. Those of Charlemagne, of Genghiz Khan, of Timur, of Charles V., and of Napoleon, failed to become permanent. The genius of modern civilization seems opposed to any wide-reaching domination of a single ruler, while the new polit-

ical principle of the "balance of power" vigorously hinders any permanent control of a civilized state by a powerful neighbor. Individualism in statecraft is being replaced by the policy of imperial alliances, and of the combination of the weak against the strong.



## CHAPTER IV.

### THE RELATIONS OF BARBARISM TO CIVILIZATION.

DURING the long period in which civilization was extending and consolidating itself in the south, barbarism had remained with little change in the north. The regions inhabited by the hunting and shepherd tribes were but thinly settled, yet were of such vast extent as to support a great body of people. The country of old known as Scythia is an immense domain, stretching, in its fullest extension, from the mouth of the Danube to the Sea of Japan, a length of five thousand miles, while its breadth from the fortieth parallel northward is more than a thousand miles. Westward from this Scythian region lay the realm of the Aryan tribes of Europe, embracing Germany, Scandinavia, and the country of the Celts. As the far-outreaching steppes of the one region were occupied by hardy and warlike pastoral tribes, so the interminable forests of the other region were peopled by no less hardy clans, whose lives were passed in hunting, herding, and warlike pursuits, to which they added a crude and but slightly productive agriculture.

These barbarian hordes were a constant threat to the civilized states which lay along their whole southern border. Some historians appear to consider it by a sort of accident that they at last overran, and for the time abolished, civilization. Yet this result seems to have

been an inevitable consequence of the conditions and relations of the inhabitants of the two regions. The cloud of war which hung for centuries upon the northern skirts of the settled states could not fail finally to descend and pour its devastating floods upon the smiling valleys of the south.

We have traced the gradual progress of the civilized communities from their early stage of small, independent states to their final condition of vast empires. The constant effort of these empires was to suppress revolt at home and conquer new territories abroad. Yet each of them became in time unwieldy, and the acquisition of new territory grew more difficult as the armies advanced farther from the centre of the state. Every new acquisition became the seat of new insurrections, and eventually the armies of each empire were fully occupied in controlling its subjects, in repelling invasion and reducing insurrection, and they had neither the time nor the strength for new conquests. The possible extension of each of these empires depended greatly on the perfection of its political machinery. The first of them, the Assyrian, was loosely consolidated, and much of its strength was wasted in the suppression of rebellion. Its final great extension brought it weakness rather than strength. Persia was more definitely centralized, and was less troubled with internal revolt. In the last of the great ancient empires, the Roman, the art of national consolidation had greatly progressed. Rome was vigorously centralized, and was thus able to keep in subjection a much wider domain than had been held by any of its predecessors. Yet Rome's power in this respect was also limited. Parthia on the east,

Germany and Scythia on the north, defied its arms. Every step beyond the Euphrates proved a loss rather than a gain. The Dacian provinces on the north of the Danube could not be held. The Belgian province was the seat of violent insurrections. Every acquisition beyond the Rhine proved temporary only. The Roman armies had too much work at home to spare the strength necessary to keep the fierce German tribes in subjection.

Such was the final result of the efforts of the ancient form of civilization to gain new territory. The Rhine and the Danube, the Caucasian mountains and the rivers of Turkestan, formed its northern boundary. Every effort to subdue the fierce tribes beyond this boundary proved ineffective, and the settled states ended in treating their savage neighbors as troublesome wasps to be brushed off, instead of enemies to be conquered.

No statesman of the period recognized the fact that ruin hovered in the north. It was the wealth of civilization that attracted the barbarian hordes, but there was no similar attraction to direct the arms of civilization against barbarism. Constant wars took place between civilized states, but conflicts with the barbarian tribes were only spasmodic. They were principally raids to inflict punishment, not definite attempts at subjection. Rome, indeed, made some efforts at conquest in the region of barbarism, but in these it failed. Had civilization recognized its true source of danger, it might, by a concerted effort, have avoided it. Rome did her best. She conquered Spain and Gaul, and occupied Belgia and Dacia. She extended the borders

of civilization and pushed back the wave-front of barbarism, yet only heaped it up for a heavier fall. It was principally military ambition, not a determined effort to destroy a dangerous foe, that instigated these movements, though it is doubtful, even if Rome had fully recognized her danger, that she could have escaped the impending ruin.

In fact, the power of the old empires weakened instead of strengthened with age. Their wars inevitably ended in despotism. The despots inevitably became the slaves of the armies which sustained them. The armies inevitably discovered their power and became insubordinate. The separate divisions of the armies, at the remote extremes of the empire, tended to centre around their successful leaders, and to lose their feeling of allegiance to the distant emperor. Not only rebellious provinces, but rebellious legions, had to be controlled. The armies, once aware of their power, grew proud, turbulent, undisciplined, and unwarlike, an element of weakness rather than of strength to the state. This was no chance result, but a necessary consequence of the conditions of these great warlike states. Whether similar results would arise under similar conditions in the more firmly consolidated states of the present can not be positively affirmed, but may be considered highly probable.

The lesson of Roman history is easily read. While Rome remained a republic it continued to conquer. After the empire was established its career of conquest ended. Some few ambitious emperors sought to add new provinces to the empire, but in every instance they failed to retain their conquests, and the empire of Augustus

had the same boundaries as that of Theodosius, the last ruler of the old realm.

The methods of consolidation in the ancient empires could not be changed without a complete disorganization. And no better methods of government had yet been devised. Thus the progress of civilization had reached, in the Roman state, a stage in which the extension of the empire was self-limited, and in which the government not only displayed special weakness with every weak emperor, but weakened even under the strongest emperors, through the innate viciousness and imperfection of its system.

Such was one element of the problem: a civilized state with an innately weak system of government, constantly enfeebling internally, while its border provinces dropped off by their own weight until the empire was reduced to its natural limits. Its power of centripetal attraction controlled the provinces to a certain distance from the centre, and failed to hold them beyond that limit.

The other element of the problem was barbarism, the untamed inhabitants of the forests and the steppes. We have said that they were a perpetual menace to civilization. They were more. They were the destined conquerors of the civilized states. For barbarism grew in strength as civilization weakened, and the relations of equality in strength which had been established between them ceased in time to exist. Barbarism grew the stronger, and civilization fell before it.

There is apparent here a peculiar cycle of events to which we may briefly advert. In the prehistoric age all Europe and Asia were the seats of a barbarism of an

undeveloped form. Development took place, but not with equal rapidity in the different sections. The south advanced much more rapidly than the north. Civilization arose in the south, and forced its way northward until checked by the repellant conditions of the northern peoples. In this process the population of the continent, at first largely homogeneous, became separated into two widely different sections, the civilized southerners and the barbarous northerners. The vigorous principle of civilization weakened as it reached this intractable northern population, and the two great unlike zones of humanity touched, with a narrow neutral band, at a line running east and west across the continent.

Such was the first stage of the cycle, that of differentiation between the north and the south. Its second stage was that of hostility between the north and the south. The north remained poor and rude. The south became rich and cultured. But this wealth of the south was doubly an element of weakness to its owners. Men grew unwarlike in its production and timorous in its possession, while it became a more and more tempting prize to their barbarian foes. Civilization tends toward peaceful, barbarism towards warlike, interests. In proportion as the civilized ceases to have any strong motive for attack upon the barbarous state, the latter gains stronger motives for attack upon the former. And civilization in its conflict with barbarism teaches the latter lessons which are eventually fatal to itself. For it teaches it the arts of war and of concentration. The one grows formidable on the field of battle as the other weakens. Barbarism gains as civilization loses

military vigor. The one is in the first, or military phase of progress; the other has advanced beyond that condition, and entered the industrial and unmilitary phase.

Great empires arose in the South, but as they increased in size and in civilization their interests became diversified. The business of foreign conquest became a less and less important occupation. Finally, in every case, the extension of their borders was exchanged for the defence of their borders, they found abundant occupation for their energies at home, and every effort to advance beyond their established boundaries became spasmodic and ineffective. They had reached their natural limits.

While the military vigor of every great state thus attained its acme and then steadily declined, that of barbarism steadily developed. The small tribes of barbarians became consolidated by war into extensive hordes, and these into great warlike aggregations, temporarily welded by the energy of some vigorous leader, and forming a military rather than a political form of human organization. There could be but one end to this relation between civilization and barbarism. The former ceased, the latter grew, to concentrate all its strength upon one object, and that object war. Thus the military vigor of barbarism became, in time, greatly in excess of that of civilization, and, as a final consequence, civilization unavoidably fell, and barbarism again overflowed the whole continent.

So ended the grand cycle. But it did not end at the level at which it began. The continent of Europe and Asia, barbarian in the far past, became again barbarian. But these were very different grades of barbar-

ism. The original stage had bordered closely upon savagery. The final stage bordered closely upon civilization. The cycle had completed itself, and had lifted man to a much higher than his ancient level.

In truth, nothing had been lost; much had been gained. All the ideas of civilization survived, and at once began to permeate the new populations which occupied the seats of the old empires. These ideas, in fact, far from being destroyed or imperiled by the barbarian conquest, were really aided in their outflow by the fall of the ancient states. For they became associated with a renewed warlike vigor which carried them into regions which all the armies of Rome had failed to penetrate. The new nations adopted the political, the religious, and many of the social institutions of Rome. It cannot be said that they understood them, but they clung to them tenaciously, forced them upon the more northern tribes, and combined them with institutions of barbarian origin. Thus grew the new out of the old. The tempering of despotic civilization with free barbarism yielded the modern system of government, a civilization based upon popular liberty, and in which representative government replaces absolutism.

This is the philosophy of ancient history. And it is a philosophy which offers a suggestion as to the possible history of the future. For the inequality in civilization between the inhabitants of two great regions of the earth, from which it arose, is repeated in the national relations of our own era. The old inequality between north and south is paralleled by a modern inequality between east and west. A brief review of these existing conditions may not be without interest. All



Asia, and Russia in Europe, are to-day the seat of empires whose political organization and social development somewhat resemble those of the great states of the ancient world. The remainder of Europe, and the continent of America, are the seat of nations far more developed in political and social conditions. In Asia are the vast despotisms of Russia and China, and the smaller ones of Persia and Turkey. In addition to these is the mighty population of India, now under English rule, but which may at any moment throw off this foreign control, while its mental condition is such as to expose it to danger of despotic government.

As of old civilization spread in the south until it came into conflict with the north, so in modern times enlightenment is spreading in the west, and encroaching upon absolutism in the east. The cases are parallel in other respects. In the past the barbarian north gained little instruction in the arts of peace, but much in the art of war from the civilized south. Is not this just the portion of western enlightenment of which the east is now becoming possessed? The intellectual, moral, and political conditions of the west penetrate the east but slowly. The military conditions penetrate it rapidly. The use of modern weapons, of railroads and telegraphs, of military discipline and tactics, is being accepted far more readily than the conditions specially pertaining to peaceful pursuits.

In addition to this it must be remembered that the east far surpasses the west in population. A glance at the map of Europe and Asia will show that enlightened Europe hangs but as a pigmy peninsula upon the vast region of Asia and despotic Europe. Enlightened Europe

is growing unwarlike in its sentiments and interests much more rapidly than its less developed neighbors. The hostility among the despotic states is no greater than that which separated the nomad tribes of the past. As the latter combined, so may the former. As of old the bowmen and spearmen of the desert poured upon the swordsmen of the south and overwhelmed them, so in the future the east, led by Russia and China in alliance, and perhaps conjoined with India, may pour upon the west, armed with its own weapons, and again trample into the dust the proud results of human progress.

And yet, though we may propound the possibility of such a result, there is good reason to believe it exceedingly improbable. The reaction of civilization upon barbarism, begun in the Middle Ages, is by no means at an end. Modern civilization is eating its way, by peaceful as well as by hostile means, into the borders of less developed states. Though warlike ideas are being most eagerly adopted, commerce, literature and religion are growing in influence, and teaching their lessons of peace. And the nations alluded to are mainly unwarlike in disposition. Neither China nor India has ever waged an aggressive war. Slowly, but surely, the east is yielding to the progressive ideas of the enlightened west, and the conquests of the future promise, more and more, to be those of peace, not those of war.

A brief review of the early history of America will be interesting in this connection. There the fertile river bottoms of the southern United States, and the possession of maize as a food plant, offered conditions favorable to the growth of civilization. Yet nature had left

this region unprotected. In America the mountain systems run north and south, instead of east and west as in Europe and Asia. The forests of the north open, without a natural line of defence, on the fertile alluvial lands of the south. As a result, the incipient efforts at agriculture must have been made in the face of incessant danger. Yet the hunting tribes were probably, at first, without organization, and their attacks weak and desultory. We have reason to believe that a considerable advance in agricultural knowledge was in time made, and that a partially civilized community arose. And it is not improbable that this civilizing people slowly pushed back the limits of savagery, and advanced northward until it occupied all the eastern and part of the western valley of the Mississippi. Such an indication is given us in the works of the Mound Builders. The people known by this name seem to have eventually gained a natural line of defence in the great lakes to the north, the Appalachian Mountains to the east, and the Mississippi to the west. Yet it is by no means probable that they had originally this extension, and it seems more reasonable to conclude, from the example of eastern history, that this great domain was the work of conquest, long-continued, and its results strongly maintained. Next we seem to perceive in America, as in Europe and Asia, the northern tribes growing stronger and better consolidated, assailing the richer agriculturists, driving them back from line to line of defence, and finally conquering the territory of their more advanced enemies. It is quite probable that the agricultural communities found by early European investigators in the south were remnants of the vanished Mound

Builders. The above conjecture, of course, is mainly hypothetical, yet it is not without support in the results of archæological investigation. And if such a cycle of events really did occur, we may have one of its important results in the knowledge of agriculture, the tribal organization, and the simple arts of fortification and of manufacture, which were found among the Indians of the northern United States region when first discovered by the whites.

We might carry this thought further and consider the possibility of similar cyclical movements in the prehistoric era of Europe and Asia. Of course there is no satisfactory warrant for such an assumption in what we know of the events of prehistoric times. And yet such an idea might aid in the elucidation of some questions now difficult to understand. The active migrations which undoubtedly prevailed in this archaic era may have been set in motion by some such series of influences, and many of the arts possessed by the barbarian inhabitants of Northern Asia may have had this as one method of their dissemination from the south to the north.

We shall follow these general considerations with some special ones. The relations of ancient barbarism and civilization were particularly affected by geographical influences, and it is very probable that human development would be at a much lower level than at present but for the physical conditions of the earth. In Europe and Asia, indeed, it almost seems as if nature had made special preliminary provision for the protection of the budding civilizations of mankind. By a happy contingency the great mountain chains of these

continents run east and west, instead of north and south, as in America. From the Pacific coast region on the east the impassable Himalayan range extends far to the west, and is continued by the Hindoo Kush, the Armenian and Caucasian ranges, and the Black and Caspian Seas, until together they form a great natural barrier between the north and south of Asia.

In Europe the south has a similar protection. Its three peninsulas have each a mountain border to the north: Greece, the Balkan range; Italy, the Alps; and Spain, the Pyrenees. Greece again is specially protected by its internal ranges. North of these mountains the great river system, the Rhine and the Danube, forms a second line of defence, and proved the natural boundary of the Roman empire, beyond which it failed to extend its dominion, but which it held intact for centuries.

Thus the civilization of the south and the barbarism of the north were not in actual contact, but were separated by a barrier which barbarism was not likely to cross until report of southern wealth, and its own growing consolidation, gave it both the inducement and the strength. Consequently, civilization was able to grow and to fight its own battles for centuries, before the nomad races of the north were in condition to break in upon it.

We may, however, name two of the ancient empires which were but feebly protected by nature, and in which a cycle of changes took place suggestively similar to the general one already described. One of these was the empire of Assyria. It was a civilized lowland bordering directly on a highland region inhabited by war-

like barbarians. At first, undoubtedly, general barbarism prevailed over upland and plain. Then civilization arose in the plain. Yet it was long vigorously warlike, and steadily repressed its hostile mountain foes. It drove them back, as did Rome its barbarian enemies at a later date, and subjected many of the tribes to its authority. Yet, as in all such cases, the chief lesson which civilization taught to barbarism was the lesson of war and tribal consolidation. Finally the warlike power of Assyria weakened, that of the mountaineers strengthened. The tribes of the hills threw off the yoke of the empire of the plain, and consolidated as we find the Germans and Mongols consolidating at later eras. The inevitable consequence followed. The weakening warlike vigor of the civilized state yielded to the growing military energy of the barbarian clans, and the tribes of the mountains conquered the cities of the plain. Persia succeeded Assyria in the empire of the east. But the reaction of civilized ideas upon barbarism which necessarily followed was in this case rapid, since it had made much progress before the actual change of empire took place.

The other empire referred to is that of China. This, of all the Asiatic empires, was the least protected by nature from barbarian assault. Its whole northern line lay open to the nomads of the steppes. Yet its story singularly resembles that of the other nations considered. At first it was warlike and barbarous. Then its seeds of civilization took root and grew, while the vigorous young state still presented a hostile front to its foes. But the national result in due time arrived. It grew unwarlike as it grew civilized. Its ancient vig-

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orous resistance to barbarism was succeeded by an effort to repress the assaults of its foes with an artificial line of defence. The great wall of China, the most stupendous of all human labors, was built for this purpose, and built in vain. For the long continued conflicts of China with its barbarian foes ended, as in all such cases, in teaching these foes the art of war and of military consolidation. They became a more and more vigorous foe, growing stronger as China grew weaker, century by century. The wall, which may at first have checked them, soon became useless for this purpose. They swarmed over it, assailed with ever growing vigor and ability the ever weakening state, and finally completely subjected it to their arms, after a conflict of more than two thousand years in duration.

The relation between civilization and barbarism here indicated is a very natural one. Civilization at first necessarily has the advantage. It is better armed and disciplined than barbarism, and is its superior in food supply and in political consolidation. Yet these advantages are gradually lost. Civilization tends to grow unwarlike, and finally fights only on compulsion, and with a minor portion of its population. Barbarism, on the contrary, constantly grows more warlike, and slowly learns the art of military consolidation. The pursuits of the nomads of Asia, with whom China and the states of the south had mainly to contend, are such as to make them natural warriors. The army is not selected from the population, but is the population. It is always armed, drilled, and supplied. Its wanderings are so many marches. Its cattle form a movable food supply. Its hunts are military forays. Only consolidation is

needed to make of a series of separate tribes a powerful military nation, and to give them the advantage in war over their peace-loving neighbors.

As very little is known of the history of these nomad warriors of the Asiatic steppes, it may be well to give it here in brief outline, as a parallel picture to that we have given of the rise and outgrowth of Asiatic civilization. We first hear of the Tatar tribes in the reign of the Chinese emperor Muh Wang, 936 B. C. From that time forward they frequently troubled the Chinese with their predatory incursions. Vigorous leaders arose from time to time, and greater combinations of tribes successively appeared. In Chinese annals the consolidated tribes are first known under the title of Heung Noo, or *detestable slaves*. This organization, under the leadership of its chiefs, called the Tanjou, became in time very formidable to China. Its assaults gave rise to the building of the great wall, in the third century B. C. Eventually the success of the marauders became so great that China was forced to buy them off with an annual tribute, to whose treasure of gold and silks the empire was obliged to add a select band of its fairest maidens, doomed to become the wives of its savage foes.

The power of the Heung-noo was finally broken, by a monarch who met them successfully in the field, and, with shrewd policy, induced their subject tribes to rebel. The rule of the Tanjous, after it had continued for a thousand years, and been predominant for at least three hundred, came to an end in the first century of the Christian era. Some of their subjects migrated to the west, some to the south, some entered the Chinese service, and the remainder became incorporated with



their most powerful foes. The westward moving bands are supposed by Gibbon and others—though this opinion is questioned—to have been the ancestors of the Huns, who afterwards devastated Europe.

But the fall of the Heung-noo was not the fall of the principle of political aggregation, which they had taught to the nomad tribes. The Sienpi, the most powerful of the revolting clans, succeeded to the dominion of the nomad world. They, too, in time became formidable, and styled themselves *Topa*, or masters of the earth. They even succeeded in conquering the northern provinces of China, and establishing an imperial dynasty, which reigned for nearly one hundred and sixty years.

But a slave of one of the Topa princes, at the head of a gang of one hundred outlaws, ventured to rebel. This gang rapidly increased until it became a powerful tribe. Finally, under the lead of a brave commander named Toulun, it broke the power of the Sienpi, and the tribe of the Geougen gained the ascendancy. The dominion of Toulun became very extensive, reaching from Corea to far beyond the Irtish river, and over a wide range of latitude. The new title of *Kahn* or *Cagan* expressed the fame of this redoubted chief.

In the sixth century of the Christian era we have the record of another important revolt. An enslaved tribe, which worked the iron forges of the Altai mountains for the Khan of the Geougen, rebelled and gained its freedom. Its strength rapidly increased until, in a decisive battle, it almost extirpated the nation of the Geougen, and became supreme in their stead. Thus first came into history the great tribe of the Turks, who were afterwards to exert such an important influence upon Europe.

The dominion of the Turks became very extensive. Their Khan, who dwelt at the foot of Mount Altai, made his power felt by the Romans on the west, and by China on the east. Northward his dominion stretched far into Siberia. Southward it embraced the white Huns, who dwelt on the borders of Persia. Ambassadors were sent to Constantinople, and Roman ministers were received, in return, at the foot of the Altai. It was the first of the great nomad organizations to make all civilization feel its power. We need not here follow the later history of the Turks, in their onslaught upon Europe. This occurred centuries after their great Asiatic dominion had ceased to exist.

Other organizations succeeded that of the Turks upon the steppes of Northern Asia. A tribe called the Khitans came into power, and held the supremacy from 900 to 1100 A. D. Their vigorous inroads proved a serious annoyance to China. They were succeeded by the Kins, or Golden Tatars, a yet more terrible foe. This tribe, of Manchu origin, made a partial conquest of Northern China, which was long held. Next came the most powerful and terrible of all, the Mongol Tatars, who were destined to win themselves a world-wide fame. Under their able and vigorous leader, Genghiz Khan, the power of the Kins was overthrown. The rule of this remarkable nomad chieftain quickly extended over all the tribes of the desert, and ere long the whole civilized world trembled before his mighty arms. All Asia lay at his feet, and Russia in Europe was subjected by his lieutenants. China, after its long struggle for liberty, finally fell, and became subject to the desert barbarians with whom it had so long contended. The

cycle of relations between civilization and barbarism was completed in the overthrow of the civilized state. A century later the Mongol conquests were repeated, with still more terrible devastation, under Timur, a native of the Mongol province of Turkestan, and the civilization of Southern Asia vanished before the murderous sword of this savage chief.

China, meanwhile, had regained its freedom. But it had regained none of its old energy and ability, and it fell again, in the seventeenth century, under the rule of a desert tribe. This conquest was by the Manchurians, a people who had felt the civilizing influence of China, and whose onslaught was less destructive than the earlier ones. The final result has been that of all similar cases. The civilization of China has reacted upon its barbarian foes, and all the inhabitants of the eastern steppes have become peaceful and improving subjects of the Manchu monarchs of the great oriental state. As for the western nomads, they have fallen under the dominion of Russia, once a subject state of their great Khan.

We need but briefly refer to the European phase of this conflict. The principle of tribal aggregation gradually developed on German soil, as a result of hostilities with Rome. At first Rome was opposed by individual tribes, and even in this condition, in the shelter of their native woods, they proved invincible to the Roman arms. Arminius, a bold and able chief, cut to pieces an army sent against him by Augustus, and successfully opposed other armies. He also made conquests in Germany, and might have founded a great state had he lived. This disposition to combine continued, and

from the third century we find confederations taking the place of single tribes. These minor confederations in time expanded into great military organizations, the first of which was that of the Goths, under their leader, Ermanaric, or Hermanric. The dominion of this leader extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and he might perhaps have achieved the conquest of Rome but for the onslaught of the Huns, which broke the Gothic power. Again, under Attila, a great kingdom was formed, which embraced all northern Europe and extended far into Asia. Only by the aid of the Goths was Rome saved from its destroying inroads. The kingdom of Attila was the last of the great barbarian kingdoms of the west. But we cannot doubt, had Rome been able to sustain her empire longer, that the principle of political aggregation, thus adopted by her barbarian foes, would soon have brought against her an irresistible force. Against the rocky bulwark of civilization the waves of barbarism heaped themselves higher and higher, until they finally overflowed it. It could not have resisted much longer, for its foes strengthened with every repulse, and returned to the assault with better arms, superior organization, and more able leaders. The fall of Rome and of its phase of civilization were inevitable.

## CHAPTER V.

### POPULATION, ITS GROWTH AND CLASSIFICATION.

PROBABLY, in the early days of man's existence upon the earth, he had little advantage over other animals, so far as numbers or extent of territory occupied were concerned. He may have been little above the beasts of the field in ability to obtain food and defend himself, and was certainly below many of them in the power of enduring extremes of climate, since they were clothed and he naked. But he had the great natural advantages of superior mental ability, and of the unrestricted use of his arms as weapons, while all other animals were obliged to employ their fore limbs largely as locomotive organs. This free use of the arms, and the grasping power of the hands, which enabled man to use readily other than his natural weapons, must always have given him a special advantage in food getting and defence. At the same time, the mental ability which taught him to adopt artificial clothing and shelter removed his disabilities as regarded climate. Thus, at a very remote period, he became master of the animal world and of climatic conditions, increased in numbers at the expense of other animals, and extended his domain until he inhabited the whole land surface of the earth.

Whether his expansion was from one or several centres is an unsettled question. However that be, we have

good reason to believe that the region inhabited by man was very extensive at a highly remote period, since remains of human beings and their works have been exhumed both in Europe and America in situations that indicate a great antiquity. In these early periods, however, the human population must have been quite sparse. The density of population has been in all ages controlled by the quantity of available food, and has increased with every addition to the food supply. During nearly all the past ages of the world, indeed, man pressed sharply on the limits of the available nutriment, and his tendency to increase was kept in check by semi-starvation, and the enhanced death rate caused thereby.

The tendency to increase rapidly in numbers is the most general characteristic of animal life. Fecundity is usually so great that there is scarcely an animal which would not, if unchecked in its increase, cover the whole earth in a few centuries, while some would do so in a few years. The checks to this tendency in the animal kingdom are few but effective. They consist in starvation, disease, and destruction by natural forces or by enemies. These agencies constitute the elements of what is known as the struggle for existence, and are sufficiently active to destroy the great mass of the germs or young of living beings, and permit only a few to attain maturity. In the case of man the too rapid increase of population is partly checked by other agencies, which we shall consider subsequently.

Early man, then, was controlled in his increase by the limitation of his food supply, the diseases to which he was subject, and the destructive agency of his animal

foes or of natural forces. During all human history there has been an incessant effort to overcome these limiting agencies, or at least to thrust them back and permit a fuller increase of the human population. The food supply has been augmented until it is greatly in excess of its original quantity. Disease has been battled with until it is far less destructive than of old, animal foes have been destroyed or rendered comparatively harmless, and the destructiveness of the elemental forces has been greatly avoided by shelter and by counteracting agencies. Hence man has now become master in great measure of the animal world, of disease, and of the elements, and has learned the art of very greatly increasing the food supply. At present, therefore, the human population is considerably below its possible limit, and is increasing, in many parts of the earth, with a rapidity never before known.

Primitive man trusted for food to the vegetable stores provided by nature, and to such animals as he was able to destroy. For shelter he depended upon trees and caves, and for clothing upon the skins of beasts. With all his ability he could but seldom have been able to overtake and destroy the larger animals, and must have been very greatly exposed to the dangers surrounding him. Hence at this early period the population was necessarily sparse and of very slow increase, and was principally confined to regions where food and shelter were most fully provided. At a later period, when superior weapons were gained, and the shrewdness of man was increased by mental exercise, his power of destroying the food animals grew much greater, and population increased in accordance with the fuller supplies of food. Still later the art of domesti-

cating animals was attained, and the food supply thus very greatly increased, with a corresponding augmentation of population. Yet still the numbers of human beings continued sparse as compared with those of civilized times. The American Indians when discovered were in the hunter stage, and possessed of imperfect weapons. They constituted a population very thinly spread over an immense territory. The inhabitants of the great Asiatic plains are in the pastoral stage. Their herds of domesticated animals furnish them with abundant supplies of food. Yet they constitute but a thinly scattered people. This, however, arises largely from the scarcity of pasturage, and a pastoral race, with abundant pasture, might attain a considerable density of population. But the earliest really dense populations arose from the cultivation of the earth, and the consequent great increase in the vegetable food supply. It was this which gave rise to the great nations of the past, who come into history as densely crowded masses of human beings.

Four such nations emerge to view from the darkness of the prehistoric period, the great communities of Egypt, Babylonia, India, and China. Of these the first two were far more populous than at present, and the last two, perhaps, little less populous. When they arose the art of agriculture was in its infancy, and their rapid growth in numbers would be phenomenal, but for the fact that nature had prepared the way for man by providing highly fertile and well-watered soils, in which slight and unskilled labor yielded an abundant return in food. The self-watered valley of the Nile early provided the means of feeding an immense population, whose numbers were augmented by the labor enforced



and the protection afforded by a vigorous and judicious government. The same region has ever since been as capable of supporting a large population as of old, but the lack of protection and governmental wisdom has negatived the gifts of nature, and caused a great reduction in the inhabitants of the Nile valley. Under the better protection of the government of the present century they are again rapidly on the increase.

The same considerations apply to the inhabitants of the valley of the Euphrates and Tigris, and to those of Syria. The proceeds of skilled agriculture and the protection of strong governments enabled them of old to become very numerous. The loss of agricultural skill and of governmental wisdom in modern times has almost swept this region bare of inhabitants.

There are two other of the populous agricultural nations of the past of which the same may be said, viz.: Peru and Mexico. These had grown densely peopled through the skill of their farmers and the protective ability of their governments. The same regions, under Spanish misrule, the loss of skill, and the diversion of the people from agricultural pursuits, have lost a great part of their population, which is very slowly being regained through a gradual return to wise principles of government and productive industry.

Of the primitive, self-originated civilizations, only two have escaped this decay of population. China and India have gone on steadily increasing, or have suffered no decrease, in population. The former has retained its old form of government through all the ages, and its industries have suffered no permanent check. The latter is now, for the first time in its history, under a general

and wisely-administered government. Its civilization, in some respects, has declined. But its industrial organization and methods of labor are the same as of old, the protection of its inhabitants has not diminished, and its population has remained intact, or is perhaps slowly increasing.

It would appear, from the history of these regions of early civilization, that two things are requisite to yield the fullest increase in population. One of these is a skilled and complete cultivation of the fertile soil. To this may be added the full employment of pasture lands in the feeding of food animals. On the results of these processes the possible number of inhabitants is strictly dependent. No country which trusts solely to its own resources can raise more men than it can feed, and however numerous be the occupations of the people their increase must cease at this limit. The labor of one man may indeed produce food enough to feed ten or more, and these ten may be engaged in other pursuits, yet their existence is dependent upon the labor of the man who provides them with food.

The other requisite to increase of population is protection of the food producer, the retention of his skill and activity, and the absolute requirement that the quantity of labor necessary to food production shall not be decreased. War has always been the main disturber of this condition. Laborers are drafted from the field to the army, and the soil is left in part uncultivated. The food producers still at work are oppressed by crushing taxation, and in consequence lose diligence and interest in their work, decrease in numbers through penury and starvation, or desert their fields in despair. Dependence

on the plunder of other lands draws the attention of rulers from the cultivation of their own soils. Adverse fortune in war and conquest by foreign armies cause great decrease in population. These and similar influences produce a wide diversion of interests, loss of skill in food production, the employment of the population too largely in other pursuits, and other evils, all of which act to reduce the quantity of food available, and thus to diminish the population. Such have been the main causes of the disappearance of ancient dense populations, and their replacement by a few half-fed barbarians.

The question of the distribution of the human race is equally important with that of its numbers. Populations originally were confined to the regions of food production. The number of inhabitants of any region was in close accordance with the quantity of food there produced. But at an early date other influences came into play, which caused considerable changes in the distribution of population. Reasons arose why men should settle in localities that yielded no food, and trust for their support to the transportation of food to those localities. There have always existed two causes of this secondary arrangement of population, government and commerce; and two agencies in the transport of food supplies, tribute and trade.

The necessities of government early caused special concentrations of men, and the growth of civic centres, whose food came by transport from the fields. It was supplied by the cultivators as tax, to the extent that they received some return for it in public services or improvements; and as tribute, to the extent that they received no return for it. In the case of warlike nations, con-

trolling large conquered populations, the food thus supplied came very largely as tribute, since little service to the people was returned. In peaceful communities the return to the people in service has always been greater, and the food exaction has lost much of its tributary aspect, and assumed the form of exchange of service for service.

Commerce has produced a far wider extension of this principle of food distribution. Great cities have arisen in infertile districts, far removed from the principal regions of food production. Yet the food has come to them with the full good-will of its cultivators, not as tribute, but as trade, it being supplied in exchange for some commodity more desired by the food producer than that which he parted with. The exigencies of commerce have been widely different from those of government, and in consequence the centres of exchange have arisen in localities different from those of tribute and taxation. Commercial cities, rivaling in wealth and population the capital cities, appeared as soon as exchange became active. The transport of food for the sustenance of their inhabitants soon spread beyond the limits of the nation, and has grown until now productions from the whole earth may flow to a single centre of commercial activity.

Of the various exactions of food for the support of persons not occupied in its production, there is only one that has been adverse to human interests, that taken as tribute, or to be expended in ways not beneficial to the producers. Legitimate taxation, whose proceeds are employed for the good of the whole people, and trade, in which the producers receive personal instead

of communal benefit, are similar in principle, being natural methods of interchange of commodities and services, and they must operate to the benefit of all peoples concerned.

The exigencies of government and commerce here referred to, while causing a new distribution of population, not directly dependent upon the localities of food production, can do nothing directly towards adding to the numbers of the people concerned, though they may do so indirectly by encouraging industry, by stimulating mental activity, and by offering new rewards to the food-producer for increased skill in his labor. Otherwise the rule holds strictly good. No new distribution or classification of population can release it from its absolute dependence upon food production, and the earth can sustain no more men than it can provide food for. The city has its foundation in the fields, and the non-food-producing population of the world is strictly limited to the number which can be supported on the excess food produced by agriculturists, herders and hunters.

At a very remote epoch appeared the earliest of the secondary commercial centres of population, in the Phœnician community, a people who inhabited an infertile region and obtained their food almost entirely through barter. Later a somewhat similar community arose in Greece, and particularly in Attica, whose infertile soil was inadequate to support the teeming population of Athens in its best period. Side by side with this concentration of men in centres of exchange arose similar concentrations in centres of tribute. The great cities of Assyria and Babylonia were such centres, yet

these were sufficiently supplied with food by the fertile surrounding region. Such was less the case with Persia, which was a comparatively barren region, whose population during the times of the empire must have trusted considerably to food transport. But Rome was the first empire in which the exaction of food tribute from distant regions became greatly extended. In the earlier empires transport was largely overland, which rendered the carriage of food supplies difficult. At Rome the sea offered a ready channel of transport, and hence Rome was supplied with food from remote regions to an extent never before known.

This obtaining of food from afar caused certain new relations in the distribution of population. The fields of Italy were in great measure deserted, and their cultivation neglected, while the population crowded into the cities. Such in time grew to be the case with all the western regions of the Roman empire, which became in this district an empire of cities, the fields being feebly cultivated by unskilled and disheartened slaves. Different conditions prevailed in the fertile lands of Northern Africa. From this region came the main food supply of Rome, and agriculture there must have maintained its old activity. Important consequences followed. The demand upon the corn-producing regions of the south became extreme, and the impoverishment of the inhabitants such as to produce a considerable depopulation of that rich land, and to choke the very springs of Roman prosperity. Finally the Vandal conquest of Northern Africa completed the disasters of Rome. The result was an inevitable one. The great city had ruined its native

resources by neglect, and its distant resources, in great part, by crushing tribute, and finally became too weak to repel the foe that cut off its supplies of food afar, and overwhelmed its depopulated fields at home. The Roman empire fell as much from depopulation, caused by its own unwise policy, as from any other cause.

With the fall of this great empire began a remarkable shifting of populations, which has produced an extensive change in the distribution of races. The German tribes of the north of Europe rushed down and occupied the south. The Celtic race became crowded into minor localities, and population everywhere declined in consequence of this barbarian inflow. Subsequently the tribes of Arabia emerged from their desert and occupied a wide region of the earth, replacing the Germans in several localities. This movement proved a civilizing one, and the population of the region occupied greatly increased under the Arab rule. At a later period the nearly savage inhabitants of Northern Asia emulated these migratory movements, and poured forth in a cloud of Turks and Mongols that half depopulated wide regions of the south. This onslaught caused a permanent decrease in population, and several of the regions overflowed, once highly populous, are now in an almost desert condition. With the irruption of these shepherd tribes ended the great warlike migrations of mankind, and the existing populations of Europe and Asia are those which succeeded the close of this vast outrush from the deserts and the forests on the civilized realms of the ancient world.

But the population of the remaining parts of the

earth has been very greatly modified by a new series of movements, which succeeded these hostile raids. With the settling down of the seething elements of the European population, and the rise of a new civilization, commerce again raised its head, and a series of commercial migrations began, which have yielded still more vital results than the preceding warlike migrations. These movements were most strongly directed to America, whose broad lands were sought by the excess population of Europe. The native inhabitants of the New World vanished before this vigorous inflow, and civilization spread its refreshing waves over a continent which, during all preceding ages, had been in great part the home of savagery.

This modern migration, which has extended to many parts of the earth besides America, at first but little increased the world's population, but simply consisted in a replacement of the old by the new. But it had this essential difference from the warlike migration just described, that the latter was a replacement of civilization by barbarism, and hence eventuated in a decrease of population; while the former was a replacement of savagery and barbarism by civilization, and hence quickly began to display its effects in an increase of population. Improved methods of agriculture were applied, the hunting life was replaced by the herding, and quickly an addition to the world's store of food began to appear, rendering possible an increased population.

This increase has gone on with extraordinary rapidity. The fecundity of the human race has been fully demonstrated, since the slow increase of the population of Europe changed to a rapid growth as soon as the



cultivation of these new regions added essentially to the world's stock of food, while their descendants in America have grown into a separate population which rivals that of all Europe in the Middle Ages. Within the present century the increase here indicated has been enormous. In the year 1800 the combined population of Europe and America was something less than two hundred millions. In 1880 it was more than four hundred millions. If to this latter number be added the European populations of Australia, Africa, and other colonial regions, the civilized population of the world will be found to have much more than doubled since the beginning of the present century.

During the period named the uncivilized population has probably not decreased. The extensive addition to the world's population is simply a consequence of the increased food supply, resulting from improved agriculture and the greater justice displayed in the treatment of food producers. We may specify some of the items of the increase in the numbers of mankind. The population of England and Wales in 1200 has been estimated at two millions. In 1500 it was three million two hundred and fifty thousand, and in 1800, more than nine millions. This rapid rate of increase has been greatly augmented during the present century. In 1800, the population of Great Britain and Ireland was about sixteen millions. In 1880 it was thirty-four million five hundred thousand. The other kingdoms of Europe have not increased in this large proportion. Germany has considerably added to her population, but France has grown much more slowly. The population of France, in 1784, was twenty-four million eight

hundred thousand. In 1836 it was thirty-three million five hundred and forty thousand. In 1880 it was thirty-seven million six hundred and seventy-two thousand. This difference in rate of increase between France and England is not difficult to account for. France has continued to depend principally upon her own resources, and her increase is in close accordance with the increase of skill in food production at home. England has been the greatest of manufacturing and commercial countries, and her increased population is due to food obtained from abroad in barter, while her own fields are suffering much of the neglect which fell upon those of old Rome. It is an unnatural condition, for which she may yet pay as dearly as Rome did, though hardly in the same coin; for the tendency is now towards a return to the original condition of population, viz., a massing of numbers in each locality in accordance with its powers of food supply.

There are, in fact, influences at work which may seriously affect the distribution of population in the future. During the whole civilized period of the world, until now, reasons have existed for the transfer of food to distant regions despite the expense incurred. These reasons are losing their force. One of the potent causes in this movement of food was the forcible requisition of government. This has greatly lost its influence. In civilized lands tribute is no longer paid, and the purely capital cities have shrunk to their just proportions. Another cause was the demand for food in exchange for the manufactures of other regions. Afterwards arose a concentration of manufacture in certain localities, in which skilled labor and productive appliances were

abundant. This caused not only an inflow of food, but also of raw material, to be returned as manufactured goods. Thus arose the manufacturing centre.

The influences here enumerated are still at work, though with a rapidly decreasing energy. The expense of transport has always been an adverse element in the relations described, though submitted to in consequence of the great advantages gained. These advantages are ceasing to exist. Manufacturing skill is now widely distributed. Capital and machinery are abundant in all civilized lands. Nations and local regions are manifesting a growing disposition to manufacture their own raw material, and transport it themselves. Though the expense of transport is greatly reduced, it is still an item of importance in these days of general commercial and manufacturing activity. In consequence we may, with some assurance, look for a new and final shift in the world's population, in which all its artificial relations will vanish, and the original natural conditions be resumed.

Population must more and more tend to seek the regions of food production, in numbers accordant with the food supply. A similar tendency to centre within the regions of supply of the raw material of manufacture, or those of the most economical manufacture and exchange, must arise. A third, though less vigorous tendency, will be to centre in capital cities. A fourth tendency, which may become of considerable energy in the future, will act to the formation of centres of wealth, art, intellect, and pleasure. Other minor tendencies will exert their influences, while all that is artificial in the existing distribution of population must

gradually give way as civilization advances, and only such now existing conditions as are natural can be retained.

There is another important question respecting population, to which attention must now be given, that of checks to increase. The checks which act upon man in common with animals have been enumerated, but it has also been said that these checks have largely ceased to be operative. Man's long fight with the animal world is virtually at an end, and the destruction caused by wild beasts to the human race is reduced to an unimportant item. That caused by epidemic diseases and by famine is very greatly decreased. That resulting from elemental violence is of diminished importance. That arising from war, from intemperance, from neglect or destruction of children and old people, and from other such causes, has also greatly decreased. That coming from disease, exposure, etc., has declined before the developed medical and sanitary skill of the present day. Thus, with this great removal of the influences which kept in check human populations in the past, it would seem natural that they should now increase with unprecedented rapidity, as they are indeed doing in civilized lands.

In this connection the Malthusian doctrines become of importance. Malthus, a Scotch philosopher of the last century, propounded a theory of population which has been a stumbling block in the path of political economy ever since. According to his theory, the ratio of increase of food throughout the world is much less than that of the increase of population. Hence there is an inevitable tendency of population to press on

the food supply. He perceives but one sufficient check to the increase of population, namely, an increase of the death rate through absolute starvation, or the decimating effect of partial starvation. This condition has been reached frequently in past times. Population has pressed sharply on subsistence, the lower line of the human race has been mowed down remorselessly by hunger and its effects, and through this terrible agency the fecundity of mankind has been kept within bounds. Within the present age the same influence is at work in many parts of the earth, of which we may particularize the crowded empires of India and China. In the more enlightened lands it is now effective in only a minor degree. Scientific agriculture, and the discovery of fertile uncultivated regions, have caused a sudden and extensive increase in the food supply, and a possibility of far greater increase. As a result, the available supply is in excess of the demand, and centuries may pass ere a sharp pressure will be again produced. But if no other agencies become operative the final result must be inevitable. The population of the earth must increase until it presses sharply on the utmost possible limit of food production, when starvation will again act as a general checking agency. Such is the Malthusian doctrine, and such the undesirable destiny of mankind to which it points.

Fortunately Malthus did not fully consider the problem. There are other checking agents than starvation, as has been pointed out by later economists. There is such a thing as choking a river at its source, instead of waiting to drain its full current. An assault has been made on human fecundity, and with considerable

success. The check thus produced, ordinarily called the "prudential check," is an artificial, but an effective one. It operates through a cessation of early marriages, a decrease in the total ratio of marriages to population, and a wise effort to limit the number of children in accordance with the probable means of support. This prudential check is in active exercise in several parts of Europe, and has had a satisfactory influence upon the comfort of the inhabitants. Elsewhere it is neglected, and hunger remains the only check.

Some illustrative instances may be given. In ancient Rome marriage was strongly inculcated. The laws even made it in part obligatory. The increase of population through this means must have been an essential aid to the rapid progress of Rome, in its quick replacement of the numbers lost in war. The wide expansion of the Roman territory, and the frequent partial or complete destructions of old populations, also made room for a rapidly increasing people. In the days of the empire marriage was greatly neglected, though more through vice than prudence. Yet the population of the empire approached the starvation limit, on account of the neglect of home agriculture, and the diminution in food supply caused by crushing tribute. This decrease in food through neglect or cessation of agriculture necessarily reduced the population, and in the most distressing of all methods, that of a superabundant death rate through misery.

In India and China custom and religious doctrine have rendered early marriage obligatory. The Laws of Manu strongly inculcate marriage, and very early matrimony prevails in India. Early marriage is the universal

custom in China, and celibacy is considered disgraceful. The bachelor is looked upon with contempt. In consequence there is, in these countries, no artificial check to fecundity, population has grown enormously, and the starvation influence prevails as the only active check. In European countries we find this custom to prevail most fully in Ireland, and particularly in the most ignorant and impoverished strand of its population. Where the condition of the producer has been hopelessly reduced, and the feeling that it is impossible to leave his children worse off than himself has arisen, prudence fails to influence the marriage rate, and the peasant is apt to seize without restraint almost the only pleasure which life holds out to him. Among the depressed agricultural operatives of England the same principle acts. The former injudicious poor law in that country had a similar effect, in providing a harbor for the victims of imprudence and penury, and thus reducing the restraining influences. The ability to employ young children in productive pursuits, until recently, also acted to remove the restraints upon reckless marriage.

Elsewhere in Europe intelligent foresight acts more decisively, and the prudential check upon marriage is in active operation. Such is strongly the case in France, Switzerland, Norway, and Italy; and somewhat less so in Holland, Denmark, and the German states. It is not operative in Spain, whose cultivators, like those of England and Ireland, are servile laborers. For its active operation, indeed, some personal interest of the farmer in the results of his work is necessary. In Italy, where the land is worked on shares, under favorable conditions, and in France and elsewhere, where it is cultivated by

small proprietors, the prudential influence strongly acts. As Sismondi remarks, there is no danger that the proprietor will rear children to swell the ranks of the beggars. He knows exactly what inheritance he has to leave them, and a just family pride makes him abstain from summoning into life children for whom he can not properly provide. If too many are born, they do not marry, or they agree among themselves which of several brothers shall perpetuate the family. This state of things is found in several European countries, but most particularly in France, where, in consequence, the rate of increase of population is the slowest in Europe. It acts most effectively where there are no active manufactures to drain off the surplus population, and where the parents can most clearly foresee the future of their children.

In Belgium the population is rapidly increasing. Here, however, the limit of support has not been reached, and there is another vigorous influence at work, which operates also in Spain and Ireland. This is the influence of the Roman Catholic priesthood, who strongly oppose celibacy, but whose influence is inoperative in countries where the poor live in some degree of comfort and wish to transmit that comfort to their children. In Italy it is the custom, according to Sismondi, among the poor—as also in the higher ranks—that all but one of the sons of a family shall remain unmarried. In Denmark a young man's first ambition is to purchase a horse and cow, which he hires out. His next effort is to become a petty proprietor. Marriage is an after consideration. In Norway no man can marry until he can satisfy his clergyman that he



has a fair prospect of supporting a family. In Germany the conscription law hinders early marriage, and late marriage, as is well known, is never very prolific.

This important prudential check to human fecundity is not active only among the poor. It is practiced by the higher classes in Italy. Elsewhere it is strongly influential upon the middle classes, to whom their position in society and their accustomed luxuries are often stronger incentives than the pleasures of matrimony, while they are checked also by a feeling of shame in the thought of marrying without the power of supporting a wife in her accustomed station.

The operation of the prudential check to marriage thus yields much more desirable results than that of the starvation check. By its action populations are kept within the limit of comfort, instead of being limited by misery and disease. And this standard of comfort is constantly lifted higher as civilization advances, and what were originally luxuries become necessities. Its eventual result, if fully carried out, will be to lift all mankind beyond the reach of absolute want.

There is, however, another check to increase of population, to which almost no attention has been paid by political economists, yet which possibly may in time become a very important one. It is what may be called the physiological check, and differs from the prudential in being natural instead of artificial. Physiologists tell us that the human body possesses a general store of energy from which drafts are made for various purposes, mental, muscular, reproductive, etc. If any one of these functions be strongly exercised, the action

of the others will be correspondingly hindered. Regular muscular labor does not seem to interfere with human fecundity, but there is some reason to believe that active mental exercise does. It is certainly the case that the class of hand workers is more prolific than that of brain workers, and that the leisure classes have fewer children, as a rule, than the working classes.

This question has not been scientifically tested, yet it is known that the nobility in all countries tends to decrease, apparently through sterility. In every century there has been a thinning out of the British peerage, whose numbers have been hardly kept up by a frequent creation of new peers. Most of the original noble families have died out. The same thing was the case in ancient Rome. Of the noble families created by Cæsar and Augustus, scarcely one survived to the days of Tacitus. Malthus says that in the town of Berne, of four hundred and eighty-seven wealthy families, three hundred and seventy-nine became extinct in two centuries.

Other instances might be adduced, and numerous special cases could be named, in which the rulers, the generals, the statesmen, the scientists, and the authors of the world have left few or no descendants. The same rule we can see evidenced everywhere around us. It is a well known fact that persons constantly engaged in mental labor have small families as a rule, and often have no children; while the largest families belong to the class which does little of the world's thinking.

It would seem, therefore, that ease, cultivation, high living, mental activity, and similar conditions, tend to produce human infecundity. If this actually

is, as it appears to be, the case, one danger might arise from it, namely, that each new generation would be recruited chiefly from the more ignorant section of the community. But the cultivated class is recruited, in a growing degree, from the class below it. There is no question that the proportion of the thinking to the unthinking class is steadily on the increase. If human fecundity should decrease in consequence, and the total rate of increase of the population be thereby diminished, a highly desirable condition of human society must eventually result. The restraints upon increase of population have hitherto been misery, war, and disease, or a resistance to a natural instinct of mankind. All these restraints might be obviated if a natural decrease of fecundity should yield the same result. Under such conditions the prudential check need act only against too early marriages, through the desire to provide for a high standard of comfort in married life.

In a condition of society in which the activity of mankind is largely mental, and an excess of population is hindered by the combined physiological and prudential influences above described, the standard of human comfort must greatly advance. For in such a case the wealth of the community would accumulate more rapidly in proportion to the population than at present, and the natural share of each person be increased. In consequence physical misery and starvation might become unknown evils, human desires grow with the increase of culture, and luxuries which are now unattainable become necessities to the comfort of every individual in the happily organized society of the coming time.

There is another important aspect of the population question yet to be considered, that of classification. Society began, indeed, in a condition in which there was but one class. All men were equal in station, in ignorance, and in misery. Division, however, soon began, one of its early forms being an industrial distinction between the sexes. The women became laborers, the men hunters and warriors. Other divisions early displayed themselves. The war leader and the peace councilor appeared. The priest or sorcerer emerged. The slave dropped into his servitude. The manufacturer arose, as we have evidence in the history of the Indian tribes. The artist also appeared, and his work may still be seen on very ancient relics of the European aborigines.

At a later period these divisions had become much more strongly accented. The chance and temporary separation of the past became a permanent formation of classes. The king succeeded the chief. The priest replaced the sorcerer. The councilors of old became nobles. An army was differentiated from the populace. Industrial pursuits fell into the hands of men as well as of women, and became divided into pastoral, agricultural, and manufacturing vocations. The artist became an important member of the community. And finally, at a late period in the development of human society, the author appeared.

Coming on down through time, we discover a great degree of separation within the lines of each pursuit above described, while new conditions of classification appear. In fact, at the close of the history of the ancient world society had established an immense number

of minor divisions, within the limits of its fewer chief divisions. Along with this there was a vigorous tendency to make these divisions permanent, or to establish caste institutions. A great degree of success in this effort was attained in India. It was much less successful elsewhere, yet everywhere there was some disposition to confine certain families to certain occupations, and a much stronger one to rigidly retain the lines of rank division. The slave, the artisan, the noble, the royal family, all became hereditarily fixed in their ranks, and the artificial formation of society which arose was retained with all the force of the law and the army.

In modern times the ancient pursuits of mankind are still retained, though the subdivision has grown far more minute, while various new vocations have been added. This differentiation, in fact, is a natural result of human development, and promises to go on indefinitely. From the original generalized condition, in which every man served himself, and the occupations of all were alike, there has been a growing specialization, through the natural tendency of each person to confine his labor to the occupation for which he is best fitted, to supply others with that service which he can perform better than they, and to be supplied in repayment with the service which they can perform better than he. This is the principle which has led to the great diversity of condition and occupation of the present day, a diversity which must become still greater in the future, since through its influence the work of the world is constantly better performed, every man tending to do that one thing for which nature has best fitted him.

But side by side with this natural division of occupations there is an artificial division of ranks, which cannot be sustained, since it is opposed to the strongest desires and aspirations of mankind. At a very early period a movement towards a political separation of mankind began. It originated in force and has always owed its strength to force. The war leader quickly claimed special political privileges. At a later date other members of society demanded similar privileges, while still other members were deprived of all privileges. The division into king, noble, priest, artisan, and slave, was completed, with a descending scale of political privileges from the higher to the lower ranks of society. This division has been energetically retained, through all the civilized ages of the world, and is still vigorously held in many localities. At the present day industrial caste has disappeared, occupations may be freely changed, but rank divisions are strenuously maintained wherever possible.

Yet such political distinctions are artificial, and must yield to the constant pressure upward of the masses, as they have already yielded in republican nations. In the early periods of history we perceive very little indication of this pressure, though the occasional revolts and changes of rank show that it existed. In the days of Greece and Rome it was strongly manifested, and much of the history of the latter nation is occupied with the struggle between the masses and the nobles, and between the slaves and their masters. In Middle Age Europe rank classification was vigorously maintained by warlike energy. Yet the pressure of the masses for political privilege was unceasing, and

has produced its inevitable effect in a considerable breaking down of the lines of rank separation in Europe, and their complete disappearance in the United States, in which the just principle of the political equality of all men has finally been put into practice. Even here, however, a difference in political privilege still exists between men and women, and it is on this line that the battle is now being fought. It must succeed. Artificial distinctions can not be permanently retained in human society.

The conditions of classification of mankind have constantly changed from another cause, the pressure upwards towards a higher standard of comfort and of mental unfoldment, or an upgrowth of civilization from its lowest towards its highest ranks. In the earliest historical nations only the few were in any just sense civilized. The masses were in a barbarian condition. During all subsequent periods the relation of these classes has been changing. The numbers of the civilized upper class have been constantly recruited from below. Here the teacher has come in as an efficient aid in the development of man's mental energies. At present we see this tendency strongly declared. Men seek to escape from ignorance to knowledge, from poverty to wealth, from severe drudgery to light labor, and from physical to mental occupations; and their effort to do so is telling strongly upon the classification of mankind, adding constantly to the enlightened class, and as constantly decreasing the hand-working class. But the labor thus drafted away is replaced by the powers of machinery, and the supply of necessities is increasing despite this comparative

decrease of physical laborers. What may be the final result of this upsurging it is difficult to prewise. But it seems evident that the hand work of the past will be very greatly replaced by the head work of the future, and that the physical needs and pleasures of the past will be largely succeeded by the intellectual demands and enjoyments of the future.

No man has yet reached the summit of civilization, or of mental development, and as the masses move up from below those at the top will still press upwards to new levels of attainment. The motto of the human intellect is "Excelsior." There is no purpose too high for it to grasp at, no desire too extravagant for it to entertain. Its incessant effort can not but be effective in lifting civilization to ever loftier heights. As it rises, it also spreads. It is all-conquering. The savage races are disappearing before its outgrowth, or are rising out of their savagery. The older civilizations are becoming infiltrated with the spirit of the newer. Nature's restrictions are yielding to man's onslaught, and the whole of the earth's surface is becoming his empire. Step by step the population of the world is moving towards its ultimate stage of comfort, enjoyment and civilization.



## CHAPTER VI.

### GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL PROGRESS.

IT is a common apothegm of modern political philosophy, that "all men are created free and equal." This truth, perhaps fortunately for mankind, is not the whole truth. It is true only in the sense that all men are born with a natural right to personal freedom and to political equality. The political development of mankind is mainly due to the fact that in a very important sense all men are not created free and equal. For every man is, to a certain extent, the slave of hereditary tendencies and weaknesses which largely control his future life. If to these hereditary influences be added the beliefs and superstitions gained in education, we must admit that man's personal freedom of action is very largely limited. He is the slave of his passions, tendencies, and beliefs.

The equality of men is subject to the same restrictions. No two men are born mentally or physically equal. The utmost diversities exist in size, muscular strength and agility, and in personal attractiveness. Still greater diversities exist in the mental powers. Some men are mentally obtuse, others have vigorous powers of imagination or reason. Some are shrewd and secretive, others frank and confiding. Some have depth of thought, others facility of expression. Some are beyond, some on the level of, others behind their age, in

thought. Some have great, others little, mental attractiveness, so that often a mind of low caliber exerts a much greater immediate influence upon the movements of mankind than other minds of much greater depth. The thoughts of some men are seeds which germinate at once, and yield fruit in their own lifetimes. Those of others are seeds which can germinate only in the far future, slow of growth, but mighty and long-enduring in influence.

It is principally to this inequality of mankind that we must ascribe the political evolution which has gradually lifted the human race from the condition of savage individuality to the enlightened subordination of republican institutions. Had all men been alike mentally and physically their political progress would have been excessively slow, since it could have arisen only from inequalities produced by exterior circumstances, while man's personal actions would have tended to reduce, instead of to increase, these inequalities. But the native diversity in the powers of individual men has greatly aided the action of circumstances in producing diversity of human relations, and in causing that political and social heterogeneity which has had so much to do with the progress of mankind.

Whatever may have been the strictly primitive condition of the human race, it is not easy now to find instances of complete equality among savage tribes. Even in those which have no hostile relations with their fellow-tribes, inequalities of wealth and of skill and knowledge are apt to arise, which give to certain men an influence over their fellows. The family relation also gives to the husband, as the stronger, a control over

the wife and children. When hostile relations arise, the more able are sure to gain the position of leaders, and are likely to acquire an influence which will persist throughout their lives. Finally, when some form of religious belief is gained, the thinkers of the community become its teachers or priests, and control it by its superstitions.

It was in some one of these modes that the earliest form of political organization arose. Some condition of patriarchal, of military, or of religious leadership emerged from the original savage equality, as the germ of a future political inequality. In all organized savage or barbarian communities we find instances of the above relations. Sometimes the three forms of leadership are combined. The nomad shepherds possess a patriarchal organization. The idea of subjection to the father of the family has, with them, developed into the idea of subjection to the hereditary head of the clan. When hostile relations arise the head of the clan may become its leader, and thus add the power of military despotism to that of patriarchal authority. Such was the case in the leadership of Genghiz Khan, who was obeyed as at once the military and hereditary ruler of the Mongols. But Timur had military authority only. The family of Genghiz continued to be revered as the patriarchal head of the nomad empire.

Where, however, hostile relations are continuous, the patriarchal power tends to become lost in the military. The supremacy of military leadership quite overcomes that of hereditary authority. Great ability in the art of war is seldom inherited by the son from the father. Thus in actively hostile tribes new men are sure to

rise to the head, and the old patriarchal authority to gradually disappear. There has been, in fact, an interesting conflict in human history between the principles of heredity and of military supremacy. On the one hand, the son of an able ruler is sure to inherit some of the respect and obedience paid to his father. The transfer of the wealth of the chieftain to his son increases the influence of the latter. He is also likely to be specially trained in the arts of war and government. The influence of the father is exerted to secure his official position to the son. Thus the latter is born to an authority which gives him a special advantage over all competitors. As the art of government grows more complex, and the danger of leaving the throne open to competition greater, the principle of hereditary transmission strengthens, and is apt to become considered in time a natural, and even a divine institution.

On the other hand, there is a frequent disposition in successful military leaders to seize the throne. They have a controlling influence over the most powerful body of the state, the army. With every increase in size and training of this body the power of its leader grows, while the inevitable subordination of the army to its chief, and the separation of its interests from those of the other citizens, constantly imperil the security of the ruling powers.

The question, then, as to whether election or heredity shall be the mode of transmission of authority depends greatly on whether the state is a peaceful or a warlike one. In times of peace, the principle of heredity strengthens; in times of war, that of personal chieftainship. A change of dynasty means simply that the

latter political principle has triumphed over the former, and such a change is far more apt to arise in a warlike than in a peaceful state. Rebellion against the incompetency of a ruler is occasionally the work of a people, but far more frequently the work of an army. And even in this case the principle declares itself that heredity is a peaceful, election a warlike, institution; for the kind of ability which is placed upon the throne by election is nearly always the military, which often replaces a much superior ability in the arts of peaceful government.

Numerous historical instances of the working of this principle might be given. History is full of cases in which the military influence of a successful leader has led to the forcible seizure of the throne. If we take the history of China, for instance, we discover successive periods of peace and war. In the peaceful periods hereditary monarchs possess the throne. In the warlike periods this quiet transmission is almost in every case broken, and a new dynasty established by the force of military rebellion. The history of Rome is a curious one. It had no period that could fairly be called a peaceful one, and the principle of heredity never definitely displayed itself. For short periods the imperial power remained in the hands of single families with the consent of the army, but usually the army ruled the state, and elected its successful generals to the throne. In some few nations the principle of election became definitely established. Such was the case in ancient Parthia. Here the power remained in the hands of one family, but the ablest member of that family was elected to the throne. A somewhat similar method pre-

vailed in the Aztec empire. These two cases present a curious combination of the two principles of transmission of governmental authority, a compromise which must have worked well for the good of the state, and would have been highly useful if more generally adopted.

As the periods of peace in most states have been longer than those of war, and as the peaceful condition steadily gains upon the warlike in the progress of civilization, so the principle of hereditary transmission of the throne has grown more and more dominant in modern times. Cases of forcible overthrow of the kingly power have decreased in frequency, and in nearly every modern instance they have arisen through a revolt of the citizens, not of the army. England presents two instances of this character, in the revolt of the people against the Stuarts, while France presents several still later instances. Yet in both of the cases in England, and in the first one in France, a powerful military leader succeeded to the throne.

If we now come to a more special consideration of political development, we at once perceive a steady progress in the idea of national aggregation, and in the vigor and diversity of the links which bind men into nations. Human history began with utter disintegration. It may end with complete integration. Yet there seems to be a singular parallelism between the condition of the savage and that of the citizen of a modern republic. In the primitive stage each individual was politically the equal of every other individual. The same condition exists in the modern republic. It might seem, then, that the long intermediate ages of inequality were full of waste effort, if they have

simply reproduced the political equality with which man began his history.

This similarity, however, is in seeming only, not in fact. The republican is not free in the same sense as was the savage. His freedom is subordinate to that of the whole nation. He is free only in so far as his independence does not tend to limit that of his fellows. The savage was free without legal limitation. With him the idea of subordination as a duty did not exist. In short, the primitive savage bore to his fellows much the same relation which state now bears to state. Each state is a political unit in itself, and in its external relations is peaceful or hostile as best suits its own selfish interests. This was the exact status of every individual savage in the period antedating the beginning of human consolidation. Each man was a political unit, a separate state in himself. The analogy here is a curious one. Mankind not improbably began its political life in a condition of complete disintegration, in which every man was his own law-maker, judge, and executive, and in his relations with his fellows had only his own selfish interests to consider, while he was only controlled by fear of reprisal. This stage was succeeded by aggregations of men, and partial subordination of individuals. These aggregations increased in numbers, and there arose political inequality and violent subordination of individuals. In the principle of modern republicanism, however, internal political inequality is done away with, and violent is replaced by voluntary subordination. From the original condition in which each man was a state in himself, and made, interpreted, and executed his own laws, we have reached a stage of de-

velopment in which each man is an equal component of a state, and has an equal voice in the making, interpreting, and executing of the laws. But as the external relations of original man were based on the law of force and self-interest, so are those of modern states. The hostility of savage individuals has been succeeded by the hostility of states. In other respects the world is still in a transition period. The primitive equality is reproduced only in its political relations, not in its property relations. Inequality in wealth is now greater than ever before, and in this respect there is a wide difference between the primitive and the existing condition of mankind. It is quite possible that this difference will also in the future be obviated or greatly reduced, and also that the relations of force and menace between nations may be replaced by relations of mutual legal restriction and subordination of interests. If such a condition should arise it would constitute a virtual reduction of the whole world as one integral mass to the condition of the original savage as a single individual, and the primitive political and social equality by force would be succeeded by a final political and social equality of all mankind by law.

In the further pursuit of our subject some general consideration of the growth of inequality of possessions and privileges becomes desirable. This growth of inequality was largely a result of military action, and of the wealth and authority thus concentrated in single hands. In the barbarian empires only one political principle appeared. The state was an army. It was governed by military regulations, and with the despotic vigor of military command. The power of the chief arose largely



from his supremacy in war, and the laws which he promulgated were those necessary to control an army. In regard to the concerns of peace, the old tribal, clan, or patriarchal organization prevailed, and the chief had no control, the only subordination of the people being that of war-tribute in property or person. This subordination ceased when war ended. The coherence of the empire was that of an army. It fell asunder when it ceased to act as an army, while its units continued to sustain their tribal organization. Such was the constitution of the great nomad empires. They were welded by the sword, held together by the warlike vigor of a dominant tribe, and by the mutual interest of the members in the spoils of war, but were destitute of legal centralization, and each ceased to exist as a state the instant it had no further function as an army.

In agricultural peoples the principle of political subordination is much more complex. Men are controlled in more of their actions. The freedom of the barbarian individual is restrained only in minor particulars; that of the civilized individual in major particulars. Stringent laws control his industrial employments. The ruler ceases to be the mere head of an army, and enforces his authority in affairs of peace as well as in those of war, and by political arts as well as by military energy. In following up the history of mankind we find this subordination of the subject to the ruler to grow successively more and more stringent. The condition of the people tends to become that of virtual slavery under an irresponsible despot.

Again, as a result of conquest, actual slavery is introduced. The conquered are made subject in all par-

ticulars to the will of the conquerors. Such a process of enslavement kept pace with the growth of all early civilizations, until it reached its climax in the Roman empire, in which nearly the whole body of agriculturists became slaves. Such is, indeed, the natural succession of events in the growth of civilization. Men, at first free in all their relations, become subordinate to a chief in their military relations, and subsequently subordinate to superiors in their property and personal relations. Step by step this subordination grows more stringent and more general. It is a process of gradual enslavement which may end in complete subjection to authority, and the utter subordination of the working class of an empire to the ruling and military classes. Such was virtually the case in the later Roman empire.

This condition is followed by a reversal of the process. The subjects begin forcibly to claim their lost privileges. Men slowly regain their individual freedom, despots slowly lose their authority. After the fall of the Roman empire, enslavement of the people long continued under the feudal regulations of the new states that succeeded. But as intelligence increased men gradually asserted their natural rights. The complete subordination of the slave was succeeded by the partial subordination of the subject; the complete authority of the despot by the partial authority of the limited monarch. These two lines of change constantly approached, the subject resuming his lost political and property rights, the rulers and nobles losing their usurped privileges, until the converging lines finally met in the republic, in which every subject became the political equal of the ruler. The long cycle of change

thus completed itself, man passing through the phase of entire inequality on his upward path from the equality of force to the equality of law.

The main agent in human subordination has been the army. The opportunities of the despot arose from war. With every increase in the discipline, strength, and destructiveness of the army the ability of the monarch to tyrannize over his peaceful subjects augmented. The most stringent despotisms have always been those in which the class distinctions between army and people were most complete, the interests of the soldier most identified with those of the ruler, and the strength and compactness of organization in the army most in excess of that of the people. In this, as in all the fields of human development, there are natural laws of change which inevitably control the result. Originally, as we have said, there was no subordination of the subject by the aid of the army, because the whole state was an army. The only subordination in the great pastoral kingdoms was that necessary for military discipline. The ascendancy of the ruler was that of the general only. This condition was succeeded in the military despotisms of agricultural communities by a separation of the army as a class, and its employment not only in foreign war, but as a means of oppression of the industrial class. But the growth of civilization and the relations of modern kingdoms have introduced a new form of this principle. The strength of the army at all times has been limited by the power of production of the community, and its ability to support an unproductive class. This productive ability has so increased in modern times that the possible

strength of armies has greatly augmented. There has been a partial reproduction of the old condition in which the army was the state. In the European monarchies of to-day this condition has been almost completely reproduced, in the new theory that every subject must devote a portion of his life to the army, must undergo military discipline and be taught the use of arms.

Is not despotism in this forging the weapon to destroy itself? The class distinction between soldier and subject must disappear when every subject becomes a soldier, and again, as of old, the state becomes the army. The primitive military relation is returning, by an inevitable law of progress, and with it may return the primitive political relation, of the supremacy of the ruler in war, and of the people in peace. When war ceases in such a national organization the authority of the chief declines, and despotism must die out when the reign of peace is fully inaugurated. Such may be one of the fluctuations in the tide of human affairs. The modern theory of preparation for war may destroy the chain by which the limbs of the people have been so long fettered, and yield them the power to regain their usurped liberties. In a nation of trained soldiers the army can no longer play the tyrant.

It is not difficult to perceive why so much greater a degree of subordination is possible in an agricultural than in a pastoral state, apart from the above reason of the separation into military and artisan classes. In the agricultural community wealth tends to become personal instead of collective, fixed instead of movable. Among

pastoral tribes, in which the wealth is general to the community, and personal possessions of trifling value, the fear of the loss of property, which induces so many men to submit to oppression, but slightly exists. The resistance to loss of property is not personal but tribal, and thus is far more efficient. And the movable character of pastoral property enables the nomad to readily escape from oppression.

In the earlier agricultural tribes the land was held in common, and was so abundant that one district could readily be abandoned for another. Thus there was the same security for personal liberty as that possessed by the shepherd tribes. In the village communities of later date the density of population hindered any such ready abandonment of the tilled fields. The inhabitants thus became more immediately subject to the will of the ruler. Yet even in the village communities which have continued to our own times a degree of local self-government has been retained, though it applies now principally to agricultural affairs.

As civilization advanced this holding of property in common died out in most nations. Land and other wealth became individual instead of communal property. Each man stood alone, with his own interests to defend or his own safety to purchase. This result, by breaking up the common interest in property, undoubtedly rendered oppression and spoliation easier tasks to the despot, from the selfish individualism which it produced. But on the other hand, when vegetable productions ceased to be the main elements of wealth, and large quantities of manufactured goods, of gold and jewels, were held by the people, wealth again became movable,

and in a measure capable of concealment. Personal freedom increased in consequence. Despots had to trust to moderate taxation for their revenues, since immoderate taxation caused wealth to disappear. Only the produce of the fields lay helpless before the tax gatherer. Consequently, in all ages, despotic oppression has borne most heavily on the agriculturist, and least heavily on the inhabitants of cities.

Thus from primitive individualism, in which there was no ruling power, men passed into communism, under the control first of a local, then of a general head. The nomads are still in this stage. The civilized races emerged into a new individualism, under a despotic political head. From that time forward individualism has grown more complete and diversified, while despotism has declined. Finally, in the most advanced nations, the power has returned into the hands of the people, and the republic of to-day is the true successor of the village community of the past.

## CHAPTER VII.

### EVOLUTION OF THE ANCIENT TYPE OF EMPIRE.

IN the preceding chapter some of the general principles of the political progress of mankind were considered. In the present it is designed to review the origin and development of political institutions. Any such review, however, must begin at a somewhat advanced stage of the process, since in most cases the earlier stages have vanished, and can only be regained by the questionable method of conjecture. The conditions of savage and barbarian life are now being studied by numerous able writers, and possibly this study may lead in time to some satisfactory acquaintance with the institutions of primitive human society. With our present knowledge, however, no very definite conception of these institutions can be attained.

Possibly the earliest condition of human combination was similar to that of the social animals generally,—that is, an association for mutual aid and defence. Originally it may have been as simple as the herding of wild horses or cattle, the mere natural tendency of social animals to live in groups. The conditions displayed by existing savages are no just example of primitive institutions. These conditions have arisen through ages of slow development, and very dimly indicate the character of the original association. Rights of property were doubtless unknown, except perhaps an individual claim

to the ownership of tools, weapons, and ornaments. Rights of government were equally unknown, except possibly the temporary leadership of some strong or skilful hunter or warrior.

But within this vague association there originally existed, or gradually developed, a more definite compound, that of the family. The origin of the family association is one of the most debated and most uncertain of anthropological questions, and it is still unsettled whether the family developed from an original promiscuity of the sexes, or whether it is as ancient as mankind. However that be, it certainly grew more definite as time advanced, society becoming divided into distinct family groups, which replaced the older associations, and formed the germ of all later political combinations. The tie of blood was closer than that of race, and blood relatives were more apt to dwell together, to hold possessions in common, and to pursue similar objects, than the members of a common race. The very ancient system of the vendetta, or blood revenge, indicates such a primitive banding into family groups for mutual protection, and a degree of hostility to other family groups.

This organization of mankind on the basis of the family is the condition which we very generally perceive on man's first emergence into historical view. It is clearly displayed throughout Europe, Asia and America, in the more advanced savage, in all the barbarian, and in several of the civilized communities, and the more distinctly the less they have been subjected to disturbing influences. This organization, it is true, can not be traced in the archaic civilization



of Egypt and Babylonia. These empires break upon us full grown. Their days of infancy are lost in the mists of antiquity. Their history begins with the pyramid and the temple, not with the stone weapon. Yet the character of their governments indicates that another influence than that of the family played an important part in their formation, and that paternal had become secondary to priestly authority. In India and China, on the contrary, the influence of the primitive family organization is clearly defined, as clearly, indeed, as if these governments had been but recently formed. In the other early empires the same influence is manifested, though it became greatly affected by other political forces.

In fact, as shown in the preceding chapter, two other powerful influences entered into the formation of all the ancient empires, which disturbed, and in ~~some cases~~ completely changed, the course of political evolution. These influences were those of the church and the sword, each of which sought for political control. In certain cases these secondary forces availed themselves of and preserved the antique family organization. In other cases they set it aside, partly or completely, and established governments on a distinctly different basis.

It is with the growth of the family governmental principle, however, that we are here immediately concerned. In the three races of mankind which inhabited Asia at the dawn of history, the Aryan, the Turanian, and the Semitic, the political organization was more or less distinctly an outgrowth of that of the family. Sections of two of these races still exist in their

archaic condition—the Turanians of Central Asia, and the Semites of the Arabian desert—and their primitive organization still persists as the patriarchal family. The organization of the early Aryans has also been preserved to the present day, in the village communities of India and Russia. In all these cases the family relation is evident, though less sharply so than in the far past. In the lapse of ages other influences have crept in and partly masked the basic relation of these communities, but have by no means obliterated the traces of their original character.

The family organization of primitive society separated, however, at a very early period, into two distinct branches. And this separation has had a vital influence upon all the subsequent history of mankind, although, so far as we are aware, its wide-reaching effects have not yet been pointed out by any historical critic. One of these two forms of organization was that displayed by the Semites and Turanians—the patriarchal. The other was that of the Aryans—the village community. In the former the tribal group continued to represent a single family unit, under the leadership of the patriarch, or hereditary representative, of the original ancestor. In the latter the tribal group became a copartnership of several family units; an association of families, each under its hereditary head. The distinction between these two forms of social organization was not at first a strongly declared one. In both, the leader of the community seems to have gained his position by election, and to have had no political prerogatives beyond those possessed by the heads of the minor families. But in the patriarchal tribes this leader was looked

upon as the representative of the primitive ancestor, and became invested with a degree of paternal authority and hereditary claim to his office; while these influences had far less dominance in the choice of the chief of the Aryan group, and have vanished from the modern village community. In the later development of these two forms of organization—that of nomadic clans into hordes, and of families and villages into tribes—the same distinction prevailed. The leader of the pastoral horde had a paternal authority; that of the Aryan community had only the power derived from election, with some minor degree of hereditary claim to the office. The nomads looked up to their Khan with pride, as the representative of their genealogical head, and were far more likely to submit to despotic acts on his part than were the Aryans to similar acts from their leader, who was one of themselves, and derived his main right to command from their votes.

In these two antique forms of the family organization we can perceive the germs of the two subsequent types of political society, the despotic and the democratic. In its development the patriarchal organization became more and more that of a single great family, under a chief with hereditary rights, as the paternal head of the community. It finally unfolded into the Asiatic despotism. The Aryan organization became more and more distinctly an association of equal families, whose chief was the elected head of one of these families, and possessed no patriarchal authority. Its early unfoldment was into the Greek and Roman democracies, and into the disorganized political condition of early India.

Though the Aryan organization was the highest in principle, it seems to have been the least progressive. At any rate it is a singular fact that the early empires of the world emerged from the pastoral tribes, with their patriarchal organization, while the Aryans remained, for many centuries afterwards, politically unprogressive. This result, indeed, is not extraordinary. The patriarchal organization was far better adapted to national consolidation than that of the village. The latter, with its democratic leveling of authority, vigorously opposed the despotic supremacy of individuals. The former specially aided the growth of individual supremacy. The patriarch was a hereditary ruler from the first, and thus had the opportunity for that growing usurpation of authority which is broken at every successive election of the head of a tribe organized on the Aryan system. In both cases war and the subjection of conquered tribes added to the authority of the chiefs. But the patriarchal authority, in connection with the religious influence which it early associated with itself, was in the direct line of despotic monarchical authority. It needed but an extension of its original principle to become a despotism. Such was not the case with the Aryan organization. Two of the main essentials of despotism were here wanting, paternal and religious headship. There was but little sense of subordination among the freemen of Aryan communities. Each head of a family felt himself to be the political equal of the chief, who held his office only by the free suffrage of his followers, and could not claim it by hereditary right. It was not easy for the chief to make himself a despot nor for political organization to ad-

vance in the communal democracies. The formation of a centralized nationality, so easily established under the unity of the patriarchal system, was opposed by the whole energy of the principle of elective chiefship, and it is significant that we perceive great kingdoms growing up from the patriarchal races while the Aryans continued in the state of disjoined tribes. The former system yielded a series of archaic civilizations, which held their ground for thousands of years, during which the Aryans displayed but minor traces of political progress.

One of these archaic civilizations still exists, that of China, and still yields striking indications of its origin. It is not enough to say that the government of China developed from the patriarchal organization. It is the patriarchal organization. As the language of China still retains its primitive form, so does its system of government. The emperor is the patriarch of the nation. He is, in a direct sense, the father of his people, and the principle of paternal authority runs through the whole organization of the empire, from the emperor down to the humblest citizen. Filial respect and obedience, paternal power, and the severest punishments for any infringement of this principle, are the skeletal elements of the government. The emperor may order personal chastisement to his highest officers without the latter feeling a sense of shame, or without any change in the familiarity of his relations with them. He stands to them in the position of a father to a disobedient son whom he has been obliged to punish. There is none of the bitter sense of degradation which a high officer in an European king-

dom would experience in such a case, nor of the social ostracism which might result. The native religion of China points to the same origin. It is the worship of ancestors. In short, the whole state organization of China is the patriarchal, and indicates its original establishment by a patriarchally organized nomad horde, which conquered the country, and expanded its system of family government into the government of a nation.

There are nominal grades of nobility in the Chinese empire, but the nobles are such only by title. They are destitute of authority. The members of the hereditary nobility formerly had power as well as title. At an early period China was divided into a number of hostile states, or of feudal provinces. These were finally subordinated by the most powerful, and their rulers became local or feudal governors under the supreme prince. If this was the origin of the hereditary Chinese nobility, the influence of the patriarchal organization is strongly shown in their gradual decline to the common level, and the establishment of the complete supremacy of the father of the nation. Politically, all below the emperor are equal, and governmental positions are filled by competitive examination, the ablest being chosen, and holding their positions for life. The emperor is the spiritual as well as the temporal head of the people. As the head of the family alone holds direct relations with the ancestral deities, so he alone can hold direct intercourse with heaven. The petitions of his subjects must be addressed to the gods through him. They cannot hope in any other manner for communication with the heavenly powers.

But the emperor, if supreme over the people, is not supreme over the laws. He must conform to the old statutes of the empire, and the people do not feel themselves bound to obey an emperor who governs them badly. This is a direct survival from the primitive system of government, in which the body of ancient usages forms the laws, and the chief has only executive power. The singular conservatism of the Chinese people is shown in all these particulars. Both their language and their system of government remain in a primitive stage. The government is, in principle, even less advanced than that of the modern nomads, among whom the paternal and spiritual features of the patriarchal system have largely vanished. The Chinese seem to have become petrified, in language and government, into an archaic form of human culture.

This condition is probably a result of their long isolation from external civilizing influences. They form the one nation of the world that has pursued its course of development almost alone. Their external relations have been chiefly with the Mongol hordes, whom they resemble politically, and from whom no new ideas could be gained. The only vigorous influence of external civilizations upon China has been that of Buddhism. The rapid and extensive spread of this religious system shows plainly that the Chinese are readily susceptible to the influence of new ideas, and that their long stagnation is principally due to isolation, though doubtless partly to their peculiar and inflexible system of government.

If we come now to the consideration of the Egyptian civilization, certain interesting parallels with that

of China are apparent. Whoever were the first settlers of Egypt, its situation in the midst of shepherd tribes is an argument in favor of their having been of nomad origin. At all events, we know that in two historical instances—that of the Hyksos shepherd invaders, and that of the Jews—pastoral influences affected the government of the empire. It is by no means improbable that prehistoric agencies of the same character may have influenced the government in its formative stage, even if it did not develop originally from a shepherd tribe. But the character of the Egyptian government indicates that religious was yet stronger than paternal influence in its origin. There is much reason to believe that it was molded under the authority of a ruling head of the priesthood, and that the political conditions to which this gave rise were stronger than those arising from paternal patriarchy. It is with the latter, however, that we are here mainly concerned. The consideration of the effect of the priestly authority must be left for a future chapter.

Egypt was, in its early historic period, as isolated as China. Its communications were mainly with the shepherd tribes, and its wars with the barbarian kingdoms of the south. Its governmental system, while based on an intricate religious organization, of which the emperor was the acknowledged head, bore certain close analogies to that of China. It is doubtful if the early kings possessed despotic power, though the later kings became completely autocratic. Some of the original feeling of independence of the nomads perhaps long persisted, and the leaders of the separate hordes which combined to form the nation may have been repre-



sented by the powerful hereditary aristocracy, of whose existence we find indications at early historic dates. Possibly these nobles were originally the heads of minor states, which became subordinated by the conquering energy of the most powerful. But we perceive this nobility disappearing with the lapse of time, and the monarch becoming absolute. Under the Empire scarcely any trace of a hereditary nobility remains. Even the princes had ceased to be a royal clan, and could claim no authority as the king's sons. This disappearance of a hereditary aristocracy, and complete subordination of the people to the monarch, has no parallel in modern governments. Its occurrence both in Egypt and China indicates a close resemblance in their political principle, and a distinct difference from the modern principle of government. If in China it was a result of the patriarchal system, then in all probability it had the same cause in Egypt.

Egypt, however, did not possess the effective Chinese system of competitive examination of candidates for office. The offices, it is true, were not confined to a class. The son of the poorest citizen might, as in China, by successful scholarship attain to the highest dignities. Yet the appointment and dismissal of officials remained solely in the hands of the monarch. In consequence a deep corruption invaded the public service, which perhaps had much to do with the decay of the empire. From this there gradually arose a division into classes, which was impossible under the Chinese system, and which was not unlike the class separation in some modern European states. It had none of the rigidity of the Hindoo caste system, to which it has been

often compared. Egypt was practically, if not nominally, composed of a great governing high priest and patriarch and his national family, whom he rewarded and punished at his will, and to whom he was the immediate vicegerent of heaven. The honor which was paid to parents likewise indicates an original paternalism, of the character of that of China, and points to a similar nomadic origin of the monarchy. This patriarchal system was repeated in most of the great governments of that region of the ancient world. The Babylonian government, probably of nomadic origin, and undoubtedly influenced by that of Egypt, resembles it in character, so far as we know anything about its organization. Of course the constant influx of foreign elements to which Babylonia was subjected must have exerted a vigorous molding influence upon its political system. The only mode in which an exposed state, in that day, could sustain itself was by successful war, and successful war leads always to an increase of monarchical power. Hence in warlike Assyria we find a despotic authority possessed by the ruler in excess of that which appears in the Egyptian state. In the later Asiatic states a combination of these principles appears, the authority of a paternal head, the influence of a spiritual superior, and the despotism of a successful military leader. Every new empire adopted the Egyptian idea, even when it had no basis in the primitive institutions of the people. In the Persian, the Macedonian, and the Roman empires alike there was a combined despotic and religious supremacy, the monarch being at the head of all the institutions of the state. It was no new idea of Alexander and the Roman emperors when they claimed

to be gods. It was the ancient patriarchal idea, but they seized upon it, either through shrewdness or conviction, as the true relation which they bore to their people. In all these cases the power of the emperor tended towards absolutism, and to the suppression of all hereditary intermediate authority between him and the people, the nobility disappearing as a privileged class as the power of the emperor grew.

This political principle appears generally in the nations of Asia, with the exception of India, Parthia, and Palestine. The Parthian kingdom was organized on the Aryan type, though its people were Turanian nomads. The separate tribal organizations here remained intact, the monarch being elected by the tribes, and his power limited. The same was the case with the Hebrews. Long after their settlement in Palestine they continued to exist as independent tribes, the power of the patriarch being limited, and the people retaining much of the personal freedom of the desert life. The priestly power with them became organized in advance of the monarchical, and never became subservient to it, Church and State being often in antagonism. The Church, in the person of Samuel, dethroned Saul, the first king, whom it had crowned, and placed David on the throne. In the later history of the Jews we hear as much of the prophet as of the king, the two powers steadily remaining separate.

The Arabian empire was strictly patriarchal. The Caliph was at once political and spiritual head of the nation. His government was an outgrowth of the paternal organization which had existed for ages in Arabia. The same may be said of the Turkish empire.

In this the patriarchal system of the Turanian nomads was the basic idea of the governmental organization.

In fact, in all the important Asiatic governments, with the exceptions named, and in the organization of the Macedonian and Roman empires, the influence of a single original principle of human organization appears. The patriarchal system of single headship, and of the equality of all below the head, is the ruling idea of government. It was, of course, in the later governments, much influenced by other conditions, yet to be considered, and in Greece and Rome it had the democratic Aryan system to contend with. But in these latter countries it established itself by conquest, as in the earlier states it grew up from barbarism. Democratic Rome was as much conquered by its emperors as democratic Greece was by the Macedonian despot.

In the history of these empires of the ancient world, and of the more modern governments of Asia, we see the results of this first-developed system of civilized organization. It seems to have led inevitably to the suppression of all intermediate grades of hereditary authority between the monarch and the people, to the centering of all power in the hands of the monarch, and to the direct outflow from him of all governing authority, as the head of the church, the father of the people, and the imperial owner of all their possessions. This principle has been the bane and the ruin of all Asiatic governments, the one crushing weight under which they could not hope to rise. In China alone has it long sustained itself, under the only principle which could give it vitality. Elsewhere other potent influences worked their way in, ideas derived from more progres-

sively organized states. The steady course of all such governments has been, and is, downward towards decay through irremediable imperfections. Even China, vital as its organization has proved, is now falling into utter political corruption. The pure coin of its competitive system is being debased by government appointment of venal officials. It is sustained by the industry and activity of its people, but the government itself is in the last stages of dry-rot. The only other extensive patriarchal government which yet exists, that of Turkey, is a mass of festering decay, which would ere now have fallen to pieces but for the threads of European policy that sustain it.

The first system of civilized government, the patriarchal, has been tried and found wanting. It has inevitably ended in corruption and decay. The second system, which we may here call the Aryan, is everywhere succeeding it, and apparently with a very different destiny, since it is constantly tending to vigor instead of decay, to purity instead of corruption. It is the latest birth of the organizing intelligence of mankind, and seems to bear within itself the seeds of unceasing progress, as its predecessor was full of the seeds of decay. The word of destiny has gone forth that the last shall be first in this as in all the productions of the human intellect.

We have so far confined our attention to the underlying principle of these ancient governments, and its results. We have now to consider the secondary machinery by which these results were produced. The patriarchal family is, in its primitive stage, a family of equals, with little or no political subordination to the head of the

tribe. The growing power of the chief comes from a secondary instrumentality, that of war. The disposition of men to infringe upon the liberties of their fellows is so common an attribute as to seem a natural one. Even with all the legal safeguards of modern republics against this tendency, it is everywhere manifested. Every petty official is apt to violate the law which it is his duty to sustain, for the purpose of enriching himself or of showing his authority. The wealthy are everywhere inclined to trample upon the rights of the poor. It needs a constant watchfulness in the people to guard against these insidious usurpations of power. Yet if such be the case now, in the midst of modern intelligence, morality, and legal restriction, it must have been far more the case and far more effective in the ignorance, immorality, and lack of defined law of barbarian communities. The head of a clan or tribe undoubtedly often went beyond his delegated authority. The common property of the clan became, to some degree, the personal property of its leaders. Doubtless by unopposed petty acts of usurpation a degree of power finally attached to the office which was no part of its original character.

But in addition to the thirst for power there is another thirst, that for wealth, which has much to do with the transformation of human society. The disposition to usurp power and to seize upon property, which manifests itself even in a community of kindred, is still more strongly manifested in relation to separate communities, and is a main cause of war. Hostile relations, from time immemorial, have displayed themselves between pastoral clans and tribes. The property of the weaker has been forcibly seized, and the

persons of the conquered have been often reduced to subjection or slavery. In war the power and wealth of the leader visibly augments. There is a necessary subordination of his followers which gives him increased authority at home. The lion's share of the spoils of conquest falls into his hands. And finally, the subordination of the conquered is less to his tribe than to himself personally. A growing usurpation of authority arises in the relations of a conquering leader to subject tribes which there is no power and little disposition to check.

Such are the first steps towards despotism. In pastoral society they never produced other than military subordination and the claim to tribute. The nomad has never submitted to control in his personal actions except in times of actual war. Yet the sentiment of the paternal authority and single supremacy of the leader became far more effective in its consequences when nomad tribes seized on arable regions and exchanged pastoral for agricultural pursuits. Wars continued at home and abroad. The power and wealth of the chief constantly augmented. The increase of the people caused the separation of a distinct military class, which afterwards served as an efficient agent in the suppression of the liberties of the industrial classes. Thus the original delegated authority of the leader of the tribe became the despotic authority of the emperor of a nation, whose supremacy in time became unquestioned. Yet even in the most complete of these patriarchal autocracies, the Chinese, certain of the original relations of the clan and its leader persist. His authority is looked upon as that of a father, he is ex-

pected to conform to the old laws of the empire, and to govern with judgment and discretion, and the Chinaman no more feels himself in duty bound to obey a bad king than does the tribesman to submit to an unjust leader.

It must not be imagined, however, that great empires arose as early results of warlike aggression. No small exercise of human intelligence is needed to control a vast body of people, and a long schooling in the art of government was requisite ere the necessary principles of national organization were understood. Probably the patriarchal clan was long the highest result of human intelligence in this direction. From this gradually grew up the combination of clans into tribes, of tribes into hordes, and of hordes into nations, as we perceive in the history of the nomads of Asia. The vast aggregation of barbarians which Genghiz Khan held together, simple as its organization was, would have been impossible in the more primitive days of barbarism. In savage America we perceive instances of the same growth. Every degree of aggregation is displayed, from the family groups of the Brazilian savages to the clans, the tribes, and the confederacies of various North American races, the upward growth reaching its culmination in the national aggregations of Mexico and Peru.

In the history of the agricultural states of the Eastern world this growth of governing ideas is equally manifested. They began in minor communities, which were only slowly aggregated into empires. The dim pages of early history yield us indications of this process. China was at first divided into warring states,



which only at a comparatively late period became united into a single kingdom. Vague evidences of the same slow concentration appear in the early history of Babylonia. The earliest history of Egypt is far beyond our reach, yet there is reason to believe that the final empire was preceded by several separate states which, at an early period, may have been small and numerous.

In Syria this primitive condition is historically manifest. Here the Bible becomes to us a valuable work of history. In its pages we perceive the Syrian territory, and to some extent the Babylonian, to be divided up into numerous minor states. These were frequently at war with one another, and in consequence of this hostility arose the most primitive form of state aggregation with which we are historically acquainted, namely, the walled city of defence, surrounded by its agricultural district. The defensive city probably began in mountainous regions with a rampart, in plains with a block-house or hill fort; but as population increased, and the territory of each separate community widened, the fort must have expanded into the walled stronghold, inhabited by the head of the state with his soldiers and officials, and probably by all whose duties did not require their presence in the fields.

And as the nomad clans combined to form tribes, so we behold the minor states forming confederations for warlike assault or defence. Such is the first step towards extended political organizations which history reveals to us. A very interesting example of this stage of organization may be found in the fourteenth chapter of Genesis, in which we behold a confederation of

the kings of Babylonia and the adjacent regions, led by Chedorlaomer, king of Elam, against the Syrian kings of Sodom, Gomorrah, Admah, Zeboiim, and Bela, whom they conquer and hold in subjection for twelve years. It is not necessary here to repeat the story of the subsequent rebellion, and of the conflict of "four kings with five." But a highly interesting sequel of the affair, as showing the minor importance of these kingships, is given in the action of Abraham, who is said to have pursued and completely defeated the associated kings with his servants, amounting to only three hundred and eighteen men. This story takes us back to a very early stage in the political association of the agricultural races.\*

Certainly the original Syrian and Babylonian states were minor affairs when four kings, leading their forces to war, could be put to complete rout by a handful of shepherd nomads, such as the patriarch Abraham led. Each of these states was perhaps but a city, with its immediately surrounding territory. Yet this story yields indications of the successive steps of imperial aggregation. First hostile relations between neighboring communities. Then confederation of communities for assault or defence. Hostility usually ended in the subjection of some of these communities to others of

\*Recent research into Babylonian history indicates the existence of a powerful state at a much earlier period. Sargon, who ruled, as the records seem to show, about 3750 B. C., appears, at this very remote date, to have frequently invaded Syria, and to have even reached and conquered Cyprus; while his son, Naram-Sin, invaded the Siniatic peninsula, whose mines had probably long before been worked by Egypt. Yet the state of affairs in early Biblical times, as above stated, indicates that this early imperial unity could not have been persistent. It may have been a counterpart of the illy-consolidated nomadic monarchies, which were sustained only by the genius of single great leaders, and were quickly succeeded by the old tribal division and independence.

special warlike vigor. Temporary leagues of states led to permanent confederations, controlled by one leader, and capable of more vigorous hostile movements. Organizations of minor into larger communities undoubtedly took place in both of these methods, by confederation and by conquest. The latter was probably the most effective, since it resulted in a subordination of the subjects to the authority of a single ruler. The natural result of this system of aggregation we can perceive in the constitution of the earliest empires. Their subject states preserved their old laws, customs, and organization, and were only required to pay tribute in men and money. The subjection as yet was military only, and no idea of civil subordination had arisen. It was the nomad nation repeated in agricultural regions. Large numbers of men were held in subjection by the sword long before any but the crudest efforts were made to hold them by the law, and civil organization was as yet confined to the affairs of minor communities.

These remarks, however, do not apply to Egypt, which had passed through its preliminary phases of government in the prehistoric ages, and was to a considerable extent a law-governed community while yet the inhabitants of the adjacent Asiatic plain were slowly forming the primitive empire of the sword. So far as we can deduce from history, Egypt, during this period, remained politically isolated from Asia. There are indications of long-continued peace, broken only by occasional wars with the unquiet African tribes. This period of Egyptian history ended with an invasion and conquest by Asiatic nomads, and the long subjection of

Egypt to Shepherd kings. Several centuries of hostility succeeded ere these conquerors were expelled. And now we see Egypt suddenly taking a new position in the history of the world. Home wars with the invaders seem to have changed her from a peaceful into a warlike kingdom. Large armies had been formed, experienced leaders had arisen, and a thirst for foreign conquest grew up. The ambitious emperors of the XVIII. dynasty led their armies into Asia, possibly with some idea of preventing further invasions from that quarter, but more probably stirred by that thirst for military glory which has been so full of mischief and misery to mankind.

The arms of Egypt were carried over Palestine and Syria, and onward until distant Assyria and Babylonia were invaded and subjected. Thus was produced the first of the great empires of the world. Naturally it was the crudest and least consolidated. The subject peoples were required to pay tribute, but in every other respect they remained as distinct units as before their conquest by Egypt. It was an empire without centripetal cohesion, and fell to pieces with the withdrawal of the army that made it.

The early Assyrian empire had no more political cohesion than that of Egypt. But warlike aggression was an accident in Egyptian history; it was the rule in that of Assyria. The history of this later kingdom was a series of annual insurrections and annual raids, and the empire held together because the army was never withdrawn. Assyria developed through war. Its situation exposed it to constant assaults from the mountaineers of the Zagros range, and perhaps from the

fierce tribes of the Persian highlands. There must have been some efficient cause of its warlike tendency, and this may have been the cause. Agricultural nations grow warlike only through the pressure of necessity. We seem to perceive the Assyrians, grown bold and aggressive through conflict with their turbulent neighbors, at first subduing these mountain foes, and then turning their disciplined valor against the cities of the plain. One by one the minor states fell before them. Nor did their conquering vigor cease until Babylonia, and all of Syria to the Mediterranean, were loosely incorporated into a great Assyrian Empire.

This empire, like the old Egyptian, was a "government of kings." Its subjection was military only, not civil. And the same remark applies, in a large measure, to all the subsequent Asiatic kingdoms which ruled over that region, the Median, the Persian, the Parthian, the Arabian, etc. Their government consisted in the subjection of diversely organized states to the control of an army. This, it is true, was not wholly the case. In centuries of rule the science of government made some progress, and certain political principles were developed. In the later Assyrian and in the Persian empire the subject kings were deposed, and replaced by satraps, under whom, in the latter case, the lines of the old kingdoms were to some extent obliterated. Yet there is no evidence of any extensive application of general laws. Each conquered people remained, in great measure, a distinct unit. Tribute and military duty, but few if any civil obligations, were imposed upon them from without. Such was the outcome of all the early Asiatic efforts at empire making, the

formation of great military despotisms, whose subject kingdoms preserved their internal organizations nearly or quite intact.

The period embraced in this rapid review covers thousands of years, during which, although the Asiatic civilizations were actively engaged in the pursuits of peace and war, and though successive great empires arose, very little political progress was made. The empire of the sword grew enormously. The empire of the law was hardly yet born. The legal subjection of empires was still in embryo. The reign of law had undoubtedly made considerable advance in the minor units of these great imperial masses, in Egypt, in Assyria, in Babylonia, etc., but in the empires as a whole it failed to declare itself. These antique empires were blown together by the wind of the sword blade, and held together by its edge. Between their building stones was none of the enduring cement of general laws.

It must be borne in mind that the great interest of the empires mentioned was the agricultural, and that agriculture, of all human pursuits, lends itself best to the purposes of the despot. The farming population, tied to the fields, thinly distributed, without effective means of resistance, their possessions and products openly displayed, are at the mercy of their rulers; and throughout the history of the world the hand of tyranny has borne most heavily upon the field, and the farm has been the home of the slave. But as civilization progressed other interests arose. Agricultural production was followed by manufacture, and that by commerce. The city succeeded the farm, and in the city we have the true birth-place of liberty.

But the city as well as the state has its separate species. Analysis has revealed to us two distinct types of empire. With these are conjoined two distinct types of the city. The one is the city of the past, the other that of the present; the one the city of the ancient, the other that of the modern empire; the one the capital, the other the centre of commerce. This is no fanciful, but a real and very important distinction. The great ancient cities were capitals. They were the strong citadels within which despots lay intrenched, behind whose walls they defied both foreign foes and rebellious subjects, from whose gates they sallied forth both for foreign conquest and for the deeper enslavement of their people. These cities were not natural but artificial centres of trade and manufacture. The wealth of foreign and of home lands flowed into them, but not in the modern method of exchange. It flowed in as the spoils of war and the enforced tribute of subjects.

These cities became great as they grew rich, through rapine. They were reservoirs of spoil, and the seats of lavish courts, which freely distributed their plundered wealth. Within their walls gathered the officials and the parasites of the government; the artificers of the nation, who sought there remunerative employment for their skill; and the trading classes, who found there the best market for their wares. Protected behind the vast walls, which defied hostile efforts and the frantic rebellions of starving subjects, the monarch and his court sat at their ease, while the great surrounding city teemed with wealth, and stirred with a multitudinous industry. Here the despot sat like a spider in the centre of his web, sucking the blood of his subjects

and of all foreign states to which his lines of rapine reached.

Such was the capital of the ancient empire, the Memphis, the Babylon, and the Nineveh of the far past, the Rome of a later age, and dozens of others which might be named, great wens on the fair face of the earth, parasites upon the nations, which sapped their strength, and in return gave them the protection of the despot, the stern assurance that none should rob his people but himself. They were artificial products, the results of war, spoliation, and oppression, so utterly different from the modern city in principle that they would be better known by a special name. They stood athwart the natural course of human development, and hindered the growth of a healthy commerce by substituting robbery for exchange. These capital cities were not fixed in place by the advantages of situation, as are our modern trading centres. They were located by the fancy of a monarch, and changed to please his whim. In Egypt, in Mesopotamia, and in Rome alike, the capitals were peripatetic. In the first named country Memphis was deserted for Thebes. In the second Babylon was succeeded by Nineveh, and this by several successive cities of the Persian, Roman and Arab periods. In the third Rome was replaced by Constantinople. There was no reason for their existence other than the presence of the court. Where the court was thither flowed spoil and tribute, and thither flocked all those who had an interest in the redistribution of this wealth. The ancient type of city was a fortified camp. In many cases it grew up on the site of an actual camp, and it retained the mobility of a camp to the last.

Striking instances of this are seen in the capital cities



of the Mogul dynasty of India. Here nearly every monarch deserted the seat of government of his predecessor, and established a new one for himself. The inhabitants followed. The old city was left to sink into decay, while a new city rapidly grew up around the sovereign centre. The results of this artificial and wasteful process are visible to-day, in the ruins of deserted cities, robbed to build younger rivals, and left to illustrate the happily-vanished period of the rule of force. Doubtless something of the old pastoral restlessness yet stirred in the blood of these Mogul monarchs, who were but a few generations removed from the life of the steppes. As the wandering shepherds change their camps, so their imperial successors changed their cities, to gratify a nomad whim. They may be said to have struck their palaces as their ancestors struck their tents.

Yet the laws of nature cannot be quite set aside even by the hand of force. The imperial cities above described were the typical cities of the ancient empires, the centres of great agricultural kingdoms, but they were not the only cities. Commerce asserted itself even against conquest. In certain cases the situation of the capital was fixed by the needs of commerce. In other cases commercial cities grew up separate from, and despite the centralizing energies of, the capital. In "Ur of the Chaldees" we have an instance of the first kind. This city, one of the earliest capitals of Babylonia, was so situated as to be the natural *entrepot* of the active sea-going commerce of that state. Instances of the second kind existed in Assyria, where arose a number of active commercial cities. But in all these early instances the commercial city was subordinate to and

dwarfed by the overgrown capital, as now the capital is dwarfed by the commercial city.

Moving westward in our review, an interesting instance of this reversing influence displays itself. We discover in Phœnicia the earliest example of the modern state, one in which industry and commerce are the prevailing considerations, and war a secondary one. In Sidon and Tyre of the Phœnicians the interests of commerce dwarfed those of conquest. These cities were in no sense reservoirs of spoil, but of wealth gained in peaceful barter. Their location was controlled by this influence, and though we find several successive changes in the site of the capital city, these were probably made for purposes of defense, as we know the final shifting of the site of Tyre to have been. Phœnicia had no agricultural interests. And it had discovered a better method of gaining wealth than the destructive process of conquest. The ships of Phœnicia replaced the armies of Assyria. Her cities were the seats of the most active industries, and the centres of prodigious wealth. And her government was not despotic. Despotism is the product of war. It cannot arise in a state strictly devoted to the arts of peace. Nor can it persist in a state where the wealth of a people is easily concealed or transferred, and where intelligence has considerably advanced.

In Phœnicia, then, a new political element displayed itself, the commercial city. The military stronghold was replaced by the special seat of commerce and industry, the most important of all aggregations of mankind. With the growth of such cities rose a new political interest, the municipal. In all the great imperial

cities the interests were not municipal. They were centres of great agricultural districts, and seats of government which controlled vast regions. But in the commercial city new principles came into play. There was no great agricultural or imperial interest. The wealth of the community was concentrated within the walls of the city, and the political attention of the citizens was fixed upon their municipal government. Their exterior relations were with foreign states, over which they had no political control. Their ruling object was to gain power by industry and its results, not by despotic seizure. They sought not to dominate over widespread bodies of men, but over money and precious goods, which could with ease be returned within their civic limits. Thus the commercial city differed radically from the capital. It was destined to be a most important factor in human progress, but its natural tendency to isolation long made it the sport of despots who craved its wealth.

The principle which thus displayed itself in Phœnicia was one not likely to die out. It taught men a surer and safer method of gaining wealth than by robbery. To use a homely parable, it was no longer necessary to kill the goose to obtain the golden egg. The idea slowly grew that it was wiser to foster the production of the golden eggs of industry than to check and destroy it by violence and bloodshed. In fact the example set by Phœnicia was quickly seized upon by the active-minded Greeks. Athens succeeded Tyre as the carrier of the world, and became the centre of a great concentration of wealth, and of an extraordinary development of art, industry, and intelligence. Yet the early commercial

cities could not sustain themselves against the great military despots. Tyre fell before the arms of Assyria. Athens became the prey of the Macedonian conqueror. At a later period the commercial state of Carthage fell before the military state of Rome; and the great industrial centre of Alexandria yielded to the same overwhelming power. The law of force was yet in the ascendant.

But the new political element, the commercial city, had immense vitality. Alexander the Great fully recognized the source of the power of Greece, and sought to introduce the same important element into his new Asiatic empire. Cities on the Greek model, and inhabited by colonies of Greeks, were founded wherever his armies went, from the banks of the Nile on the west to those of the Indus on the east. Had his wise designs been fully carried out it is possible that the influence of these self-governed cities would have extended over the surrounding country, and Southern Asia have become the seat of a great advanced civilization, capable of self-defence, instead of being the sport of despots, as it has since remained. But the efforts made by Alexander to Hellenize the inhabitants of his new empire were in great part negatived by his successors, who followed his example in founding cities, but did not display his far-sighted political wisdom. Strict lines of demarkation were drawn between Greeks and Asiatics. The cities remained Greek, the country Asiatic. The municipal principle persisted, but in an isolated form. Successive despotisms arose, but the cities were permitted to retain their internal self-government. They might have persisted to this day, and been the centres

of a new growing Asiatic civilization, but for the vast waves of barbarian conquest which afterwards swept over this region, and whelmed it in one common ruin.

Pursuing our review of the course of political development, we now come to the empire of Rome. In the early days of this great empire a new form of despotism displayed itself, the despotism of a city, instead of that of a single ruler. Italy at an early date was, like Syria, Greece, and all the countries we have considered, occupied by small, warlike communities, centered in cities of defence. The story of the older empires is here repeated. These minor states became gradually subjected to Rome. But they were not the subjects of a single despot. In Rome it was the city, not one of its citizens, that became supreme over the conquered state. There was at work here a new principle of political development, the Aryan, which we are not yet prepared to consider. But the persistent wars in which Rome engaged could have but one result. The supremacy of the city was replaced by that of the army. Thenceforward the army ruled the Roman empire. Successive military leaders were placed upon the throne, and ruled with a despotism equal or superior to that of any Asiatic monarch; but they were powerless to transmit their authority to their descendants, or to materially change the constitution of the empire. There was a power behind the throne before which the most autocratic of the emperors stood helpless. The army was the real ruler of Rome.

During the long centuries covered by the successive empires of the past political science, as we have said, was not at a standstill. Although the earlier empires remained aggregates of distinct units, each with its sep-

arate civil policy, yet in these minor states the art of home government must have made considerable progress. Egypt seems to have made important advances in this direction, though the simplified conditions of her civilization did not need any intricate system of legal machinery. In the commercial state of Phœnicia quite probably a new type of public policy arose. A commercial community cannot be governed by the same or by as simple methods as an agricultural population. In Greece both these systems of policy became united, and were greatly developed. Every type of state existed in Greece, from the strictly aristocratic community of Sparta to the strictly democratic one of Athens; and of policy from the edicts of war in the one to the laws of commerce in the other. Greece was, to a remarkable extent, as we are rapidly discovering, the reservoir of Asiatic thought. The long labors of the past were in no wise lost. Their results flowed in converging streams into this small but alert community. The religion of Egypt, the commerce of Phœnicia, the despotism of Assyria, the art, the literature, the laws of all the east, here concentrated, commingled, and combined, until they yielded, as their grand consequence, the wonderful civilization of the Hellenic race.

And with the establishment of the Macedonian dominion a new phase in the government of empires appeared. Alexander made a distinct effort to break down the barriers of political distinction between the units of his empire, and to make it one whole, instead of a loose aggregate of separate parts. This earliest essay at imperial homogeneity failed, partly through the early death of the emperor, partly through the stubborn

resistance of the materials, partly perhaps through the crudeness and inefficiency of the methods employed. But it has the merit of being the first distinct attempt to govern an empire by law.

As Asia gave the cue to the civilization of Greece, so did Greece to that of Rome. And in the Roman empire we perceive this principle of political consolidation, which Alexander had failed to establish, fully developed, all national lines of demarkation obliterated, and an empire in the full sense of the word for the first time established. As the Greeks were artistic, the Romans were practical. The science of law made a striking advance in this great kingdom. Like all preceding kingdoms, it simply developed the principles it had received from its predecessors. But it caught the true idea out of the imperfect preceding efforts, and after gaining dominion by the sword it held it by the law. It destroyed the internal organization of each conquered state, and replaced it by the Roman system. All conquered peoples were Romanized, and their old laws replaced by the Roman code, their old kings by Roman prefects. The subjects of Assyria were Egyptians, Syrians, Persians, Babylonians, etc., permanently hostile elements, ready, and often anxious, to change masters. The subjects of Rome were Romans, proud of their empire and hostile only to its enemies.

The political system of Rome perfected itself but slowly. In its completed form it presented a complex descending series of officials, reaching downwards from the emperor to the minor governors of provinces, which firmly knitted the kingdom into one whole, and rendered it immediately subject to the imperial orders. It

was the army organization indefinitely expanded. Yet in one respect the government of Rome repeated that of the older empires. It was a government of cities, as the old empires had been "governments of kings;" there being scarcely any interference with the local management of affairs. There was little country population of freemen. Slaves tilled the fields. The owners of plantations made their homes in the cities, which extended their control over the surrounding districts.

Through all past time the city has been an important unit in human affairs. The wars of ancient Syria were wars of cities. Assyria conquered cities, and thus laid its rein on the surrounding provinces. Alexander, in seeking to bring his Asiatic dominion directly under his control, did so by the establishment of Greek cities, intended to be the centres of his administration. In Rome the cities remained distinct units, answerable to Rome only by tribute of men and money. They governed themselves by self-elected officers. As the empire grew older the cities became more and more alike in their civic system of government, though to the last some of them retained peculiar customs and privileges. But the fact remains that the cities continued units, each responsible to Rome as a mass. Politically the emperor knew no separate citizen. He knew the city only. In fact, even in the city of Rome itself, the democratic organization of the older republic remained intact. The senate continued its sessions until the fall of the empire. The army leader merely tyrannized over the republic. The emperor might have been removed at any time, and the government gone on with scarcely a break in its operations.



In this system of civic government there was one strong influence tending to the spread of democratic ideas, in the fact that the aristocratic component of the population was held personally responsible to Rome for the tribute due from the city. As taxation became heavier, in the later days of the empire, many of the wealthier citizens were ruined by this obligation to make up from their private estates the deficiencies of the civic taxation, and there was as earnest an effort to escape from the dangerous honors of aristocracy as there usually is to attain them. The wealthy had special privileges, but they paid dearly for the honor, and the singular spectacle was displayed, perhaps for the only time in the history of the world, of the privileged class seeking to descend into the ranks of the commonalty, and being forcibly held back from this coveted obscurity. It was a new and extraordinary phenomenon in human history.

The rural population of Rome was principally a population of slaves. The fields were tilled by human beasts of burden, not by men with social and national rights. As has ever been the case, the hand of despotism bore most heavily upon the agriculturist. These slaves were under the supreme control of their masters, who dwelt in the cities, from which, therefore, the government of the country largely emanated. Thus the Roman Empire, in its distinctive form of government, did not differ essentially from the earlier empires. They were compounds of self-governed states. It was a compound of self-governed cities. Yet the art of legal administration had greatly advanced in the Roman state. Though the cities governed themselves, they did so

largely under a system of laws which emanated from the capital. All general interests remained in the hands of the imperial government, all local interests in the hands of the municipal governments. The *duumvirs* and *defensors*, the officers who linked the city with the imperial authority, were not nominated by Rome, but were chosen from the municipal senates by the voice of the people.

We perceive, in these successive phases of historical progress, the gradual steps of mankind towards personal relations with their rulers. The early emperors dealt only with subject kings. The Roman emperors dealt with cities as individuals. Only in the modern governments have men become truly individuals in the state. Of old the single man was personally responsible only to his immediate ruler, who answered for him to the king. As time went on the dominion of these local rulers extended, and men became personal subjects of wider states. Now they have become personal subjects of great imperial masters. Such have been the results of the unifying process of political development.

It might be well here to say something of the progress of legal science in Rome. It must suffice, however, to remark that it became truly a science, instead of largely a result of happy or unhappy chance, as in older times. The laws of Rome were a most complex and intricate system, and the legal literature of Rome, as collected by its great jurists, is in some respects the most valuable portion of its intellectual productions.

In the Eastern Empire of Rome, the last relic of the great warlike empires of the past, thrust down, like an expiring brand, far into the heart of the mod-

ern world, we see the inevitable tendency of the patriarchal system towards absolute despotism and utter subordination. Even the army, which had governed the throne in the older empire, sank beneath it in later Constantinople, and the government assumed the true type of an Asiatic despotism. It lacked only one element of the latter. The church was separate from and often hostile to it. But otherwise it had retrograded to the old type. It was dead at heart, and its overthrow by the nomad Turks was no misfortune. This simply swept away so much dead wood from the path of progress, and brought a new race under the influences of civilization.

We may close this review with one final consideration. The extraordinarily rapid expansion of some of the ancient empires has often been viewed as marvelous, and the career of such a conqueror as Alexander, who subdued the civilized world with a handful of men, has appeared almost miraculous. And yet all these events were in the natural course of political development. Conquest prepares the way for conquest. In ancient Syria, with its multitude of minor states, each conquering city had a hundred separate states to subdue ere it could control a province of any considerable extent. But with each larger state thus formed the area of conquest widened. If conquered, it fell at a blow. Its separate portions did not need to be again conquered successively. Egypt conquered Syria and Mesopotamia probably as soon as they had become sufficiently consolidated to be subdued as wholes. Centuries of preceding wars had been combining the small states into larger units, upon which the blows of Egypt fell.

The old stubborn hostility of the separate cities had died out under their subordination to a single conqueror, and there was no vigorous local opposition against a transfer of their allegiance from one conqueror to another. Yet the dominion of Egypt was only temporary. The hostile elements of the empire were too unruly to be long held by one hand. Assyria succeeded, but she only slowly broke down the patriotic resistance of her new subjects. By centuries of war, by massacre, and by deportation of whole populations, she finally brought a wide district into a state of cohesion and submission that had needed a thousand years of effort to produce. In such a result ended the first phase of empire-making.

The succeeding phase was a very different one. Persia simply fell heir to the submissive empire accumulated by the warlike industry of Assyria. The Persian conquest was largely a willing transfer of unwarlike populations from one ruler to another. The formation of empires now became rapid and easy. A battle transferred a state. The conquest of a city gave Assyria to Media and Babylonia. Little more effort gave the whole civilized world to Persia. The city was the head of the state, and when the head was cut off the state fell. The work of consolidation had been done in earlier centuries, the subject populations had fallen into unwarlike habits, and they became the unresisting prize of ambitious conquerors.

When Alexander invaded Persia an army represented the Persian state. A few successive blows of the small, but compact and ably-led Greek army upon this large, but undisciplined and feebly-led Persian army, and the

work was done. The army fell, and the state lay at the feet of the conqueror. The work which ten Alexanders in a life-time could not have done ten centuries earlier was done by one Alexander within a few years. He reaped the harvest his predecessors had sown.

The rapid growth of the empire of Rome was largely due to the fact that the world was ready to be conquered. In the east Rome fell heir to the results of the long labors of Assyria, Persia, and Greece. In the west Phœnicia and Carthage had partly prepared the way for it, by subjecting a considerable portion of Spain and Northern Africa. The whole process was one of gradual evolution of empire, and we need not be surprised that the inevitable came to pass.

After the fall of Rome, and the outflow of barbarian hordes over civilization, the original condition was in a measure reproduced, and the old work had to be done over again in the development of the modern world. But it was the old work with new forces and elements, and with a marked difference in results. This second evolution of empire will be considered in the next chapter, and the successive steps in the political unfolding of the modern world reviewed.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE.

THE modern state is an outgrowth from the Aryan village community, as the ancient state was from the pastoral tribe. This is a fact of the utmost importance in the history of political institutions. The democratic organization of the Aryan village was the foundation of modern political conditions, as the patriarchal organization of the nomads was of ancient ones. In the unfoldment, however, of this modern type of government, it has been opposed by two vigorous forces, those of the sword and the church. Both of these were in harmony with the organization of the patriarchal family, and powerfully aided the rapid growth and long persistence of the ancient despotisms. But they have been opposed to the Aryan principle of political equality, and the diversities and rapid modifications of modern political systems have mainly resulted from the mutual hostility of the three forces above named. The emperor of the ancient state held in a single hand the control of the family, the army, and the church. He gathered all the reins of authority in his grasp, and ruled with unquestioned supremacy. In the modern state these elements have remained distinctly separate, each striving for control. The democratic family principle cannot possibly combine with the aristocratic, warlike and priestly influences, and modern

political liberty is mainly due to the persistent discord of these three elements of the state.

The purpose of our work does not call for any detailed description of the Aryan village community. It will suffice to say that its organization, while strictly democratic in principle, was not without its aristocratic elements. Each family, indeed, was despotically constituted, the hereditary head of the household having arbitrary powers and privileges. He could not dispose of the property,—that belonged to the family as a whole,—but its management was in his hands, and the members of the family were under his control. In village affairs he was the representative of the family. Here his privileges ceased; he was but one of a body of equals. The organization of the village was communistic—the land belonged to all. Part of it was kept undivided, for pasturage or other general use; part was divided into farming lots and distributed among the families; the remaining portion, that on which the dwellings stood, was family property. The separation of household from household was complete. Each family enjoyed the product of its own labors, and there were no common stores, as in the village communities of the American Indians, to be seized by the ambitious and used as an aid to despotism.

The organization of the village had little in its make-up that can be called political. There was no recognized law-maker. The laws were ancient customs, unchangeable, even where change of conditions had made them injurious to the interests of the community. New regulations might be adopted to meet new conditions, but these quickly fell into the code of old cus-

toms, and by a transparent fiction were considered of ancient origin and authority. The duty of the officials was administrative only. These officials were chosen by election, the government being in the hands of a village council (the more archaic form), or of a headman, elected by the heads of families. This headman does not seem to have had the paternal authority of the patriarch. The office undoubtedly became hereditary in certain instances, and a degree of dignity attached to its incumbent; but it is questionable if he was ever considered the representative of the remote ancestor of the village kinsmen, and invested thereby with sacred rights and privileges. In addition to the elected headman there were war chiefs, whose military prowess gave them great influence. The chiefs were not always inmates of the village. They occasionally set up establishments of their own outside its boundaries, and attracted around them groups of war-loving young men, the household being organized on the patriarchal principle. Such an establishment was, in fact, a reproduction of the family on a large scale, and its head had the despotic authority of the lord of the household.

Recent examples of the Aryan village exist throughout Russia and other Slavonic countries, and in India and Ceylon. Of old it formed the basis of organization of the Teutons and Celts, the Greeks and Romans, and, to some extent, of the Persians. The American Indians, as we have said, were organized on the same general principle, and interesting instances of village communism have been found in other parts of the earth.



From the Aryan village, as thus outlined in its organization, arose the modern type of political institutions. And yet there nowhere exists a state that directly emerged from primitive Aryanism. So many foreign elements crept in, such as those of warlike usurpation, priestly activity, the warping force of external political ideas, etc., that all modern states have developed under the influence of varied conditions, each striving energetically for precedence. This was less the case in the simpler and more isolated national relations of the far past, and here we can trace at least one direct outgrowth from the Aryan village.

There are four ancient Aryan nationalities which we need to consider, the Indian, the Persian, the Greek, and the Roman. The development of these nationalities, with the exception of the Persian, is singularly unlike that of the remaining ancient empires. Democratic ideas vigorously hindered the natural tendency to consolidate into states, and long prevented the establishment of patriarchal despotisms. These ideas had two hostile powers to contend with, those of military chieftainship and the church. During the early period of barbarian warlike activity the power of the chief grew in every Aryan community, and some degree of subjection of the people took place. Such was not the case with the power of the church, except in one instance. In fact the Aryan priesthood, like the Aryan community, was organized on a democratic principle. It was an association of equals, not a hierarchy with a distinct head, as in the older type of empire. There was no powerful church organization, subjecting the people spiritually, and capable of being seized by a

successful military chief, and no priestly despotism arose in any Aryan nation. Yet the priesthood, as a caste, became dominant in India, and by its influence almost completely checked the political development of the people. Politically the realm of the Hindus remained fixed in an archaic stage of development. It existed for ages as a series of minor communities, under despotic chiefs, and every further step towards national consolidation was hindered by the controlling power of the priests. The country continued unwarlike and the sport of foreign conquerors, and has not yet advanced beyond the barbarian stage of political development.

The Persian empire was an artificial government, planned upon a foreign model. The same thing may be said of the government of the Medes, a branch of the Iranian people. In the vague early history of these peoples we find traces of an Aryan organization. The story of the conquest of Nineveh by the Medes is greatly confused, but there is satisfactory evidence that the conquerors were not led by a despotic king, but by the military chief of an aggregation of self-governed tribes. This tribal organization was long retained, the tribes occasionally combining for military purposes, but otherwise retaining their independence. The power of the chiefs was limited by parliamentary forms, and sometimes by a popular assembly. After the conquest of Assyria, and the extension of the new-formed kingdom of the Medes over Persia to the east and Armenia to the west, despotism replaced democracy, at least to some extent. The principle of the Assyrian government was borrowed by the new empire.

The national development of the Persians was of the

same character. At the earliest historical date they were divided into ten tribes, partly nomadic and partly agricultural. They preserved their tribal independence, their republican liberty, and their parliamentary form of government until the time of Cyrus, who was elected king in the true Aryan method, by free deliberation in a national assembly. Even in later times, at the height of the Persian power, these ancient political conditions were in part retained. The wide extension of Persian rule over peoples accustomed to the utter subordination of the Assyrian government made the Persian king absolute over his conquered subjects. He was not so over the Persians. They paid no tribute, could not be condemned to death by the king without the forms of justice, and could not be marched to war by kingly caprice. The Persians retained the right to decide on the propriety of the war. "On these solemn occasions the king, whose word was law to all the other nations beneath his sceptre, assembled around him, before taking his resolution, a real parliament, composed of the chiefs and principal men among the Persians, who were looked on almost as his equals."\* This ancient freedom gradually disappeared, as luxury and enervation destroyed the energy of the people. Despotic authority over a great subject empire was reflected back over the small home people, and the king became everywhere autocratic.

Greece, fortunately, escaped this fate. It borrowed from Asia the elements of civilization, but not the principles of government. Despotism and civilization alike invaded it. The former was repelled, the latter wel-

\*Lenormant and Chevallier's "Ancient History of the East," p. 61.

comed. The Persian defeat was a definite repulse of despotism. The early Hellenic organization seems to have been based on the primitive Aryan model, and in its unfoldment it yields us the only existing instance of the undisturbed development of Aryan institutions. The Grecian *genos*, which appears to answer to the communal village, was the basis of the political organization. Next came the *phratry*, as a group of clans, combined principally for common religious objects. The phratries were combined into tribes, and the tribes into nations. Such was the general organization of a Greek state. The democratic make-up of these small communities was strongly adverse to national consolidation. Temporary defensive confederacies were frequently formed, but only at a late date in Grecian history was an effort made to combine the several small states into a single Grecian commonwealth. Had such a "United States" been early formed it might have changed the history of the world.

The organization of the primitive Athenian state is of much interest. At the earliest historical date it consisted in a council of chiefs; an *agora*, or assembly of the people; and a *basileus*, or military leader, perhaps the developed representative of the village headman, but with a hereditary claim to his office that signifies the survival of patriarchal influences. It was the Aryan village in its first stage of civilized unfoldment. We have evidence in Homer that the basileus exercised civil and priestly as well as military functions. No definite law-making power yet existed, and the tribe was probably governed by ancient customs, which it was the business of the basileus to enforce, but which he had

no power to abrogate. In fact his authority was chiefly that of military leadership, the people in times of peace being very largely masters of their own actions and destinies.

The Aryan principle of combination affected the whole later development of the Grecian state. The attempts at usurpation of authority by the basileus were resisted by the democratic organization of the people. The council and the popular assembly were strong bulwarks against tyranny, and at an early date the basileus was replaced by an archon, elected for life from the family of Codrus, the last basileus. Probably council and people had rebelled against the growing tyranny of their ruler, and the authority of the archon was restricted to civil functions. The term of office of the archon was next reduced to ten years, and finally to one year only, while nine archons, instead of one, were elected, though the principle of heredity was still retained. Eventually the power of these officials was restricted to minor duties, and the Attic commonwealth was left without an executive head. The president of the senate—which officer was changed daily, no one being permitted to hold the office for more than a single day in any one year—was the nearest approach to an executive. There seems to have been a constant dread of usurpation of power by the executive officers, and a fixed purpose to prevent it. The council or senate, and the agora or popular assembly, became the government, and the people were the power as much in the Attic nation as in the Attic *genos*. Attractive orators occasionally gained a controlling influence, and the leaders of factions at times seized supreme power; but the tendency was con-

stantly towards a more thorough democracy, and the institution of ostracism, by which six thousand opposing votes could send into ten years' banishment any one deemed dangerous to the state, proved an effective means for the preservation of the popular government. Democracy has never since gained the extreme unfolding of its principle which it displayed in this earliest of democratic states.

While the political equality of the Aryan village was retained in the Grecian state, its communism gradually disappeared, and with it the clan organization of the people in its political relations. The commercial activity of the Athenians, and the general introduction of slavery, were hostile to the old system. The government had been in the hands of the clans, and the new people whom commerce brought in large numbers into the country, and who were members of no *genos* or clan, were without a voice in the politics of the state. This in time grew intolerable, and several efforts were made to overcome the difficulty. Theseus and Solon are credited with attempts to divide the people on a personal basis, separating them into classes. The true basis of political division, the territorial, was adopted by Cleisthenes, in 509 B. C. He divided Attica into one hundred *demes* or townships, each with a fixed name and definite boundaries. Each citizen was required to register and have his property enrolled in his own deme. The deme had close features of resemblance to the American township, with even fuller powers of local government. Ten demes formed a local tribe or district, and ten tribes the Athenian state, with its general officers. The deme, indeed, had existed before, in connection with the clan

system; but Cleisthenes made up the new tribes out of separate clans, and thus broke up the political unity of the clan system. It had outlived its usefulness, and the new system was founded in response to the demand of the new population and the absolute necessities of the state. Had the political development of Greece been permitted to proceed unchecked, there would undoubtedly have arisen in time a federal republic. The preliminary steps toward such a union of states had already been taken when the Roman invasion put an end to the natural unfoldment of Grecian democracy.

The story of Rome is in some respects similar to that of Greece. The gentile organization existed here also, and the flocking of strangers into the city produced two classes: the gentes or Populus, who held all political power; and the Plebeians, who had no voice in the government. The Roman Rex, the "King" of the historians, belongs to legendary history only. This office probably answered to that of the Greek basileus, and was abolished, like the latter, in consequence of attempts to usurp the civil power. The Romans were as determined as the Greeks to preserve their ancient liberties.

The difficulty between the Populus and the Plebeians was settled in the same manner as in Greece, by the establishment of a territorial system of organization. This is ascribed to Servius Tullius, at a somewhat earlier date than that of Cleisthenes. The city was divided into four wards, each citizen having to enroll his name and register his property in his own ward. But unfortunately a class division was also made, on the basis

of wealth, there being five classes, of which each higher one had a greater number of votes than that below it. The vote of the highest class was sufficient to give it political supremacy in the state, the senate was chosen from its ranks, and in time it gained the lion's share of power. The people, in consequence, became divided into Patricians and Plebeians, an aristocracy and a commonalty, whose mutual hostility was destined to prove a source of endless dissension in Rome.

The later political history of republican Rome is a record of continued conflict between these classes. The people fought desperately for their lost equality, and step by step repressed the privileges of the Patricians. But before the conflict ended a third power, the army, overthrew both the warring factions. At first the people of Rome constituted the army; but with the growth of the state the army became a class, whose leaders, the consuls, often gained great influence through military success. Eventually the army became a great despotism in the heart of the state. The interests of the soldiers separated more and more from those of the citizens, and centred round their leaders. Finally the state lay helpless before its "defenders," and the democratic government of republican Rome was overthrown and replaced by the despotism of the general of the army. The arbitrary power of the leader over his troops was simply extended to embrace the state, and the empire of Rome began. Thus ended the democracies of Greece and Rome, in the general establishment of a despotism of the ancient type.

The third of the Aryan peoples which developed into a high civilization was the Teutonic. This de-



velopment is of particular interest, as from it arose the modern state, the final and successful outcome of the Aryan principle of organization. It is desirable, therefore, to give fuller attention to the political history of the Teutonic race, as to it we owe the governmental institutions of modern Europe and America. At the first glance one important distinction is apparent. The Greeks and Romans emerged directly from barbarism into democratic civilization, the institutions of the village community unfolding immediately into the democracy of a state. But the Teutonic race reached a civilized democracy only through the long and painful road of feudalism and despotic monarchy.

Before considering the cause of this difference, however, it may be well to review the political development of the Slavonic people, since it presents some highly interesting illustrative phenomena. The early condition of Russian society was strongly democratic. The Varangian adventurers, who accepted the government of Novgorod on invitation in 862 A. D., possessed little power. The supreme authority was retained by the people, and prince and state alike were controlled by the popular assembly. The prince had to swear that he would observe the ancient laws and usages. If he failed in this, he could be deposed and expelled. The descendants of Rurik, the first monarch, found the governing of the free-spirited Slavonians no sinecure. As the country became divided into principalities, the freedom of the city people was contrasted with a greater subordination of the agriculturists, though the communes steadily held to the right to select and depose their rulers. Each reigning prince was surrounded by

Boyars, or large landed proprietors, and knights. These nobles could refuse to take part in military expeditions of which they disapproved, and often took active measures against a prince whose behavior was not agreeable to his free-spirited followers. The government became hereditary in the family of Rurik, but the continuance of any prince in office depended on the will of his subjects.

For the origin of the despotism of the Asiatic type which has replaced this ancient liberty we must look elsewhere. It arose in great measure from the long subjection of Russia to the Mongols, after its conquest by the lieutenants of Genghiz Khan. Under this domination, which continued for several centuries, the natural effort of the rulers to increase their authority was greatly aided. The princes became servile vassals of the Tatar Khans, and were sustained by the latter in their usurpations of power over their people. The princes of Moscow displayed special craft and vigor in this direction. By the aid of the Tatars they rapidly extended their authority over the neighboring principalities, which they ruled with an autocratic system of government, borrowed partly from Constantinople and partly from the Tatar horde. Finally these Muscovite princes grew strong enough to turn their arms against the Khans themselves, and the long Tatar subjection of Russia came to an end. The remaining history of Russia consists in the subjection of the whole state by the princes of Moscow, the destruction of the freedom of the city of Novgorod through the massacre of its inhabitants, the enslavement of the agriculturists, and the loss of power by the nobles. The Russian autocrat is

a virtual successor of the patriarchal Mongol Khans. But for the Mongol conquest Russia to-day might be a democracy instead of a despotism.

Returning from this digression to the question of Teutonic development, it is easy to discover why it differed so strikingly from that of the Greeks and Romans. The latter were municipal peoples, the Teutons were agriculturists. Only with the Teutonic tribes did the Aryan agricultural system pursue its natural course of development, and directly unfold into state governments. With the Greeks city life was early instituted, and commerce replaced agriculture. The primitive system of Aryan government could not be applied to the requirements of municipal life, and was, after several efforts, replaced by the system of demes, organized democratically. City life strongly tends towards democracy. In Greece the city was virtually the state, and it proved easy to preserve the liberties of the people. Rome also was a municipal organization. In this state, as in Greece, the original rural life was early followed by a city life, and the institutions of the village were replaced by others better suited to the government of a city.

With the Teutonic nations, on the contrary, rural life long continued, the agricultural districts became the seats of feudal tyranny, and the cities, instead of being lords of the country, became vassals of powerful country potentates, from whose control they but slowly emancipated themselves. Thus the Teutonic development is of especial interest from its reversal of the conditions of the ancient Aryan nations, and the fact that it yields us a more extended series of developmental phenomena than those of Greece and Rome.

The early Germans possessed a village system closely analogous to that of India, so far as its features can be traced. The village land was known by the name of the "mark." Or rather there were three marks: the village mark, on which the houses were situated; the common mark, or waste, which served for general pasturage; and the arable mark. The last named was divided into three portions, one only being cultivated each year, the others lying fallow. Each family had a lot in each of the sections. The lots were cultivated separately, but the crop to be raised was rigidly fixed by village law. The idea of consanguinity of the villagers does not seem to have existed within historic times, and the periodical redistribution of land had died out; so that, at the beginning of the Christian era, each family appears to have acquired hereditary rights in its separate lots.

As for the extension of this system, we may quote from Maine: "The Mark or Township was an organized, self-acting group of Teutonic families, exercising a common proprietorship over a definite tract of land, its mark, cultivating its domain on a common system, and sustaining itself by the produce. It is well known to have been the proprietary and even the political unit of the earliest English society; it is allowed to have existed among the Scandinavian races; and it survived to so late a date in the Orkney and Shetland islands as to have attracted the personal notice of Walter Scott."\* The government of the mark was strictly democratic. Each village had its chief, elected by the freemen, and its minor officers, whose duties were not to make laws

\* "Village Communities," p. 10.

but to enforce the proper observance of a minutely divided body of ancient usages. The higher political organization was that of groups of villages into a "hundred," which in their turn were combined into tribes or national communities. The heads of these higher organizations were also elected by the freemen. The legal authority of the chief seems to have been very limited, the freemen jealously preserving their rights. Every village, hundred, and tribe had its periodical assemblies, which were attended by all freemen, each of whom had an equal voice in all decisions. The questions to be acted on might be considered by the supreme chief in consultation with his council, but the final decision remained with the freemen, who retained all the actual power in their own hands. At these assemblies chiefs were elected, young men armed as citizens, war and peace declared, and all important questions affecting the tribe decided.

It is highly probable, however, that this theoretical constitution was diverged from considerably in practice. We know that certain chiefs were chosen from particular families, which claimed descent from the gods. Thus the principle of heredity existed. And there can be little doubt that many of the chiefs usurped political authority, as did the Greek basileus and the Roman rex. If successful in war, their influence with their tribe would naturally extend, and their power might become despotic over conquered tribes or villages. Some recent authors are disposed to believe that the real organization of the village was that of a community of serfs under a despotic lord, as in the later period, or in recent times in Russia. Such may have been the case in

occasional instances, arising from conquest, or military supremacy, but there is no reason to believe that it was the general rule, and the ancient Aryan freedom was doubtless largely retained.

But the freedom of the German people applied only to the freemen, or heads of families. Within the precincts of a German household democracy was replaced by despotism. The house-father was the autocrat of the family. A German family consisted of father, wife, children, servants, and slaves; the last, perhaps, captives gained in war. Thus in the organization of the household there existed the basic features of the feudal manor, the father of the family being the prototype of the feudal lord.

In the progress of an active and warlike people like the Germans certain changes in this primitive organization were unavoidable. One of these was the gradual claim to individual ownership of the cultivated family lot. Another was the claim to hereditary right in the chieftainship. A third was the gaining of special wealth and power by successful military leaders. There were probably incessant hostile movements, which frequently ended in the capture of a village, or the defeat of a tribe. In such a case the land may have been seized as lawful spoil, and the captives enslaved; or it may have been left in the hands of the original holders under a rent charge or tax, and with the retention of certain political powers by the conquerors. Thus arose inequality of property and of power. The spoils of war were not evenly divided. The chief would naturally claim the lion's share. And when one tribe or village retained a suzerainty over another this lordship would

be exercised by the chief in the name of the tribe, and eventually in his own name. The growing power of chiefs was aided by the tradition that certain families were in the most direct line of descent from the original ancestor of the community, and the custom of choosing the chiefs principally from these families. Other influences undoubtedly aided in producing inequality of power and wealth, an important one being the influx of strangers, as slaves or paid domestics, to the village. The subject has been closely worked up by historical students, but is much too extended for our purpose. It must suffice to say that war is a fatal foe to human equality, and that the incessant petty quarrels of the unquiet tribesmen could not but produce social and political inequalities. Such minor inequalities still exist throughout India, in which country popular development has been arrested at this stage.

At the earliest historical date social distinctions existed in the Teutonic tribe. There were three well-marked classes; the *eorl*, distinguished by ancestral wealth and purity of blood; the *ceorl*, or simple freeman; and the *servus*, or slave. These distinctions were recognized by law. An injury to an *eorl* would cost the offender two or three times as much as the same injury to a *ceorl*. But politically there was no distinction between nobles and freemen, except that, as a rule, the magistrates were chosen from the *eorls*. In times of war, however, ability rather than birth formed the basis of choice, and any freeman who had shown military ability could obtain followers.

These causes of inequality must have slowly produced considerable effects even in the German woods; but it

is not probable that the democratic institutions of the tribes could have been so quickly or so completely overthrown by tribal quarrels as they were through the invasion of the Roman empire, and the formation of powerful Teutonic kingdoms in the conquered lands. The army of the German tribes was not a distinct class. The whole body of freemen were liable, at a moment's notice, to be called into service. The men of the hundreds, led by their chiefs, and the tribe, commanded by the principal chief, had but to seize spear and shield, club and battle-ax, and rush gladly and furiously to the field of battle. But any chief had the right to gather around him bands of young men, eager for distinction. These followers were armed and equipped by their lord, ate at his table, followed him to battle, and were bound to espouse his cause against all men. It was a voluntary servitude, a military subordination which had in it the germ of the feudal system.

It has been held that the conquest of Gaul by the Franks was effected by independent chiefs, each with a powerful retinue, and that the lands were immediately parcelled out by the chief among his followers upon terms of military service. It is not probable, however, that the institution of feudalism was so quickly established. Little is known of what took place during these "dark ages," but most likely a true migration occurred, whole tribes, with their wives, children, flocks, and herds, coming over and settling on the conquered lands. With them came the village organization. The tenure of land was still largely on the old principle, in which the landholders owed duty to the community, not to the chief, and were bound only by the personal obligation to appear



in the host and in the political assembly. The political organization was still communal. The gift of an estate by the leader involved no special obligation of service. The territorial relations of feudalism probably grew up at a later date. But the social and political inequality of the people must have been greatly increased by the subjection or enslavement of the inhabitants of the conquered regions.

Any attempt to consider the political relations of the new kingdoms which were built out of the fragments of the Roman Empire leads us into a bewildering phantasmagoria of conditions. We find here none of the simplicity of the early political systems, but a confusing diversity. A medley of church dominion, imperial rule, feudal relations, representative government, and municipal institutions, presents itself, and seems to defy orderly arrangement. And each state displays differences of organization which add to the confusion. All the political principles of the older civilized and barbarian peoples seem jumbled together in inextricable confusion.

Yet the difficulty is more in seeming than in reality. A complex political system had replaced the simpler ones of the past, and to understand it each of its elements must be separately considered. Rome left three legacies to modern Europe: its self-governed cities, its church organization, and the memory of its imperial administration. To these may be added a fourth, its system of laws, which powerfully influenced the formation of the legal codes of the new states. To these Roman ideas Germany added a fifth, that of the right of every freeman to a voice in the government. Such were the discordant elements of the new states,

which it was necessary to harmonize ere a strong government could be formed.

There was one feature of weakness in the political organization of Rome. The civic interests were stronger than the imperial ones. The people were citizens of Rome only in a minor sense. Their municipal concerns were of more importance to them than the imperial administration. Fear of barbarian spoliation, rather than patriotic pride as Roman citizens, made them cling to the empire. Each city was an isolated unit, and the citizens had so little share in the general government that they became utterly destitute of expanded views of political relations. Their ideas centred in the town halls of their respective cities. When, in the year 418, the Emperors Honorius and Theodosius called upon the cities and provinces of Gaul to send deputies to Arles, with the purpose of forming some sort of representative government, there was not a city with sufficient political wisdom to perceive the value of the proffered privilege. No delegates were named. The assembly failed to meet. The people had been so long treated politically as children that they could not well be expected to display manly vigor of thought. They clung to their civic governments and let the empire fall.

The fall of Rome was like that of the beads from a broken string. The cities remained intact, though their connecting link was gone. They continued to elect their municipal officers and carry on their civic governments as they had done before. The great colossus had collapsed, but its fragments retained all their vitality. And when new, barbarian governments were

formed, the cities paid tribute to them as they had done to Rome, and moved on as of old.

The second gift of Rome to the modern world was its church organization. It must be but briefly referred to here, as we shall treat it at length in a separate chapter. We need only say that the relations of mediæval states to the church differed essentially from those of the old world. In all the ancient empires, from Egypt down to Rome, church and state were closely combined, and the emperor was, in a greater or lesser degree, the head of the church establishment. But when the Roman empire broke into disunited fragments its church organization did not break with it. So far as religion was concerned the empire remained intact, and the ecclesiastical government at Rome long continued a living remnant of the old imperial administration. In the new kingdoms church and state were disunited. Nations arose that were politically separate, but ecclesiastically they were combined into one. The barbarian kings only partly governed their peoples. A very important branch of the government remained centred in a spiritual emperor, the pope at Rome. In this respect modern Europe was in a condition strikingly distinct from that of the older empires. The king controlled the bodies, the church the minds of men. The elements of human control, united in one head of old, had become disunited, and important results could not but arise from this disunion.

The third element of Roman government, the imperial administration, was one which had exercised a strong influence upon the barbarian mind. The forest-dwelling clans had felt so often the strength of the

Roman hand, and had heard so much of the splendor of the central city of the empire, and the godlike dignity and authority of the emperor, that, in their minds, something supernatural must have appertained to this far-off potentate, whose simplest word moved the whole civilized world. The name of emperor, and a court and state organized on the imperial plan, were the dream of the rude leaders of the conquering tribes. To their untrained minds the sublime in dignity and the supreme in power were to be attained through the mere claim to imperial authority.

But such a conception could be little more than a barren idea. The freemen of the German woods were not likely to submit to despotic control. They were pleased to have their leaders play the empty farce of imperialism, but they decidedly objected to assuming the position of Roman citizens. The claim to a voice in the government, to elective privileges, to representation, was not likely to die out. It greatly declined, it is true, for reasons to be yet considered; but it was too full of vitality to perish, and was sure eventually to assert itself.

To the elements of government thus reviewed we must add a condition of the new states in which they differed widely from the Roman empire. Their interests were agricultural. That of Rome had not been so. The empire in Europe had trusted to Africa for food. Its special industries were those of manufactures and commerce. The land was half cultivated by troops of slaves, whose masters made their homes in the cities and took part in the municipal administration. But the conquest cut off the fertile fields of

Africa. The new states had to trust to their own lands for food, while they were destitute of commercial activity, which could not exist in the face of the anarchy that prevailed. Moreover, the new owners of the land had not been accustomed to city life. They were farmers, hunters, and warriors, to whom the field and the forest were home, and the confinement of civic walls would have been slavery. With the formation of new kingdoms, then, the modern rural life began. Villages, manor houses, castles arose. The old population remained in the cities; the new population encamped in the fields.

Thus in Middle Age Europe there existed the municipal institutions of Rome, the imperial church, a shadow of the imperial power, the sense of personal freedom, and a rural life of the ruling people. But there existed more—there existed the feudal institutions, which we must now consider.

The slave system of ancient Rome had somewhat changed its character before the fall of the empire. The fields were still tilled by slave labor, but the artisans of the cities, who had once been slaves, had gradually gained their freedom. Thus the Roman slavery which existed at the time of the conquest resembled that of the German villages, and the number of agricultural slaves which the conquerors found was greatly increased by the subjection of former freemen to their new lords.

The German political system must have been greatly modified by the conquest. Military success gave kingly authority to the leader, and his power tended to become more decidedly hereditary. The wandering hunter

life of the freemen was restrained when they exchanged the wide-spreading forests of Germany for the cultivated lands of the south. A class of landed proprietors arose, who dwelt upon their estates and devoted themselves to the improvement of the lands which had become theirs by seizure or by gift. The family group was greatly increased by the addition of numerous serfs or slaves, the village lot was replaced by a large estate, held absolutely or with rental privileges, and the autocratic authority of the house-father became the despotism of the territorial lord. The feudal manor was simply the Aryan household expanded.

These changes began to operate from the date of the migration. Even if each freeman received his family lot, as of old, the leader must certainly have received a much larger allotment, while the idea of communal possession of the land rapidly died out, and the tendency to claim individual ownership of the family lot grew stronger. A degree of subordination to the chief and to his principal followers arose from the necessity of a strong hand to restrain the large subject population. Royalty, before unknown to the Teutonic peoples, quickly appeared. After the resistance of the natives was at an end wars between different bands of the conquerors began, and one inevitable consequence of war ensued, the aggrandizement of the successful chief and of the more valiant and daring of his followers. The feudal arrangement had its main source in two systems, which naturally arose from the relations of the conquerors to one another and to the natives. One of these was the system of "benefices." These were land grants, made by the king to his followers, on terms of

special fidelity to his cause. The other was the system of "commendation." This was a similar arrangement, made without reference to land. The weaker placed himself under the protection of the stronger, and agreed to become his vassal and devote himself to his service in exchange for this protection.

The condition of things which naturally followed the conquest of a rich, populous, and civilized state by a host of barbarian adventurers, who entered upon their new rule as equals, necessarily led to the relations above mentioned. There was little idea of subordination. Even a temporary cessation of war released the freemen from a sense of mutual dependence, and weakened the authority of the chief. The kingship was more of a form than a reality. Those who had gained control of great districts had no fancy for submitting to a central authority. The people were incapable of comprehending the restraints of a kingly government. Revolt, disorganization, endless battling, became the rule. The government was virtually disintegrated. Each proprietor became a petty despot. There was no great state in any true sense. There was rather a congeries of small states, really independent, though acknowledging, with more of sentiment than truth, the supremacy of their central head.

The rights of the lord were rights of rent and service from subordinate freemen, who, in their turn, autocratically governed their families and slaves. But the incessant wars necessarily increased the power and authority of the lords. When those beneath them looked to them for protection it was easy to make a forcible seizure of power. And the obligation of service in

return for protection was a natural consequence of this condition of things. The institution of feudalism seems to have been an unavoidable outgrowth from the peculiar relations of the members of the conquering tribes to their chiefs and their subjects, and of the incessant internal hostilities.

As the power of the land-holders constantly grew through these causes, so did that of the king through similar causes. He took part with one warring lord against another. He was the leader in foreign aggression and against local insurrection. Though given the name of a king, his authority was that of an army leader. The submission to his rule was not quiet and voluntary. His supremacy was gained by actual war with and conquest of his restless lords. They viewed him with a certain sentiment of reverence, but were too unused to subordination to submit, in practice, to the supremacy which they admitted in principle. But the king had one marked advantage. His interests were general. Theirs were local. Their petty strifes were to gain momentary advantages. His efforts led to permanent advantages. He was on the alert to profit by the errors of the barons, to stir up the friendly against the hostile, to join the cities against their oppressors, and to add to his power by every possible restriction of that of the lords. Yet the authority of the kings only slowly increased. The insubordinate elements of the state were too vigorous to be easily subdued. In fact the tendency of this whole process was towards the subjection of all inferiors to each superior. The lords, like the king, strove for an enhancement of power, and the increase of the dominion of the greater barons kept pace with that of the king.



This Middle Age feudal organization has points of interesting analogy to that of the development of all the more primitive empires. It was a "government of kings," like that of the early Asiatic despotisms, though the dominion of the central monarch was here much less supreme. It was virtually an association of potentates, each a despotic ruler over a limited district, while the whole were loosely consolidated into a single kingdom, under a monarch whose authority was largely nominal. As of old, tribute in men and money was demanded by the superior potentate, but with this difference, that the territorial lords supplied the men, the cities the money. But the idea of tribute in men had gained, as an outgrowth from the political system of the Aryan tribe, an extension not thought of in older times. The greater baron paid tribute in military service to the king; the lesser to the greater lord; and so on downwards, society being organized on a peculiar system of descending tax or tribute, which was paid in personal service instead of in money.

The rule of the barons in time became absolutely autocratic. Their subjects were real or virtual slaves, kept down by an armed soldiery. The people had no relations with the king, nor the king with them. He was monarch over a multitude of lesser kings, who were absolute rulers at home. His only authority over the nobles was the right to claim military aid. All beyond that could only be gained by the strong hand of force. This peculiar organization of society included even the lords of the church, who held lands, demanded service from their inferiors, and owed service to the king. The cities, in great part, lost their

liberties, and each became subject to some conquering lord. Their power of self-government was vexatiously interfered with, and though their people were not enslaved like the inhabitants of the country, their freedom was reduced within very narrow limits, while the growth of the cities was checked by severe taxation, or by violent assaults on their wealth. The development of mercantile interests was hindered by the insecurity of the whole social system, and the violence which everywhere prevailed.

Yet though there were certain resemblances between this organization and that of the more ancient empires, there were essential differences. The ruler no longer held all the reins of power in his own hand, but was restricted to the single control of the sword. The government of the church was lost to him. Thus there was none of the sense of abject submission to a king, a father, and a god which the Asiatic felt towards his emperor. The sense of natural freedom persisted. Revolt against tyranny was continuous, either in thought or deed. And this rebellious feeling was heightened by the peculiar military organization. The old idea of subordination to authority as a duty was replaced by a strong sentiment of insubordination.

The simplicity of the old governments had also vanished. In them there was no distinction between temporal and spiritual monarch; between the government of city and country; between commercial and imperial cities. Political society was a concrete mass. But in the new European kingdoms all these elements were in antagonism with one another. Church and state were divided. City and country were under different lords

and had different interests. The imperial and the commercial interests were centred in different cities. Hostile relations often existed between all these elements of society. The monarch and the church were often bitter foes. The castled country barons were hostile to the walled cities. The capital city was at odds with the centre of trade and industry. It was impossible for such discordant elements to harmonize. A perpetual jarring resulted. Before permanence could be hoped for some one of these battling elements must reduce the others to subjection. Either the pope, the king, the lords, the cities, or the people, must gain supreme authority, for it seemed impossible that such a host of discordant elements could be brought into harmony.

By a singular unfoldment of events we find each of these elements coming to the head of affairs in some one of the European states. In France the king became supreme; in Spain, the pope; in Italy and the Netherlands, the city; in Germany, the lordship; and in England, the people. It is true that these conditions of supremacy were not usually permanent. No element succeeded either in harmonizing or in completely subordinating the others. The conflict never for a moment ended. In fact, the hostility between the elements of government, which was not strongly declared originally, grew more decided as civilization advanced. No ruler, whether spiritual, monarchical, civic, or baronial, could hope to establish a fixed government that should control all these unruly members. And particularly the sentiment of political equality, which the German invaders brought from their woods, was not suffered to die out. It continued to hold its place as a chief element in

political evolution, and it promises in the end to attain supremacy over all its active opponents.

If we now consider the Teutonic kingdoms separately, we may be able to perceive the causes of their different development. In France, as above remarked, the royal power in time attained supremacy over the other elements of political society. But it was only by slow and doubtful steps, and through several stages of baronial supremacy over the kingly power. All the new kings sought to establish their governments on the model of the imperial administration of Rome, but with very slight success. Their followers made no objection to the idea in principle, but they decidedly objected to it in practice. They were incapable of either submitting to or comprehending the imperial authority, and though the kings gained a measure of control in periods of war, it was quickly lost in times of peace. The fierce chiefs and tribesmen yielded a partial submission to Clovis, who led them to victory, but they could not be controlled by his enervated successors, who gradually lost all authority. France became a congeries of petty states, without a combining head. The kingship grew to be an empty name. The king, from being originally but the most powerful of the barons, sank into a nonentity, and his title was finally seized by the "mayors of the palace," the most energetic of the lords.

Such was the first era of French history. It ended in the supremacy of the lords. The second era begun in a series of foreign wars, which gave overmastering power to the new Carlovingian dynasty. The Arab conquerors of Spain broke in a devastating billow over

the wall of the Pyrenees. They were met and crushed at Tours by the brave Charles Martel. His son Pepin seized the title and the estates of the king. The son of the latter, Charlemagne, proved a mighty warrior, and was enabled, for a time, to achieve the dream of his predecessors, and establish a government based on the model of the imperial despotism of Rome. In fact, there was abundance of work ready for warlike hands. The barbarian invasion of Gaul had by no means ceased with the Frankish conquest. Other tribes pressed over the Rhine. Not until the days of Charlemagne was this tide of migration fully checked. This great leader crossed the Rhine, subdued the turbulent Saxons, and finally reduced all Germany. It was the first powerful reaction against the Teutonic flow of invasion, and it ended in the establishment of a permanent boundary to civilization. The land migration of the Teutonic tribes ceased from that period.

Charlemagne ruled as a despot. But his supremacy was that of a successful general, not of a peaceful autocrat. The barons were yet too powerful and turbulent to yield except to the temporary supremacy of the sword. No sooner was Charlemagne dead than the imperialism of his throne vanished. Once again the kingly power slowly declined before the vigorous insubordination of the lords. After two centuries of decline it vanished as before. The barons again asserted their power, thrust aside the weak descendants of the great Charles, and elected their most powerful member, Hugh Capet, to the empty throne.

Four centuries of French history had passed, and ended in the complete victory of the barons over the

kings. It was the weak fable of imperial dignity, and the effort to reconstruct the kingdom on the Roman system, that chiefly turned the barons against the Carolingian kings, and caused the final overthrow of the dynasty. For a period there was no king of France. Hugh Capet bore the name, but was wise enough not to aspire to the authority. France had become a congeries of independent lordships, and the Capets were simply the most powerful of the lords. The farce of imperialism had been played, and had failed.

While the authority of the kings was thus vanishing a confusing anarchy pervaded the state. It was a carnival of petty warfare. Each lord was concerned only with his personal interests, and no idea of general interests existed. The cities were in the same condition. They might have exercised a controlling power had they combined. But the burghers were too limited in their political education to perceive the advantages of a permanent confederation. Their interests were bounded by the walls of their cities. Only one consequence could arise from this civic isolation, and from the relations of the feudal lords to the cities. War was the trade of the former; peace was essential to the latter. The former were constantly aggressive; the latter fought only in self-defence. The result was inevitable. The cities grew weaker, the lords more powerful. Wealth could not accumulate where there was no security. Step by step the lords encroached upon the ancient privileges of the citizens. One by one the cities fell under the control of feudal dignitaries. The local self-government which they had held from Roman times was largely retained, but it was subordinate to the despotic

authority of their feudal lords. To a partial extent the burghers became reduced to the condition of the enslaved agriculturists.

But this subjection proved a turning point in the history of the cities. Those who had formerly assailed them now defended them from the assaults of others. Commerce was given an opportunity to grow. As an element in the feudal organization the cities became more populous, active, and wealthy than they had previously been. The church influence centred in them. Fugitives, many of them wealthy and of noble blood, fled to the cities for protection. The free cities had proved unfitted to cope with the warring barons, and gradually declined. But their decline was arrested when they became feudal cities, and they began to prosper when they had to pay tribute to only one baronial bandit, who defended them from the others.

Yet they had still another stage of development to pass through. Their prosperity made them objects of the avarice of lordly robbers, who found it more profitable to plunder peaceful merchants than to cut one another's throats. The merchants, in their collecting tours, were waylaid and robbed of the proceeds of their sales. Even the feudal lords of the cities took part in this robbery. They lay in wait at the gates for their rich subjects, and, with blind avarice, destroyed that commercial security to which they owed their power and wealth. There could be but one consequence of this state of affairs. The prosperity of the cities was threatened with destruction at the very time when they had become strong enough to assert their independence. They rebelled against their lords.

How many unsuccessful rebellions of this kind took place cannot be told. Now the cities were victorious. Now they were conquered and their defences leveled. But the fallen walls rose again. The battle was renewed. Finally the cities generally gained their independence. They became chartered communities, the charters providing for their security against oppression, and virtually establishing them as members of the feudal aristocracy. It was again, as in all Middle Age changes, the right of might. The cities were respected when they became strong enough to fight their own battles.

The lack of political wisdom shown by the cities and the lords was shared by the kings. By all alike only private interests were considered, with little or no conception of public duties. But the position of the king, as lord paramount of the kingdom, made his private interests really public ones. Every successful effort of the king for control limited the power of the whole body of lords. What was private ambition in a lord, became, in the king, a movement towards centralization. He played off lord against lord, city against lord, lord against city, his influence and strength increasing with every active interference in the private wars of his subjects, and with every foreign war.

Two special influences tended to strengthen the power of the kings of France. One of these was the Crusades, which, indeed, weakened the baronial power throughout Europe. Unsuccessful as were these long-continued efforts to conquer Palestine, they had the important effect of ruining many of the feudal lords. Many holders of small fiefs sold their domains to the



king, or to neighboring communities, to raise money for crusading purposes. Many others lost their properties through long absence, or left them vacant by death abroad. After the Crusades feudalism displayed itself under a new form. Most of the minor lordships had disappeared. A few great lords, with almost regal power, paid feudal tribute to the king.

The other cause which aided the centralizing process was the influence of invasion. The long-continued and ruinous invasions of France by England had the effect of rallying the whole community around the king. He became, at last, visible to the people as their true ruler. When France was almost a captive state, the sole representative of the old dominion was the resisting king and his small band of followers. The authority of the monarch, which had steadily weakened during foreign peace, steadily augmented during foreign war. When France became again free, a marked advance in centralization displayed itself. It was the king alone who had triumphed, and his path towards despotism was assured.\*

While the lords were thus losing their independent power, and becoming subordinate to the king, it was the same with the cities. At first, only the tax gatherer connected them with the king. Then, as other than military laws emanated from the capital, other royal officials made their appearance in the cities, and supplanted the municipal officers. Step by step the self-government of the cities was taken from them and centred in the king. It was a new phase in their

\*One important aid to this was the terrible slaughter of the French nobility at Agincourt. That one battle did much to clear the king's path towards absolute rule.

history. Their liberty had first been taken from them by powerful barons. From this control they had emancipated themselves. Once more their liberty was taken from them by the supreme baron, the king. Their subsequent history has been one of slow emancipation.

But there is another element of the state which cannot be passed over, though it but slightly appears in the pages of history. We have so far seen the king, the lord and the citizen. There remains the serf, the laboring inhabitant of the rural districts. The enslavement of the field worker displays itself with more or less completeness throughout the whole history of the past as a necessary result of its incessant wars. We have seen that the agriculturists of Rome were slaves. The same condition existed in Greece, and even in Attica, despite its determined democracy. Four-fifths of the population of Attica were slaves. The freedom of the Attic people was the freedom of a class, not of the community. The agriculturists of Middle Age Europe were somewhat similarly situated. They were slaves to the land, a condition not essentially different from that of personal slavery.

Yet in the relations of these serfs to their oppressors a very different condition from that of the subjects of Asiatic despots appears. The sentiment of personal freedom had by no means died out. The land was their master, not the lord. There was none of the submission of fatalism, or of the worship of a divine head. In fact, a bitter and unrelenting hatred of feudalism seems to have affected the people of all the feudal states, a hatred which could not fail in time to produce its results, and which showed itself in the past centuries in the form

of blind and easily repressed insurrections. Its final outbreak was in that terrible carnival of revenge known as the French Revolution, in which the memory of centuries of misrule was quenched in the blood of the nobility, the caste of despots.

One main reason of the long continued servitude of the people was that they were under an extended series of masters, stretching upwards from the petty lord to the king. The lord of the manor, who by armed force tyrannized over the villagers and farmers, was their immediate monarch. All powers beyond were but empty names. They struggled blindly for freedom, and every successful effort only opened out to them new vistas of oppression. King lay beyond king, and each lower one overcome revealed new and greater monarchs. The fight with minor despots but aided the purpose of the supreme despot, who sought to bring all under his sway, and it was less by their own efforts for freedom than by the effort of the king to attain absolutism that the people at length succeeded in exchanging a multitude of masters for a single tyrant.

In the long conflict between the king and the nobles it was the aid of the cities, rather than of the whole people, that enabled the former to triumph. They supplied the king with funds, they furnished him with armies. Their hatred of the nobility, little less unrelenting than that felt by the serfs, was the right hand of the monarch. The power of taxation was given into his hands without restriction. Both the foreign wars and the religious civil wars aided in producing this result. A standing army and full power of taxation were the

free gifts of the cities to the king. He was, for the time, their natural ally against their old foes, and they gave him the power which they took from the lords, that of taxation without representation.

Such was the process of unification of the French government. Out of the bewildering diversity and minute division of authority of feudalism a nation was at length formed, with a central government and general laws. There was no longer any law-making intermedium between the people and the king. Centralization was fully effected, and the king of France became politically almost as absolute as an Asiatic despot. This result was finally attained in France during the reign of Louis XIV., and largely in consequence of his successful foreign wars.

But this modern despotism differed essentially from an Asiatic absolutism. There was no mental submission of nobles or people. Such a government could be but temporary. The lords continued insubordinate in spirit; the cities craved their old privileges. The people discovered that the hand of one tyrant could press as heavily as the hands of a thousand. Their struggle for liberty continued, and it was now truly effective, since the power which was wrested from one despot was given to no greater despot, but was kept by themselves. The whole intricate framework of feudalism had to be torn down, piece by piece. Despot after despot had to fall, until but a single supreme tyrant remained, before the path to freedom could be cleared of its opposing barriers. Only after the king became the sole power of the government did the blows of the people become truly effective. Thenceforward every step taken was toward self-government.

Such is in brief the political history of France. Out of the several elements of the Teutonic kingdoms monarchy here attained supremacy, and subjected the remaining political elements of the state. But the free spirit of the German village survived through all. Monarchy at length fell in wild ruin before its throes, and the rule of the people is now the government of France.

The second element of the Middle Age political situation, the city, attained supremacy in two of the new states which arose, and partial supremacy in a third. In Italy and the Netherlands the city became the ruling element, and for a time also in the Hanse towns of Northern Germany. In a preceding chapter we have contrasted the two types of municipalities, the capital and the commercial city. In the ancient world the capital was the ruling type. In the modern world the centre of commerce has gained the supremacy, and dwarfed the centre of government. And the commercial city is the cradle of liberty, as the whole history of the world declares.

In ancient Phœnicia the interests of commerce began to trench upon those of government, and liberty partly replaced despotism. But Athens was the first purely commercial city, and the first true home of human liberty. The cities of Rome were crushed beneath the army. They possessed local self-government, but had neither the opportunity nor the desire to expand it. In fact, one of the great difficulties in the way of the expansion of civil freedom has always been a tendency to isolation. The citizens, shut up within their walls, and concerned only with their municipal interests,

have been slow to perceive the advantages of confederation, and the cities have in most cases fallen one by one beneath the power of ambitious conquerors. Such was the case with those of Greece. They continued hostile to one another, and were absorbed piecemeal by Philip of Macedon. Such was the case with the cities of France, which fell successively under feudal lords. Such was the case with the cities of Italy. Only in the Netherlands did the stern pressure of invasion force the cities at length to combine, and freedom followed their combination.

The lessons of political wisdom have always been hard lessons to learn. Isolation and localization of interests expose man to the assaults of despotism. Expansion and confederation are the watchwords of liberty. Yet in all ages the tendency to isolation has ruled in human society. In the clan, the village, and the city alike men have concerned themselves with their local affairs, and failed to recognize that their divided liberties were at the mercy of every ambitious soldier. Human concentration has always been the work of despotism. In this respect the despot has had his value in the world. He has broken up the petty isolation of mankind, forced the advocates of liberty to combine for defence, and taught to modern republics the essential lesson that in union there is strength. Had man learned this lesson early in the history of the world, that history would be far different from what it is. The lesson has been learned by slow and painful degrees through long centuries of aggressive war and tyrannous control. Ages of misery have been the school in which men have been taught the true art of government.

Two classes of cities are displayed in the history of the Middle Ages. One of these was the Roman city. This retained certain privileges, and had a well-devised system of government. The other grew up from the feudal borough. This was under the power of the lord from the first, and became a full member of the feudal system. Yet even the latter was not without its privileges, which were given it for the purpose of attracting population. The inhabitants of the mediæval cities were principally made up of merchants and traders, of house owners, and of landed proprietors who had taken up their residence within the civic limits. There was no governing or intellectual class. These were confined to the capital cities. And the most marked characteristic of the citizen was his timidity, and obsequiousness to the noble class. He displayed no expansion of ideas and no political talent. He asked only to be let alone, and this was just what his masters had no thought of granting. Thus there was a continual struggle for existence between the civic population and the lords.

In regard to the cities of Italy, they had nearly all existed from the days of the empire, and most of them had possessed special privileges even under the emperors. After the fall of Rome they continued stronger and more influential than the cities of the provinces. And various causes prevented them from being overshadowed by a vigorous baronial or monarchical power. Barbarian kingships were established in Italy, but they never succeeded in planting themselves firmly or in conquering the whole country. The Greek emperors long kept a foothold in Southern Italy, hold-

ing it from the barbarians while unable to govern it themselves. The barbarian chiefs frequently dispossessed one another. France and Germany invaded the land again and again. It became the battlefield of successive hostile forces. In times of war a monarchy becomes absolute through success, or it sinks through failure. The latter took place in Italy. No general government was established. All efforts in this direction failed.

In consequence of this weakening of the centralizing element, the minor elements sprang into prominence. There remained only the cities and the lords. Of these the cities, with their large populations, their riches, and their well-devised Roman system of administration, proved the stronger. The lords were too weak to cope with them, and became absorbed by them. It was impossible that any powerful landed interests could arise in a country that was frequently swept by foreign invasion. The only hope for power and distinction was offered by the cities. The lords entered their walls and became burghers.

Thus the dominant political element of Italy became, as it had been in the past, the city. And the cities became so many minor republics. They had governed themselves internally, even under the empire. After the fall of the empire only their internal government remained.

Had the Italian cities been left to their natural development the final result would probably have been a federal republic. In all the turbulence of their history, in all their diversity of government, despotic, aristocratic and democratic, there appears a gradual



weakening of aristocracy and strengthening of democracy. The set of the tide was strong toward republicanism. At the same time the civic influence spread beyond the city walls and over the surrounding country. It needed only that the borders of these growing communities should meet and their interests converge, in order to produce in time a confederation for mutual defence and government.

But influences hostile to such a result swarmed everywhere. The lords who had now become citizens had not lost their pride and ambition. They aspired to rule, forced themselves into offices of trust, and kept up constant turmoil with their private jealousies. To these internal causes of trouble were added those of the frequent invasions, French, German and Italian, that swept over the fair plains of Northern Italy. With all this to contend with it is surprising, and shows the strong democratic tendency of commercial cities, that the Italian municipalities moved steadily towards republicanism through centuries of turmoil.

Yet they displayed the one fatal weakness of civic governments, the tendency to isolation and mutual hostility, and this was the main cause of their eventual failure. The devotion to local interests ruined the hopes of Italy. Instead of uniting for defence, its cities were divided by commercial jealousies. Florence conquered and ruined Pisa. Genoa and Venice were at constant war. The imperial and papal factions which tore Italy forced their way into the cities and divided the citizens into hostile classes. War raged within as without their walls. Thus, after centuries of self-rule and of remarkable intellectual and com-

mercial activity, they at length fell, and dropped into nonentity under the crushing rule of kings.

In the Netherlands also the cities became supreme. Here, as in Italy, they grew rich and powerful through commercial activity. They had not the good fortune, like the Italian cities, to escape from the dominion of feudal overlords. Yet internally their freedom was more assured. They took no part in foreign fights. They were not torn by aristocratic factions. The supremacy of one lord proved an advantage, for the eagle of Burgundy scared off all the lesser hawks who might have pounced upon these fair prizes. They were free to develop internally, for Burgundy dared demand no more than tribute from the proud burghers. Every effort to increase his authority was vigorously resisted. In fact, the cities of the Netherlands were favorably conditioned for their ultimate good. Undoubtedly commercial jealousies divided them. But these were less strong than the interests which drew them together. In their resistance to the Dukes of Burgundy they were in unison. In their fight for religious liberty with Philip of Spain they were drawn into an intimate compact. That political development which is the result of war, and almost wholly of war, displayed itself in this rich land. The cities became not only republican, as in Italy, but they combined into a federal republic. In the government of the United Provinces, and in the somewhat parallel confederation of the Swiss cantons, political development reached the highest phase it had yet attained. They were minor prototypes of the great confederation which presents itself to us in the United States of America.

We may briefly refer to still another confederation of cities, that known as the Hanseatic League. This union of the Hanse towns of Northern Germany was not originally a political, but a commercial one. It was, as in all such cases, the result of war. Formed with the primary object of protecting their ships against piracy, it increased in strength as wealth poured into the cities of the league, and in time it added political to its commercial objects. The cities fell under the control of the guilds of merchants, in whose hands they not only defended themselves against the robber lords in their vicinity, but even entered into foreign wars of their own. Denmark, which had troubled the commerce of the league, was conquered by it, and was held for a time in a state of virtual vassalage, it being stipulated that no king should ascend the Danish throne without the consent of the Hanse towns.

Yet despite its warlike vigor the league continued essentially a commercial one. The cities never sought to form a free state, and their combinations for defense never long outlasted the immediate danger. The jealousy of trade stood in the way of political progress. The league at length dissolved of itself, when the superior vigor and advantages of the Dutch and English commercial cities robbed the Hanse towns of their trade. They were not, like the Netherlandish towns, driven by oppression into a contest for political independence. They remained throughout integral portions of the empire.

In fact, in the history of Germany the political problem worked itself out in a different direction, and another of the mediæval elements of government gained

the supremacy. We have traced, in France and Italy, the supremacy of the kingship and of the cities. In Germany the lordships triumphed. In France the monarchy became from the first hereditary, and the king, supported in his birthright by the cities, gradually subdued the nobles. But in Germany, the original home of the Teutonic village system, the old Germanic principle of election maintained itself. The monarchy continued elective, the feudal lords, the lineal descendants of the old village freemen, being the electors. This necessarily threw a great power into their hands. Instead of this influence decreasing, as elsewhere, it constantly increased. The barons forced privileges from the emperors whom their votes elected. Finally the virtual kingship of the mediæval nobles became an acknowledged kingship of the modern German nobles, each of whom ruled supremely over his minor portion of the general domain.

The histories of Germany and Italy are in this respect strangely connected. The rise of kingship in Italy was mainly hindered by the claim of the German emperor to suzerainty over the Italian soil. And the rise of imperialism in Germany was prevented by the same cause. Vain efforts to establish his power in Italy weakened the authority of the emperor at home, and the prerogatives of the electors were strengthened by his every invasion of this foreign realm. He began as the tribal chief, the elected military leader, of the confederation of lordships, and such he continued to the end. The name of emperor increased somewhat in dignity, but the office of emperor decreased constantly in power, until at last we find the sway of the emperor confined

to a single state of the German confederation, while the remainder of Germany was governed by kings, counts, dukes, margraves, etc., the lineal descendants of the feudal lords.

Such was Germany in the last century, an association of independent rulers, of whom the emperor was the elected leader, but utterly destitute of political influence beyond the limits of his own province. The election of the tribal chief by the freemen of the village communities had expanded into the election of an emperor by the lords of the German soil. Such continued the position of Germany until recent times, in which the ambition of Frederick the Great, the Napoleonic wars, and the late conquering efforts of Prussia have destroyed the electorates, and brought the whole land under the real sway of an imperial master.

As if it had been destined that each of the conflicting elements of the early Teutonic kingdoms should somewhere attain supremacy, we find, in the peninsula of Spain, a fourth governing element coming to the head of affairs—the church. The papal power had been, for a limited period, supreme over all the states mentioned. But only in Spain did it maintain its supremacy. The long religious wars of the Spaniards with the Arabs, and their proselyting efforts upon the American natives, increased the religious fanaticism of the people and assured the papal supremacy; and in the acme of Spanish power, the days of Charles V. and Philip II., the monarchs were but the tools of the church. The Inquisition governed Spain. The kings were but sons and vassals of the Roman magnate, and all their wars were efforts made by the church to regain

its old authority, and reduce rebellious Europe again to its sway. Such was the purpose of the terrible war in the Netherlands. Such was the object of the Invincible Armada. Every effort failed, Spain poured out its blood and treasure in vain, Europe continued free. But the realm of Spain long remained the enervated vassal of the Roman church.

It is remarkable that, out of the medley of discordant political elements in mediæval Europe, no harmonious combination anywhere arose. Each strove separately for the supremacy, and each somewhere attained it. We have considered four of these elements of government. There is a fifth, the people, yet to be considered. In two of the modern states, Switzerland and England, the course of development moved towards the supremacy of the people.

This result was early attained in the Swiss cantons. Intrenched in their mountain stronghold, the people drove out feudalism from their midst and established the first stable federal republic which the world has known. It is remarkable as not being a confederation of cities, as in all other early efforts at republicanism, but of agricultural districts. In fact, the combined cantons of Switzerland were but an expanded copy of the combined villages of the Aryan tribes.

Switzerland escaped from the feudal tyrannies by forcibly shutting them out from the Alps. England made a similar escape by slowly crushing them under the feet of the people. The right of popular representation, which had been a duty of the Aryan villagers, remained a claim in all the Teutonic states, but it was a claim that was rarely admitted. In them all legisla-

tive bodies were occasionally convened, in which the nobles, the clergy, and the cities were represented. But nowhere on the Continent did these assemblies gain the prescriptive right to meet and act. They were subject to the call of the king, who took care to convoke them only on occasions of special emergency, and the States-General of France, the Cortes of Spain and Portugal, and the States of Germany, remained alike without political power or importance.

In England the case was different. The Teutonic settlement of England, in fact, differed from that of the Continental states. The Saxon invaders did not simply subject the native inhabitants; they in great measure exterminated them. Saxon England was not the supremacy of a migratory horde over an enslaved population, but consisted in the establishment of the German village system on English soil. It is for this reason that the communistic land-holding system so stubbornly persisted in England centuries after feudalism had in great measure destroyed it abroad. Saxon England never became feudal. A nobility arose, composed of lesser and greater thanes, beneath whom the people were largely reduced to serfdom; but there was no requirement of military service based upon the possession of landed property. And the Aryan popular assembly continued to convene on English soil, the Saxon Wittenagemot retaining much of the controlling power. This assembly was not representative. Every freeman represented only himself and his own interests, as in the old village assembly. Gradually the right to assemble became limited through neglect of its exercise, as the expansion of the state increased the difficulty of

attending the meetings of the assembly. There was no idea of public duty and no payment of members, which in modern times makes it the interest of legislators to perform public services. At first the assembly was open to every freeman. Then this right lapsed through neglect, and only landowners attended. Finally the right became restricted to the wealthy landowners.

The Roman political system, which had exercised so direct and vigorous an influence on the Continental kingdoms, failed to affect Saxon England. Here we perceive the natural unfoldment of the Aryan village and tribal system, free from the action of discordant elements. There was no vigorous effort to attain absolutism by the kings. There were but slight lines of demarkation between nobles and people. The people were pagans. Thus the church was not, as in Southern Europe, a strong element in the situation. The village system was permitted to expand into a national system with slight interference.

The lack of demarkation between the nobles and the people is one of the most important features of the English political situation. The children of nobles possessed no political privileges. The descendants of noble families frequently sank into the ranks of the people. Important commoners rose into the nobility. People and nobles combined to resist the usurpation of the kings.

The Norman conquest for a time introduced into England the French system of feudalism. The natives were crushed beneath foreign feudal lords. But it was not a feudalism that grew up naturally. It was imported full grown, and it failed to establish itself.



From the very first, William the Conqueror was determined not to accept the weak relation which the French kings bore to their lords. He at once placed himself in relations with the people which were foreign to the feudal principle. There was but little real variation from the old Saxon system. On the completion of the Domesday census, in 1086, all the landowners of the kingdom, great and small, were assembled, and made to declare themselves William's men. Thus was established an important principle. The king was king of the nation, not suzerain of the lords. And in the duties of the people those due to the king came first. England, therefore, became a centralized kingdom, with direct relations between the king and his people. There was nothing of the intricate system of delegated sovereignties which existed in France.

The right to popular representation in England was never suffered to die out. But even in William's time a division took place between the Witan and the "land-sitting" men, and from this germ grew up the distinction of Lords and Commons. The Witan has continued, by unbroken succession from Saxon times, its right of personal assembly, as now displayed in the House of Lords. The "land-sitting" men, on the contrary, gradually lost the right of personal attendance. But they in time exchanged for this the right of appearing by their representatives. In this manner arose the House of Commons.

Thus from the very first the people became and remained a power in the English nation. By their aid both kings and nobles were prevented from becoming too powerful. Now they joined the king against the

nobles, now the nobles against the king. They kept, as it were, the casting vote in the national game, and were wise enough to gain confirmation of and addition to their privileges in repayment for their services. In the reign of John the cities aided the nobles against the king, and forced from his weak hands a great charter of rights whose privileges both the people and the nobles shared. The civil Wars of the Roses in England ruined the nobles. They cut their own throats in their mad fight for power, and removed the screen of lordly authority that stood between the people and the king. Henceforward there was no feudal barrier in the way of the movement of the king towards despotic rule. The suppression of the power of the nobility took place in England much sooner than in France, and the natural effort of the throne towards despotism declared itself at an earlier date.

But the situation was very different from that abroad. The nobles had taught the people the valuable lesson never to submit to taxation except through the vote of their representatives. This was a strong wall in the path of despotism. To remove it the power of a standing army was necessary, and no warlike exigency in England had yet demanded more than the temporary muster of a military force. Such was the situation when the attempt to seize despotic power reached its climax under Charles I. Henry, Elizabeth and others had made partial movements in this direction, but had always gracefully retired from any threatened conflict with the Commons. Charles precipitated a conflict by his determined effort to establish a standing army, and to tax the people without giving them a hearing.

The result was inevitable in a country organized like England. The people refused to pay taxes not authorized by their representatives, the king was forced to convene the parliament, and civil war broke out between the king and the Commons. Despotism, therefore, failed to establish itself. It was hurled from the throne by the hands of the people, who attained the supremacy in England at the same period that the other mediæval political elements had gained or were gaining supremacy on the Continent.

No stage of the political freedom which now exists in England was won by peaceful efforts. Political progress is a result of aggression, not of concession. The holders of power never yield it except to the peremptory demand of greater power. The liberty of England is the result of an unceasing contest, in which, though the sword was but occasionally drawn, it was frequently threatened. The English people, through their representatives, have fought inch by inch for their natural rights. Point by point they have wrested power from the kings. The history of Parliament is a history of constant incipient rebellions, which usually ended in kingly concession, and without appeal to the sword. Most of the English kings were wise enough to retreat when the people plainly showed their teeth. In two notable instances the kings opposed the power below the throne, and struck boldly for despotic rule. There could be but one result in a nation constituted like England. The incipient rebellion broke into a real one. Charles I. ended his life upon the scaffold. James II. became a homeless wanderer in a foreign land.

The considerations here taken bring us to the thresh-

old of modern times. The last two centuries have been prolific of events connected with the political progress of mankind. The feudal wars of the Middle Ages were succeeded by a series of religious wars which long distracted Europe, and of which the most notable political result was the establishment of the Netherlandish republic. To these succeeded the war of conquest, as inaugurated by Louis XIV., and continued by Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and modern Prussia under the leadership of Bismarck. Its whole effect has been a retrogression towards despotism. It has overthrown the republic of the Netherlands, subjected Germany to the control of a partial absolutism, greatly increased the imperial centralization in Austria, and brought Italy under the rule of a single monarch. Side by side with this has been a series of wars for freedom. They began in England by the revolt against James II. In France they took the form of a great revolution, the overthrow of absolutism, and the bold defiance of all Europe. They have ended there in the establishment of what may prove a permanent republic. In America they began in the rebellion of the English colonies, and the birth of the great republic of the United States. They have been continued by similar successful efforts of the Spanish colonies.

Thus within the period named the progress towards political emancipation has made gigantic strides, while there is not a monarchy in modern Europe whose existence is not seriously threatened by the growing vigor of the republican sentiment. Despotism has vanished from England, France, Spain, Italy and Austria. An absolutism tempered by parliamentary

representation exists to-day in Germany, but it is yearly losing ground before the determined advance of the people. Education is too advanced in Germany for autocracy long to prevail. The army is its support, but the army there has become the people, and in times of peace must become infiltrated with popular sentiment. An army must fight abroad or it will think at home, and thought is the deadly bane of despotism. The only autocracies still prevailing in Europe are those of Russia and Turkey. But the government of Russia merits to-day more than ever its old title of "a despotism limited by assassination." The spirit of revolt is rapidly undermining the whole political constitution of that autocratic empire. Its strength lies in the commune, the vast multitude of ignorant villagers, with no political outlook beyond their fields, and with a devotion to the emperor that has in it something of the filial sentiment of the patriarchal monarchies. Political propagandism is maintained by the comparatively small middle class, and fear of assassination, rather than a popular demand for liberty, is depended upon to force the emperor to grant parliamentary representation. The autocracy must eventually yield at some point or other. The pressure is growing too great to be permanently resisted.

There remains to be considered the problem of political development in America. This must be dealt with more briefly, though it presents many features of interest and importance. We have already stated that the organization of the American Indians resembled that of the Aryan villagers. It differed in certain im-

portant particulars, however, and this difference had an essential influence upon the character of the primitive American civilizations. The American community, in fact, seems to have been intermediate between the patriarchal and the village communities of Asia. It was, like the latter, an agricultural group, and the land was divided into family lots; but communism was more declared. The Indian family was not an entity to the same extent as the Aryan, and the house-father had no autocratic power. Family individualism was much less developed. In many of the tribes several families of near relations, sometimes as many as twenty, dwelt in a single large habitation, of which we have an instance in the "long house" of the Iroquois. This house communism reached its ultimate extension among the Pueblo or Village Indians of New Mexico, where whole tribes, sometimes of several thousand individuals, dwelt and still dwell in single huge edifices.

In agriculture also communism was more declared. The Aryan family was owner not only of its own house and house plot, but of all the products of its fields. In the organization of the Indian tribes of the southern United States, on the contrary, there was a public storehouse, in which a portion of the produce of the fields, as also of the spoils of hunting, in the form of dried meats, was required to be stored for the general use of the community in case of necessity. This seems to indicate a greater providence in the Indians than in the Aryans, and resembles the Egyptian storehouses of which we are told in the Biblical history of Joseph. Its real significance in both cases probably is that the community had made less progress towards

individualism than the Aryans; and was but a stage removed from the patriarchal condition, in which not only the land, but the whole of its product, was the property of the community.

The Indian organization in several other particulars differed from the Aryan. There were distinct peace and war officers: the former being the sachem, or elected headman, the executive ruler of the clan, who had no leadership in war, as in the case of the Aryan chief; and the latter the war chiefs, also chosen by popular suffrage. And in the election of these officers women as well as men had a vote, female suffrage being a recognized institution of the primitive American political system.

There is much else of interest in the organization of the American clan which we have not space to describe. It must suffice to say that the political development of the Northern Indians reached its highest outcome in the combination of the clans into tribes, governed by a council of chiefs and sachems; and in some instances of the tribes into confederacies governed by a council of sachems. The most notable of these confederacies is that of the Iroquois, or Six Nations. In this confederacy there was no semblance of autocracy; clans and individuals alike retained their freedom; the members of the council had no special powers or prerogatives, and their decision was not necessarily final; as for the war chiefs, their authority disappeared when the war ceased, and was replaced by that of the peace officers.

We have here a more clearly defined political organization than can be traced among the primitive Ary-

ans. Among the Indians of the southern United States a highly developed political and religious system existed—very probably a survival from that mysterious vanished people, the Mound Builders. The tribes of the Creek confederation, for instance, were made up of village communities, each of which was governed by a council and a Mico, or village elder—an elective officer, though usually chosen from the members of one family. There were in addition a “Great War Chief” and an “Ancient High Priest,” but the Mico was superior to these in authority, and seems to have possessed some degree of despotic power. He had full control of the use and distribution of the food in the common storehouse. His power, however, came mainly from his priestly authority, he being looked upon as, in a sense, the representative of the Sun, the Great Spirit of the tribes. In this respect the Indian organization much more nearly approached the patriarchal than the Aryan. There was no household worship like that of the Aryan villager, but an organized system of sun worship, with its priestly hierarchy, over which the Mico presided.

This condition of affairs reached a highly interesting expansion in the Natchez Indians, a group of Mississippi River tribes, who, unfortunately, were destroyed by the French before their political and social conditions could be fully studied. Among them existed an elaborate religious machinery, of temples, priests, idols, etc., while their presiding officer, who seems to have united in his person the functions of king and high priest, was called the *Sun*, and was regarded as the direct descendant of the solar deity. There was, under



him, a nobility of *suns* (members of his family) and men of rank, and a submissive commonalty. The organization, in fact, was a complete despotism, of the patriarchal type, gaining its strength from the spiritual subordination of the people. It was, perhaps, the most direct surviving instance of the political and religious system of the Mound Builders.

Some further remarks may be made concerning the religious system of the southern Indians. There were two classes in the priesthood: the conjurers, who practiced a sort of magic, or incantation, and who resembled the Mongolian Shamans; and the priests of the sun, one of whose special duties was the preservation of the holy fire, to which great importance was attached. This sacred flame was purposely extinguished at the end of every year, together with all household fires, which were rekindled from the "new fire" of the temple. A similar custom prevailed among the Aztecs, who went through the performance of extinguishing and rekindling the fires, with a great deal of ceremony, at the end of every fifty-two years. Among the Natchez human sacrifices were not uncommon, and it is said that on the death of the ruling Sun many of his subjects, of both sexes, were sacrificed. The family of Suns were claimed to be descendants of a man and woman who originally came down from the sun, the solar deity being represented on the earth by the ruling member of this supreme family.

As regards the political organization of the Aztec civilization of Mexico our knowledge is but slight, the Spanish conquerors having made no satisfactory investigation of the conditions of this interesting people.

There is reason to believe that they were organized on the principle of land communism, though this was dying out at the era of the Conquest, through the usurpations of the church and the nobility. Whether communism in dwellings existed to any extent we have no satisfactory evidence. The government was an elective monarchy, the choice being confined to the members of one family, while the election had become restricted to the votes of a few great chiefs. The monarch was in great measure a despot, though his civil authority was limited by a council, to which all imperial acts had to be submitted. In all this we seem to perceive a direct outgrowth from the northern system of an elected sachem and council of chiefs. As with the Creeks and Natchez, the emperor was head of the church, the vicegerent of heaven, and the spiritual superior of the nation.

The Aztec empire was strictly one of conquest, and such empires have always become despotic. The authority which the ruler exercises over the inhabitants of conquered provinces is invariably extended to embrace the members of his own tribe. This empire bore interesting resemblances to those of early Asia. It was a "government of kings." Tribute alone was demanded from the subject provinces, and their original governments were left intact. At home despotism grew apace, and a feudal society arose, not unlike in its conditions that which recently existed in Japan. This despotism had a double origin. It grew up partly from conquest, partly from the close union of church and state, which existed in the original composition of the Aztec tribe. Its growth was aided by another institution of

Indian origin, the common storehouse. This seemingly valuable provision of communal forethought opened an opportunity to ambitious chiefs to acquire wealth and power. Among the Creeks, as above stated, it had fallen under the sole control of the Mico. A diversion of those stores from their original use would give great influence to an ambitious ruler. The Aztecs possessed such common stores, but they had become the property of the state, not of the people, and were used as a form of tax in kind. Doubtless the sole control of these stores had aided greatly in the establishment of the despotic power of the Montezuma.

It is of high interest to perceive that a closely similar communal system existed in South America, and in the Peruvian empire attained a remarkable unfoldment. The communism of the American tribes here developed into a communistic empire, the only one that ever existed, for the communism of Russia does not include the government. In Peru the whole empire, from the Inca downward, was organized on the communal principle. Its social condition was, in one sense, in favor of the communistic theory now so prevalent. Its people were remarkable for their industry, well-being, and happiness. They were, however, equally remarkable for ignorance and industrial stagnation. The world stood still with them, and might have stood still forever, for there was no incitement to education and industrial progress. If this condition be a necessary result of national communism, then communism must be inimical to the highest interests of mankind.

The Peruvian empire was, like the Aztec, strictly an empire of conquest, and, as in all such cases, it was

a despotism. The government was held solely by the members of the conquering clan, except that the caciques of conquered provinces were partly admitted into the ranks of this clan. But as in the Asiatic patriarchal despotisms, the authority of the ruler was reflected over the members of his own clan, and he became a supreme autocrat. The authority possessed by the nobles was a delegated privilege only, and they had lost all prescriptive rights, the natural development of autocracy having proceeded much further than in Mexico. The Inca ruled the people as civil, military, and priestly head, but not as paternal ruler, as in the empires of China and Egypt. His paternal headship was confined to the members of his own clan. The sun was the great object of worship. And in the traditions of the Inca family we have a singularly close resemblance to those of the Natchez. The Incas were claimed to be descendants of a man and woman who came down from the sun, precisely as was claimed for the Suns of the Natchez. This consonance in tradition is an interesting evidence of the intimate relations of the several American political groups.

The Peruvian agricultural policy may be briefly described. The whole territory of the empire was divided into three portions: one the property of the church; a second, of the Inca; a third, of the people. But the cultivation of the church and state lands was not performed by tenants or slaves, as in Mexico, but by the whole people. There was no trace of class privilege beyond that of the Inca clan, or of inequality of wealth, as in Mexico. The lands of the people

were cultivated on a communistic plan similar to that of all early agricultural communities, they being divided into family lots, which were annually redistributed. The state products were placed in public storehouses, from which the people were fed in case of necessity. Thus throughout the American communities we can trace the unfoldment of a single principle of public policy, in which the institution of the public storehouse played a prominent part, and which reached its highest stage of development in Peru.

This ancient and natural unfoldment of political institutions on American soil has been succeeded by a modern one of an essentially different character. It is not native to the soil, but has its roots in the political conditions of Europe; yet it is of great interest from the decided step in advance it has made from European monarchy to American republicanism. Of the several republics that have been founded in America, there is only one of any interest in this connection, that of the United States. The Spanish republics simply followed this as a model.

Of the four European nations which formed important colonies in America, namely, England, Spain, France and Portugal, one only, England, possessed representative government at that period, and in its colonies alone a republican spirit was shown. The colonies of Spain, France and Portugal were despotically governed, and the colonists submitted without resistance to the autocracy of their governors. Such was not the case with the English colonies. In such of them as were under the control of governors or proprietors there was a constant resistance of the people,

and a persistent determination to govern themselves on democratic principles. In the colonies of New England, which were fortunate in having no royal governor or proprietor, this democratic spirit was most vigorously shown, and they were originally organized on the strictest republican principle, their system of manhood suffrage, council, and elected governor being closely analogous to that of the ancient Aryan village. Representative government was adopted when these colonies had grown too extensive for personal service, and at a later date the several colonies of New England combined into a minor federal republic, a partial prototype of the later federation of the United States. The efforts that were eventually made to bring these self-governed colonies under the control of a royal governor signally failed, and they retained their independence throughout most of the colonial period. The example of New England doubtless affected the more southern colonies, and strengthened them in their efforts to gain independence, though the native love of liberty of the colonists was the main instigation to this. The people of England were then struggling for liberty, and those of America were in no temper to submit to tyranny.

The truth is, though it is not generally recognized, that the American colonies were republics from the beginning, those of New England completely so, the southern ones partially so; and that the formation of the United States was but the combination into one nation of a number of previously existing republics. They were, like the old empires, a congeries of separate states, controlled by a tyrannical power

in their external relations, but possessed of self-government, and master of their own destinies in their internal political conditions.

These colonial republics differed in an important particular from the republics of an earlier period, with one exception, and represented an important extension of the principle. The republics of Greece and Rome, of the Netherlands, and of mediæval Italy were republics of cities. Their government was reflected to some extent over the surrounding country, but it was only a reflection, the city remaining the controlling element. The federated cantons of Switzerland formed the only agricultural republic, and the sole true prototype of the United States. In America a series of agricultural republics on a large scale was formed, nominally as portions of the English State, yet—partly through English unconcern, partly through their persistent resistance to political control—really independent democracies, governing themselves through their own councils or parliaments, and submitting only in their general relations to foreign management.

The tendency to combination of the colonial republics manifested itself before the Revolution. It was greatly strengthened through the necessity of mutual aid in that great conflict. The former vague federation became a more declared one, yet one in which little power was delegated to the central authority. It needed the work of the Constitutional convention thoroughly to cement these separate republics into one strong government, that of the present United States.

The severance of the colonies from England produced scarcely a ripple in their system of government.

Like the cities of the Roman empire on the fall of Rome, these colonies, on the breaking of the English bond, went on unchanged in their governmental institutions. They had been republics before, and continued republics still, simply replacing by home officers the few foreign ones they had discarded. The final task, that of the federal union of these minor republics, was accomplished with remarkable skill, and a spectacle in political development produced which the world had never before seen, that of the formation of a union of great agricultural states, each with its home government intact, yet with a central government strong enough to resist the most vigorous disrupting agencies. Sixty millions of people rest to-day in political equality and content under the wise regulations of the American constitution, and it is broad enough in its provisions to cover six times sixty. The United States is the only large nation ever known, except possibly Peru, of which general political contentment of the inhabitants can be affirmed. In this respect it impresses us as the true and highest outcome of political evolution, a nation without classes or castes, and in which every man is the political equal of every other.

In conclusion it may be pointed out that this great republic is in a close sense the lineal descendant of the primitive Aryan village community. It differs from the latter in respect to industrial communism and equality of wealth, but resembles it in political equality and its system of local self-government. As Greece presented an example of the civic development of the Aryan principle, so the United States



presents an example of its rural or general development, the unfoldment of the principle into a political organization which already embraces a twentieth of mankind, and which seems quite capable of being extended to embrace all mankind, in a confederated republic of the world.

## CHAPTER IX.

### WAR AS AN AGENCY IN CIVILIZATION.

IN the review of the political development of mankind, as given in the preceding chapters, several of the vitally essential elements of this development, such as war, religion and commerce, were but casually glanced at. A more detailed consideration of these elements is now desirable, and in the present chapter it is designed to point out the very important part which war has borne in the progress of civilization.

We are apt hastily to consider war as simply destructive, and as a fatal stumbling-block in the path of civilization. It may be shown to be vigorously constructive, and a highly important, perhaps a necessary agent in human progress. It is indeed quite possible that, but for the agency of war, the Aryan race would still be in the village community stage of development, and the civilization of the world be confined to the autocratic empires of the Eastern and the communal despotisms of the Western hemisphere.

Before considering the philosophy of what is here affirmed it may be well to glance briefly at the facts which support it. Looking back through history we appear, at first sight, to behold only a phantasmagoria of war, a world constantly trembling beneath the feet of marching armies, and reddening with the blood of slaughtered populations. But looking more closely,

we perceive two distinct regions whose history widely differs in this respect. Europe and Southwestern Asia have been the seats of incessant war, Eastern Asia has been the home of comparative peace.

Neither of the two great peoples of Eastern Asia has ever attempted foreign conquest. India has been frequently conquered, but there is no record of its ever sending an army abroad. The only home wars of this region have been the petty squabbles of military potentates, in which the people at large took no part, and by which they were but slightly affected. China has had few home wars of importance, and no foreign wars except such as were necessary to repel barbarian invaders. Its wars have been but ripples on the surface of its long centuries of peace.

If, then, we contrast these states with Rome, whose record is one of continuous war, we should be able to derive some idea of the respective influence of peace and war as civilizing agencies. And when we glance at the histories of these nations we are certainly not drawn to favor a golden age of peace. For peace, as exemplified in China, is synonymous with stagnation; war, as instanced in Rome, is equivalent to constant activity and political change. China and India alike have grown old as men grow old, their prejudices becoming rigid, their conceits confirmed, their beliefs inflexible. They have progressed in a narrow line only, and their industries, customs, laws and government have crystallized into fixed and unchangeable forms. National isolation has kept China from the influence of intellectual contact with exterior races. Mental isolation has had the same effect in India. Local pride and

self-satisfaction have hindered progress, but they have not hindered the decay which attends stagnation. These nations having ages ago ceased to develop, they have become subject to influences similar to those which affect a tree that has ceased to grow. Decay has set in. Whole swarms of political, social and moral delinquencies have fastened themselves upon the body corporate, which has lost the vitality to throw them off, and which is being gradually consumed by these eating parasites, as a dead tree is destroyed by its devouring fungi.

It may be argued, however, that both these nations had attained an advanced civilization before their progress became checked. But it can be answered that this progress took place during an early warlike stage that preceded their later ages of peace. The intellectual growth of the Hindu race was mainly gained during the era when they were fighting their way southward through opposing tribes, and winning with the sword a home from the Indian aborigines. In China also we have historical evidence of a warlike period which preceded the long reign of peace. At an early date the Chinese territory was occupied by a considerable number of independent states, of which China proper was but one. War was of frequent occurrence among these states, and the aggressive province of China slowly reduced the others. In time they were brought into a state of feudal allegiance, and finally into complete subjection. The subjugation of the aborigines was also a protracted process. This was the period of the active growth of Chinese civilization. Since the final establishment of the empire within its present

boundaries political progress has virtually ceased. There has been no want of activity of the intellect, either in China or India, but it has occupied itself in chewing the cud of the old philosophies, and has made few steps forward into new fields of thought.

We have instanced Rome as a contrast to these Asiatic states. Yet it is only a partial contrast. No warlike state has ever existed long enough to become a parallel in duration to the states mentioned. Warlike states are in the nature of things non-persistent. They are born of violence and die of violence. They destroy and they are destroyed. They die and leave their heirs. Properly to consider such a state we must follow it through the long line of its descent, and accept the history of its successors as part of its own. We might, for instance, view all western Europe as in some sense a parallel to China, there being no essential degree of difference either in extent of territory or numbers of population. In Western Europe war has been incessant, from the earliest historic date until the present time. In China peace has been the predominant condition for more than two thousand years.

How do the histories of progress in these two regions compare? In the one mankind has advanced from rude barbarism to the most active and inquiring enlightenment. In the other an unbroken stagnation has prevailed, and scarcely a new thought or idea has been promulgated. In the one the mental powers have grown more and more diverse, until every imaginable phase of intellectual activity has become manifested. In the other diversity of mental powers has almost vanished, and intellectual activity has become confined to a single

narrow line. The people of China have grown more and more like one another, while those of Europe have grown more unlike. The one region has become homogeneous in thought, the other heterogeneous.

Of course this vital difference in condition is in itself no positive proof that it proceeds from the cause assigned. That it is due mainly to this cause might perhaps be made evident had we the space to review the histories of the several nations, and contrast the political and social progress during their warlike with that attained during their peaceful periods. Such a review, however, must be left to the reader himself; and we can but add here that war is not the only agency concerned in the progress and dissemination of civilization, but that commerce has been an equally important agency, and is to-day much the more important of the two.

Some research into the causes of this active influence of war is perhaps more desirable than an accumulation of illustrative facts. In seeking for the incitements to human progress we are really seeking for the sources of new ideas, since the idea always comes first, the condition follows. But new ideas chiefly arise from new experiences, and the question may be here asked, Whence do we derive our experiences?

No isolated individual can learn much of himself. Our own powers of thought and observation are limited, and the great sum of our knowledge is derived from the experiences of others. The greatest thinker can add but little to the vast stores of thought which the world already possesses. And to add anything of value he must first gain a foundation from the world's stock

of knowledge. Thus a wide dissemination of extant ideas is at the root of any active and important human progress. But an isolated nation is in the same position as an isolated individual. Its experiences are limited, its ideas few and narrow in range. It receives nothing from without, and simply works over the little it has gained from within. Its domain of thought becomes contracted in accordance with the special character of its experiences, and in every other direction there is a degree of mental abortion.

The long persistency of one form of government, of one phase of social customs, of one line of thought, tends to produce a uniformity of character which is fatally opposed to any breadth of mental grasp. Variety of influences alone can yield a healthy and vigorous growth of thought. The movement of the mind of a nation in one fixed line must soon cease. Unless it be caused by new influences to develop in new directions intellectual stagnation is inevitable. China affords us an example of this. There the religion is the worship of ancestors, or the Buddhistic atheism; the learning is the ethics of Confucius; the government a patriarchal despotism. Religion, learning, and political institutions are innately prosaic. There is nothing to arouse the imagination. In consequence the mentality of the nation has become hereditarily prosaic.

In India, on the contrary, the imagination has been fostered at the expense of the reasoning faculties. Literature, religion, and political relations are full of an unpruned growth of fancy. Imagination has dwarfed reason. The world to come is the subject of the people's thoughts. The present world has long been of sec-

ondary importance. History, the basis of the literary work of practical China, is unknown in imaginative India. There the gods are all-important, and thought is confined to them. Man is unworthy the attention of the thinker. In consequence of this leading characteristic of its thought practical considerations have almost ceased to exist in India.

On the other hand, when individuals, each with his special store of thoughts, meet and exchange ideas, a rapid mental expansion is likely to result. But between nations this mental contact is much less easy. Isolation and national prejudice form barriers over which thought can but slowly make its way. In the earlier communities war was the only agency by which these barriers could be overcome, and peoples of diverse mental conditions become intimately commingled. There were, it is true, other methods of intercommunication, but none so active and effective. War, despite its destructiveness, is the one efficient means for the mingling of barbarian and semi-civilized nations.

There are special causes that render war peculiarly effective in the diffusion of ideas. An invading army not only leaves its country behind it, but it leaves also the laws and customs of the settled state. The soldier is to some extent an adventurer in disposition and an outlaw in thought. He marches over new soils, under new skies, through new climates. He comes into close contact with new laws, customs and institutions. And he is in a condition specially fitted to be affected by these fresh experiences. The local prejudices of a people are only partially retained in the army. The laws of the state are abrogated in the ranks. Military disci-



pline replaces legal restriction. Religious influences weaken. A sense of liberty fills the mind. New hopes and fears are engendered. The old quiet devotion to law becomes a tendency to license.

Thus the mind of the soldier is far more receptive than that of the quiet citizen. The one is heated where the other is cool. Expectancy in the one replaces self-satisfaction in the other. License and insubordination in the one replace the law-abiding disposition of the other. The intellect of the soldier is in a state to render it a ready solvent of new experiences. All its fixity of ideas is broken up, the deep foundations of its prejudices are shaken, new thoughts readily pass the yielding barriers of its reserve; it is freely open to ideas which it would have refused in the cold, stagnant, un-receptive peaceful stage.

Thus we find races which have dwelt long in self-satisfied barbarism suddenly leaping into civilization when they assume the rôle of conquerors. The savage hordes of Timur yielded, in a few generations, the comparatively civilized Mogul inhabitants of India. From the Saxon pirates who conquered England an Alfred the Great soon arose. The Norman invaders of France quickly threw aside their barbarism and emerged into chivalry.

Such a rapid change in mental conditions is rarely displayed by conquered nations. They remain sullen and obstinate. Though conquered physically they continue mentally on the defensive. Yet this mental resistance can be but temporary. Nothing is more difficult than to bar the mind against the influx of thought. New social customs and new political institutions are

forced on the conquered. No one can hinder himself from thinking and comparing, and whatever appears advantageous is sure in time to be accepted. It is usually religious thought that is longest resisted. Yet this, too, is rapidly propagated if an effort be made to that end. Witness the quick outflow of Mohammedanism through the nations conquered by the proselyting armies of Arabia, and of Christianity through pagan Europe.

The intellectual results of invasion depend largely on the comparative civilization of the conquerors and the conquered. If a barbarian people overflow a civilized nation the mental level of the conquerors is sure to be raised. That of the conquered may be lowered. Yet the result is never a mean between the two grades of advancement. For ideas are hard to kill out. Unlike material possessions, they are capable of unlimited dissemination. Thus unless the conquered people be utterly crushed out their intellectual influence must widen the mental horizon of their conquerors.

If the conquering race be the civilized one it is likely to enforce its social and legal system on the conquered, while in its turn open to reflective influences from the latter. Resistance to the infusion of civilizing influences is ineffective if the subjection be long continued. Roman thought and Roman civilization followed Roman conquest over half the ancient world. And when Rome was finally overflowed by barbarians the persistent Roman thought exercised its lifting force on these barbarians. Nothing of value that existed in Rome was lost. It all reappeared in the history of new kingdoms and wider regions.

In like manner Greek thought spread far and wide throughout Asia and Egypt. The whole mode of thought of Asia was affected and transformed as a result of the Hellenic invasion. New conditions of thought sprung up which were neither Hellenic nor old Asiatic, as the combination of two chemical elements yields a compound that is unlike either of the simples. This Greek thought deeply affected the subsequent Arabian conquerors of that region, and was spread by them, in another form, over a still more widely extended region. The Hellenic influence failed to become persistent in Asia from the fact that the subsequent conquests were annihilating ones. The Mongols were brutal conquerors, who in great part depopulated the nations they overcame, with the exception of the densely peopled realms of China and India. The conquerors of Southern Europe were fortunately less barbarous. The edge of barbarism had been taken off before Rome felt their fierce presence. The subsequent history of Europe and Asia is largely a result of this difference in condition of their barbarian conquerors.

Another consideration naturally flows from those above taken. This is, that the greater the diversity in condition between two warring nations, the greater is their mutual benefit—if this diversity be not abnormally great. Civil wars usually yield but slight results in this direction. They resemble the commingling of two similar fluids. Yet they are not without their important results, particularly if it be a war of classes or of unlike provinces. In the American civil war very important advantages to civilization were gained. The belief in the moral obliquity of slavery, which had been the

dogma of a party, became the creed of the nation. Four years of war produced an effect in this direction which might have needed centuries of peace for its accomplishment. The heated minds of the American people received the doctrine of abolitionism as a river of new thought, where before it had been little more than a rivulet. And this influence has been felt south as well as north. The war has lifted the whole nation a step forward in civilization.

It is not the soldier's mind alone that is heated and receptive. The same condition exists, in a lesser degree, in the people he has left behind. The souls of the people march, if their bodies do not, with the army. They are excited, hopeful, eager. When the conquerors return, with spoil in their hands, and new thoughts, beliefs, and aspirations in their minds, they mingle intimately with a people joyful in their success, and ready to hear and accept their new ideas. The more unlike these to those previously held, the greater the warping influence upon the public mind, if this unlikeness be not so extreme as to preclude combination.

Thus the world progressed during the long ages of the past. Each tribe developed in knowledge and institutions in a somewhat different line from every other. During peace they remained isolated from one another, and preserved their mental strain intact. In war they overflowed one another, new ideas were engendered from the mingling of diverse thoughts, and fresh forms of civilization resulted. Still the process went on. Nomads subdued settled lands, and became agriculturists, but the habits and ideas gained in a nomadic life combined with those which they found in their new

homes, to the production of a broader range of thought. Mountaineers brought down their thoughts to combine them with those born of the plain. Deserts and river valleys poured their thoughts into common moulds. East mingled with west, north with south, mountain with plain, seashore with interior. Men's thoughts fused and boiled continually, new compounds constantly appeared, the range of ideas grew wider and higher, and mental development steadily advanced, over the ruins of empires, and through the ashes of man's most valued possessions.

It was a destructive process. Life vanished, wealth perished, nations disappeared. But mind remained, and became expanded by every invasion of new ideas. The raw material of progress was not destroyed. Material production is only inorganic substance poured into the mould of an idea. Its loss is only temporary if the idea remains. Its loss is a gain if it aids in yielding a crop of new and superior ideas.

There is, indeed, one direction in which most men would look upon the influence of war as simply destructive—that of morality. Physically and intellectually, war has greatly benefited mankind. Morally it seems, at first sight, to have caused deterioration. Its innate cruelty and destructiveness are degrading influences. Yet this moral deterioration is more in seeming than in fact. Wherever intellectual progress takes place some degree of moral advancement must accompany it. Stagnation improves man neither intellectually nor morally. With the growth of empire the sentiment of human brotherhood expands, and it needs but a glance to perceive that in the warring nations of Europe

morality has reached a higher grade than in the peaceful nations of Eastern Asia. It was war, in the Roman world, that cleared the way for the rapid outflow of Christianity, and more recent wars have done much to aid its unfoldment. Peaceful stagnation leaves China to-day at a lower moral level than it had attained twenty centuries ago. Thus alike in the physical, the intellectual, and the moral fields of mind, war has been one of the most important agents of human progress.

This general consideration of the influence of war as an agent in the mental advancement of mankind may be followed by some particular reference to its agency in political development. Political progress has two opposite phases, the movement towards despotism, and that towards republicanism. To these may be added a third, of equal importance, that of the unification of peoples, the bringing of greater and greater bodies of men into a single political union. War has also its two opposite phases, foreign war, and domestic, or civil war. These do not necessarily always appeal to arms and end in bloodshed. A hostile attitude is incipient war, and often produces the effects of actual battle. Hostility begins with threats and ends in blows. But if threats produce the effect, blows become unnecessary. As regards the general influence of war on political evolution, it may be briefly stated in the following words: Foreign war tends to the production and strengthening of despotic government. Civil war tends to the overthrow of despotism, and to the production of democratic institutions.

Countless historical illustrations might be given of this. Scarcely a case of open war, or of threatened hos-

tility, can be mentioned, which does not yield its testimony in favor of the above axioms. In primitive times it was foreign war which brought local communities into union and subjection under a single leader. And with the continuance of war the power of this leader constantly augmented. In the ancient empires foreign wars cemented the power of the kings. The kings of Egypt, of Assyria, of Persia, and of Macedonia, became more despotic as their foreign warfare became more successful. Nations were organized upon military principles. The possession of an army gave the king supreme power over the people, and the successful use of this army abroad gave him supreme power over the army. Military success caused the enlightened to despair of liberty, and the ignorant and venal to worship the despotic general of the state.

Similar results appeared in the Roman empire. Military success abroad was followed by the overthrow of the liberties of the people at home. Military leaders became despotic emperors, and ruled, in almost an exact sense, as generals of the state. In modern times the nations which have been most actively engaged in foreign war have most completely fallen under the power of despots. The long contest of Spain with the Arabs, and afterwards with European nations, established the essentially absolute rule of its monarchs of the sixteenth century. The fight for life of France against England, and its later efforts at European conquest, made the French kings despotic. This despotism culminated in the reign of Louis XIV., in which reign the most successful foreign wars were fought. Still more recently, the warlike vigor of Prussia has not only reduced all

Germany under the sway of a real, not a nominal, emperor, but has given that emperor a partially absolute authority.

If now we look upon the other side of the picture, an opposite movement of development will be perceived. Civil war tends to produce democratic institutions. In the history of ancient Rome we have abundant evidences of this. The people of the military republic were in frequent revolt against the aristocracy. And with every rebellion they gained some new extension of their liberties. The Roman institutions grew constantly more democratic, solely through these popular rebellions. It was the same when the subject Italian states rose and demanded for their citizens the privileges of Roman citizenship. They won freedom by the sword. There were, of course, unsuccessful revolts—as the Sicilian rebellion of the slaves—but even these must have made men think, and added might to the cause of right.

In the intestine quarrels of mediæval Italy, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, we see similar results from similar causes. The Swiss fight for freedom was against a home oppressor, not a foreign monarch. The Netherlands fought, not against Spain, but against Philip as their own monarch. In regard to the intestine quarrels of feudal times, they cannot properly be termed civil wars. They were really foreign wars, for the lords who fought them were virtually independent rulers. And the natural result occurred. These lords became more despotic and more powerful with every success. It was only through successful foreign wars that the kings gained the strength to reduce the barons from



the position of independent monarchs into that of subordinate subjects.

England has had frequent foreign wars, the earlier of which were inaugurated and fought by the kings, and added largely to their despotic power. The more recent foreign wars, however, have been wars of the parliament and ministry, not of the king, and have added nothing to the authority of the latter. For many centuries past this country has been free from invasion, and has not felt the effects of a life and death struggle for its home territory. The intervals between its foreign wars have been largely filled with civil conflicts, either incipient or declared. There have been hostilities between factions of the nobility, between the lords and the kings, and between the people and the kings. And every such period of hostility has resulted in some important addition to popular liberty. There has, moreover, been incessant parliamentary hostility. The people have frequently, through their representatives, shown their teeth to the rulers, and frightened them into yielding. Henry VIII., Elizabeth, James I., and Charles II., submitted with what grace they could, to these quiet victories of the people. Charles I. and James II. refused to yield, and parliamentary hostility speedily became armed hostility. The doctrine of the divine right of kings fell headlong into ruin before the onset of the people.

In the United States every foreign war has resulted in that popular worship of military glory which is the first step towards despotic rule. Fortunately these wars have not long continued, and have been succeeded by extensive intervals of peace. Their only result has

been to place the successful generals at the head of the government. But this tendency has had no opportunity to develop its ultimate consequences, and our military presidents have quickly been succeeded by statesmen, as the interests of peace predominated over those of war. A people is only truly republican when it ceases to see a man in the seat of government, and beholds only the law thus enthroned. It is safer to forget the name and the very existence of the ruler than to have his personality too strongly in the minds of the people. Men give power where they give admiration.

In one sense foreign war tends to weaken the despotism that it has established. It impoverishes the people by taking away the cultivators from the land, and by loading them with crushing taxation. Destitution is produced, and gives rise to restlessness and a spirit of revolt. People are set to thinking, and thought is a deadly poison to despotism. Long continued war thus tends to overthrow the political edifice it has built. The bane brings its own antidote. And however successful war may be at first, its long continuance is sure to bring disaster. The state is impoverished in men and money. The enemy is improved in the art of war. The inevitable result is a final overthrow of the belligerent state. We have striking instances of this in the career of the Roman empire, and of France under Napoleon. Despotism can only remain intact when its establishment by war is followed by its permanence through a long continued peace. China is the one long existing instance of this result, though several minor instances might be named.

## CHAPTER X.

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.

IT is no easy matter for the mind of enlightened man to project itself into that of the savage. Much complex and useless theorizing has been indulged in under the ideas that the sense of what is absurd and what is reasonable must be fundamentally the same in all men; that what is sin to one must be sin to all; that conscience is primitive and inherent; that the belief in a God and a future existence is native to mankind; with other conceptions based upon the assumed innate conditions of the thinker's mind, not upon the results of observation. Late research into the modes of savage thought and the growth of the intellect has dispelled most of these ideas, and taught us that in dealing with the mind of primitive man we have no warrant to make our own mind the measuring rod of what we find there.

So far as ethnological discovery has yet gone, we seem justified in looking upon the earliest men as but a step beyond the brute, and devoid of any sense of sin, any conscientious scruples, any ideas of divinity or immortality, and any power of abstract reasoning beyond its simplest germs. Man must, from the first, have been possessed of curiosity and a spirit of investigation. Even some of the lower animals manifest this spirit. But that he possessed any inherent conceptions, any knowledge not gained through experience, or any

innate faculties not found in the lower animals, has grown exceedingly doubtful.

In tracing the development of religious thought, therefore, the tendency is now to begin with an anti-religious stage, from which religious ideas slowly emerged and elaborated themselves. And this tendency is not based on speculation, but on actual research. This research, it is true, has produced but partial and often confused results, partly from misconceptions of savage institutions, partly from intentional or unintentional deceit by savage tribes, and largely through the fancy that the savage mind is a minor copy of that of civilized man, and, to use an apposite proverb, that savage corn may be measured in civilized bushels. Yet with all these sources of error and imperfection it has grown more and more apparent that we have here the growth of a tree from the germ, not the unfoldment of a flower from the bud, to deal with, and that religious thought was preceded by an utter absence of religious conceptions.

The primitive savage must have beheld in nature very different relations from those which it presents to our eyes. Science was yet unborn. No notion of unconscious force existed. Motion was evident, but this motion was common to man and to the things that surrounded him. In man it was controlled by consciousness. In things it was naturally ascribed to consciousness. It would be to credit early man with improbable powers of analysis to imagine that he had already distinguished between animate and inanimate motion. Below man were numerous animal forms, actively moving. Below these again were numerous

objects, equally active and wayward in their motions. It needs some knowledge of gravitation, of the existence and movement of an invisible atmosphere, of heat and electric energy, etc., fully to satisfy us of the inanimate character of these activities. When even the mind of a Kepler held to the old idea of a sentient soul in the sun, we can readily comprehend that to the mind of the untutored savage the motions of all things are manifestations of conscious life.

The phenomena of growth aided in this conception. Growth was not confined to man, but appeared also in animals and plants, and seemed indicated in the changes of many of the substances of mineral nature. Things, like men, came into and went out of existence. This helped to assimilate the inanimate to the animate, and to strengthen the conception that all change was the product of, or attended by, consciousness. Such a conception has not completely died out, even in enlightened nations, and its gradual decline can be traced throughout the history of human thought. Escape from it was gained only through scientific and philosophical research. It must have reigned supreme in the ages preceding the origin of science and philosophy. The thought conditions then existing can nowhere be found now, for the lowest of modern savages are affected by the results of ages of slow mental evolution, while very many of them have come into contact with civilized thought.

There is still another source of this earliest of human conceptions of nature. Man was compelled to theorize about the conditions of the surrounding world. His own motions were frequently hurtful or helpful to

himself. Similar results arose from the motions of his fellows, of animals, trees, and minerals. Thus he could not avoid taking cognizance of these motions, whose effects he was constantly obliged to evade or to avail himself of. His own motions in relation to other persons and things were influenced by considerations of anger, hatred, affection, appetite, or other mental moving forces. Similar mental conditions would naturally be imputed to those objects whose motions produced like effects upon him. The malevolent and benevolent powers and designs, which are still ascribed by savages to inanimate objects, indicate the earliest theory of nature arrived at by thinking man.

Only vague and imperfect remnants of the primitive stage of human thought remain to us, but they all point back to this as the first attempted solution of the mystery of the universe. Everything that moved lived. Everything lived, since motion at times displayed itself in all objects. And this life was a conscious one, and affected by all the passions and emotions of the human mind. We cannot speak of this belief as a crude pantheism. There was no conception of a general life, but of individual life in every separate object. And from this basis arose the most primitive form of religious observance anywhere existing, that of Fetichism.

In the lowest form of Fetich worship the savage mind concerns itself only with that which immediately surrounds it. It is not yet sufficiently expanded to take thought of the distant, or to speculate about remote phenomena. As the malevolent powers cannot always be avoided by flight, an effort is made to avoid

them by homage. The submission and respect which are necessarily given to a stronger man are also paid, in the form of a crude worship, to stronger things. Trees, stones, whatever has the power of inflicting harm, become objects of reverence, and particular objects are worshiped with the idea that they may defend the worshiper from the malevolence of other objects. Among animals the serpent is the most frequently worshiped, perhaps from its mysterious power of inflicting injury. Fetiches, however, are made of the most incongruous things, which are thrown away in scorn if they fail to do their duty as protectors, and are quickly replaced by some other odd object, to which magical powers are ascribed.

We speak of this as worship; it is worship only in the germ. It displays none of the characteristics of true worship, since the mind of the fetich worshiper has yet none of the conceptions of the true devotee. He fears, and he seeks to propitiate the objects of his fear; that is all. That he has committed sin, for which retribution is exacted, is foreign to his thought. Selfishness is too utter, as yet, for any conception of duty to have arisen. Men aid one another instinctively, but not through the workings of benevolent impulses. It is simply through the gregarious instincts of the herd, or the absolute necessity of mutual aid for the existence of the community, that assistance is rendered. The sense of duty and of sin cannot arise until human society has sufficiently consolidated to give birth to legal restrictions. When men are made to understand that certain actions are wrongful, and sure to be followed by punishment, these actions in time come to be looked

upon as sinful, and their opposites as virtuous. All existing savages possess many such unwritten laws of custom, and consequent ideas of vice and virtue. But in this, its earliest phase, the idea of sin was confined to conduct injurious to the tribe. Only at a later date, when seeming punishment came from objects or forces outside human society, did the notion of sin widen, and a sense of duty from the individual to invisible intelligences arise.

Fetich worship, as it at present exists in Africa and other regions, is still very crude, though it probably contains ideas which are not primitive in origin. The objects chosen as fetiches are believed to possess peculiar powers, among them the ability to counteract the injurious actions of other fetiches. The possession of these powers can only be discovered by experiment. The savage will choose the first object upon which his eyes fall—a stone, twig, tree, feather, human or animal remnant, or any imaginable article—and set it up as his individual deity. If fortune favors him the article is credited with superhuman power, and is revered accordingly. If fortune fails him it is degraded from its high estate. It is abused, kicked, dragged through the mud, and some other object made the deity of its savage owner. It is a convenient faith, perhaps, this possession of a pocket god, but it is not a very exalted one.

It is doubtful if any idea of spiritual intelligence adhered to the original fetich. It indicated probably but a recognition of the power to hurt in inanimate things. Yet with the lapse of time and the growth of ideas it is likely that some such notion grew up in



the savage mind, and that the fetich is now usually regarded as symbolic and in a certain sense as an embodiment in matter of the invisible element of mind. Some such idea of the existence and power of the unseen could scarcely fail to dawn upon the awakening intelligence, even of the savage. He is exposed to all the influences of nature, and is as yet neither philosopher nor scientist. The invisible air blows upon him, now softly, now violently. Clouds are born and die in the blue vault of heaven. Rain and hail pour down. The lightnings flash, the thunders roll, the warm sunshine gleams through the broken clouds. Everywhere nature seems full of life and power. Supernal intelligences become visible and invisible at will. They war with each other and with man. Even the lower animals seem to regard moving things as living. Man, as his intellect unfolded, could not but extend this idea and gain a somewhat enlarged conception of the seeming intelligence of nature. If so the fetich must have become to some extent a representative of the unseen powers, rather than an actual power in itself.

There is one other source of primitive religious ideas at which we may here glance, but must reserve for full attention in a later chapter. This is the effect of dreams upon the mind of the savage. In sleep he wanders in spirit, and beholds the inmates of what seems an immaterial world. Departed friends and ancestors reappear to his mental vision, with their features, their dress, and their weapons as when they lived upon the earth. This naturally led to the belief that both the dead and their belongings had a spirit-

ual increment which survived the physical death. We can indeed scarcely credit the savage with any conception of immortality such as we entertain. His ideas are necessarily vague and crude. He sees but a short distance into the past and future, and fails to deal philosophically with the appearances that have stirred up his uncultured soul. Yet it is quite possible that to this dream-engendered idea is due the earliest form of sacrifice, such as the burying of weapons and ornaments with the dead, and of food for the use of the spirit. This in turn may have given rise to the idea of propitiation by sacrifice. Efforts would naturally be made to satisfy the restless or angry spirits which occasionally appeared in visions, by funeral ceremonies, and, as a later consequence, to propitiate the deities by offerings.

It is, of course, difficult to decide what was or what was not the true course of unfoldment of religious observances. The views here advanced are supported by known facts; but other causes, no traces of which now exist, may have acted upon the mind of primitive man, in the evolution of worship. Yet as the history of the old world of animals is laid up in the rocks of the earth's crust, so is that of the old world of human thought in the habits and mind of existing man. As we unearthen the fossils of life from the rocks, so may we the fossils of thought from the mind. Religion is an evolution. It advanced by steps, not by bounds. Many of these steps no longer exist as facts, but they have all left their footmarks on the mind of man, and on his existing deific conceptions, and there many of them may still be traced.

The second stage of religion was simply an expansion of fetichism. As the human intellect gradually unfolded, man looked beyond his immediate surroundings. He traced relations between himself and remote objects. He was burned by the sun as by the fire that touched his hand. The pool which drowned him was a minor counterpart of the ocean. The scope of his worship extended, though its character did not change. It was simply fetichism on a grander scale. Man still worshiped material objects, but the remote gradually replaced the immediate. Reverence for the objects of the earth extended to the powers of the air, and from the visible to the invisible. By an unfoldment of this process, the heavenly bodies, the sun, moon, and planets, became objects of worship. But they were revered as fetiches. The soul of the sun was not yet isolated as a divine being, as in the later era of religion.

Such a worship of the powers of nature, and usually of the sun or of the sky as the superior deity, is the earliest form of religion which is strongly displayed in the history of civilized peoples. The idea often advanced, that monotheism was the first form of worship, and that it was but slowly replaced by polytheism, is a pure deduction from fancy. It has no satisfactory basis in historical fact, and the modern extension of historical knowledge into the remoter ages renders it still less probable. Everywhere history seems to begin with polytheistic conceptions, though often rather of several names for deity than of several deities distinct in their attributes.

A brief review of this earliest historical stage of

religious thought is here desirable. Almost everywhere we find it to consist in some form of nature worship, with the sun as supreme deity. With the civilized Americans sun worship everywhere existed. We find it alike in the agricultural tribes of the southern United States, in Mexico, and in Peru. With the Peruvians devotion to the sun-god was particularly prevalent. Other gods were worshiped—the moon, the planets, thunder and lightning, the rainbow, the elementary powers, etc.—but the sun was the supreme object of devotion, to whom great temples were erected, of whom golden images were formed, for whom the Inca stood as earthly representative, and from whom flowed life and fortune to the Peruvian people. Among the Aztecs, also, solar worship was probably, at an early period, the prevailing religious faith. But at the period of the Conquest the terrible god of war had gained the supremacy, while the god of the air was the chief beneficent deity. The sun had nearly vanished from the popular worship.

Nature worship exists among all the Mongolian peoples of Asia; but with the civilized Mongolians, the Chinese and Japanese, it has been nearly replaced by another very common form of ancient religious belief, the worship of deified heroes, or of departed ancestors. Traces of the deification of men appear in all the ancient mythologies, and the custom is common to-day in India; but nowhere else did it attain the supremacy which it displays in the two nations mentioned. The *Shinto* system of Japan is partly a nature worship, but more particularly a deification of ancient worthies. In China the old form of nature worship has virtually dis-

appeared, and a reverence for departed ancestors is nearly the only form of religious observance that exists for the great mass of the people. It is true there are mingled with this the three religious doctrines of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. But these as practiced are little more than fetichism, and neither in China nor Japan do we find anything that can properly be called the religion of a civilized state, in the modern sense of the phrase.

The most ancient trace of religion which appears in the Semitic nations is a Shamanism resembling that still practiced by the Turanians of Northern Asia. This was the faith of the Accadian inhabitants of Babylonia, who are supposed to have been of Turanian extraction. Sorcery took the place of worship. The idea of deity was but a step above the crudest fetichism. Every object had its spirit, good or bad, favorable or inimical to mankind. The world swarmed with unseen intelligences, frequently hostile to man, and controllable only by the magic rites of the Shamans, or sorcerers. At a later period a more dignified worship arose, the sky, the earth, and the underworld became deities, and finally the sun-god, under various titles, emerged as the principal object of worship. An intricate mythology appeared, perhaps in the same manner as mythologies have grown up elsewhere, by conquest and the concentration of the gods of numerous tribes within a single pantheon. At a still later period, under Semitic influence, the principal deities were combined into trinities, each god was associated with a female divinity, and below these supreme gods came a host of inferior deities. The Phœnicians, like the Babylonians, had

their sun-god, Baal, with whom was associated a female deity, while below them were many deities, of whose names and attributes we know but little.

And in the worship of Semitic nations another frequent phase of ancient religious belief attained considerable development. This was the deification of the procreative power of nature, the act of generation being looked upon as a symbol of the creative principle, the agency through which the universe and all it contains has arisen. Traces of *Phallus* worship are found in all parts of the world, both among very low and considerably progressed peoples. And in many cases it leads to sensual rites of the most wanton character. This dissolute form of worship was very common with the Semitic nations, from whom it passed over into Greece. In the worships of Cybele and Aphrodite, the Babylonian Istar, and the Phœnician Astarte, prostitution was a hallowed rite, and their sacred groves were the scenes of debasing orgies. The extreme sensuality of Syria in the Roman period was but a natural consequence of this deification of the sexual passion.

The religion of the ancient Egyptians was an intricate system of nature worship. The cruder form of fetichism had vanished, but the system continued in its higher stage of a general worship of animals. It is true that the sacred animals had become, to the priests, mere symbols, or earthly representatives of the deities, but it is doubtful if the faith of the common people had any such philosophic groundwork. The numerous deities of Egypt, with their interchanging attributes, were largely consequences of the extension of the nation. As separate tribes were concentrated under one govern-

ment, the gods of each became, in a measure, the gods of the whole, and the supremacy was, at times, given to different deities, who had been separately supreme in the original tribes.\*

It is usually asserted by Egyptologists that the priests worshiped a single supreme, unlimited deity, whose attributes were personified in the nature gods. Yet this assertion rests upon incomplete evidence. It is probable that there was an indefinite conception of such a deity, the eternal source of the gods and all below them, such as may be traced in the religion of all early civilizations; but there is nothing to show that it had attained any philosophic completeness.

\*Much of the occasionally great extension of polytheism is probably due to this fact. Polytheistic religions have always been tolerant of the gods of other peoples, and have incorporated, instead of exterminating, foreign deities. From this undoubtedly arose much of the confusion of legends and interlocking of attributes of the gods of mythology. Here two gods continued to occupy, side by side, the same field of nature. There several deities were combined into one, without regard to the lack of harmony in their mythologic stories. In fact it has always proved easier to convert a conquered nation by incorporating its old faith than by seeking to eradicate its belief. This method has been employed by Monotheists, as well as by Polytheists, but usually in the former case by converting the ancient gods into demons. The Zoroastrians dealt in this manner with the gods of subject tribes, and the Christians with the gods of European mythology. In like manner the legends, modes of worship, and religious philosophy of converted nations have been largely accepted by religious propagandists. We have illustrations of this in the strong influence which the ancient faiths have had on the doctrines and practices of Christianity, and also on Mohammedanism. It is easy to conquer the bodies of a people, but difficult to conquer their minds, and the cases are few in which the mentality of the subdued has not to some extent modified the beliefs of their subduers.

From this fact, indeed, we may trace one result of great importance. The tendency of all religions has been towards monotheism; that is, to the conception of a single supreme deity, and to the subordination and gradual suppression of the remaining deities. This tendency has had to combat with that above named, the adoption of foreign gods, through conquest or otherwise. This placed a strong check on the development of monotheism, and undoubtedly had a powerful influence in extending the reign of the primitive polytheism, as also in giving a perplexing confusion to the originally simple mythologies.

In the Egyptian polytheism two superior gods became prominent in the public worship, above the host of inferior deities. These great gods, Ra and Osiris, were at the head of two groups of gods, and probably represent the deities of two original nations. Both had their origin in solar worship, though the myth of Osiris became in time less directly identified with the sun. He came to represent the hidden sun, the ruler of mankind in the future state, the combatant with evil, and the deific principle with which the souls of the dead became identified. His story was full of human traits and human woes, and appealed strongly to the sympathies of man. Ra was a colder and more vaguely outlined figure. He continued particularly the god of the sun, and it was around his form that the tendency to unification of deity concentrated. He was becoming or had become to the priests the omnipresent and omnipotent, the deific ruler of the universe.

If we pass now to the consideration of the public worship of the remaining progressive race of mankind, the Aryan, we find ourselves yet more fully within the circle of nature deities, and still more justified in declaring that the primitive fetich worship, in all cases, developed into an enlarged fetichism, a worship of the heavenly bodies, the earth, air, and sea, and the forces of the elements. The final results of this primitive Aryan worship appear in the mythologies of all the historical Aryan tribes. The gods of the Indian Vedas are probably the nearest to the original deities, and lead us towards an era of less developed polytheism, less intricate mythology, and a more direct worship of



nature than appear in the religious conditions of the subsequent Aryan nations.

In Aryan worship the sun, the supreme deity in most ancient religions, loses this exalted station, which is taken by the broad-spreading, bright-shining heaven, the mighty Dyauspitar, father of gods and men, whose name reappears in the title of the superior deity of all the European pantheons. Sky worship very probably existed in the early stages of all mythologies, though in most cases it was quickly succeeded by the worship of the sun. Such we find to be the case in the Babylonian mythology. But the Chinese and the Aryans continued to regard heaven as the supreme deity, the Chinese exclusively so. Their imagination failed to carry them beyond this early deific conception.

There were fewer gods in the early than in the later period of Aryan worship. New deities were afterwards manufactured or imported, and added to the older pantheon. Around these deities grew up complex mythologic notions, which greatly clouded their origin. Only of late years has critical analysis penetrated these myths, and proved them to have originated, in great measure, in the variations of natural phenomena, the succession of night and day, of calm and storm, of sunshine and cloud, of summer and winter, and similar changes. All such variations in nature became ascribed to the actions of good and evil powers, who were at war with one another for the control of the earth and the skies, while making the destiny of men one of the main purposes of their existence.

Innumerable fancies collected around these central conceptions. Even the words employed to describe

them, becoming used in their metaphorical instead of their literal sense, added to the maze of myths. And this complication was very probably increased by the deification of earthly heroes, and the transformation of deeds of human heroism into godlike adventures. Thus ideas having a variety of origins attached themselves to the original beliefs, and yielded intricate mythologies, within which the central core of nature worship is often but dimly, or not at all, visible.

After the separation of the Aryan peoples, great changes came over their religious conceptions. Particularly between the eastern and western Aryans a striking divergence arose. Religion became the business of the eastern branch. It became the play of the western. With the Greeks the gods, while their origin was clearly revealed in the ascription of consciousness and superhuman power to natural objects, grew more and more humanized. They became personal beings, with all the appetites, passions and habits of man, and each with a personal history resembling that of some human hero. There was no impersonal deity, no divine, overruling power, no heaven higher than the summit of Mount Olympus, no omnipotence or immortality, even of the gods; for like man they were subject to Fate, and destined to a final fall from their high estate. This vague figure of Fate took with the Greeks, in some measure, the position of supreme deity.

Perhaps to the character of the Greeks themselves we must ascribe that of their pantheon. Man was the central figure in Greece. The Hellenic was the most self-respecting of ancient races. Every man was a god to himself, and felt capable of coping with all

the powers of earth and heaven. There was no sense of self-abasement. The gods were brought step by step down to the earth, and assimilated to man. The mind of the Greek rebelled against the conception of any being supremely superior to man, or unlike him in nature and habit. The unification of deity which we find elsewhere never took distinct form in Greece. Heaven was a limited monarchy, with displays of arbitrary force, of constitutional control, of rebellion, and of division of powers, like those that appeared in the events of Grecian history. There was a steady progress towards irreligion, a dethronement of the gods and an enthronement of man as the grandest being in the universe.

Among the remaining European Aryans this tendency only partly appeared. The gods of the Scandinavians were not the sunny deities of Greece. They were conflict-loving divinities, raging and rending like the winds of the north. The world of the Greeks was subdued, bright, beneficent; that of the Scandinavians was stormy, grim, and uncontrollable. In the one, man had conquered nature. In the other, nature ruled despotically over man. Yet the fierce, free spirit of the northern warriors hindered any abasement before their deities. The gods of the Scandinavians were personified as dark, warlike, lawless spirits, like those of the warriors they overruled but who were too fierce of heart to submit, even to the divine powers. And the imagination of the northern Aryans was equal to that of the Greeks. A mythology was wrought out as intricate as that of the Grecian deities, and more connected, since it probably contained a lesser

admixture of foreign elements. It was the story of a deific society, rather than a series of stories of independent deities, as in Greece.

With the Romans the gods were more spiritualized than with the Greeks. There was much less tendency to myth-making, or to anthropomorphism. The Jupiter of the Romans was a vaguer conception than the Zeus of the Greeks, though an effort was made to identify the two when the Romans became possessed of Greek learning. The Latin race lacked imagination. It was the most practical of ancient races, and it dealt with religion as with a business. The Roman mind did not play with its gods as did the Greeks, nor, like the Scandinavian, translate its own fierce spirit to the sky. It continued to worship what it had originally received, and the vague spiritualism of the Roman belief was far nearer to the primitive Aryan faith than the clearly defined polytheism of the Greeks.

If now we come to consider the deific conceptions of the eastern Aryans, we find a strikingly different development from that of the west. The two branches of this people, the Indian and the Iranian, were originally combined, dwelling together in Bactria and Northern India. Their gods then were fewer than they afterwards became, and more distinctly of nature origin. This is a general rule. The younger the polytheism the fewer the gods, and the more closely identified with natural forces. The numbers, the attributes, and the deeds of the gods tend to increase with time and thought, though at the same time they tend to become subordinated to a supreme deity.

Subsequently a division took place among the eastern Aryans, which has, though with no historical warrant, been ascribed to religious dissension. The Indian branch marched on its conquering career southward. The Iranian branch pushed slowly westward towards Persia. The religious development of the latter need not here be considered, as it belongs to a later division of our subject. That of the former presents one of the most peculiar and interesting of mental phenomena.

The gods of the Vedic poets failed to attain the distinctly anthropomorphic character of those of the Greeks. They were more indefinitely conceived, their characters were vague and vast, and they displayed little diversity of attributes. They tended to flow together and merge into one. As a late Vedic writer declares, "There is but One, though the poets call him by many names." It was a more primitive stage of development than that exhibited in Greece. All the energies of mighty nature were conceived to be contained within each deity successively. Deific individuality faded, instead of increasing, as with the Greeks. There was a distinct movement towards pantheism.

If we seek for the cause of this difference of development in the difference of conditions affecting the two peoples, we may perhaps partially find it in the patriarchal and autocratic rule prevailing in Asia, as compared with the democracy or limited monarchy of early European institutions. Every primitive people is influenced in its conception of heavenly society by its knowledge of earthly societies, and the idea of government possessed by the Indian Aryans may have been

gathered from the despotic monarchies of the early Asiatic states. The Hindu deities show little tendency to form a pantheon. Of the several deities acknowledged, each is worshiped singly, and invested with all the deific powers, as if he was supreme ruler of heaven and earth. It is not easy to separate these deities into the gods of special domains of nature, since to each are ascribed the attributes of all. The attention of the Hindus was successively concentrated on one after another of their gods. Now one, now another, became supreme, and the others vanished from the sight of the worshipers. It was the autocratic conception of deity as compared with the democratic. Such was the original tendency, though it was finally set aside by the growth of the extraordinary system of Brahmanism.

If now we return to the Semitic religions we find a similar tendency. Though intricate polytheisms arose, the duties and attributes of the separate gods continued vague. There was little of the definiteness of the Greek, or even of the Egyptian worship. To each god worshiped were ascribed general, not particular deific powers. It was patriarchy lifted to heaven. We discover not the sun, the moon, the air, the ocean, clearly defined as gods; but El, the strong; Baal, the lord; Moloch, the king, etc. This peculiar development of Semitic theology has been ascribed by some writers to the character of the Semitic languages. They lack the flexibility of the Aryan tongues, and are ill-suited to that metaphorical diversity which undoubtedly had much to do with the growth of Aryan myths. What had been adjectives became nouns. Strong,

lordly, kingly, became the strong, the lord, the king.

The gods lost definite personality in consequence, and became merely supreme, great, splendid deities without terrestrial attributes. They differed in name, not in character. It was a movement opposite to that of anthropomorphism. As the Greek gods grew more, so the Semitic gods grew less man-like. They moved away from earth into the depths of the infinite heavens. The Almighty of the Semites replaced the Heaven-father of the Aryans.

In reviewing the gradual growth of religious conceptions, as here considered, a constant widening and deepening of the current of human thought appears. From the gross fetich of savage worshipers, with its dimly conceived powers, man advanced to an extended fetichism, in which the grand objects and the mighty forces of nature became worshiped as deities. But in the unfoldment of this principle of progress there are two distinct phases to be considered. In the one case there was a steady tendency towards monotheism, a belief in the supremacy of some single deity, below whom the once equal gods sank into angels and demons, while He became the universal and omnipotent, the creator, preserver, and destroyer of heaven and earth.

In the religious system of every civilized nation such a supreme deity, more or less clearly defined, makes his appearance. He is perceived in the Pachacamac of the Peruvians, and the Teotl of the Aztecs; in the Ra of the Egyptians, the Brahma of the Hindus, and the Heaven of the Chinese; in the Ahura Mazda of the Persians, and the El and other supreme deities of the Semites. He is less distinctly declared in the European

faiths, his highest representative being the vaguely outlined Fate of the Greeks. Even certain savage tribes, as the North American Indians, and the Siberian nomads, vaguely reverence a supreme, all-controlling being, of whom they form no material representation.

This tendency towards monotheism has been accompanied as above said, by a second tendency, that of the separation of religious thought, at first single, into two branches, which, though never completely divided, have pursued distinct channels of development. Even the fetich worshiper had a religion which was to some degree duplex. He revered not only the material objects, but also vaguely the invisible forces of nature. As religion progressed the worship of the grand objects became associated with that of the great energies of nature. These were to some extent combined. A conscious soul was imputed to the sun, or other nature god, and in time was worshiped as the true god, reverence for the material object diminishing. But a sense of the existence of abstract force, of energy apart from matter, gradually arose, and became an object of the fear and worship of mankind. Thus religion became duplex. In the one direction thought moved towards a conception of material, in the other towards a conception of immaterial divinity. Something of each of these exists in every early religious system, but they are mingled in very different proportions. If we consider the religions of Aryan and of Semitic origin, we find in the former the idea of material, in the latter that of immaterial deity strongly indicated. The Aryan monotheism emerges from a pantheon of object divinities; the



Semitic from one of force divinities. As a consequence the supreme god of the former remains indissolubly connected with the matter of the universe, that of the latter becomes pure force as separate from matter. In the one case pantheism emerges, the deity becomes the soul of the universe, the Brahma of the Hindus. In the other case pure theism arises, the deity exists separate from the material universe, its creator and controller, but not its informer. We have its ultimate in the Jehovah of the Hebrews.

In modern religious faith there is a tendency to merge these separate ideas. The religion of the enlightened modern nations arose from a mingling of Aryan and Semitic conceptions, and in it the two modes of thought above mentioned overlap. They do not strictly mingle, for they are mutually exclusive. In consequence the idea of supreme deity entertained is vague and generalized; now verging towards pantheism, now towards theism; now accepting anthropomorphism, now declaring for immaterialism; inclining hither and thither, according to the mental strain of the believer, and growing less instead of more distinct and defined with the progress of thought. A definite conception of infinite deity by finite minds is of course impossible, and these vagaries of belief must continue until men are content to acknowledge the impossibility of fixing the status of the infinite, and to worship without question where all question is vain.

The philosophy of religion, however, by no means ceased with the conception of a single supreme being, either controlling or informing the universe of matter. From this central idea ramified various secondary

beliefs, and it is to these secondary dogmas that the diversity of religious systems is due. Though the priesthood of nearly every early nation reached some conception of supreme deific unity, their faith in the multitude of lesser nature deities continued. These popular gods were differently dealt with as the religious idea developed. Here they sunk into demons; there they became the servants and messengers of the Supreme. In some cases they retained their supremacy, and hindered the growth of a monotheistic faith; in others they became included in an involved system of religious philosophy, that of Emanation.

The doctrine of Emanation has played so important a part in the history of religion that it is desirable here to trace its growth from its simpler to its more intricate forms. As displayed in the Brahmanic philosophy, it would seem to have been devised by the deep-thinking priesthood of Brahmanism. But a fuller consideration of religious development enables us to trace it upward from its origin in fetichism.

The savage belief that all things, animate and inanimate, possess souls, was accompanied with the idea that not only the human soul, but that of all lower objects, is capable of existing separate from the body. As we have already remarked, it is quite probable that this doctrine of separate soul existence originated in the phenomena of dreams, in which the forms of dead men and destroyed things re-appear in a phantasmal world. A secondary result of this doctrine was the belief that these souls might become re-embodied. If savages thought on such subjects at all, the origin of the soul must have become a problem to their simple

minds. If it exists after the death of the body, it might have existed before its birth, and the flitting souls of the dead might enter the new-born and thus regain material embodiment.

Such a doctrine is widespread among savage tribes. Tylor, in his "Primitive Culture," gives numerous examples of the belief that the souls of infants are the reincarnated souls of ancestors, or other dead persons. This idea is very generally entertained by the American Indian tribes, from the Esquimaux southward. The notion is also widely held by American and other tribes that the human soul can pass into the body of an animal. Probably from this notion arose the Totemism, or veneration of certain animals, of the American tribes.

Evidently in this savage belief we possess the germinal form of the doctrine of transmigration, as held by the primitive civilizations. This doctrine is entertained by the Chinese in a shape but little advanced beyond its primitive phase. The Chinese believe that the spirits of the dead may be reborn into the world, in the form of a human being, or perhaps of a beast, bird, or reptile, at the end of five generations. Hence the worship of ancestors ceases after the fifth generation from their death. In Egypt this belief was held in a more developed form, and the Egyptian soul was, as it were, capsulated, or composed of several successive layers, more or less material, all of which must be discarded ere the spirit could attain its complete disembodiment. From Egypt the doctrine of transmigration passed to Greece, apparently through the agency of Pythagoras, and makes its appearance in the systems of several of the later Grecian philosophies.

But this primitive belief gained an extraordinary development in Brahmanism. The highly intellectual priesthood of this remarkable faith, in their effort to comprehend the mystery of the universe, made the doctrine of the separate existence and successive reincarnation of the soul the basis of an intricate philosophy. Whence originated the vast multitude of individual souls, which seemed to have an immortal existence? What would be their final destiny? The material universe began, and would end. Was the destiny of the soul bound up in that of the universe? But the universe had emanated from Brahma, the infinite spirit. Was not the soul, then, a spiritual concretion, emanating in like manner from Brahma, possibly an individualized portion of the infinite spiritual essence? If so, it must still, during its individual existence, remain an integral portion of Brahma, and might finally lose its individuality, and be reabsorbed into the infinite oneness from which it originally emerged.

Such was the basic principle of the Hindu religious philosophy. No one, of course, can declare that it originated in the manner above indicated. Yet when we consider the widespread existence of ideas of spirit transmigration, and compare them with the Brahmanic doctrine that the infinite spirit preceded and gave birth to all things, the ideas of emanation and absorption seem but natural outgrowths from the combination of these two beliefs. They arose independently, though confusedly, in Egypt. They became fully elaborated only in India. All came from the One. All would finally vanish into the One. The earth and the heavens, gods and men, and all lesser things, were but tem-

porary existences, insubstantial phantasms, breathed out by Brahma; to be again breathed in, and lost in his divine essence. It was the supreme outreach of pantheistic thought.

But man was gross and earthly, full of wicked thoughts and sensual passions. Such a being was not fitted for absorption into the divine unity. He must become purged of his grossness and purified in thought ere his destiny could be fulfilled. Poverty and asceticism seemed the true methods of purification. The pleasures of appetite and of the senses must be despised and rejected, severe penance for every sinful deed or impure thought must be performed, the body must be reduced that the soul might be exalted, man must withdraw himself as far as possible from earthliness, and concentrate his whole existence upon thoughts of the divinity within and without him, ere he could hope to become fitted for his final destiny. Few or none, however, could attain this position by earthly abstinence. Most men remained slaves to their passions. They died in utter unfitness for divine absorption. Yet the process of purification could not be avoided. It must be performed, here or hereafter. From this seeming necessity arose an extraordinary conception of the destiny of the human soul.

There was, in fact, a double conception, one of future rewards and punishments, and one of purification through transmigration. These two ideas, which Sir Henry Maine supposes to have had different origins, and the last of which he ascribes to the aborigines of India, became welded by the priests into a single definite system. A series of hells, in which the erring

soul was devoted to extraordinary tortures, was devised. Yet in the completed system they became rather purgatories than hells, the punishment in them being but part of the process of purification. The soul could not cease to exist. It was impure and must become purified. It became embodied in form after form, in each of which it fulfilled some part of its long destiny. The freed soul was continually reborn into the bodies of men, of the lower animals, or even into inanimate objects, and thus became gradually purified from sin and imperfection, and fitted for reabsorption into the divine. Even the inferior gods, the Vedic deities, who had been relegated to the lower heaven of Indra, were occasionally obliged to take on human forms, and pass through an earthly phase of transmigration. On the other hand, purified human souls might enter this lower heaven, and dwell with the gods ere attaining their ultimate destiny. In fact the highest gods, even the creative Brahma, at times assumed the human form, not for purposes of personal purification, but for the salvation of mankind. Successive incarnations of Brahma thus took place, and probably from this originated the idea of the incarnation of deity, which has played so prominent a part in later religious systems.

As for the Brahmanic doctrine of final absorption, what it really signified no one seems to know. It was left in the state of vagueness in which all the highest religious conceptions necessarily lose themselves. It became, indeed, to some extent defined in the Buddhist philosophy, in which the personality and consciousness of the supreme divinity vanished. The Buddhists accepted the Brahmanic transmigration and

purgatorial torments, but with them absorption seems to have meant a gradual lapsing into endless unconsciousness, a virtual annihilation. The idea of Nirvana is clouded in the vagueness of which we have above spoken, but the train of thought which led to it, if carried to its ultimate consequence, ends inevitably in the final annihilation of conscious existence.

A somewhat similar unfoldment of religious philosophy displays itself in the Egyptian belief, though it failed to attain the definiteness and extension of the Hindu conception. In Egypt the priesthood never gained the supremacy it attained in India, but continued a more active and less reflective body. Yet so far as its dogmas extended they flowed in much the same channel. The transmigration of souls through animal forms was an Egyptian dogma, though it was complicated, in the case of many animals at least, with the idea that these animals symbolized certain divinities, and were rendered sacred by the divine essence which dwelt within them. They were not gods in themselves, not even the sacred bull, Apis, but only terrestrial representatives of the gods.

Here also the belief in transmigration was connected with a belief in absorption. The soul of the dead, if absolved from its sins, at once took the name of Osiris; and its final destiny, after a series of changes, of which absorption into the sun was the last definite phase, seems to have been a swallowing up into, or identification with, the supreme divinity. The story, as given in the Ritual, or Book of the Dead, is exceedingly complex and undefined, and ends in such vagueness that it is difficult to understand its real meaning, if it

has any. It is as shapeless and flitting as a morning cloud.

The intricate polytheism of Egypt never developed into a definite monotheism. The monotheistic ideas which were probably entertained by the more intellectual priests seem to have been but vaguely conceived, while the philosophy, which led in the direction of that of India, stopped far short of the well thought out system of the Brahmanic priests, and ended in a maze of contradictory and confused notions which it is impossible to disentangle. The Egyptians were devoted less to thought and more to action. With them national development progressed. With the Hindus it ceased to exist, and only thought moved.

In the religions of Europe but little trace of the philosophy of emanation can be found. It is displayed, it is true, in the speculations of the Neoplatonists, which undoubtedly originated from the oriental religious dogmas; but these speculations had little effect upon the course of European thought. Plotinus taught an intricate system of emanation. From the primal One, the all-perfect and eternal, emanates reason, the highest archetype of existence. From reason again flows the world-soul, which forms, permeates, and animates the world of matter, the visible universe. In like manner individual souls have emanated from the all-soul, flowing from reason into matter, yet retaining their existence in the world of reason while inhabiting the world of sense. Finally the freed soul mounts upward to its source, loses consciousness, and becomes absorbed into the primal One, the eternal divinity.

To the primary religious ideas above described are



attached several secondary conceptions to which reference may here be made. Among these the doctrine of future retribution for sin but slowly took definite form. The fear of hell has had but a narrow range of existence in human history. As already said, the savage mind seems to have no distinct conception of sin. Even after the reign of law began, and with it the idea of virtue and vice, this idea was long confined to man's relations to the community. The belief in duties to the gods was probably of much slower growth. Fear of the gods was early entertained, but this fear confined itself to dread of bodily injury from the malice of mischievous intelligences. The worship of savages is entirely a religion of fear. Where they believe in good deities they do not trouble themselves to worship beings who can have no inclination to hurt them, but devote their efforts to the propitiation of the malicious or demonic intelligences. But, as above said, the malice of demons is confined, in the savage conception, to the injury of man, and is not extended to the torture of spirits. Nor does the idea that man can commit sin on earth which must be atoned for by punishment hereafter, appear in the religions of the earlier civilizations. The doctrine of special reward for the brave and virtuous was early conceived, and is to-day entertained by some savage tribes; but the great mass of mankind who have not deserved this happiness are not consigned to any special misery. In the ancient civilizations as a rule a vague degree of misery attaches itself to the future existence of this general herd. They remain in a nebulous, uncomfortable state, while the delights of

heaven are reserved for the virtuous and the brave. In such a negative purgatory dwelt the mass of the Mexican dead, while the warrior who died in battle attained supreme delights. The Peruvians had a distinct doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, and of a separation of the good from the wicked; but the punishment of the latter was no more severe than a wearisome labor. The hells on which imagination has exhausted itself in devising extraordinary tortures are those of the Hindu, the Mohammedan, and the mediæval Christian creeds. The demoniac ferocity of these doctrines has nowhere else a parallel. There is no defined hell in the Egyptian creed. In the Babylonian it was merely a dark, nebulous region, where dust was the sole food of the joyless shades. There is no distinct conception of a hell to be found in the Hebrew scriptures. With the Persians and the early European Aryans it was also indistinctly conceived. The Scandinavian heaven was a huge battlefield, on which the blessed warriors daily hewed each other to pieces, and then revived to the joys of feasting on immortal mead and mutton in a celestial hall. The general dead remained in dark and dim joylessness, distinct punishment being reserved for the few special culprits. The future life of the early mythology of the Greeks was equally ill-defined. A joyless wandering of disembodied ghosts, or a participation in celestial delights, with special torture for the few desperately impious, seems to have been the general Aryan conception of the destiny of the spirit.

As for the doctrine of a great evil deity, it exists as a definite conception only in the Ahriman of Persian

and the devil of Christian theology. Jacob Grimm's remark that "the idea of a devil is foreign to all primitive religions" has been variously accepted and rejected by ethnologists. There can be little doubt, as Mr. Tylor maintains, that "rudimentary forms of Dualism, the antagonism of a Good and an Evil deity, are well known among the lower races of mankind," yet the conception of an evil spirit was but vaguely entertained. Prescott speaks of the *Çupay* of the Peruvians as "only a shadowy personification of sin, that exercised little influence over their conduct." From the god of the dead—the *Mictla* of the Mexicans, the *Pluto* of the Greeks, and the various deities of the underworld in the other pantheons—probably originated this conception of a great spirit of evil, as it may be seen developing in the *Seth* of the Egyptians, the brother of *Osiris*, who became first his opponent, then the enemy and persecutor of the human soul, and finally was looked upon as a deity of evil.

In the Hebrew scriptures there is no defined evil spirit. The title of *Satan* occurs but five times as a proper name, and never as a distinct impersonation of evil. The *Satan* of *Job* is no more than a malicious spirit. The serpent of *Eden*, which *Milton* has made the embodiment of *Satan*, is in the Bible an animal, and nothing more. Thus the only distinct and declared great lord of evil in religious history is the *Ahriman* of the Persians, who still exists in his direct successor, the devil of the later Jews and of modern theology.

As the idea of a severe future punishment of the wicked failed to become a general religious dogma, so

did that of eternal existence of the human soul. The vague notion of immortality entertained by the savage races seems to have grown little more declared with some of their civilized successors, while with others it vanished, together with all belief in intelligent deity. This is one of the most interesting phases of religious evolution, and merits special attention.

The ancient Hebrews, despite their distinct conception of deity, had no definite belief in immortality, so far as appears in their writings. The duties and obligations of the man of the Hebrew scriptures are those of a citizen of the world. No doctrine of either heaven or hell appears, reward and retribution are affairs of this life merely, and if any idea of immortality was held it failed to gain clear expression in their voluminous sacred literature.

If we seek Eastern Asia we find in China a populous empire destitute of any declared belief in immortality. The ancestral worship there prevalent indicates an original belief in the future life of the spirit, but this belief has grown less, instead of more definite. It has given rise to no creed, and no conception of eternal existence and heavenly joys. It remains a blank and bare superstition, and is accompanied, in the minds of the lower Chinese, with idolatrous observances, but a few steps removed from the fetichism of savage races.

Nor has the utmost reach of philosophic thought in the Chinese mind attained to the conception of intelligent and personal deity. The *Heaven* of Confucius, the order of the universe as reflected in the starry sky, probably meant more to him than to us. Yet

it had no distinct spiritual significance, and nothing to do with the soul, though it might have with the body. Spirit was but the energy of matter. The speculations of Lao-tsze reached a somewhat higher philosophic level, though his *Tao* was but the shadow of an intelligent deity. In the relations between *Tao* and the universe there was no tangible basis of a theistic conception, and the Chinese remain to this day a nation without a god.

The widespread Chinese acceptance of the Buddhist faith has brought with it no belief in an intelligent deity, or in eternal immortality. For the supreme divinity of Buddhism is but an undefined eternal unconsciousness, while the soul of man, though existing in its attributes hereafter, is destined to a final absorption into this everlasting unconsciousness. The several religious systems which thus dwell together in China harmonize to a considerable extent, and the faith of a true believer may be a confused mixture of Confucianism, Taouism and Buddhism, with ancestor worship for its main religious practice. This merging is assisted by the loss of the philosophical significance of the various creeds, and their decline into gross superstitions among the lower classes of the people.

Brahmanism also lacks the conception of an individual eternal immortality. Life is a heavy burden to the Hindu, and immortality is simply an indefinite extension of the torture to which he is subjected upon the earth. Escape from life is his hope and dream. His soul emerged from the infinite deity, into which it must again sink and vanish from individual existence, but only after, through interminable torture, it has got

rid of every stain of sin. As to the character of its final condition no conception has formulated itself. The Brahman supreme deity is vaguely conscious, while that of the Buddhist is vaguely unconscious, yet they flow together, and the strenuous effort of modern religious critics to understand the belief of those who did not clearly understand their own belief is largely a waste of thought.

Elsewhere the belief in immortality was little more defined. With the Egyptians the future existence of the soul ended in a vague idea of absorption. In the American civilizations there was a distinct belief in future existence, with no trace of the absorption dogma; but in these, as in the early Aryan, and the prevailing savage and barbarian beliefs, there was not probably any clear conception of immortality, in its full sense. The idea of everlasting existence is too broad a one to be grasped by the undeveloped mind. The savage intellect has but a narrow outreach of vision into the future, which soon fades away into utter vagueness before his weak mentality. As man developed his outlook became stronger. Yet probably not until the era of the Zoroastrian faith was a definite conception of eternal immortality gained, if it even was then. The completely outlined belief in an eternal conscious existence of the soul may have needed the mental unfoldment of the later Christian era for its full development, as did also the extraordinarily irrational doctrine of eternal punishment of the wicked.

From the condition of development of religious thought reached in the ancient nations as above considered, a new phase in the evolution of creed began,

that of metaphysical philosophy. Religion in all its earlier phases was a natural growth. It was the result of the general thought of mankind. But this was succeeded by special thought. The great thinkers of the human race devoted themselves to the deep problem of the relations of man to the universe, and attempted to think out the mystery of life and deity. Some of these thinkers were the founders of the great religious systems of the world, to whom we must devote a separate chapter. But the great body of philosophers, who attached no system of morals to their doctrines of belief, and who therefore originated no religious sects, can best be dealt with here.

Metaphysical philosophy, in this restricted sense, had its origin in Greece. This was natural, inevitable indeed, since religious faith, while steadily growing in influence in other lands, had died out in the minds of the learned men of Greece. Everywhere else in the far past we find the gods moving more and more away from man, and tending to merge into a single, vast, all-embracing and controlling deity. They began in the fetich, and ended in the absolute. In Greece, on the contrary, they constantly came nearer to man. Each of them became a sharply defined individual, with a distinct history and special duties. Zeus, instead of expanding into the informing spirit of the universe, became dwarfed into a mighty invisible man, throned on the Olympian summit.

When the expanding intellect of the Greeks approached the inevitable question of the mystery of the universe, there was nothing in their religion on which to base a philosophy. It had become a series of ridicu-

lous legends, which no thinker could for a moment entertain. Thought impatiently veered from the confusion and puerility of mythology, and began to build itself a philosophical universe of its own.

In the development of philosophy two separate channels were pursued, each a great highroad of thought leading to a distinct goal. In the one the material universe was mainly considered—physical nature and the body of man. In the other the mental universe was considered—the human soul and immaterial intelligence generally. To these two paths philosophical thought has necessarily confined itself, and the thinkers who have sought to fathom the mystery of the universe have separated into two opposed phalanxes, the ideal and the material, or the philosophers of the mind and of the body. If to these we add the eclectic philosophers, those who have sought to harmonize the metaphysics of the body and mind, we cover the whole field of philosophical speculation.

Greek philosophy began with the material systems of the Ionic school. It was the first step in scientific induction, and a weak one. From the properties of water, of air, and of a vague material essence, Thales, Anaximenes, and Anaximander sought to derive the universe. Philosophy quickly advanced from this crude effort to the doctrines of Pythagoras, who studied the mathematical relations of objects, and advanced the dogma that "number is the essence of all things." Another philosopher, Heraclitus, was struck by the incessant changes which take place in nature, and taught that "the becoming" is the only important reality. With him, "everything flows"—from place to place,



from form to form, from non-existence to existence—and this endless change is the essence of the universe. Others of these material, atheistic philosophers were Empedocles, who taught the all-sufficiency of matter, and advanced ideas of attraction and repulsion; and the Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, who taught that all things are made up of minute, indivisible atoms, whose combinations form the essentiality of the universe.

Side by side with these material conceptions was taught an ideal philosophy fully as extravagant in its demands. The Eleatic philosophers, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Zeno, looked at nature from its mental side, and succeeded in utterly disposing of the existence of matter. Xenophanes was the first of the philosophers to devise a god, a supreme, absolute, immaterial being, eternal in duration, and distinct from the world which he governs. Parmenides expanded this conception, and taught that “pure being” is the only existence; while Zeno carried ideal abstraction to such an extreme as to utterly deny the real existence of the visible world. Anaxagoras, who was the first to plant philosophy in Athens, continued these ideal doctrines. He admitted the existence of matter, however, but placed a world-forming intelligence beside it, and recognized mind as the first cause of all things. His Supreme Being has creative powers, but only as a first moving agency, being the contriver, but not the sustainer, of the universe.

Such were the earlier efforts of Greek philosophy. With Socrates began a new era. He turned aside from the philosophic schemes of his predecessors, and made

the energies and attributes of the human mind the subject of his speculations. As with the Ionians began physical, with Socrates began mental scientific induction. Plato, the greatest thinker in ancient idealism, carried mental research to its utmost extension, and devised from it a philosophic system to which modern idealists have added little of importance. In his view of nature, every object has an ideal which underlies its apparent existence. Beneath the appearances of things lies an unseen reality. The varying phenomena from which we derive our notions of things may be stripped off, and the actual basis, the "thing-in-itself," remain. It is true that the mind can advance but slightly towards a vision of this true basis of objective existence, but it can make some steps towards the reality which underlies the appearance. The "idea" of an object, not its external aspect, is the real existence. But each superior idea embraces in itself many inferior, and the highest, all-embracing idea is the absolute, immaterial essence of the universe. Again, as goodness (not the moral, but the metaphysical good) is the highest attribute of mind and matter, so the all-embracing Goodness is the highest form of ideal existence. From this method of speculation Plato deduced *The Good*, in its absolute sense, as the ultimate idea, the Supreme Deity. As to whether he invested this underlying, absolute principle with intelligence, we are in doubt. A certain degree of vagueness clings to his conceptions, as to those of all idealists, and most probably his lack of clearness of expression arose from an indefiniteness of conception. He pursued thought back into a depth of abstraction in which it grew too vast and vague to be clearly defined.

First with Plato, in Greek thought, the soul of man became definitely immortal. In Homer the soul is a vague shadow, indefinite and impersonal. With Plato it gained a definite and concrete existence. His arguments in favor of immortality, it is true, are not very satisfactory to modern thinkers, but they first gave the belief in man's future existence a clear and rational standing in the minds of the learned men of Greece.

In the doctrines of Aristotle, the succeeding great thinker of the Hellenic race, all the preceding systems of philosophy are combined and extended. Their vague material conceptions became, with him, an actual science. He was the true originator of the inductive system of inquiry, in which discovery of facts precedes research into principles. The indefinite reasoning of his predecessors became with him a system of logic, the great *Organon*, in which the laws of the kingdom of the reason are fully compiled. He also wrote largely on metaphysics, though without adding anything of importance to the Platonic ideality. He conceives of two phases of existence, the Potential and the Actual, matter and form. Matter, in its absolute basis, is destitute of form, and has potential existence only. When form is added to it actual existence is gained. The form grows at the expense of the matter until eventually there is a complete transformation of matter into form. This is the absolute essence, form without matter, the actual and eternal. Thus Aristotle deduces the infinite deity, the great immaterial and immovable, who moves all things; the eternal thought of thoughts. All this is argued out with exact logic and infinite detail, yet it is all a castle built upon the

clouds, full of subtleties, which no one can hope to understand.

We may close this review of Greek philosophy with a glance at two succeeding systems, the Stoical and the Epicurean, which are of interest from their great influence over the thinkers of the Roman Empire. With the Stoics idealism became pantheism. Their god was the soul of the world, a great self-conscious being who vitalized and controlled the universe. It was the definite completion of an idea attributed to Pythagoras, and supported by Aristotle, and which probably originated in Egypt, where Pythagoras is said to have traveled and studied. With the Epicureans, on the contrary, materialism became atheism. They did away with the gods, except as useless empty phantoms, and founded nature on the facts of observation, not on the figments of fancy. With them the line of the material philosophers of Greece ended, as did that of the ideal philosophers with the Stoics.

. Both these systems of philosophy are here of importance from the fact that they became also systems of religion. They added moral practice to belief, and became the religious creeds of all the higher classes of Rome. The stern virtues were taught and practiced by the Stoics, rigid abstinence, duty, courage, patriotism, and all the cold, hard merits which conduce to the stability of a state. Many of their doctrines are models of social law. Among them was that of the universal brotherhood of mankind, which was earnestly advocated by Cicero. But they are strangely lacking, as a rule, in human sympathy. In their creed pain and suffering are necessary evils which must be patiently borne.

Every man has the full control of his own life, and no other man has the right to interfere in his disposal of it. Suicide, to escape the pains of incurable disease, or for other reasons, was common among the Roman Stoics. The purpose of the suicide might be combated by argument, but no one claimed the right to hinder him by force. His life was his own, to do with as he would.

The Epicurean morality was markedly different from the Stoical. Indulgence with them replaced abstinence. Pleasure was the one great good to be attained, and pain the evil to be avoided. But as indulgence in immoderate and sensual delights often brings more pain than pleasure, the importance of moderation was strongly inculcated. Mild enjoyments, an inner sense of contentment, and the repose of a satisfied mind were the doctrines of the Epicurean school, though they were far from the practice of the profligate Epicureans of Rome.

Greek philosophy ended with the wild speculations of the Neoplatonists, in which, to the figment of emanation, gained from oriental sources, there was added the doctrine of "ecstasy," or immediate beholding of the absolute, the idea that by withdrawal from the things of sense the soul might attain an intuitive rapport with the divine, and in a sort of holy intoxication behold that which is forever shut out from our physical sight.

The death of Greek philosophy was followed by an interval of more than a thousand years in which ideal speculation failed to gain a step in advance. There was no lack of thought. The Middle Ages Euro-

pean history were full of speculative endeavors to comprehend the universal mystery. Arab and Christian thinkers were alike busy, and yet philosophy stood still through all their hair-splitting of the Aristotelian logic. The Realists and Nominalists fought for centuries to decide whether or not the abstract had a real existence. They ended where they began. There was some useful mental discipline in the prodigal arguments of the schoolmen, but not a thread was added to the web of human knowledge.

In more modern times, however, metaphysical and physical philosophy have considerably progressed, though we can here but very briefly refer to the dogmas of the more prominent of these philosophical thinkers. In ancient Greece materialistic and idealistic systems appeared side by side. In modern thought they have separated, material philosophy being largely confined to English and French, and ideal to German thinkers. We may review these separately.

Descartes was the true founder of modern philosophy. He swept aside with one stroke all preconceived notions, and advanced his celebrated axiom, "I think, therefore I am," as the postulate upon which all speculation must base itself. It was the first declaration of the individuality of the mind. From it he deduced a dual theory. All matter is extension, all mind thought. Soul and body are forcibly joined, but have nothing in common. Matter and mind are both substances, but are mutually exclusive. God exists because we are able to conceive of infinite existence. Whatever is possible in thought must actually exist. In this theory Descartes gave the keynote of modern German metaphysics.

With Spinoza we return to the monistic idealism of the Eleatic philosophers. There is only one substance, and that substance is God. This is but a new expression of the "pure being" of Parmenides. Yet Spinoza adds much to the Greek conception. The infinite substance contains an infinity of attributes. Matter and mind have no existence in themselves. They are simply attributes of the infinite. They are real existences as contemplated by the human understanding, and in this sense are dual, each acting separately from the other. Yet in their absolute nature they are the same thing. Matter is the infinite substance made manifest in one of its attributes. Mind is the same infinite substance made manifest in another of its attributes. It is as if we take imagination and reason each as composing the whole mind, yet as distinct if considered by themselves. We have here a new form of emanative pantheism. The god of Spinoza does not think or will. He is the "thing-in-itself" which underlies the varied manifestations of substance; the infinite unconscious.

Leibniz cuts utterly loose from matter. Only spiritual things exist, only souls and their ideas. He carries the Spinozan doctrine to the *Reductio-ad-absurdum*. In one of his speculations the universe is made up of "monads," metaphysical points, not atoms, since they have no resemblance to atoms in their qualities. Each monad is an infinite mirror, in whose depths all others are reflected. Each contains the universe as a reflection. Thus each monad is a kind of all-containing deity. It potentially holds everything that is, has been, and will be. Yet each monad reflects

from a somewhat different standpoint, so that each differs from all others. Some reflect confusedly, some more clearly. The whole hypothesis is a very neat figment of fancy.

Without considering the various lesser idealists, we may proceed at once to Kant, the greatest of the German metaphysicians. Like Descartes, this new seer swept aside the idealism of the preceding world, and laid a fresh foundation for speculative thought. He shows that it is impossible theoretically to arrive at the mystery of the universe. Experience is the only province of knowledge, and experience as yet is but in its embryo stage. Yet after demolishing the cloud-built towers of all preceding idealists, he at once proceeds to erect a new tower of his own on the same old clouds. What the "theoretical reason" cannot discover, the "practical reason" may prove to exist. The conditional good which we seek leads inevitably to an unconditioned, highest good. This highest good has two elements, highest virtue and highest happiness. For the first of these to become actual the soul must be immortal. For the second to become actual God must exist. Perfect virtue can be realized only by an endless progress. Perfect happiness requires a perfect being, distinct from nature, who imparts to us happiness. Religion is morality, and the church becomes useless when faith transcends morality.

Such is the essence of Kantism. It is based on the doctrine of innate ideas, and on the theory that the existence of finite innateness is only possible if there be an infinite innateness. Whatever is innate to the mind exists as one of the essentialities of the universe, and



represents and requires a universal principle or essence. The difficulty with this, as with all ideal systems, is that it is based on an unproved hypothesis. It begins by declaring, not by proving, that innate ideas exist.

Kant was followed by several others, partially disciples of his. Fichte discarded Kant's "essentially thing," and made the "Ego" the basis of all existence. The universe is nothing but the great "I." The infinite Ego is God. Matter does not exist. Schelling follows Fichte in attempting to combine the visible duality in a primordial unity. In the *absolute* nature and the mind are identified. The absolute, self-conscious *identity* is the essence of all that exists. All emanates from it, and returns into it. Thus the German, as of old the Hindu and Greek philosophies, reaches a theory of pantheistic emanation. Brahma is revived in modern thought.

The remaining German philosophers tread the same misty path. Herbert conceives of "Reals," a modification of Leibniz's "Monads," a fanciful extension of the theory of atoms. Hegel sinks into the purest idealism. With him the "thing-in-itself" is replaced by the "idea-in-itself." Thought is the basis of the universe. There is but one absolute essence, yet mind distinguishes itself from matter, withdraws into itself, becomes consciousness, or the Ego. The apparent distinction between mind and matter is an ideal differentiation of a single prime essence.

There are but two other distinct voices in this idealization of the universe. Schopenhauer declares that "The universe is merely a mental phenomenon." Searching through the mind for some mental basis of

this universe, he selects the will. "The Will" is the principle of all things. "It slumbers in the rock, awakens in the plant, becomes fully developed in man." Finally Von Hartmann utters the last word in this ideal universe-building. The *Unconscious* is the absolute basis. Consciousness is only a local specialized condition. Below it flows a vast ocean of unconsciousness. The conscient state is preceded and formed by innumerable unconscious impressions. This negative state constitutes the Supreme being, the *One-all*, at once substance, principle and end, will, wisdom and activity. It does not think, but it is the essence of thought.

We have thus briefly presented the outcome of German metaphysical thought. The ideal as the basis of the universe has been thoroughly worked out, yet without furnishing the mind of man a solid foot of standing ground. For nearly three thousand years some of the deepest thinking power of mankind has been devoted to this problem. The finest philosophic thought has dealt with it, alike in India, in Greece and in Germany. Every faculty of the mind has been conceived as the basis of the universe. "Pure being" in every imaginable relation has been dealt with. And yet all ends where all began, in a cloud. There has been abundance of logical reasoning, but not an ounce of solid foundation. A dozen universes have been built without a single established fact to bear up their weight.

While the Germans have thus been exhausting the possibilities of idealism, the English and French have sought to establish a philosophy based upon realism. Bacon first in modern times took up the method of

Aristotle in the ancient world, and declared that the discovery of facts must precede the induction of principles. No thought is of permanent value that is not sustained by experiment. The path thus pointed out has been eagerly followed by English thinkers. Locke gave the key-note by declaring that no innate ideas exist, that experience is the basis of the intellect. Hume carried Locke's premises to the extreme of scepticism. We can be certain of nothing. No real subject or object can be proved to exist. There is no actual dependence of effect upon cause. The results of experiment can alone be depended upon. To this ultimatum the Scottish school, consisting of Reid, Stewart, Brown, Hamilton and others, vigorously objected. With them, common sense proves the actual existence of nature. They believe, Hume doubts. That is all. Neither establishes anything.

The French philosophers followed the path of the English. Condillac makes the soul grow out of the combination of the sensations. Helvetius makes selfishness a moral principle, the lever that moves all our mental activities. Later French philosophers teach pure materialism. Nothing exists but matter and motion. There is no immortal soul and no deity. Of the philosophers of our own time, Comte stands most prominent, with his system of *Positivism*, a broad system of philosophy based on the inductions of modern science. The collective *great-being*, an abstraction from the complete sum of conscious existence, is the God of his system. As a single actual being this composite deity has no more sound basis than the deepest dream of idealism.

The later English philosophers have confined themselves strictly within the kingdom of science. With them, a series of known facts must underlie every hypothesis. Stuart Mill, Bain and Spencer are the best known of these thinkers. The last, in particular, stands forward as the most strenuous advocate of modern evolutionism and sensationalism. Upon the Darwinian theory of evolution he has built up a broad system of philosophy, in which he claims to accept nothing for granted, and in which he disposes of the doctrine of innate ideas, which has given rise to so voluminous a literature, by explaining all innateness as an effect of heredity. The doctrine of Locke is thus maintained. The mind is a blank sheet, upon which sensation impresses all our knowledge, and gives rise to all our ideas. But each individual mind has seemingly innate tendencies which were really derived from its ancestors.

In the latest system of philosophy, that of material monism, all the results of modern science are employed to prove that matter alone exists, and that consciousness is a phenomenon of motion. The mind is a condition of the motive relations of matter in the human body, and can only exist while the organic molecules maintain their functional relations. When life departs the mind vanishes.

This is the last word yet spoken in philosophy. But it is certainly not the last word to be spoken. The mystery of consciousness remains a mystery still, despite the somewhat glib fashion in which it has been disposed of. That consciousness is intimately related to the brain has been scientifically proved. That nerve

vibration can yield consciousness continues utterly unproved. After the long centuries of thought given to this question we still stand, as did the Brahmans of old, before an unsolved, perhaps an unsolvable, problem. The chasm between matter and mind remains unbridged. Whether it will ever be bridged is a question which cannot now be answered.

Yet the long, ardent, and vigorous effort to think out a system of the universe formed of the crude stuff of thought has not been without its utility. Its greatest use perhaps has been to prove the uselessness of such efforts. Endless endeavor has been wasted in striving to build a palace of cobwebs, and the palace remains unbuilt. We have learned that it cannot be built. That is all, but that is much.

Turning from these empty imaginings, man has become content to begin at the beginning rather than at the end. The universe is a great congeries of facts. Every fact comprehended is an aid towards the comprehension of the universe. This may be a painfully slow process of universe building, but it is the only sure one. Every fact established is a stepping-stone in the grand stairway that leads towards the infinite. We may climb but slowly, but it is a satisfaction to feel that we are climbing surely.

## CHAPTER XI.

### THE CREEDS OF THE LAWGIVERS.

THERE is a highly important section of the history of the development of religious thought whose consideration was postponed in the preceding chapter, since it can be best examined separately. The religious conceptions there reviewed were principally those that have grown up spontaneously, as results of the general unfoldment of human intelligence. Equally important are those which originated in special thought, arising from the philosophical speculations of a learned priesthood, or the doctrines of the founders of religious systems, the great ethical teachers of mankind.

The Greek philosophers and modern metaphysicians, as briefly considered in the close of the preceding chapter, come in a measure under this category; yet not strictly so, since their speculations were scientific rather than religious, and stand apart from the direct flow of religious thought. The true founders of systems, to whom special attention needs to be given, are the Chinese sages, Confucius and Lao-tsze; the Brahmanic priests and Gautama of India; Zoroaster, or Zarathustra, of Persia; Mohammed of Arabia; and Moses and Christ of the Hebrew race. Several other names, of minor importance, might be given, but the above eight are those that stand strikingly forward in the religious history of mankind, and whose doctrines have specially

turned the tide of human thought. Other priesthoods than the Brahmanic aided in the formation of religious systems, particularly the Egyptian and the Christian, yet only as secondary, not as primary agents. The Brahmanic priests created their system, and therefore must be classed with the founders of religious faith. They dug the channel in which the waters of Hindu theistic thought were thenceforward to flow.

No founder of a faith ever set up a completely new current of thought. In all cases the lawgivers were sons in thought of the race that gave them birth, and wove the old threads of belief into new webs. The raw material of all such systems existed before the system-maker, and his mind was deeply imbued with the native instincts and beliefs of his race ere he began to weave a new fabric out of the old fibre of opinion. In like manner the moral doctrines of the new systems had in great part previously existed, though each founder must be credited with some additions to the world-stock of moral apothegms, or with the presentation of existing moral doctrines in fresh and striking formulæ.

The sages of China were particularly imbued with the spirit of their nation. Confucius cannot properly be styled the founder of a religion, although his teachings are the basis of the faith of all educated Chinese. He represented the intense practicality and lack of imaginative outreach of his race, and crystalized this practical atheism into a series of dogmatic sayings which have ever since held captive the Chinese intellect. Chinese education still continues largely confined to the Confucian philosophy, and Chinese

thought, in consequence, flows steadily in the Confucian channel. The moral teachings of Confucius are of the most practical character. It is the morality of a strongly utilitarian race. This, indeed, cannot truly be said of his greatest moral apothegm, "What you do not like when done to yourself do not do to others." In this he reached a lofty level of moral elevation, and approached the sublimity of the greatest saying of Christ: "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you." The meaning of these precepts is to some extent the same, yet they have not quite the same "ring." The spirit of the Confucian dogma is negative, that of Christ positive. The one says, "avoid injuring others;" the other, "seek to benefit others." The latter is the broader and deeper in ethical standard, and manifests a wider sentiment of human sympathy.

The literary labors of Confucius were principally confined to an effort to preserve the old writings of the nation, and his teachings were largely a remodeling of the old morality. But the new wine of his vigorous and original intellect could not be confined to these old bottles, and many of his thoughts have in them the freshness of a new revelation to mankind. In fact, he stands alone in ancient history as the great teacher of practical materialism, of a system concerned only with the present life and duties of mankind, and sternly closing out all interest in or thought of the empire of the invisible and the infinite.

The pithy, practical wisdom of the Confucian sayings is worthy of all praise. It resembles the utterances of our own somewhat similar sage, Dr. Franklin,



in his "Poor Richard" apothegms, though it is of a less homely and more elevated character than the latter. Franklin dealt in the wisdom of the man of business; Confucius in that of the far-seeing social philosopher. Yet the work of the latter is almost solely a code without a creed. Unlike all other ancient religious reformers, he contented himself with telling men what to do, and avoided telling them what to believe. It was a system of morals alone which he advocated, and one that was consistent with any system of religious belief which men saw fit to entertain. His answer to an anxious questioner about things unseen—"While you do not know life what can you know about death?"—shows the purely practical standpoint of his teachings, and closed, in his code, the gates of the invisible to the searching eyes of mankind.

Yet China was not quite devoid of religious philosophers, although it must be said that their philosophies are mystical and opaque beyond those of any other land. And of this philosophy Lao-tsze is by far the greatest exponent. In fact, he is the only one to whom can be fairly given the title of religious reformer in its full sense, the advocate at once of a system of belief and a code of morals. Yet the creed of Lao-tsze can scarcely be claimed as his own. It but sought to give clear expression to the philosophical ideas previously extant in China, in the same manner as the system of Buddhistic belief is but an unfoldment of the preceding Brahmanic doctrine.

For the origin of Chinese philosophy we must go back to Fu-hi, with his mystical and incomprehensible diagrams, of the traditional date of 2800 B. C. Wan

Wang, about 1150 B. C., attempted to give a philosophical meaning to these diagrams. His work, and that of his commentators, constitutes the *Y-King*, a work which Confucius sought in vain to explain, and but succeeded in making more incomprehensible. All that can be made out of it is the existence of two primal principles: *Yang*, the active, and *Yin*, the passive. These are the source of all existence. *Yang* gives rise to all masculine, strong and active conditions; *Yin* to all feminine, weak and passive. Expansion and contraction are the ruling principles of nature. When expansion reaches its limit and the utmost activity has set in, contraction succeeds, and the movement towards passivity begins. Man has arisen as the highest outcome of this pulsating activity and passivity. A later addition to this theory is the conception of the *Tai-Keih*, the first great cause, from whom the *Yang* and the *Yin* originated. This conception is of interest from its resemblance to the Brahmanic and Zoroastrian ideas of the emanation of two or more world-ruling powers from a single, mysterious, primal deific existence.

The philosophy of Lao-tsze seems but a peculiar exposition of this more ancient idea. His mind was the most deeply philosophical of any that appears in the great cycle of Chinese literature, and yet he but succeeded in evolving a mystical idea which it is probable he never clearly understood himself, as he has failed to make it comprehensible to any one else. With him the great underlying principle of the universe is the *Tao*, a something which hovers suspiciously about the borders of nothingness. The char-

acter designating *Tao* signifies "the way" or "the road." But it is apparently used figuratively, and its nearest significance may be "the method." But this conception has been expanded into a labyrinth of meanings, through which it is quite impossible to follow the philosopher. Professor Douglass remarks: "But *Tao* is more than the way. It is the way and the way-goer. It is an eternal road, along it all beings and things walk; but no being made it, for it is being itself; it is everything and nothing, and the cause and effect of all. All things originate from *Tao*, conform to *Tao*, and to *Tao* at last they return." This is mystical enough, but it is less so than the words of Lao-tsze himself. Commentators, in their strong effort to comprehend his meaning, are very apt to give his words more significance than they actually convey. The seeming fact is that he was struggling with an idea that was too vast for his philosophic grasp, and which, therefore, he has conveyed in mystical half-meanings, that, like *Tao* itself, might mean something or nothing. As Lao-tsze himself says: "*Tao* is like the emptiness of a vessel. \* \* \* \* How still and clear is *Tao*, a phantasm with the semblance of permanence. I do not know whose son it is. It might appear to have been before God. (T<sub>i</sub>, 'Heaven,' the mythological Chinese deity.)"

Such is the creed of Taoism. There is mingled with it, however, a more comprehensible idea, the outcome of the expansion and contraction conception of older China. Passivity is upheld as the road to power. *Not to act* is the source of all true success. *To endure* is to conquer, since it identifies the mortal

with the divine, and gives to the believer the power of *Tao*. The active is overcome by the passive, alike in the doings of man and in the operations of nature. There is a flavor of Buddhism in all this, and the emanation doctrine is outlined in the expression that "from *Tao* all things come; to *Tao* all things return." Yet it is very far below Buddhism in clearness and distinctness of statement, and in the philosophic breadth with which the idea is grasped.

The moral code of Lao-tsze has in it nothing of the mystical. It is marked by a still more elevated ethical spirit than that shown by Confucius, since it advocates the practice of virtue without holding out the promise of reward. The writer constantly advocates the merit of humility and unselfishness. "It is the way of *Tao* not to act from any personal motive, to conduct affairs without feeling the trouble of them, to taste without being aware of the flavor, to account the great as small and the small as great, to recompense injury with kindness." In this last expression, inculcating the principle of "good for evil," we have set forth the loftiest precept of the Christian ethics, though spoken 600 years before Christ. "To become as a little child," says Lao-tsze, "is a man's true duty in his government of himself." We need hardly say that this lofty ideal of morality is not practiced by modern Taoists, and that Taoism has degenerated into the most debased polytheistic superstition held by any modern people above a low stage of barbarism.

The course of thought in Aryan India followed a channel remarkably unlike that pursued in China.

The thought of the latter country is marked by an intense practicality, that of the former by a vivid imagination. The Aryans as a race are imaginative, but the idealized system of religious faith which took root in their primeval home bore different fruit in each later branch of the race. The priesthood became early a power with the Vedic Aryans. Something in the conditions of nature, their mode of life, or the events of their history disposed this people to bodily lassitude and to mental activity. The overpowering weight of tropical nature, as is usually argued, may have had much to do with this loss of energy and enterprise. Certainly the drain on human vigor in India surpasses that in any other tropical seat of civilization. Its nearest approach is in Egypt. Yet most probably the enervation due to the climate was but one of the causes of Indian lassitude. The overcrowding of a dense agricultural population, and the mental influences of a quieting creed, were doubtless other aids to this change of character. At all events we perceive the Hindu branch of the Aryans sinking into lack of enterprise and loss of concern in human life, and becoming the unresisting prey of foreign conquerors, while in every other Aryan tribe human energy and a sense of the dignity of man remained dominant over the autocracy of creed.

The condition of the Hindus in their later history is a religious rather than a historical phenomenon. Mentally they grew to dwell far more in the world to come than in the existing world, and became indifferent as to what might happen to their bodies in their much deeper concern about the welfare of their souls.

Thus it is that India has no historical literature, while its religious literature is most voluminous.

The Hindus fell early under the dominion of the priesthood. In their primitive days of active war and conquest the priests marched at their head, full of warlike fire. The influence thus gained over the minds of the people was never lost. It increased to the detriment of the secular authority. The Hindus never became a nation politically. The power of the secular rulers was steadily dwarfed by that of the priesthood, so that the country remained politically divided among a number of petty princes, while religiously it formed a compact and harmonious unity.

This unity arose not from the inculcation by the priesthood of the dogmas of the Vedic creed, but from their formation of a new creed, admirably calculated to control, and to sap the life from, the society beneath them. The priests became the founders of a religious system of a very remarkable character. It was not formed at once, as in the creeds of individual propagandists. It grew by slow increments, but it displaced the old faith as completely, and formed a new one as thoroughly, as in the work of the most radical religious reformers.

Brahmanism was a true religion of a priesthood, for it began in the practice of sacrifice, and ended in the deification of sacrifice. The rites of religion were developed and made gods of by the Brahmans, as other peoples deified the forces of nature. As the practice of sacrifice grew more frequent, and a belief in its absolute necessity and utility arose, a phenomenon of thought evolution appeared which is without parallel in human

history. The gods disappeared in the service of the altar. Their importance gradually diminished as that of the act of sacrifice increased, until the attention of the priests became so fixed on the exercise of prayer and offering to the gods, with its multiplicity of rules and observances, that they ceased to regard the existence of the gods thus served, and raised these observances into the category of the divine.

The steps of this evolution may be traced throughout the Indian religious literature. Its first phases appear in the earlier Vedas, and it becomes more declared in the later Vedas, to reach its ultimate unfoldment at a still later period. The idea that penance and sacrifice were grateful to the gods, and led them to yield benefits in return, grew into the idea that the gods could be forced, by prayer and penance, into the service of man, and finally into the belief that these ceremonial observances were stronger than the gods, and were divine in themselves.

Thus divinity became ascribed to the act of sacrifice, to penance and prayer, and eventually to the hymns of the Veda; to Soma, the sacrificial draught; to the Vedic poets; and to the priests themselves, who grew sacred from their knowledge of the occult meanings of the religious practices and formulas. A new heavenly hierarchy was formed, superior to and displacing that which formerly existed. The old gods were not forgotten, but they were looked upon as secondary to and emanations from the god of sacrifice, for the theory of emanation arose as an integral part of this new theory of divinity. The nature gods of the Vedas became subordinated into guardians of the world created by the new god of sacrifice.

There was never a more direct human creation of a deity. The word *Brahma*, signifying devotion or prayer, became converted into a universal, self-existing divinity, the informing soul of a pantheistic universe. It is by no means the only case in history in which a word has been converted into a god, but it is the only direct one. In the other instances the word first gained new significance through poetic metaphor. In the present instance it was transferred without change to the throne of heaven.

The process of god-making continued strictly a grammatical evolution. The neuter form of the word for prayer, *bráhmă*, had come to signify the divine essence, the eternal, spiritual principle of the universe. Afterwards the masculine form, *brahmā*, the old term for the individual priest, became revered as the creator of all living things, the first emanation from the universal spirit. The earliest step in creation was the appearance of the universe, as an emanation from Bráhmă. In the liquid portion of this universe was then placed a productive seed, which developed into a golden egg, and from this the eternal neuter Bráhmă was born into the universe as the male Brahmā, the ancestor and creator of all beings.

It was a highly curious mode of religious evolution, in which gods were created out of grammatical forms, and prayer or sacrifice became the all-informing and all-creating deity. But the priest-made deity proved too abstract and shapeless a god for the undeveloped minds of the non-philosophic masses. They clung to their old flesh-and-blood divinities, two of whom, *Siva* and *Vishnu*, the priests were obliged to include in their system.



This system, therefore, attained its complete form under the assumption of a triple emanation from the original world-soul, yielding Brahmā, the creator; Vishnu, the preserver; and Siva, the destroyer, of the universe. Such was the early form of the Brahmanic pantheon. It in time greatly expanded. The male nature of the three gods was supplemented by the association with each of a female deity, while the people themselves have converted this philosophic conception into an intricate polytheism, replete with anthropomorphic deities. Consideration of the remaining element of the Brahmanic system, that of caste, must be left for the succeeding chapter, since it is rather a political than a religious institution.

There were features in this system which inevitably gave rise to a spirit of revolt. The people found life a hard, grinding misery, rendered more so by the iron-bound institution of caste. The doctrine of transmigration threatened untold duration of this misery. Only to the priests was there a chance for direct translation to heaven. The souls of the lower castes must drag on existence for interminable ages in the bodies of despoised animals, or of suffering human beings, ere they could hope to attain heavenly conditions.\* There was nothing

\*It is well to repeat here the views of Sir Henry Maine, briefly referred to in the preceding chapter, as to the composite character of the Hindu belief. In his opinion the doctrines of transmigration and of future rewards and punishments represent two separate original religious faiths, which were combined into one by the Brahmins. The latter of these he believes to have been of Aryan origin. For transmigration he can find no warrant in Aryan beliefs, and thinks it may have been borrowed from the pre-Aryan inhabitants of India. To these must be added still a third system of religion, that of ancestral worship, which has held its own persistently in India till the present day. This form of worship is one of the most widely diffused of religious observances, and may be one of the most primitive, as it has been one of the most persistent. To it was very probably due the idea of trans-

to foster a desire for the immortality of the soul, while a release from the misery of existence in final absorption into deity and extinction of individual life, as taught in the Brahmanic philosophy, was a hopeful rather than a dreaded prospect. The thoughts of earnest men turned to the hastening of this blissful consummation instead of to enjoyment of the delights of this world. Self-abnegation, penance, reflection on divine subjects, and indifference to sensual pleasures were the methods by which escape from earthly grossness could be most rapidly attained, and asceticism arose as the natural outcome of such a creed. But of the vast multitude of self-torturing ascetics to which Brahmanism has given rise we need to consider here only one, the celebrated Siddhārtha, known usually under his family name of Gautama, the founder of the Buddhistic faith.

This remarkable personage, one of the greatest of all the lawgivers of mankind, was born prince of Kapilavastu, a small principality in the vicinity of Benares, in the fifth or sixth century B. C. He may thus, by an interesting coincidence, have been contemporary with the two great teachers of China, Confucius and Lao-tsze. We have no space here for any of the details of the striking story of his life, nor for the train of thoughts and incidents connected with his abandonment of his young wife and his hereditary throne to pursue a life of the most utter penance, privation and asceticism. It is his philosophy, not his life, with which we are concerned.

Gautama was a thoroughly educated Hindu. His

migration, as already argued. In India the worship extended to the third generation of ancestors; not to the fifth, as in China, where ancestral worship has dwarfed all later forms.

mind was trained in all the subtilities of the Brahmanic philosophy. Nor did his years of deep thought lead him to reject this philosophy, but simply to revise and improve it, as others had done before him. His system of philosophy was but an extended Brahmanism. The hells, the transmigration of souls, the successive ranks of heavenly conditions, or of minor deifications, of the Brahmans, were not disturbed. New features were added, it is true, but they did not constitute the essence of Buddhism. This addition of new features to the Brahmanic code was of no infrequent occurrence with the deep thinkers of that period of intense mental energy in the Hindu race. Liberty of speculative thought was freely admitted, and the dominant priesthood did not seek to silence heretical teachers who made no open attack on the sacredness of their caste privileges.

The Brahmanic idea of emanation from an intelligent world-soul was questioned by Kapila, the founder of the *Sāṅkhya* school of philosophy, who to some extent replaced the intelligence of the deity by unconsciousness. He taught the existence of an eternal, unconscious, material principle, possessed of self-volition. From it all matter had emanated, and into it all matter would finally return. This material principle was animated by a spiritual essence, which was in itself unintelligent, but from which emanated a subtile body, consisting of intelligence. Such is the Sankhya deity, at first unconscious, but finally unfolding into intelligence; much as the unconscious matter of man's body might be viewed as infused with a spiritual essence, from which emanates the intelligence of the human mind.

The doctrine taught by Gautama was a step further in the same direction. Eternal unconsciousness was predicated of the universal essence, and eternal unconsciousness was to be the eventual destiny of the human soul. The method by which the final destiny was to be reached also differed from that of the Brahmanic code. In the latter each transmigrating soul continued an individual entity, and passed through all its successive phases as an individual. Buddhism denied this individuality. It taught transformation rather than transmigration. When life ends the soul does not continue to exist as a self-conscious individual. Nothing of it remains but the sum of its good and evil deeds. While evil instincts and sensual desires form part of this sum life cannot truly cease. A new birth is necessary. The soul relic of the old person enters into and animates a new body. The struggle towards the eradication of evil begins in this new body exactly where it ended in the old, and in each successive life some of the evil is got rid of, and the end brought nearer. Nothing is permanent in the soul but the accumulated result of all its actions, and when every trace of human desire is eradicated from this abstract sum of deeds, and complete withdrawal from selfish instincts is attained, conscious existence ends. The final body of the long series dies. The soul vanishes into the eternal unconsciousness. Nothing remains. Such appears to be the idea conveyed by the Buddhistic *Nirvana*.

In other respects, as we have said, the Buddhistic philosophy resembles the Brahmanic. In the latter the everlasting is the only real existence. The sen-

sible world is an illusion. It is a mere reflection of the supreme deity, no more substantial than the reflection of the moon in calm waters. This illusion must be fully recognized ere reabsorption can occur. These Brahmanic views were somewhat deviated from in the Sankhya philosophy, which taught that the end of soul existence would not be direct absorption into deity, but utter withdrawal of the soul into itself and abstraction from the world of matter. A similar self-absorption of the soul formed a main feature of the Buddhistic code, and the highest duty of man consisted in efforts to remove himself from the world of the sensual, and to withdraw into the depths of abstract reflection. Of all the doctrines ever taught to the human race, this is the one that most destroys the true ideal of human life. The Buddhist ascetic no longer, in any just sense, lives in this world. He dwells in a world of thought, outside the world of sense. To attain utter indifference to the events of mortal existence is his sole aim. History, government, ambition, passion, pleasure, are naught to him. Resistance to oppression, or a clinging to life, are valueless as compared with indulgence in soul introspection. The waves of life may toss and storm in vain around him. Their violence is naught to him, for life itself is naught. Existence is the greatest of all burdens, and escape from it is the only true salvation. Release from this burden must be sought in self-denial and self-absorption.

Gautama himself, as his disciples teach, first became free from sin. But a satisfaction in this sinlessness remained, which was finally eradicated by a persistent

longing for the highest goal. Then this longing was replaced by utter indifference. But satisfaction with the attainment of indifference remained, and this it was next necessary to suppress. Happiness, pain and misery vanished in nothingness. Next vanished the consciousness of nothingness. The utter repose of Nirvana followed, undisturbed by nothingness or anything other than nothingness.

Such seems to be the real doctrine of the Buddhist philosophy, so far as it can be made out from its somewhat confused expression. Some European writers suppose that Nirvana means a blissful state, in which the soul continues to exist in an everlasting trance. But the latest and most thorough research into Buddhist authorities indicates that no existence of the soul as a distinct entity is acknowledged, and that Nirvana is simply extinction.

If the teachings of Gautama had resulted merely in the formation of a philosophy they would hardly have constituted a religion distinct from the Brahmanic. But they went further, and struck at the very root of the Brahmanical hierarchy. The faith of the Brahmans was sacerdotal, that of the Buddhists ethical in character. The latter taught the utter inutility of sacrifice, prayer and penance. The gods could not be compelled, for there were no gods to compel. There was virtue in abstinence from sensual delights, but not in self-torture. Such doctrines were inconsistent with Brahmanism, and harmony between the two sects was impossible.

Another dogma of Buddhism was a still more direct blow at the Brahmanic priesthood, for it struck

at the very centre of their power. This was a denial of the doctrine that the right of religious teaching and interpretation is confined to the Brahman caste. Buddhism made no effort to overthrow the institution of caste as a political system. It, in fact, failed to concern itself with any political system. But as regarded the question of salvation, it taught that all men are equal. There are no special privileges in the attainment of Nirvana. The member of the lowest caste is in this respect on a level with the highest. Any man, whatever his situation in life, may become an ascetic and a teacher. In modern Buddhism the ranks of the priesthood are freely open to all, high or low. In ancient Buddhism there was no priesthood. Every man had to win his own salvation by his own efforts. Virtue could not be reflected from soul to soul. Thus Buddhism was in principle the most selfish of faiths.

And yet the methods of salvation taught rendered it one of the most moral and unselfish of all religious doctrines. Self-abnegation was but one of its main dogmas. Devotion to the good of others was a parallel dogma. It was necessary to get rid of all impure desires and revengeful feelings, and of all vexation and unkindliness. The highest point that can be reached, above purity, justice, and even faith, is Universal Charity. Until he has attained this stage the believer is still within the bonds of sin. In Universal Love alone lies true enlightenment. He who has reached this has attained Nirvana. In this requirement Buddhism strives to attain the highest imaginable condition of human morality.

As may well be supposed, a conflict for supremacy

arose between Brahmanism and Buddhism. They were mutually destructive in character, and could not continue to exist side by side on the same soil. Brahmanism, for two reasons, had the advantage of its younger rival. Its acceptance of the polytheistic beliefs of the people brought it within the comprehension of the common mind. And the indifference of the Buddhists to the political existence of caste aided the efforts of the priests to retain their supremacy. On the other hand, while the abstract philosophy of Buddhism could not well be comprehended by the people, the doctrine of the equality of all mankind in the paths of salvation was a strong lever in its favor. And the superstition into which it soon degenerated brought it nearer the level of ordinary apprehension.

The conflict continued for centuries, and ended in the final triumph of Brahmanism, and the expulsion of the rival faith from India. This victory was gained largely through the shrewdness of the priesthood, who widened their flexible system to admit the favorite deities of the people, so that the popular Brahmanism of to-day is a complex polytheism. Yet the revolt against Brahmanical despotism favored the growth of heretical sects, several of which still exist. And though Buddhism as a faith was expelled from India, the effect of its ethical teachings was not lost, but is still evident in the modern system of belief. One remarkable and still flourishing offshoot of Buddhism yet exists in India, the Jaina faith. This, according to Sir Alfred Lyall, "is nothing else but the worship of deified men, and the deification of man is universally characteristic of the cults of the wild non-Aryan tribes in India."



Buddhism, in its modern form, has sunk into a debased superstition which consists largely of hero worship. The closest approach to the old faith is that which is found in Ceylon. In its northern seats, China, Japan, and Mongolia, the worship has greatly degenerated from its original character, though the basic principle of the philosophy and organization is still held. The denial of the efficacy of prayer, which formed an essential feature of the revolt from Brahmanism, has lost its effect, and the compelling power of prayer is as firmly believed in as of old. The Buddhistic sages of the past have become the gods of to-day, and the extraordinary institution of the praying machine has been devised to deluge them with the petitions of believers. This is a wheel with the printed supplications pasted upon its interior, while every revolution constitutes a prayer. An improvement upon this shrewd scheme of god-compelling is the erection of praying wheels turned by water or wind power, so that the forces of the elements are harnessed to the prayers of the Buddhists, as we harness the same elements to aid us in attaining material salvation.

The modern Buddhistic priesthood has become a still more complex body than the Brahmanic, though it differs from the latter in two particulars. It sustains the necessity of celibacy, and it forms no caste. It may be recruited from all ranks of society, and the priests are at liberty to forsake their office at will. The old idea that every man is free to work for his own salvation by teaching the doctrines of religion to the people thus persists. Another interesting feature assimilates the Buddhistic with the Roman hierarchy.

There are several grades of priestly dignity, over which is a supreme head, the Dalai Lama of Thibet, who, like the Pope of Rome, combines temporal with spiritual authority.

It may be well here briefly to refer to the character of the influences at work in the systems we have so far reviewed. In early days the deepest thoughts of mankind were given to the questions of man's relation to the universe. Little resulted from this in China, for the Chinese mind lacked the imaginative outreach necessary to probe the deeper mysteries of thought. Thus in China only systems of practical morals arose, which the people could readily grasp, and to which they have since clung. Their sages were rather moral than religious reformers, and the existing religious belief of the common people is a remnant of the ancient fetichism and ancestor worship. But to the vivid imagination of the Hindu mind nothing was too deep or distant to be grasped. It reveled in the profoundest depths of thought, and produced a compact and intricate system of philosophy which wrought into one whole all the visible and the invisible, all the past, present and future of the universe. So exalted was this system, indeed, as to be utterly beyond the apprehension of the ordinary mind; and the religion of the people to-day is an idolatrous polytheism, in spite of the unified pantheism of the priests.

It is interesting to note that the philosophical systems of the far past were the work of religious teachers, who added to their philosophies codes of spiritual law and worship, and imaginative cosmogonies, while those of the nearer past and the present have been the work

of secular teachers, and have remained unconnected with any moral requirement. The Greek philosophers were the first thus to separate philosophy from religion, and to devise systems of the universe which laid no claim to authority, and demanded no religious worship. Modern metaphysicians have pursued the same course. This, it is true, is not wholly so. We might name Swedenborg, Comte, and several others whose speculations are offered as religious creeds as well as systems of philosophy. But, as a rule, religion has become divorced from philosophy. And this separation grows wider as religion becomes steadily more a question of morality, and less a question of creed.

There is still another great lawgiver of the Aryan race, whose system of faith has had an important influence upon human history, from its decided effect upon the Jewish and Christian beliefs. This is the alleged founder of the Persian creed, Spitama Zarathustra, or Zoroaster, as he is generally named. His system is a direct outgrowth from that early Vedic faith from which Brahmanism also emerged. In fact the Hindus and Iranians, or early Persians, were originally one people, an eastward-migrating branch of the Aryan race, who seem to have inhabited the region of ancient Bactria, the oldest known home of the Aryans. At what date this was, or why a separation took place, are among the undivulged secrets of history. It has been conjectured that the separation was caused by religious dissension. Of this we have no proof except that after their separation into two distinct bodies a wide divergence in religious belief appeared. While the external side of religion, its outer and formal phase,

was developed by the Hindus, the spiritual side, its inner and moral phase, was preserved and unfolded by the Iranians.

There can be traced in the earliest books of both branches the worship of nature deities, known collectively as the Deva and the Asura—the latter being named the Ahura in the Zend Avesta. With the Hindus the Devas were good deities. The Asuras are also good deities in the early Vedas, where this name is applied to the principal gods, as Indra, Varuna, and Agni. Later, however, they became evil spirits, the persistent foes of the Devas. This change it is important to note, since an opposite change took place in the Persian faith. The Ahuras continued, in this creed, deities of good, while the Devas became evil spirits.

The Brahmanic priests of the Hindus were paralleled by a similar Iranian clergy, known as the Soschianto, or fire priests. Zoroaster, of whose date we are in utter ignorance, and of whose real existence considerable doubt is entertained, is reputed to have been a member of this order, of a period perhaps long after the separation of the Iranians from the Hindus, and after considerable religious divergence had taken place. Assuming that the name represents a real person, we may follow the Zend Avesta in imputing to him a remarkable religious system, which emerged from the polytheistic nature worship of the earlier faith. Prompted, it may be, by that ardent abhorrence of the grossness of existing systems which has stirred the noblest minds of all ages to spiritual revolt, he stood out from the ranks of his sect as a deity-maker, and with one blow swept aside the whole ancient pantheon and replaced it with a single, universal, divine spirit.

The preceding Soschianto seem to have worshiped a plurality of Ahuras, or good deities. This polytheism became, in the creed of Zoroaster, a monotheism. He proclaimed that, among the many benevolent Ahuras, was one supreme over all others, a Mazdao, or world creator, an infinite, eternal spirit, the maker and ruler of all existing things. In the attributes of this deity, as given in the Avestas, there are no points of distinction from the Jehovah of the Hebrews. They are identical in all but name. To this single spirit, however, was ascribed a dual nature. He combined in one personality the two moving causes of the universe. In him, united from the beginning, were the "good mind" and the "evil mind," and from his single existence flowed the universes of matter and of spirit, with all their duality of good and evil influences. These primeval moving causes are present everywhere, in Ahura-mazda, as in man. In the deity they are combined in eternal unity and harmony.

At a later date the priesthood developed this idea into the ordinary form of Zoroastrianism. The two sides of the godlike unity were conceived to be two separate persons, Ormazd and Ahriman, the supreme spirits of good and evil. Thus from the original monotheism a dualistic system arose, which became more and more defined with time.

As to the ethical doctrines of the Zoroastrian reform, there is no occasion to dwell upon them, as no new moral principles were advanced. One of its most important features is its earnest insistence upon truthfulness, which became a marked characteristic of the Persian character throughout the later history of the nation.

To the dualistic basis of faith was added a complicated theological system, which may be briefly described. In it idolatry was sternly suppressed, and all ideas of symbolization and incarnation swept aside, except in the worship of fire as the symbol of the infinite spirit. It is almost the only religion which has kept free from idolatry. The inherent opposition of good and evil became, in the Persian belief, a ceaseless conflict between Ormazd and Ahriman, long fought on equal terms and with equal success. All the good things of creation flowed from Ormazd, but the created world was filled by Ahriman with evil passions and poisonous and noxious things. For the threatened battle with his great foe, Ormazd called into existence six mighty spirits and a host of lower divinities, and placed them under the leadership of his son Mithra—the god symbolized in the sun worship of the Persians. Ahriman surrounded himself with a similar body of councilors and a lesser host of evil spirits. Three thousand years were occupied in the preparation of these celestial armies. Then came the era of the great struggle, destined to continue for a second three thousand years. In a third period of three thousand years Ormazd was destined to prevail over his powerful adversary, and reduce to subjection the spirit of evil and his hosts. In the end will come the resurrection and final judgment, which conceptions were of Persian origin. A flaming comet will destroy the earth, and men and spirits alike be forced to pass through a bath of flaming lava, which will feel like warm milk to the pious, but like devouring torture to the impious. In this fiery ordeal all evil will be eradicated, and universal salvation be the final lot of all

men and spirits, including even Ahriman, the great adversary.

An interesting and important feature in this system is that it brought in man as a soldier in the conflict of the gods. Man, by his deeds, could aid in the triumph of Ormazd or Ahriman. Every human effort to attain virtue aided the spirit of good in the great struggle. Every evil deed of a human being aided the cause of the evil deity. It is difficult to imagine a dogma better calculated to give dignity to human life. Man could become an ally of the great God of the universe in His struggle for supremacy over the evil powers. It gave divinity to noble deeds, while by wickedness man reduced himself to the level of the demons. Milton, in his noble poem of *Paradise Lost*, gives us what is largely a paraphrase of this Persian philosophy, but devoid of its loftiest feature, that which makes man a soldier in the battle of the gods.

The widely different histories of the Hindu and Persian branches of a single original people yield a striking instance of the influence of belief upon national character. With the Hindus, man was nothing; God was all. Effort in this life was useless. Salvation could only come through withdrawal from earthly concerns. With the Persians, man was an ally of God, and helped to shape the destiny of the universe. These differences of creed have left their mark on the histories of the two nations. The history of India is that of its conquerors. That of Persia is the record of its conquests. The Persian people had the self-poise of the Greeks, with whom man was the noblest figure in the universe.

To the original form of Zoroastrianism, as above described, certain additions were made by the Magians, the priests of a sect that inhabited Media and other western districts. These Magian priests retained intact much of the original elemental worship, particularly that of fire as the highest elemental symbol of deity. They also clung to the original monotheism, and, at a later period, added to the prevalent philosophy the idea of an underlying, universal supreme principle, *Zarvan-Akarana*, (Infinite Time), of which Ormazd and Ahriman are visible and eternally existing manifestations. The older doctrine, however, seems to teach that Ormazd alone is eternal, while Ahriman was created, and would eventually become subordinate.

With this review of the dogmas of the lawgivers of two grand divisions of the human race, the Turanian and the Aryan, we come to those of a third, the Semitic, which are doubly interesting in that they form the controlling creeds of all modern enlightened peoples, and have made their way widely throughout the partly civilized and barbarian sections of mankind. The Jewish, the Christian, and the Mohammedan peoples of the modern world alike owe their religious faith to the thinkers and reformers of the Semitic race.

With the God of Abraham, the patriarchal ancestor of the Jews, began the special development of Semitic creeds, the appearance of a distinctly monotheistic faith. A similar phenomenon appears among the other Semitic peoples. They had deities as the Jehovah of the Israelites, but the host of other



gods, derived originally from the mythology of the Accad inhabitants of Babylonia, a non-Semitic people, and added to in later times by the Semites themselves. The Hebrew people were by no means free from this tendency to polytheism, and very probably worshiped more than one god in their earlier period. Only the constant effort of the priests kept them, in their later era, from adding other deities to Jehovah, and the history of Israel is, to an interesting degree, that of the earnest endeavor of the priests and prophets to restrain the people and the kings from idolatrous practices.

The appearance of this Hebraic system is of particular importance in the history of religion, not only from the influence which it has had upon subsequent mankind, but from its distinctive position among religious ideas, its character as a peculiar phenomenon in the evolution of thought. To comprehend the origin of this system we must go back of the immediate facts relating to it, and seek to trace its development from general theistic ideas.

Four distinct sources of such ideas can be formulated. There are perhaps others, but if so they are of minor importance, and have played no prominent part in the history of human worship. First among them comes that worship of natural phenomena to which we owe the many mythological faiths of mankind. These were probably closely related in their origin to fetichism, expanding from the worship of the fetich to that of the heavenly bodies and the great movements of nature, and finally of a host of deities that were partly removed from nature as personal beings,

the traces of their origin being occasionally almost or quite lost.

Somewhat closely connected with the deities of mythological are those of philosophical origin—the gods of the lawgivers. It is evident from what has been said in the preceding part of this chapter that the supreme deities of the Brahmanic, Buddhistic and Zoroastrian faiths emerged more or less directly from mythology. They were devised by the priests of a mythological creed, through a working over of the raw material of religion which had descended to them, and it became necessary to retain the other nature gods, and devise some relation between them and these supreme deities. The lawgivers of China had little or no mythology as a soil for the growth of deific ideas. Perhaps in consequence of this Confucius produced no deity, while Lao-tsze conceived in the depths of his understanding a god of philosophy which has proved incomprehensible to any other understanding, and has become the seed of a multitudinous crop of nature deities.

The third source of deific ideas, shamanism, does not differ essentially from nature worship. It probably originated, in common with the latter, in fetichism, in which these two sources of religious conceptions seem combined. For fetich worship seems indistinctly divided between the object and the spirit of the object. At a later date this division became clearly defined. Mythology made its gods of the visible phenomena and objects of the universe, conceived of as possessing intelligence. Shamanism made its gods of the invisible spirits of the air and of surrounding objects, to

whom it imputed a certain independence. They were deities that temporarily inhabited these objects, but were not necessary parts of them. Most of them were teasing, malicious demons, bringing disease and accident to man, and annoying him with various other troubles, from which the incantations and sorceries of the shamans sought to relieve him. The shamanistic deities were not all of this character. There were good as well as evil spirits—the former being in many cases the spirits of ancestors, who assisted the Shamans in their work of controlling the spirits of evil.

Widespread as the shamanistic belief has been, and still is, it has not been prolific in the production of distinct deities. None of the great gods of the world seem to have arisen from this source. Among the Altaic nomads, indeed, it yielded a supreme good deity—Kaira Kan, who was lord over the host of subordinate spirits, and over Erlik, the great enemy of man, who was banished underground for his evil deeds. Possibly, also, similar conceptions may have had much to do with the origin of the gods of the pre-Semitic inhabitants of Babylonia—the people of Accad, of supposed Turanian race—whose religious ceremonies and beliefs were distinctively shamanistic. Yet, withal, shamanism seems to have borne no prominent part in the creation of the well-known deities of human worship.

The fourth source of deific ideas alluded to is that of ancestor worship, which, as we have just seen, has been to some degree combined with shamanism. It has been similarly world-wide in its distribution, and is still largely in vogue among uncivilized peoples. It is

the worship of the deified ancestors of the family, of the clan, and of the tribe—the last considered as the outgrowth of a single family and with a single remote ancestor. A more extended account of shamanism and ancestor worship must be left for the next chapter; we are here concerned merely with their influence in deity-making.

As a rule the tendency of the deified ancestor, as of the shamanistic spirit, to rise to the dignity of a supreme god seems to have been hindered by the prevalence of mythology, and the stronger influence of this form of faith over the imagination of mankind. It is of great interest to find that the shamanistic and ancestral deities are confined to nomadic peoples, or those who were probably nomadic originally. Among the inhabitants of the steppes shamanism, and the later acceptance of Buddhism, have in great part crowded out ancestor worship, but traces of it, in connection with shamanism, persist, as we have above shown. In an early outgrowth of the nomads, the Chinese, ancestor worship has been preserved as the national faith, despite all subsequent religious ideas. To-day shamanism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, and other forms of belief exist in China, but ancestor worship underlies them all; and the one supreme deity of the Chinese, Tien, or Heaven, is really regarded as the patriarchal divinity of the nation, and is worshiped by the emperor for his people in the same sense as every head of a family worships his own family ancestor.

For a second instance of the emergence of the ancestral deity to prominence we must seek the Semites, the other great nomadic race of mankind. Like the Mon-

golians, they seem deficient in that imaginative faculty which has been the prolific source of mythological deities in other races, and like them their religion has been largely infiltrated with shamanistic ideas and practices, while their supreme deities appear to be distinctively of ancestral origin.

In reviewing the Mosaic system of theology the considerations above taken must be borne in mind. It was the religion of a nomadic race, a creed born in the desert. Not improbably to this desert origin its monotheistic character is due. For the natural conditions of life in the desert are so strongly contrasted with those of agricultural and commercial states that a wide divergence of character in their systems of belief might safely be predicated.

In the settled state man is exposed to a great variety of natural and social influences. The laborer in the fields finds his work aided or opposed by a multitude of agencies beyond his power to control. The pursuits of the merchant, the artisan, and the navigator are alike affected by diverse influences. And the government of such people is devoid of simplicity. Even if there be a despotic head, there will necessarily be many grades of rank and authority between the ruler and the people. In states thus complex in their conditions unity of thought is impossible, and a diversity of conceptions as to the government of the universe is very sure to arise. Mythological conceptions are likely to force themselves into prominence, and to hinder the growth of other deific ideas.

Among nomadic peoples the conditions of nature and society are the opposite of those of the settled

state. In the life of the desert there is little diversity of any kind. The farmer puts his seed into the ground and waits for months in helpless hope and dread of, or in ardent appeal to, the many uncontrollable forces of nature. But the shepherd drives his flock from pasture to pasture, himself largely the master of his own destiny. There is scarcely any variety in his habits or his fortunes. He lives, thinks, and acts in the simple routine in which his ancestors have lived, thought, and acted for ages. The aspects of surrounding nature are simple and single. Around him spreads the mighty monotony of the desert, with its contracted pasture regions. Above him spreads the cloudless and rainless sky. Existence is to him a simple unity, but it has in it much of the grand unity of the sky and the desert.

The government of the nomads is equally simple and single. It is the control of the patriarch, the father of the tribe, and the earthly representative of the great ancestor from whom the tribe originally sprung. To such a people the doctrine of a single supreme deity, the possessor and absolute ruler of the universe, must have been a natural conception, and their tendency of thought would seem to be opposed to the belief in a multitude of diverse deities, each with special characteristics.

We can scarcely look for any philosophy of the universe from such a people. The doctrines of a universe of matter infused with spirit, of emanation, absorption, transmigration, and all the varied figments of the pantheistic beliefs, were beyond the thought powers of a race of simple-minded nomads. The god of the

Hebrews was simple, grand, almighty, but he was in no sense a world-soul, or the infinite essence from which emanated the universe. He stood outside the universe, its director and creator. It was made by him, not born from him. He was a separate personality, and the universe of the Hebrews consisted of God and matter, not of God in matter.

The supreme gods of the Semites were designated by adjectives, not by nouns. The attributes of strength, might, grandeur, etc., were separated from the nouns to which they had been originally attached, and remained the sole designations of these deities. The names of the Aryan gods, on the contrary, have no such grammatical origin. They are personal deities, have fathers and children, began and will cease to exist. They delight in human gifts, and fight against each other in human wars. Even the king of the gods, Zeus, or Jupiter, is only vaguely supreme. His life is full of puerile adventures, and is constantly troubled by the insubordination of his deific family. Such is not the case with the supreme god of the Semites. He is the monarch, founder, lawgiver and preserver of the state. The earthly monarch is simply his vicegerent, and is sacred as being his representative. While the Aryans are tolerant of the gods of other peoples, the Semites are intolerant of all gods but their own. The god of the Aryans is a divine father, gentle, vacillating, and forgiving. The god of the Semites is a divine sovereign, awful, inaccessible, ruling with unyielding rigor and justice over a guilty race.

Of course it was impossible for the mind of an undeveloped people fully to grasp a conception of the

infinite remoteness, yet infinite nearness, of the deity. Personal attributes, puerile conceptions, necessarily attached to their ideas of the divine nature. These ideas needed to expand with mental cultivation, and we can trace their expansion in the Hebrew scriptures. The god of the tribe, who went down to Egypt with Jacob, was a narrow being as compared with the god of the Psalmist, who could not be escaped "with the wings of the morning."

That this supreme god of the Semites was an ancestral deity there is much reason to believe. All the indications point in that direction. Three such great gods appear, towering above the host of lower deities who shared the worship of the Semitic peoples. These were the Jehovah of the Jews, the Asshur of the Assyrians, and the El of the Phœnicians. The last named seems to have been of much more ancient date than the others, and was perhaps the great god of the Semites in that remote period before they became divided into the historical Semitic nations. The origin of El is buried too far in the mists of time to be discovered, but his worship, with some variation of name, was widely extended among the Semitic peoples. The Asshur of the Assyrians, on the contrary, was almost beyond doubt an ancestral deity, a deification of Asshur the son of Shem, the legendary ancestor of the Assyrian people.

If we consider the scriptural statement concerning the relation of Abraham to his special deity, and of Moses to his god, we are strongly led to the conclusion that these also were ancestral deities. In their characteristics El, Asshur, and Jehovah are indis-



tinguishable, a fact which has no counterpart among the mythological deities, and the first named seems to have been as much a god of the Hebrews as of the Phœnicians, who particularly worshiped him. We have a form of the title in the Elohim of Genesis. Jehovah (or Jahveh), as a name of the deity, was not known to Abraham. The word came in with the Mosaic dispensation, perhaps as the distinctive name of the god worshiped by the family of Moses or the tribe of Joseph.\* All these deities are essentially removed in character and attribute from the nature gods. The latter come in hosts, with family relationships, with histories, adventures, and intrigues. They are but men a little removed and with superior strength and power. They can be transferred at will from nation to nation, for no people lays any prescriptive claim to them. The ancestral deities, on the contrary, come singly, and are destitute of histories and adventures, or of any of the figments of mythology. They are, in a strict sense, the gods of a people. No other tribe or nation dreams of claiming or worshiping them, while their original people clings persistently to them, and marches under their banners to the subjugation of surrounding tribes and nations.

The worship of the god of the clan or tribe, the ancestral divinity, was prominent in all the Semitic nations. They too had their mythologies, with hosts of nature deities, but apart from and above these ruled the great god of the tribe. The former were surrounded with myths; the latter was devoid of myth and towered as the great, supreme, absolute national divinity. El,

\* Exodus vi., 3.

Asshur and Jehovah were alike worshiped as infinite deities, without physical attributes other than those that attached to them from their character of patriarchal divinities, and devoid of that pantheistic relation to nature which all the mythological deities in some degree assumed. Jehovah was the great "I Am That I Am," dwelling alone in unapproachable majesty and glory, while around him could centre none of the gross and debased fancies which so lavishly embellished the stories of the Greek deities.

The foundation of the Hebrew theistic system is ascribed to two great reformers, Abraham and Moses. The monotheistic belief is ordinarily attributed to the former, the ritual and ceremonial to the latter. Abraham was a Babylonian by birth, though to all appearance of nomadic origin, for he assumed nomadic pursuits as though they were natural to him. It may have been that disapprobation of the gross idolatry of the Babylonians, and devotion to the god of his special tribe, were the moving causes of his leaving "Ur of the Chaldees," and going forth with his flocks and herds as a wanderer over the desert. For Abraham presents us with the earliest instance in religious history of strict monotheistic worship. He is represented as knowing but one God, and this a deity devoid of mythological attributes, a being who stood apart and separate from the created world, and ruled the courses of the stars as a driver rules his chariot, not as the soul rules the man, as in the pantheistic creeds.

This idea, as we have seen, was not native to Abraham. The other Semites had similar deities. The difference is that Abraham had but the one god, and

does not seem to have worshiped any minor deities. Sacrifice was retained, but the human sacrifice which probably prevailed before was changed by him to animal sacrifice. We can hear the voice of God speaking in the heart of the father in the interesting story of the attempted sacrifice of his son Isaac.

Abraham was no ordinary man. He was undoubtedly of a strongly religious nature, and an earnest thinker upon the deep problem of man's relations to the divine. But he was no philosopher. The Semitic race, in fact, seems destitute of the philosophical faculty, if we may judge from results. He purified the religion to which he was born, but he devised no theory of the universe. And with Abraham first appears that feature of religious faith which became such a prominent and distinctive characteristic of Hebrew worship. He was the first of the *seers* or *prophets*. The prediction of future events begins in history with him. God advised him of the future, as He continued to advise the seers of the Hebrew people, throughout the centuries of their ancient existence. This clairvoyance, divination, or by whatever name it should be called, is not without parallel elsewhere, but nowhere else did it become a leading feature in the faith of a civilized people. It is the prominent characteristic in the religious literature of the Hebrew race, and gave rise to a remarkable series of prophetic writings, extending over more than a thousand years.

The Hebrews, as we have said, lacked the vivid imaginative faculty which appears in the Aryan theistic conceptions. And the special origin of their deities may have acted to hinder the growth of philosophical

ideas. The dogmas of their religion were rather borrowed than made. The cosmogony was derived from Babylonia, the ceremonial from Egypt, the doctrine of Satan and of immortality from Persia. Such are the deductions of modern literary discovery and criticism. But with a moderation of literary taste which may perhaps be ascribed to the lack of an ardent imagination, they threw aside the absurdities and wild fancies which clustered around the older conceptions, and reduced them to a simple and striking story, which still retains a strong hold on the reason and sympathy of mankind.

We are far from sure to what extent Moses aided in devising what is known as the Mosaic code of law and morals. Recent criticism throws great doubt upon the older ideas concerning this, and makes it apparent that the Pentateuch, in its present form, was not reduced to writing until a much later period than that formerly ascribed to it, at which time the code was probably greatly revised, and perhaps considerably extended.

However that be, there can be no reasonable doubt that Moses was a great leader and lawgiver of the Hebrew race, and that the creed, as it at present stands, was fundamentally his work, however it may have been subsequently modified and extended. It was a simple yet a grand faith which these nomad-creed-makers presented for the acceptance of the world. It made no effort to settle those infinite questions which are beyond settlement. It simply presented the Almighty God for the world's worship, with no vain attempt to explain God. Efforts at comprehension of

the divine nature have but succeeded in lowering the dignity of every other religious system. The God of the Hebrews dwelt beyond question. And the thoughts of the Hebrew seers and poets tended constantly to increase the divine inaccessibility of the Almighty. There was no effort to think out a philosophy of the universe. To adore, to obey, and to believe with unquestioning faith, were the main features of their creed. Propagandism by the sword, which has been a striking feature of other Semitic faiths, was not prominent in the Hebrew. Jehovah was the "God of Israel." Destruction rather than conversion of idolaters was the moving principle of the early wars.

The God of the early Israelites, indeed, was a being of very narrow scope and powers, as might be expected in the conception entertained by barbarian nomads of their clan deity. He had been adopted as their God by the tribes of Israel, but had no power or authority beyond these tribes. The remainder of mankind had other gods, and were not his subjects. As for his power in giving his chosen people their promised land, we are told that "He drove out the inhabitants of the mountain, but could not drive out the inhabitants of the valley, because they had chariots of iron."\*

A deity of this kind, whose power stopped at "chariots of iron," was very short of the requirements of a God of the universe. The God of the later Jewish literature was a much higher and nobler being. He had taken on, to a considerable extent, the figure of a universal deity, though still with the limitation of a special paternal relation to the people of Israel. Per-

\* Judges i., 19.

haps Christ was the first of the "chosen people" to rid himself of this narrow conception, and to look upon God in His true relation, as the creator and father of all mankind. If this be so, Christ may be credited with giving a new God to the worship of mankind, by removing the last shreds of patriarchism from the tribal deity of the Semites.

As regards the present conception of deity by enlightened nations, some few words may be of interest in this connection. We have seen that there have been at least four deity-making influences: nature worship, philosophy, shamanism, and ancestor worship. These fall into two distinct groups. In nature worship the deity is closely connected with the great objects of the universe. He is the soul of the sun, of the planets, or of earthly objects. The deities of these objects gained, in mythologic belief, some degree of freedom and personality, but seldom a complete independence. Their intimate relation to some special object was never quite broken. As regards the gods of philosophy, they were but an extension of this idea. These supreme deities were the soul of the universe as a whole—great pantheistic divinities.

Shamanism and ancestor worship pursued an opposite course. The shamanistic deity is an independent spirit. He may enter into physical objects, but is no necessary part of them. He comes and goes at will, and has no indissoluble relation to any object in the physical universe. The ancestral deity is likewise independent, in the same sense as man is independent of the world which surrounds him. He is a personal being, not the spirit of some object.

Such was the origin of the two leading deific ideas of recent times. In one of them God is the soul of the universe; in the other, He is an independent being, dwelling in, but not a part of, the physical universe. The latter is the God of the Scriptures, but it is a question if this will be the God of future Christianity. Late astronomical discovery has crowded back the figure of a personal deity, and threatens eventually to leave no place for Jehovah in the universe. On the other hand, the pantheistic idea is steadily growing, and the belief in God as imminent in all things widening, until to-day a modified pantheism is the idea of deity held by the great majority of cultivated thinkers.

As a preliminary to the consideration of the Christian dispensation, it is necessary to review certain preceding religious conditions and ideas, which there is reason to believe exercised an important influence upon it. Of the various religious associations of the ancient world—the Mithraic, of Persia; the Eleusinian, of Greece, etc.—those in which asceticism was a leading feature are of most interest. Asceticism appears to have originated in Brahmanism, and to have attained a great development in Buddhism. It was based upon the belief in the worthlessness of human life, and the importance of escaping from its miseries and providing for future happiness. For this purpose, withdrawal from all the pleasures, hopes, and ambitions of this world was deemed necessary. Sensual delights, the desire for wealth, and the love of power especially bind man to the earth, and all ascetic societies, to the present time, have been founded on the principle of abrogation of these earthly ties. Poverty, celibacy, and

humility have been their basic vows. With these has been usually incorporated the political principle of communism, whose chief survival in modern enlightened nations is in societies of ascetics.

During the centuries preceding the advent of Christ the ideas of the Buddhists and of the Persian ascetics seem to have made their way westward and to have affected European communities. The earliest trace of this influence now visible is seen in the tenets of the Pythagorean sect of Greece and Italy, these tenets being full of the characteristics of oriental thought, and indicating an inflow to Europe of the pantheistic doctrines and ascetic habits of the Hindu devotees, perhaps brought west by Persian wanderers. Of Pythagoras himself we know very little, and the only distinct religious conception we can ascribe to him is the Hindu dogma of metempsychosis. The society which bore his name recommended, though it did not enforce, celibacy, taught that the body is a prison for the soul, which had pre-existed and would continue to exist after death of the body, believed in the existence of angelic beings, and objected to the use of animal food. In the early part of the century before Christ the Pythagorean society was revived at Alexandria. The doctrines of the new sect were in part like those of the old, in part new. Oaths were prohibited, the use of meat and wine was permitted, and the power of magic and of prophecy believed. God was to them the transcendent, the illimitably-removed Deity, as in the teachings of the later sect of Neoplatonists.

About the same time with the Neo-Pythagoreans appeared two ascetic Jewish sects, the Therapeutæ of



Egypt and the Essenes of Palestine, who have been supposed to be derivatives in their beliefs and customs of the Neo-Pythagoreans, but who more probably gained their doctrines from the Buddhists, through the intermediate agency of the Parsees.

The Therapeutæ were communistic celibates, though both sexes were admitted to membership in their communities. They were vowed to poverty, opposed to the prevailing slavery, and their doctrines seem to have resembled those of Platonism. They were probably a derivative of the Essenes, a somewhat older and more interesting sect, with whose habits and doctrines we are better acquainted, and of whom we first hear about the middle of the second century before Christ. Nothing is known in regard to the origin of the Essenes, though their tenets indicate the influence of Persian and Buddhistic ideas. There is reason to believe that the ascetic habits and peculiar beliefs of the Eastern devotees about this period flowed freely into Syria, Egypt and Greece, and gave birth to religious customs which were destined to a remarkable expansion a few centuries later.

The Essenes formed associations strictly communistic in their habits, and composed of men only, although in some few of their communities marriage was permitted. They dwelt principally near the western shores of the Dead Sea, in scattered agricultural groups, and are said to have numbered about four thousand. Riches and pleasure were despised, and individual wealth was prohibited. Their worship embraced an extreme veneration for the Sabbath, abstinence from the sacrifices at the temple, and a reverence for the sun

that approached idolatry. They held that the body is mortal, but the soul immortal. At death the spirit is released from its bonds and joyously soars aloft. For the souls of the good there is reserved an abode of pleasure, but for the wicked is prepared a region of wintry darkness and unceasing torment. In their secular relations they taught that poverty, humility, and obedience are essentials of virtue, that riches should be abhorred, and that man should take no care for the body beyond the demands of its immediate necessities.

The code of morals of the Essenes was decidedly in advance of that of any preceding sect, if we except the Buddhists. It inculcated not the proud, self-sufficient virtue of Greece and Rome, but the gentleness and sympathy of the Indian, Gautama. Humility and obedience to superiors were taught. Charity and mercy were advocated as essential duties. Oaths were prohibited and slavery was condemned. The novice was pledged to reverence the Deity, do justice to men, hurt no man either of his own will or in obedience to the command of another, hate the unjust and aid the just, and practice fidelity to all mankind, but especially to rulers, since no one rules but of God.

These precepts of gentleness, charity, submission, lowliness and sympathy are in remarkable contrast to the rigid and unyielding pride of the surrounding civilizations, and are of particular interest from their close resemblance to the doctrines taught by Christ. This interest is greater when we recognize the fact that the Essenes were prominent at the period of Christ's mission, and that he in all probability had some connection with them. John the Baptist, the immediate pre-

cursor and kinsman of Christ, certainly bore a suggestive relationship to the Essenes. The region of his mission, the "wilderness of Judæa," was the district in which they were most numerous. His asceticism, and his prophetic manner and utterances, assimilated him to the Essenes, with whom prophecy was common. His doctrine that "the kingdom of heaven is at hand" was not inconsistent with their creed. As to the character of his rite of baptism much uncertainty prevails, but baptism was common with the Jews of that era. The facts seem to indicate that he was a missionary of the Essene sect, though no positive proof of this can be adduced.

The family relationship between Christ and John, and the close equality in their ages, make it probable that they were friends, perhaps intimates. This becomes more than probable when we consider the immediate recognition of Christ by John, and his quick acknowledgment of the exalted character and superior abilities of his visitor. Other facts might be advanced in favor of the view that the Essenes exercised a considerable influence on the developing character of Christ, though it is not easy now to decide how closely he may have been affiliated with them. The internal evidence is in favor of his connection with them being somewhat close. The moral rules of the Essenes bear a suggestive resemblance to those taught by Christ. His celibacy and denial of family ties are other points of resemblance. Like them, he taught the duties of poverty, humility and obedience, to abhor wealth, and to "take no thought for the morrow." The doctrine of brotherly love, which perhaps flowed to the

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Essenes from the followers of Gautama, was taught by Christ in its widest and loftiest form. It is evident, indeed, that the soul of Christ was too noble and rational to be bound by the ascetic self-torture and the narrower dogmas of Essene worship and philosophy. Such a spirit was not to be held in the trammels of a narrow creed, or to be bound down to any selfish views of the relations of men to each other or to their God. Yet, apart from this, what we know of his doctrines and of his life very nearly approaches the tenets and rules of conduct of this exemplary sect, while his silence in regard to them, contrasted with his condemnation of the other Jewish sects, is an argument in favor of his affiliation with the self-sacrificing ascetics of the wilderness of Judæa.

It was by his breadth of spiritual insight that Christ broke through the walls of all preceding creeds, and founded a new religion, which had all of the exalted, but none of the narrow philosophy and morality of the more ancient faiths. In ethical dogma the Buddhists had reached the summit of human virtue, but not in moral expansion of soul. Their system was essentially selfish, and its main merit lay in its inculcation of human sympathy as the most immediate path to individual salvation. To what extent the morality of the Essenes was affected by this selfish aim we cannot tell, but it is the prevailing evil in all asceticism. In the teachings of Christ the selfishness of the older creeds was discarded, and universal humanity and sympathy were inculcated as a primal human duty, without question or thought of reward. Virtue in this noblest of creeds reached its highest possible

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expression. It was a new wine of thought that broke the bottles of older dogma, and flowed out in a stream of refreshing vitality that has spiritually intoxicated the world.

Christ sought to establish no philosophy of religion. An all-embracing love of humankind is the spirit that animates the utterances of this greatest of religious teachers. In his soul, warm with humanity, sympathetic feeling broke through the barriers of national limits and of selfish expediency, and embraced the whole human race. He came not as a philosopher, but as the last of the prophets, the greatest of the seers, the supreme advocate of universal love and charity. His mission was to man only, and it was his effort to establish sympathy not only between man and man, but between man and God. He made no effort to explain the mystery of the universe. His whole code of laws is expressed in the two grand precepts, "Do as you would be done by," and "Love one another." He offered no new name of the deity to the worship of mankind. God to him was God, no matter under what name He might be known. And yet the God of Christ was not the god of the older past. The supreme deity of his creed ceased to exist as the stern judge, the inflexible despot, the unapproachable ruler of the universe, as in the more ancient Semitic systems of belief. He became the All Father, and mankind His erring, rather than His guilty children. In the God of Christ the revenge-loving Jehovah of the Hebrews disappeared, and the lineaments of the Father God of the Aryans appeared, with infinite love, pity, and forgiveness as His attributes.

It has been, with some warrant, asserted that Christ originated none of the elements of the later Christian creed. The cosmogony of this creed is Persian and Babylonian; the conception of God as separate from the created universe is that of the Semites generally; the theological philosophy is that of the church fathers, with its germ in the preceding pagan philosophies; the moral apothegms were, for the most part, the property of mankind in the preceding ages; the doctrine of universal charity was taught by Gautama, five hundred years before. Christ indeed taught less a system of belief than a system of morals. He troubled himself little with preceding beliefs, except to ignore their absurdities. But he stands before the world as the greatest of moral teachers, the advocate of the only system of conduct which satisfies the highest aspirations of the developed human mind. His doctrine is that of universal sympathy, and of the complete obliteration of selfishness in human dealings. To him all mankind, high or low, near or distant, are brothers in blood, the children of one Infinite Father, and dwell in a universe of which the basic principle is brotherly and eternal love. The thought that "God is love," that man is linked to man and to God by bonds of love, as gravitation binds sphere to sphere, is the essence of Christ's teachings. But this link is a moral, not a physical one; and its creed is an ethical, not a philosophical, dogma.

As we have just said, the doctrine of universal charity was taught by Gautama, in advance of Christ. But its force was lost under the soul-depressing philosophy with which that deep thinker associated it.

The selfishness which was repressed in the teachings of Christ was fostered in the creed of Gautama. In the latter, salvation was to be attained by an increasing withdrawal from the world and loss of sympathy with humanity and its doings and sufferings. The charity taught was but as an aid in this withdrawal, not as the supreme element of virtue in itself. Thus, wide as was the outreach of the spirit of love in Gautama, it was based upon a philosophy of selfishness that tended to destroy its effect. } Christ did not deal in philosophy. The intensest sympathy with humanity constituted with him the supremacy of virtue. Asceticism was alien to his thoughts. The world had had a surfeit of creed-making and philosophizing. It needed a basis of belief and of action that could be comprised in a sentence. It received it in the simple injunction, "Love one another."

Such was the Christianity of Christ—a very different thing from the Christianity of his successors. Christ appeared at a fortunate era of history, one perhaps better adapted to the rapid promulgation of his religious doctrines than any period before or since. At the date of his advent the most progressed section of civilized mankind was combined into a single mighty unit. The Roman empire has had no true parallel in human history. The nearest approach to it was the preceding Persian dominion, yet that was not an actual empire, but rather a congeries of illy-linked kingdoms. Rome had gone beyond this phase of political development. The boundaries of its conquered kingdoms had been broken down and the people amalgamated. One law, one language, one government, extended from the

Atlantic to the Euphrates. All this vast region was a compact state, linked into one by its far-stretching highways, its single interests, its patriotic pride, its trust in and dread of the unconquerable might of the imperial government.

The work was done, and the sword of conquest had been sheathed. A word spoken at one extremity of the great empire might be heard and appreciated at the other. There were no artificial barriers in its way. But to this important fact we must add another of still more importance. Christianity arose in a religious interregnum of the civilized world. Polytheism had been tried and found wanting. It had flourished for thousands of years, but had finally fallen and perished in a dry-rot. The mythology of Greece had degenerated into a mass of wild absurdities which no thinking man could for a moment entertain. An effort had been made to replace it by philosophical systems, but without practical result, other than to weaken the popular belief. The more spiritual faith of Rome had, in its turn, degenerated into a system of augury and divination, a series of magic rites which made no appeal to the heart or the reason of man. Anything that could properly be called religion had vanished. For the first and the last time in the history of the civilized world was presented the spectacle of a great people without a faith or a code of morals. The iron virtues of the Stoics were advocated and partly practiced by the thinking classes. With the people a vague superstition was the sole barrier against utter vice.

Such was the religious state of Rome during the period of Christ's mission upon the earth. The field



of the civilized world lay fallow for the seeds of new thought. A very natural revulsion from the prevailing irreligion prepared the way in the empire for the advent of Christianity. A strong desire for some fixed religious belief manifested itself, as may be perceived in the literature of the time. The human heart and conscience still existed, and virtue was yet warm in the souls of many Romans.

Into this emptiness came crowding the religious creeds of Rome's new subjects, and of nations beyond the borders of the empire. The Mithraic dogmas of Persia, the Egyptian worship of Isis and Serapis, the sensual Syrian beliefs and practices, the light-hearted mythology of Greece, the stern monotheism of the Jews, all became introduced and accepted within the walls of Rome. The victorious career of the Roman armies had brought the thought of the East into the heart of the West. From all parts of the empire its priests and philosophers, its believers and missionaries, flocked to Rome. And the institution of slavery aided greatly in this result. Many of the slaves with which the imperial city was crowded were recruited from the learned men of Greece, Syria, and Egypt. The infusion of new habits and modes of thought rapidly softened the iron soul of old Rome. The sympathetic spirit of Greece weakened the harsh austerity, the luxury of Syria destroyed the severe moderation, the mysticism of Egypt infiltrated the prosaic spirit of the Roman republic, and wrought a revolution in the simple habits and practical ideas of the stern-hearted western conquerors. The void in the religious belief of the Romans began to be filled. These new creeds fell like ripe seed into a fallow soil,

and quickly took root in the creedless soul of Rome. There was but little opposition to their introduction. A stern effort was made to repress the Egyptian doctrines, but it soon ceased. The Jews were contemned for their fanaticism, but not actively persecuted. The principal persecution of Rome fell upon the Christians, whose creed had also made its way within the imperial walls. But, as Lecky clearly shows, this persecution was never long sustained or crushing. In fact Christianity came into Rome unseen, and for years made its way in the lower strand of the population before it fell under the observation of the emperors. Its mission was to the lowly, the slave, the persecuted, not to the proud Stoic or the pleasure-loving Epicurean. Some spasmodic efforts, mostly local, were made to repress it, but none of them were long continued, and Christianity had been established for two centuries in Rome before any general and determined effort to destroy it was attempted. By that time it had become too strong to be overthrown, and though the persecution started by Decius raged virulently for ten years, it utterly failed in its object of eradicating this deep-rooted faith from the hearts of the Roman people.

The decrepitude of the old polytheism had been followed, as we have seen, by an influx of philosophic thought, which did not fail to address itself to this great question of religion. Some form of belief and worship must succeed the decay of older faiths. All the ancient creeds of civilized mankind sought to fill this void, but sought unsuccessfully, for the mind of the Romans had progressed beyond their intellectual level. Schools of philosophy arose. Plutarch, Maxi-

mus of Tyr, Apuleius and others advocated a monotheistic doctrine, which was largely a modified Platonism. The strong tendency to monotheism which has always shown itself in progressing races, was here manifested. Plato's idea of dæmons, or subordinate spiritual agencies, was applied to the gods of mythology, who became the secondary spirits of a supreme power. This was followed by the speculations of Neoplatonism, a refined pantheism, in which the doctrine of emanation and absorption was carried to its ultimate extreme.

Such was the soil into which fell the seeds of Christian thought. The injunction, "Believe in the one Eternal God," was already prevalent. The new precept, "Love one another," sank deeply into the hearts of the lowlier Romans, and influenced all those who shrank from the prevailing vice and cruelty of the empire. We cannot be surprised at the rapid progress of the new creed, its spread from end to end of the empire, its vigorous resistance to persecution, and its final victory over paganism.

But long before this victory was achieved Christianity had become a system of philosophy as well as a code of morals. It had arisen in the soil of Semitic thought, grand in outreach, but simple and single in method. Its seeds had fallen into the soil of Greek thought, which lacked the simple grandeur of the Semitic, but had all the imaginative diversity of the Aryan mind. The result was an intimate mingling of Aryan and Semitic thought, which formed the basis of the later Christian faith.

Christ had hardly died before his disciples began to

philosophize, and particularly Paul, who had been educated in the subtilities of Hebrew and perhaps of Greek philosophy. The direct, unwarped soul of Christ had enunciated the basic principles of morality, but had accepted, with some necessary amendments, the earlier theology of the Hebrew race. To these precepts of virtue Paul added a system of dogmatic belief, in which philosophic ideas concerning the nature of life, the destiny of man, and the relations of the human to the divine were annexed to the lofty moral doctrines of Christ. Thus arose the basic form of Christian theology, to which so many additions have since been made. Over the majesty of the moral creed of Christ the philosophy of the early church authors spread like a shrouding garment, and only in these latter days are men beginning to discard from their faith the cloak of dogmatism which has so long hidden the shining body of truth within.

In the early days of the church, when vice and superstition reigned supreme in the surrounding world, a purely moral system was insufficient to control other than the few earnest and exalted souls. Men might admire the saintly virtue of their teachers, but were little likely to imitate it. Some more vigorous controlling agency was needed, and this was supplied by the interpretation which the early writers of the church gave to the occasionally enigmatical utterances of Christ. His doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and of future retribution for an evil life, became in their hands a powerful weapon for the government of ignorant minds. From it they wrought out a dogma of hell and of eternal torture from which the gentle and

humane spirit of Christ would have shrunk with absolute horror, yet without whose aid the Christian church could not have been so rapidly extended. The axiom that "God is Love" was replaced by a gloomy dogma that "God is Fear," and, winged with this terrible doctrine, hell was lifted from the abyss and established upon the earth, where it revelled for centuries in the torture of mankind.

The history of the church after its complete establishment in the Roman empire, and throughout the mediæval period, is an interesting, though a terrible spectacle. In no older creed was hell kept so singly and constantly before the eyes of men. Eternal punishment of the wicked was now first enunciated in all its bold, bare enormity, shorn of all philosophical mitigation. In older creeds severe penalties were prescribed for the few desperately wicked, but only in the Christian church were the minor sins and shortcomings deemed worthy of eternal torture. In Hinduism every man had to eliminate all sin from his soul through long and painful probation. In Christian theology every uncondoned sin must be expiated by eternal torture without hope of escape, while a sharp dividing line separated the doomed sinners from the virtuous few who were rewarded with eternal delights.

Such a doctrine could never, without adventitious aid, have set aside the milder and more tolerant beliefs of paganism. Had Christian theology confined itself to this dogma it could never have gained its conquering strength. Its triumph, in fact, resulted from the unyielding intolerance of its spirit, in which it stands

without a rival in religious history, for even Mohammedanism presents no just parallel with it in this respect. The polytheistic creeds of the far past were, as a rule, remarkably tolerant, and men were permitted the greatest latitude of belief. Even the powerful Brahmanic priesthood made no effort to repress heretical opinion, so long as the political principle of caste was left intact. Mohammedanism was intolerant in doctrine, yet not particularly so in practice. Tribute atoned for unbelief. After the establishment of the empire the caliphs displayed a very tolerant spirit, and freely invited the learned men of other faiths to their courts. Such is not the record of early Christianity. The dogma of the absolute necessity of belief to salvation early arose, and quickly threw into the shade its sister doctrine of the necessity of a virtuous life. The church had the fullest powers in the forgiving of sin. The greatest sinner could be cleansed of his load of evil at the last moment of life by the voice of the clergy, and could buy absolution by liberal donations of money, but for unbelief there was no pardon. He who rejected the smallest iota of the orthodox creed hopelessly doomed himself to unmentionable torture throughout an awful eternity.

This extraordinary doctrine was something entirely new in the history of civilization, and it yielded horrible results. At first there was a tendency to philosophize. Numerous sects arose. Hair-splitting of texts and vagaries of metaphysical fancy divided the Christian world into a multitude of warring creeds, which agreed only in the two cardinal points that belief was absolutely necessary to salvation, and that the adhe-

rents of every adverse creed would be eternally damned. This dogma was extended to include the adherents of paganism, while it was soberly taught that the vast multitudes who had died before the establishment of Christianity were hopelessly doomed.

Such a doctrine could have but one result, a vigorous propagandism, and an unremitting effort to repress heretical beliefs. Patriotism, the peculiar virtue of the old world, disappeared. Men's duties to their country vanished before their superior duty to their souls. An intestine war of creeds arose, of unprecedented and unmitigated fierceness. The turmoil of battling sects filled the world, and the sword was frequently called upon to decide in the contest of mutual excommunication. Paganism disappeared before this unremitting intolerance. The minor Christian sects vanished before the more powerful. Finally the orthodoxy of Rome trod down the heterodoxy of every district of Christian Europe, except in the Eastern Empire, and for centuries a single creed dominated the whole western region of the civilized world. It was the natural outcome of the dogma of the virtue of belief. A single creed established itself as the only gateway through which salvation could be attained.

The religious system which thence arose cannot be called a philosophy. It was a terrible nightmare which had established itself in the souls of men. In some older creeds belief had latitude, but sin had none. In mediæval Christianity sin had latitude, but belief had none. The vilest crimes might be condoned. The slightest doubt threw the questioning soul beyond the pale of salvation. It was an extraordinary perversion

of the teachings of Christ. The creed of terrorism replaced that of love, and man stood utterly appalled before the horror of that gloomy prospect of the hereafter which lay mirrored before his eyes.

We cannot wonder at what followed. The delights of this world vanished before the dread of the next. Men grew to despise the world into which they had been born, and to seek by a repression of all natural instincts, desires, and appetites to rid themselves of their ingrained sinfulness. It was a similar effort to that made by the Hindu ascetics, but it even surpassed the latter in the virulence of self-torture which it inaugurated. Men fled in horror from earthly delights, the deserts were peopled with half-insane devotees, every relapse into natural feelings was expiated by self-inflicted torments, and the great mass of the community who had not the strength to renounce the pleasures of life looked upon this selfish asceticism as the true model of a virtuous existence, and venerated a herd of maniacal hermits as saints.

Nothing could have been further removed from the true spirit of Christianity. The selfishness of the ascetic replaced the unselfishness of Christ. The mad desire for individual salvation ignored the duty of human sympathy. The intellect of man ran in the narrowest of channels, and all knowledge beyond this was accounted useless or pernicious. Ignorance became one of the constituents of virtue. Superstition ruled supreme. The intellectual products of the past were abhorred as the work of pagans. The noble statues of the ancient world became idols, its gods demons, its priests sorcerers. Persecution commenced, at first against



the professors of the old faith, then, as the lines of belief were drawn closer, against heretical advocates of the new. The carnival of torture which continued for so many centuries was but a natural outcome of the dogma of the necessity of belief to salvation.

In its theistic aspect Christianity took on a form of which its founder had never dreamed. The ancient doctrine of deific incarnation was revived by the early writers of the church, and a vague idea of a unified Trinity evolved. To this Trinitarianism was soon added a Dualism, perhaps suggested by, at all events in close accordance with, that of the Persian theology. The devil grew to be a more and more prominent figure in the Christian creed, until he approached the character of the Ahriman of Persia, and became, temporarily at least, of equal potency with the Almighty in determining human destiny. The parallel with Zoroastrianism was in other respects singularly close. As Zoroaster had reduced the Iranian Devas to the condition of evil spirits, so did the church fathers deal with the ancient gods, and the *dæmons*, or subordinate spirits of good, of the philosophers. They made of them *demons*, or subordinate spirits of evil. A host of angels was called into existence as servants of the Almighty. The battle between Ormazd and Ahriman, with their spirit armies, was renewed between God and the devil, with their hosts of angels and demons. The Persian doctrine of resurrection and final judgment was also resuscitated, and in these respects mediæval Christianity seems but a revival of the ancient Persian belief.

With this doctrine were associated beliefs gained from a yet lower phase of intellectual development.

Shamanism and fetichism were revived. Evil spirits swarmed everywhere. All the hurtful phenomena of nature were the work of demoniac intelligence. The science of that day was the science of Satanic agencies, and of the miraculous interposition of deific influences. But the demons could be controlled by magic spells, and forced to obey the will, or induced to aid the designs, of human sorcerers, of whom many arose.

These shaman-like sorcerers and professors of magic arts became the objects of a terrible persecution of which we must next speak. Persecution, indeed, had been at first directed against the few remaining adherents of paganism, and ended in this phase only when the more vigorous elements of paganism were incorporated into the Christian church. After the death of paganism persecution nearly ceased for many centuries. A peculiar form of fetichism arose which took the sting from demonology. The belief in the activity of Satanic agencies was more vigorous than ever, but it was associated with a parallel belief in the superior power of certain theological fetiches. The devil in a thousand forms of horror or beauty sought to terrify or tempt mankind. But a simple formula, such as the sign of the cross, the name of Mary, or a sprinkle of holy water, could put him to flight. Men could afford to despise magicians and scorn demons when their power might be so easily negatived. This fortunate absurdity greatly decreased persecution for some eight centuries. And during this period there was little occasion to punish heretics. The church was too compact to heed an occasional minor divergence of thought.

Persecution began in earnest only when the intellect

of Europe awakened after its long slumber through the Dark Ages. A natural doubt of the efficacy of the simple methods of repelling demons arose. And with it sprang up vigorous heresies, the necessary results of the growing activity of thought. This era of the birth of the spirit of inquiry may be fixed at about the twelfth century. Its effect was rapid and dreadful. The church became at once harsh and inflexible. Satan ceased to be a buffoon, the sport of believers, and became a dreaded adversary. The artistic representation of Christ lost its engaging features and became stern and often terrible. The notion of witchcraft emerged, and a fearful era of torture followed, continuing for six or seven centuries, during which many thousands of poor, old, and often half-demented women perished horribly at the stake. Simultaneously arose that yet more terrible persecution for heresy, which resulted in a dreadful carnival of human butchery, whose demoniac tortures are without parallel in the history of the earth.

Yet the work of the Inquisition, horrible as it was, was a natural, perhaps an unavoidable, consequence of the dogma of the absolute necessity of belief to salvation. To save millions from the eternal punishment which awaited heresy, by the destruction of hundreds or thousands of heretics, was looked upon as a duty. The utmost torture upon earth was held to be utterly dwarfed by comparison with the tortures of hell, and the greater the torments of the culprits the more were others likely to be deterred from the paths that led to perdition. Of course, in a different age of the world more humane means might have been taken to achieve this end. That was an age of inhumanity and violence. The

charity taught by Christ had for centuries been restricted in its action to orthodox believers. The doctrine of God's infinite mercy, as taught by Christ, had been replaced by the ancient Hebraic doctrine of Almighty vengeance. And the epoch of repression was not yet ready to be succeeded by the epoch of persuasion.

This effort to prevent divergent thought could not possibly succeed. Men grew in civilization. The literatures of Greece and Rome, which became the ardent study of the learned, the vicinity of Mohammedan Spain and the entry of Christian scholars into its schools, the vigorous mental discipline of the Scholastic philosophy, the irreverent secular literature which arose, and hundreds of other influences set men to thinking, and it is utterly impossible to confine thought within any prescribed channel. The long dominion of orthodox Catholicism was a consequence of the fall of enlightened Europe before barbarian invaders. While deep ignorance prevailed, and while men, beyond the affairs of war, government, and domestic concerns, gave over all their thinking to the church, there was little danger of heretical revolt. Some of the more absurd theological doctrines were laughed at by far-seeing men, but it was not until thought on deeper subjects than every-day concerns escaped from the absolute control of the priests that heretical ideas became widely prevalent, and the orthodox church fully awoke to the necessity of repressing them. It is impossible to imagine a more strenuous and terrible effort than was made to eradicate the growing heresy. And yet it failed, as it could not but fail. Human thought inevitably awoke, and the fetters which theological

tyranny sought to fasten on its strong limbs were rent asunder as by the energy of a young giant. The mind of man, after ten centuries of absolute slavery, became at length free.

Yet during this long tyranny of sacerdotalism the fundamental doctrines of Christianity by no means vanished. The moral axioms of Christ were overlaid with a multitude of fantastic notions, the offspring of ignorance and superstition, yet they remained intact, as the true basis of the Christian system, a vital leaven which slowly "leavened the whole lump" of ignorance, superstition, and priestly autocracy. Aside from its necessary partial toleration of the vices of society, and its rigid intolerance of heterodox opinion, the church strove to enforce as far as lay in its power the Christ doctrine of human equality and human brotherhood. In this lay the great merit of Christianity. It worked, with an energy and persistence which no other religion has ever displayed, for the amelioration of mankind, and inculcated the blessedness of humility, mercy, and charity to a degree that was utterly alien to the spirit of antiquity. Several of the prevailing vices of the ancient world were assailed with successful energy by the youthful church. Abortion and infanticide, common crimes in Rome, were early eradicated—largely by the threat of eternal torment to those who practiced them. The cruel gladiatorial exhibitions were vigorously attacked, and at last brought to an end when a monk madly rushed between the fighting gladiators and himself suffered death. Another, and the most prevalent evil of the ancient world, human slavery, was as earnestly assailed, and was gradually eradicated by

the persistent efforts of the clergy. Although Feudal Europe again sunk into a virtual slavery, in the institution of serfdom, it was not a legalized slavery, and was a condition at variance with the organization and the teachings of the church.

The narrowness of the mediæval church, its inculcation of fear instead of love as the governing theocratic principle, its exaltation of the merit of belief over that of virtue, its repression of intellectual development in the people, and its own intellectual restriction within the limits of a rigid theology, greatly hindered the development of a public morality. And yet, despite all this, the moral axioms of Christ retained their vitality, and a sympathy with suffering and misery which had never before existed marked the history of the church—within the limits of orthodoxy. The clergy became a great charitable organization, every monastery was an institution for the relief of the poor, public hospitals were now first established, and many other earnest efforts for the amelioration of mankind served to prove that the teachings of Christ had not fallen on utterly barren soil, and that the command to “love one another” still retained some degree of vitality.

In modern times the true teachings of Christ are beginning to prevail over the interpretations of the church fathers. The religion of fear is rapidly dying out. The religion of love is rapidly gaining strength. Hell is sinking into a vague limbo even in the minds of the ignorant, and is becoming an abhorrent absurdity to the cultured. The dread of perdition which constrained vice in the past is vanishing before the love

of virtue which is combatting vice in the present. And the Mosaic maxim that God is a sternly jealous and vengeful deity is yielding to the Christian maxim that God is the infinitely wise, loving, and merciful Father of all living beings. This advancement of morals over faith, which is replacing the mediæval advancement of faith over morals, has kept strict pace with the growth of science and knowledge. Its progress has been remarkable during the present century, and it has become, in a strict sense, the religion of the cultured, as contrasted with the Middle Age doctrine of the merit of belief, still held in lands where ignorance prevails.

There remains another religious reformer of the Semitic race, with a brief account of whose system this chapter must close. Mohammed may, in a measure, be taken as a representative of the settled, as Moses represented the nomadic Semites. A debased idolatry, perhaps the remnant of some more philosophical polytheism of earlier date, was the worship of the Arabs of his day. To the ardent soul of Mohammed, who had been educated in the elevated tenets of the Jewish and Christian creeds, this barbarous worship grew intolerable, and he eagerly sought to give his country a purer and higher faith.

With the history of this religious reformer we are not here concerned. He was the greatest thinker who had yet arisen among the Arab people, but he was an Arab through and through. He had none of the far-reaching imaginative vision of the Aryan mind, but much of the sensuous and illogical fancy of the Arab intellect. He was not the man to devise a philosophy

of religion. His deepest thought failed to construct more than a patchwork creed, made up of fragments of Hebrew, Christian, Persian, and other theologies, with which he had become acquainted in his travels, and which he lacked the literary ability to arrange into a logical system. These materials, thrown into the crucible of the ardent Arab fancy, yielded a creed which has had a most potent influence over the succeeding history of the world, despite the illogical discordance of arrangement and the unpruned fancy of style of the Coran, the work in which it is embodied.

Such a combination as this could not form a religion, without some strong central idea around which it could converge. This central idea was supplied by Mohammed, in the most rigid and exclusive of all monotheistic beliefs. He was, however, in no sense a god-maker. The god which he offered to his people was the race god of the Semites, who had been worshiped ages before under the title of El, and who survived as the Allah of Mohammed. Jahveh was the god of the Mosaic clan, but El was the patriarchal deity of the Semites as a race, and had been handed down from immemorial times, to be revived as the god of all mankind by this new lawgiver. Allah was the counterpart of Jehovah as conceived in the expanded ideas of the later Jews. He was the deity of the Arabs particularly, but of all mankind generally. All must bow before and acknowledge him as the one supreme god. It was the desire for conquest, not for conversion, that animated the Hebrews in their invasion of Palestine. It was the desire to convert the world to the worship of Allah that animated Mohammed and his followers in their conquering outburst.



It is true that the thirst for wealth soon dulled the nobler considerations which moved the Arab soul, yet the proselyting energy of the early Mohammedan armies was less combined with selfish considerations than was the case in any similar phase of human history. With other religious conquerors gold, empire, or victims for sacrifice to the gods, have been stronger incentives than conversion. But the Arabs went forth with the single impulse to spread the worship of Allah throughout the world, or to win the delights of Paradise in the effort. Of course more earthly considerations soon mingled with and finally replaced this purpose, yet principally to it alone must be ascribed the wonderful rapidity of the Mohammedan conquests, and the widespread influence of Islamism to-day. The inspiring idea that carried forth the armies to conquest has not yet died out. With every warlike movement of a Mohammedan people a degree of religious frenzy is awakened, and the idea of the great founder of the sect, propagandism by the sword, is still an active element of the faith.

As to the moral code promulgated by Mohammed, it has elements at once of wideness and of narrowness. It has restrained the world of Islam from certain vices of intemperance which have been allowed too great a freedom of play in Christendom, while in other directions it has permitted the existence of debasing institutions. As it contains no moral axiom which is original with Mohammed, no description of it is necessary. We might regret that this founder of a religion which has become so widely diffused over the earth failed to comprehend, or to promul-

gate, the central conception of the Christian creed, of human brotherhood and universal charity. Yet his soul was far below the elevated plane necessary to accept this loftiest of moral axioms, while the people among whom Mohammedanism has as yet prevailed are not in the condition for its intellectual comprehension.

Of all the moral maxims yet presented to the world, that of universal charity has gained the widest extension and affects the greatest number of people. Buddhism has spread it, in a selfish form, over the greater portion of Asia. Christianity has spread it, in an unselfish form, over all Europe and nearly all America. It promises to become the moral controlling force of all civilized humanity in the approaching future, when the long isolation of the nations shall be broken down beneath the advancing feet of commerce, and all hostile relations of the intellect shall disappear beneath the outflow of knowledge.

The great and successful religious reformers whose systems have been briefly reviewed in this chapter were by no means the only founders of religious systems which the world has known. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of minor reformers have arisen, each adding his mite to the great capital of religious thought, yet usually failing to produce any marked effect upon human history. The greater number of these have been the originators of sects within established creeds, and the numberless sects which have thus arisen indicate the aberrant activity of the human mind in this wide field of thought. As to naming even the most important of them, we cannot attempt it. Het-

erodoxy is as active in this direction within modern times as of old, and it will suffice to point out some few of its late results in different regions of the world.

In India the present century has produced the new theistic society of Brahmo Somaj, a remarkably pure and elevated system of morals and belief which is making its way into the heart of Hinduism. In Persia the sect of the Babi is rapidly growing among the Sufist Mohammedans, and teaching a simple and elevated code of ethics which cannot but bear good fruit. In Arabia the Mahabee reform of Mohammedanism retains its energy, and is actively seeking to replace the degenerate modern form with the purer creed of the founder. Similar Mohammedan reformers have appeared in Africa. In Europe, among the many minor sects, two forms of new religion may be named. One of these is the symbolic creed of Swedenborg, which is now an established church, with a considerable number of believers. The other is the positivist creed of Comte, which is hardly likely to gain any permanent standing as an accepted form of faith. These two systems, advanced by cultured scientists, have their parallel in America in a new church of a much lower grade, that of the Mormons, which is the only one among these various modern sects in which reform can be said to have gone backward. As for the more cultured inhabitants of the earth, the era of creed-making is probably at an end. Belief tends to diverge instead of to converge, and the only intellectual convergence which is now manifest is in the field of morals.

## CHAPTER XII.

### RELIGION AS A POLITICAL AGENCY.

IN the preceding chapters the influence of religion over the minds of men was considered. In the present chapter we propose to consider its influence over their bodies; and in the following one, that over their hearts. Only by such a threefold division can the subject be adequately treated. In our review of political development the efforts of the ambitious to control their fellows through force were indicated. Efforts to control mankind through intellectual superiority have been equally active and successful, and these have been confined almost to the single form of religious despotism. The tyranny of thought has been little less active and successful in the history of mankind than the tyranny of the sword; and religious autocracy has ever accompanied or opposed secular autocracy. Consequently, in any full review of the political history of the world, the creed is an agent quite as prominent as the sword or the sceptre.

Through all the long ages of the past, and down almost to the immediate present, superstition and fear of demoniac influences were the chief elements of priestly control; while to the exact extent that man has freed himself from this tyranny of fear he has emancipated himself from the despotism of the priesthood, and the religious rulers of mankind have declined into their

true position of moral teachers. Tyranny has ever established itself by aid of the physical and mental fears of its subjects. Whenever these elements have been removed the soul and body of man have claimed spiritual and physical freedom, yielding cheerful obedience to the authority of just law and morality, but energetically protesting against either physical or mental slavery.

The most primitive form of priestly control which history or anthropology reveals to us is that known as shamanism, a description of which, therefore, we have left for the present chapter. This name, it is true, is confined to the superstitious rites of the nomadic tribes of Northern Asia, of whose old form of faith the shaman is the accepted priest. But as a fact shamanism, or the religion of sorcery, is widespread among the barbarian and savage peoples of the earth, and some phase of its existence, from its lowest form to its highest embodiment in Brahmanism, may be found almost everywhere.

The existence of shamanism is based upon the belief in the immanence of the spiritual powers. If invisible and intelligent beings, actively seeking to aid or injure man, are everywhere around him, it is conceivable that their power might be limited or their action controlled by the agency of human knowledge and intelligence. Acquaintance with the healing or poisonous properties of plants, with the changes of the weather, and with other natural phenomena, are looked upon by the simple-minded savage as marvellous, and as most probably gained by intercourse with spiritual agencies. The art of healing, in particular, is

considered of magical origin. Savages invariably impute sickness to the action of evil disposed intelligences, and are quite apt to look upon those who heal them as more powerful than the demons. And their shrewd healers do not fail to strengthen this belief by accompanying their remedies with spells and incantations. Thus the physician was, quite probably, the progenitor of the priest, and his knowledge was looked upon as superhuman in its origin and character.

Whatever the stages through which this process of development passed, there naturally arose a belief in the efficacy of appeal to the deities, and of penance for sin, while every successful form of prayer tended to degenerate into a magic formula, and of penance into a magic rite. The notion that the gods could be constrained by prayer and penance, which we have already traced in the Brahmanic doctrines, was an early and widespread belief, which gained different degrees of development in different regions, and attained its highest unfoldment among the Brahmans, in whose creed prayer became the supreme deity.

Among the Turanian tribes of Northern Asia the belief in the power of magic is universal, and the shamans or priests are simply professors of magic, or sorcerers. The most important part of their priestly service is the cure of sickness by magic rites. They also claim powers of communication with invisible intelligences. Spirits are believed to lurk everywhere around man, and afflict him in person and property by their inimical influence. It is the object of the priests to disarm or control these hostile intelligences. In order to do so they endeavor to attain the state of

ecstasy, which is believed to bring them into immediate communication with the invisible. They seek to induce this state by mental excitement produced in various ways. Giddy dances are indulged in. Deafening music is used. Intoxicating liquors are imbibed. Every possible means to produce mental excitement and illusion are employed. Epileptics are used by the priests as assistants, their convulsions and state of trance being supposed to bring them into immediate rapport with the invisible.

The belief that surrounding spirits could thus be communicated with has never died out, but is prevalent to-day even in enlightened communities. It was displayed in the oracular utterances of the Greek priestesses, who attained the requisite condition by intoxication through the inhalation of gaseous fumes. It had its philosophical unfoldment in the speculations of the Neoplatonists, who taught that by repression of the appetites and passions a condition of *ecstasy*, or immediate beholding, might be attained, which would bring man into direct communication with the divine. The same belief is displayed in the *clairvoyance* of to-day, in which it is held that certain persons endowed with special mental vision can see and communicate with invisible intelligences, and that the better to attain this state the soul must free itself from gross influences, and by aid of music, darkness, silence, inner contemplation, and other means of mental withdrawal, reach a condition analogous to the Neoplatonic ecstasy.

In shamanism, however, more than spirit communication is requisite. The control of spirits is the

essential feature of the system. This power of control the shamans claim, and from it their influence with the people arises. The medicine man of the North American Indians is closely similar to the Turanian shaman. The American mystery bag, obtained under the influence of inspiration, gives power over such spirits as are embodied in the animals whose skins are used in the bag. The rattle of the juggler and the ring of the magician have had the same origin. They were originally supposed to control spirits. In fact this idea of spirit communication and control is one of the most primitive and widely disseminated forms of faith, and the shaman was the earliest priest. Like most widespread ideas this has been stubbornly persistent. The belief in spirit control by magic rites has always existed. As one evidence of its former prevalence we may refer to the tales of the "Arabian Nights Entertainment," in which the control of supernatural intelligences by magic rites is repeatedly described. In modern times compelling prayers and penances are indulged in by the churches, and appeals for rain, of the same general character as the rain-bringing incantations of the shamans of Mongolia, are still offered. The principal difference is that the deity is now supposed to be induced, instead of compelled.

This idea of inducement gave rise to penance and sacrifice. It was deemed that by the giving up of earthly pleasures and possessions heavenly ones might be attained. With this was mingled the politic belief that the gods would be pleased with gifts, and be ready to confer benefits in exchange. With the Brahmanic priests the notion arose that the gods could be com-



pelled by sacrifice to aid man, and, as a direct consequence, that sacrifice was stronger than the gods. Prayer had a similar origin. It was, and still is largely, the offspring of fear. Of course we do not refer to the highest modern idea of prayer, as a means of spiritualizing the nature, and bringing man into sympathetic relations with God, in his Aryan aspect of the All-Father.

The Turanian shaman has little priestly authority. The devotee is troubled only by fear of temporary evil effects, which the priest is called upon to dispel. To a certain extent the shaman replaces the fetich, and is feared or despised in accordance with the success or failure of his spells. But as religious belief deepened the influence of the priest extended. The teasing demons and the ancestral good spirits of the old belief became the mighty intelligences of the later worship. The original limited idea of immortality acquired a more definite form, and with it came the thought that demons might continue to torment man even in a future stage of existence. This latter idea, however, was one of the latest to attain consistency, and the joys of Paradise became defined long before the pains of Pandemonium passed beyond their early form of a shadowy uneasiness.

The dogma of punishment for sin, in fact, was one of slow growth. Courage, ability, knowledge, were deemed worthy of paradisaical reward long before men gained the conception that evil acts would be visited by future punishment. Paradise grew rapidly, hell slowly, in men's minds, and the belief in eternal torture of the great mass of mankind gained definite form

only in the vivid imaginations of the ignorant devotees of Middle Age Europe. It is one of the latest and most extraordinary fruits of civilization.

The priesthood did not hesitate to seize upon the extended influence which the development of belief in the inimical powers and purposes of the deities and the saving energy of prayer and ceremony offered. The notion that men could move the gods by prayer, could please them by gifts, and could control them by penance and incantation grew with the growth in belief, and the priest became one of the powers of the earth. He ruled the minds of men as the chief or king ruled their bodies. His power, therefore, was the more deeply based of the two, and particularly so in all those ages of the world in which men had learned to fear deeply, but had not yet learned to think deeply.

As a natural result the rulers of tribes and nations early availed themselves of this important element of government. Almost everywhere, in the history of the ancient world, we find the temporal and the spiritual powers grasped in the same hand. This, in fact, is the very essence of autocracy. It is the basis of every complete despotism which the world has known. No despotic government ever became firmly established in which the monarch was not looked upon by the people as the head of the church, and, in a greater or lesser sense, the vicegerent of heaven.

What we have stated is confirmed in the historical development of many nations. Among the partly civilized Indians of the Southern United States the elements of government were divided. There was the Mico, who stood alike at the head of the civil and

of the religious establishment, but whose power was not supreme. Below him came the Great War Chief and the Ancient High Priests, and below them again the Conjuror, the shaman or medicine man of the tribe, each with a share of power and influence. In the Aztec civilization the concentration of governing powers had advanced further. Montezuma had become the national head alike in the civil government, in the church, and in warlike affairs. There was an extensive priestly establishment, with its high and its minor dignitaries, and sacrifice to the God of Terror had attained an extraordinary unfoldment, but all the supreme powers had fallen or were falling into one hand. The Peruvian sacerdotal establishment descended, in like manner, in regular gradation from the Inca. Its immediate head was a great High Priest, appointed by the Inca from among his nearest relatives. But its real head was the Inca himself, a divine being, the representative of the sun upon earth, God's terrestrial vicegerent.

If we consider the ancient governments of the Eastern Continent the same significant fact appears. In all the autocracies the emperor was the head of the church, and controlled the people more through his influence over their minds than over their bodies. The complete and passive subordination of the Asiatic peoples to their rulers, which has often excited astonishment, and given rise to invidious comparisons with the Europeans, is, in fact, a natural phenomenon. It is no result of lack of energy, but arises naturally from the unity of the governing powers. All the reins of government are in one hand, a condition which has

never prevailed in any modern European state. Rebellion against an Asiatic despotism means far more than a revolt against tyranny. It means also a revolt against the powers of heaven. Heresy as well as hatred is necessary, and the mental condition of the Asiatics has not yet reached the level necessary to rebellion against priestly authority, and assertion of the right of private judgment in things spiritual. Rebellion against a European king has been an event of frequent occurrence. But if that king were the Pope of Rome, and his subjects the Catholic population of Spain or Ireland, we can readily imagine that insurrection would be of great infrequency.

It was still more so in the far past, when there was no stratum of heretical thought to infect the minds of the true believers. In all the ancient nations the king held the reigns of priestly authority. The Pharaoh of Egypt was the head of the church, God's representative, and a divinity in himself. His control over the people was supreme. Herbert Spencer has advanced the hypothesis that all the great architectural works of the older nations were an outcome of the military spirit, and rendered possible only by the absolute control which the possession of a powerful army gave the emperor over the labor of the people. He points to the pyramids and temples of ancient Egypt in illustration. In fact, however, all historical evidence goes to show that Egypt did not become a powerful military nation until many centuries after the period of pyramid building. It must be borne in mind also that the great works of Egyptian art were not civil or military structures, but religious edifices. Most probably

the controlling influence in their erection was the supremacy of the ruler over the minds of the people, and it was the king as priest, not as soldier, that set the people to work. A like result of the same cause appears in the great works of Hindu art, which are entirely sacerdotal in character, and have the story of priestly influence chiselled into their every stone.

Such is only partly the case in the great works of Mexico and Peru. These were powerful military nations, and the combined power of the priest and the military chief is shown in the mingling of sacerdotal, civil, and military characteristics in their work.

With two of the ancient Asiatic nations the influence over labor seems to have been chiefly military, although the monarchs held the supremacy in religion also. With the Assyrians the king was at the head of the church and the state alike. In their belief the state existed through the power of God, its extension was necessary to the glory of God, and the king was God's soldier upon earth. The incessant wars of the Assyrians had a religious as well as an ambitious object. Every enlargement of the state added to the dignity of the supreme deity, of whom their king was the terrestrial representative.

But the military success of Assyria, and the power of its armies, enabled the king partly to throw off the cloak of priestly dignity, and to assume the rôle of a secular tyrant. The great edifices of Assyria were palaces, not temples. The pleasure of the chief, not the worship of the deity, was the ruling idea of government. There is no evidence that the thought of the future was vitally present to the Assyrian mind.

No great tombs, like those of Egypt, arose. Constant devotion to secular objects seems to have driven deep thought upon the destiny of man from the minds of the people, and they became the great practical nation of the past, the Romans of the ancient world.

In the history of China something of the same kind appears. The Emperor of China assumed the position of spiritual head of the nation. He claimed direct intercourse with the heavenly powers, and to be the only channel through which the prayers of the people could reach the deity. The practice of ancestor worship, which became the ruling form of Chinese religion, aided, and probably originated, this imperial claim. The emperor was the patriarchal head of the nation, the sublime ancestor, a god when dead and an incarnate deity when living. The characteristics of Chinese worship were unfavorable to the growth of a powerful priesthood. No general deity existed in the conceptions of the people. Individual worship prevailed. Each family had its own gods, in the shades of its ancestors. If they reached upward for a higher deity the form of the emperor rose before their eyes, as the only open gateway to heaven. Every influence tended to the production of atheistic belief.

Several forms of so-called religion arose, the Confucian, the Taoistic, and the Buddhistic; but they all remained subsidiary to the national faith, and the emperor continues to-day the spiritual head of the nation. Rebellion against him would be revolt against the deific powers. Yet it must be borne in mind that the practical tendency of Chinese thought and the want of any firmly organized religious institutions

have weakened the vigor of the mental control of the emperor. At the same time the lack of military energy has prevented the formation of any powerful secular control. Few tyrannous emperors have arisen, from the fact that the two strong elements of tyranny are not actively present. The Chinese yield to imperial supremacy with an important mental reservation, namely, that the emperor must conform to the ancient laws and rule for the good of the people. Otherwise they do not acknowledge the duty of allegiance.

The great public works of China are in close conformity with this character of the government. Their object has been almost solely the material benefit of the people. The two greatest of these works are the Great Wall and the Great Canal, the one built to defend the nation against its enemies, the other to aid in its physical prosperity. China presents us no vast temples or immense and useless pyramids, while its palaces are dwarfed by its utilitarian works.

The hypothesis we have advanced holds good in the other great despotisms of the ancient world, those of Persia, Macedonia, and Rome. The authority of the kings and emperors in each of these was gained and sustained by the sword, and the secular supremacy of the rulers was too great to render spiritual supremacy important. Yet it had become a fixed theory of the ancient world that the head of the state was the head of the church, and that the office had in it an element of divinity, and pride rather than necessity urged these great military despots to claim for themselves the dignity of the gods. They went even further than their predecessors in the claim that they

themselves were gods. Alexander the Great and the Roman emperors alike demanded the worship of their subjects. Each of the early Roman emperors was deified after death, while the priests invented a series of supernatural stories calculated to influence the minds of the ignorant. Others, as Caligula and Heliogabalus, made extravagant claims to divinity while living, and carried this whim of imperialism to an insane extreme. Caligula is said to have sprung from his seat in the amphitheater during a thunderstorm that interrupted a gladiatorial show, and to have angrily declared that a divided empire was intolerable, and that Jupiter or himself must succumb.

Yet not everywhere in the ancient world did the military chief possess also the spiritual authority. There is one striking instance to the contrary, that of the Hindu race. In this eastern branch of the Aryans the priesthood seem to have early acquired supremacy over the political rulers. In early Persian history likewise, no chief appears. We perceive only the priestly order from which Zoroaster emerged to the headship of the people. Yet the Persian priests, though long continuing powerful, failed to gain the eventual supremacy attained by those of the Hindus. Military success in time brought secular chiefs to the head of the nation and of the church. The story of India is different. There the priesthood make their first appearance in history as a militant as well as a spiritual body. We can see the priests of the Vedas marching at the head of the people to the conquest of India, and rousing them to enthusiasm by stirring hymns to the gods, in which praise of and invocation to the deities are mingled with fierce invective against their idolatrous foes.



At this early period the authority of the priests was probably in excess of that of the military leader. And their organization, so far as we understand it, was calculated to preserve this supremacy. There is nothing to show that there was a high priest and a descending hierarchy of ecclesiastics. The priesthood was a democracy. No one was in a position to unite spiritual and secular authority, and seize upon autocratic power. An organization of this character was favorable to liberty, the church having no dominant head whose office a successful military leader could usurp, or who could himself add civil to spiritual control of the nation.

If this was the character of the early, as it is of the modern, organization of the Brahmans, it presents a condition of affairs without parallel in the history of the other great nations of the past. From it naturally arose that separation of the secular and the spiritual authority which has since continued. Thus there existed the conditions requisite to the growth of a great monarchy of the modern type. But any such development was prevented by the continued supremacy of the priestly over the secular authority. India presents a relation of spiritual and civil affairs which had no counterpart in the ancient world, though it had an inexact parallel in mediæval Europe. In it we perceive a great nation spiritually controlled by a powerful and compact priesthood, while secularly divided into a series of hostile provinces. The supremacy of the priests, and the character of the nation as moulded by priestly influence, effectually hindered the growth of any supreme secular authority.

This priestly supremacy had a remarkable effect upon the whole history of the Hindu people. The sacerdotal rulers of India fixed their attention upon the world of the spiritual, and drew their subjects into the same line of thought. All practical and military energy died out under the influence of the depressing religious conceptions. The Hindus became the almost helpless prey of foreign conquerors, while such conquering inroads took place at too long distances apart to have their ordinary effect in promoting the union of the people, or in bringing them back to a vital interest in the concerns of the terrestrial sphere.

This singular and unparalleled state of affairs yielded as singular a condition of political organization. From it directly resulted that system of caste which is the striking peculiarity of Hindu society. The priests remained the true heads of the nation as the Brahman caste, while the military caste occupied a lower level. Much lower again came the industrial classes as a third, while the descendants of the conquered aborigines formed a fourth and utterly despised caste. This caste system, which probably grew up gradually as a necessary consequence of the organization of the Hindu priesthood, has proved an efficient agent in preserving the influence of that priesthood. The lines of caste were drawn rigidly close, severe penalties were exacted from any of a lower caste who ignored the divine privileges of the Brahmans, and the power of the priests over the minds of the people was sustained by an almost complete restriction of learning and mental elevation to this highest caste.

To-day the boundary lines of the lower castes are largely obliterated. Seventy or eighty minor castes replace the few divisions of the past. But the Brahmans remain as compact a body as ever, and will probably retain their supremacy until the spread of education among the lower orders shall overcome the mental influence of the priesthood, and fling the seeds of free thought far abroad.

Buddhism was the first great protest against the Brahmanic despotism over the Hindu mind. It had an immense success, and though the ruling priesthood eventually succeeded in banishing their opponents, and regaining the power they had nearly lost, the submission has never since been as complete as in the pre-Buddhistic age. The physical revolts in modern nations are paralleled in India by mental revolts, and the priestly despotism must in time inevitably fall before the development of education and the growth of thought.

In the later history of Asia a similar unity of the governing principle existed. In the Mohammedan empire the Caliph was at once head of church and state, and ruled the souls as well as the bodies of his subjects. The same idea holds good in modern Mohammedan states. The destruction of the caliphate left the way clear for the seizure of spiritual power by the succeeding monarchs.

One of the most interesting illustrations of this subject may be found in the history of Japan. In old Japan a unity of power prevailed. The Mikado, the high priest of the nation, was at once temporal and spiritual monarch. This unity of the governing

power was finally broken by the revolt of the Tycoon, a successful military leader, who seized the temporal authority, and restricted the power of the Mikado to spiritual affairs. Within our own era, by a revolution without parallel elsewhere, this movement has been reversed, the spiritual has deposed the temporal chief, and the original autocratic unity of the Mikado's power has been restored. This cannot justly be looked upon as a change in the direction of progress, as some seem to regard it. It is rather a movement of reversion towards the patriarchal system of government, though the recent adoption of parliamentary rule will doubtless prevent any injurious effects.

If now we come to the consideration of the Aryan religious establishments of the west, it is to find quite different conditions from those existing in the autocratic empires. They present an important phase of the religious history of mankind to which we have yet given but scant attention. Religious ideas, as we have seen, arose from several distinct sources, each of which has had its influence upon the development of history. Of these sources one of the most important was the special religion of the family, the patriarchal idea of respect for and worship of deceased ancestors, of which we have spoken in the preceding chapter. No religious idea has been more general, and no system of worship more widespread, than this. As the organization of the family was the basis of all political development, so has the ancestor worship of the family been an important element of priestly development. In fact the power of the priest has very largely arisen from the practices of shamanism and ancestor worship. As their

comparative influence, and the results of their struggle for precedence, have never been pointed out, it is advisable here to give some attention to this topic.

It has been said above that shamanism, or the effort to control by incantations the powers of nature, is widespread over the earth. Ancestor worship is not less so. Traces of its existence may be found everywhere, and it has developed with all developing peoples into a strong and active system of belief. It is a system of belief, however, which does not make itself very apparent in human history. The unobtrusive family worship, in which the father officiates as priest, has none of the claims to attention presented by the more splendid public worship of the mythologic deities, in which the public priest, the direct outgrowth of the shaman, is the important officiating figure. Yet quiet and almost unseen as it has been, its influence has been superior to that of the public priesthood, and particularly so in all but a few branches of the Aryan race.

From what the custom of ancestor worship originated is not known. Probably several influences converged to produce it. One of the most important of these was that already adverted to, the influence of dreams about the dead upon the mind of the living, and the dread entertained of these visionary shades when they appeared with an angry or frowning aspect. If misfortune in the affairs of life followed such visions, it would naturally be ascribed to the anger of the spirit, and efforts be made to propitiate this household deity. Several long-persisting ideas arose from this. The necessity of burial was one of them, and the idea of the unhappy and unsettled state of the souls of the

unburied was a common belief in ancient times. That the dead would require clothing, arms, food, etc., also naturally arose, and objects of this character were buried with them. The idea of sacrifice probably arose from this as well as from the shamanistic worship. Propitiation of all invisible powers was naturally attempted. But the shaman was a public official, engaged in dealings with the general demoniac powers. The ancestral shade was a private deity, belonging to the family alone, and calling for private worship. And the performance of the household rites seems to have been assigned to the ruling head of the family, as the direct representative of the deceased ancestor.

In the Aryan family group all this is distinctly evident. There is abundant testimony to show that this group was a complex one, made up of several generations of the living and of the dead. The common hearth was the centre of meeting of all these generations, and the altar of oblation to the ancestral spirits. There is every reason to believe that occasional feasts to the dead were held, in which the spirits were supposed to regale themselves on the spiritual portion of the food, while the family consumed the material portion. Such feasts are still occasionally held in Russia, a survival of the old Aryan custom, while the idea of the hearth spirit has by no means died out in Aryan lands, though its original significance has vanished. The common custom with priests to feast on the meats of the sacrifice is a natural resultant of the idea mentioned above.

This ancestor worship still holds its own with some strength in India, in despite of the many other

religious ideas which have arisen in that land. But its specially vigorous modern home is China, where it has met with little opposition from other systems of belief, and where it underlies all creeds as the domestic faith of that rigidly conservative people. Here the family group extends somewhat indefinitely backward, though apparently never beyond the fifth generation. The Chinese family is held to consist of the several generations of the living and five generations of the dead. And of this group the head of the family is the officiating priest, who offers the oblations in the name of the family to the ancestral shades. Such was also the case in the ancient Aryan family, in which the house-father officiated as priest, and gained a great part of his dignity and authority from the performance of this duty. He was held to be answerable to the family spirits for the due performance of his duty to the living, and his authority arose in great measure from the superstitious belief that he directly represented the ancestors of the group, and would be punished by these powerful spirits for any unjust exercise of his delegated power.

From this household worship came the system of clan worship, controlled by the head of the clan, and directed to the ancient ancestor, so far as known. In China, for instance, the descendants of Confucius still meet periodically at his tomb, to offer their devotions to their great ancestor. A similar system existed in the Aryan clan, in which public worship was conducted at intervals by the chief of the clan at its common burial place. This was done always with great secrecy, and the intrusion of strangers upon

the worship of the gentes was sternly prevented. A similar secrecy surrounded the family worship, each family having its own rites and ceremonies, which were held to be sacred mysteries. There can be no doubt that this had much to do with the seclusion of the Aryan family, which probably grew up from religious, not from political causes.

That a similar system of ancestor worship was common in pastoral communities can scarcely be doubted. Its general disappearance in the pastoral groups of to-day can be readily accounted for by the fact that their native systems of religious belief have been largely supplanted by systems imported from without. Such is the case in Mongolia, where the Buddhistic belief has become the prevalent faith. Shamanism still exists, but ancestor worship has almost vanished. Among the Bedouins of Arabia, Mohammedanism has had a similar effect. Yet it has not quite killed out the old beliefs. Palgrave tells us that the desert Bedouins still worship the sun, when safe from orthodox eyes, and that the sacrifice of sheep and camels at the tombs of dead kinsmen is an event of frequent occurrence.\* The fact is that the seats of the ancient and naturally growing systems of faith have long since been invaded by foreign systems, the work of the world's lawgivers, which have largely supplanted the ancient ideas, alike in Aryan and non-Aryan lands. But there is abundant warrant for the belief that there existed in the ancient barbarian communities a duplex religious system, one form being that of a combined ancestor worship and shamanism, and the

\* "Arabia," vol. 1, page 10.



other that of mythology, or nature worship, while the interactions and struggles for precedence of these two forms have had a very important influence upon the religious history of mankind.

The growth of the system of ancestor worship very probably followed in the same lines with that of political development. As we have already seen, the ancient nomadic clan had not developed any strong sense of family segregation. The clan formed one great family, of which the separate units were not markedly differentiated. Thus the worship must have resembled that of the Aryan clan, a general worship of the remote ancestor, conducted by the chief, whose authority was thus at once military and sacerdotal. It was probably civil also, if we may judge from the control of modern patriarchal chiefs over the property of the clan. Little trace of the sacerdotal authority now exists. It has declined before the influence of imported religious systems, with their strong priestly establishments. But its former prevalence is attested by the character of the ancient imperial governments.

This is most strongly declared in the Chinese government. Shamanism has never developed into a definite religion, nor nature worship into an advanced mythology, among the Chinese. And the systems of the law-givers, native and imported, have sunk into shamanistic practices resembling those of Mongolia. Thus the ancestral religion has had no strong opponent, and it holds its own as the dominant system of Chinese belief, while the emperor fills the same position as was filled by the ancient patriarch of the clan, that of the representative of the ancestral shades, and the sole person-

age with the right to address the superior powers. In the other ancient nations interesting deviations from this condition appear. In Egypt nature worship unfolded into an intricate mythology, with its complex priestly establishment. But this establishment continued subordinate to the paternal sacredness of the emperor, whose patriarchal religious office was extended to embrace all the sacerdotal service of the nation. In Babylonia this is less apparent. We first perceive there a vigorous shamanism, and then the rise of a somewhat intricate mythology. But as to the character of the imperial rule we know little until the advent of the later empires. In these it is indicated, both in later Babylonia and in Assyria, that the emperor held the position of spiritual head of the nation and vicegerent of heaven.

In America a similar rise of the chief to supremacy through his authority as head of the system of ancestor worship is apparent. The Mico of the south was probably the descendant of a patriarchal dignitary, from whom he derived his combined civil and spiritual functions. There existed a mythologic system, with its priestly establishment, but the priests of the nature gods were subordinate in spiritual authority to the Mico, the original source of whose priestly dignity vanished as this dignity widened. In the more civilized American communities the same condition appeared. There was a well-developed mythologic system, and a priestly hierarchy, but the political ruler had the supremacy over the priesthood, and owed to it much of his autocratic power. The original source of this authority does not plainly appear, but the evidences are in favor

of there being here, as elsewhere, a duplex sacerdotal system, and of his being the lineal successor of the clan patriarch, and the inheritor of the dignity of the family priest.

If now we come to consider the Aryan nations, it is to find an interesting variation from the cases above examined. The Aryans had become democratic religiously as well as politically. Ancestor worship continued, but it was mainly confined to the family precincts, the public worship of the clans having been largely replaced by the mythologic ceremonial. The chief of the clan still conducted its ancestor worship, but the common practice of house worship had taken from this its importance, and no strong sense of spiritual dignity ever attached to the chief. It is highly probable that an active system of shamanism early prevailed, which, when the Aryans first appear to us, was rapidly unfolding into the priestly establishment of mythology, with its public worship of the great powers of nature.

The subsequent phases of this religious history are highly interesting. It was impossible that union and harmony such as we find elsewhere should exist between these two systems of religion. The one tended to democracy as the other did to aristocracy, and any growth towards supremacy of the one could but be attended by a decadence of the other. The Aryans had no spiritual patriarch, and no strongly organized hierarchy with a high priest at its head, and thus arose a rivalry, on more or less equal terms, between the two systems, with different results in the various Aryan nations. In India the mythological priests gained the supremacy, and ancestor worship sunk into the back-

ground. But the organization was democratic, no high priest appeared, and the principle of equality became firmly established. In Persia, the leadership of Zoroaster led to a different organization of the priesthood. The sect of the Magi had its distinct head, with supreme control of religious affairs, yet destitute of civil authority, and the absolutism of the ruler sprung from military success, not from spiritual control. A somewhat similar condition existed among the Celts, in their Druidic establishment. Unfortunately we know very little of the organization of the Druids. They had their high priest, yet his authority was limited, and the warrior class was predominant.

The history of the other Aryans nowhere reveals a powerful priestly organization. Alike with the Teutons, the Greeks, the Romans, and the Slavonians, the family ancestor worship seems to have reduced the influence of mythology, and prevented its priesthood from attaining power and dignity. In Greece particularly the public priests were of minor authority, and to this, to some extent at least, is due the fact that the intellect of this enlightened people in time swerved from the vagaries of mythology into philosophical thought, by which both mythology and ancestor worship were brought into disrepute. Of all the Aryan peoples, mythology seems to have gained least unfoldment among the Slavonians. In this they are in strong consonance with the Mongolians, with which race they have undoubtedly suffered considerable amalgamation.

To this lack of a strong priestly establishment among the western Aryans we can trace the origin of their

special course of thought development. In the East all the learning was in the hands of the priests, and thought was directed mainly to sacerdotal problems. In the West there was no such restriction. The priesthood was unlearned and unimportant, secular replaced sacerdotal learning, and the thoughts of men flowed, for the first time, from the narrow channel of religious speculation into the broad current of terrestrial concerns. We may ascribe to this the great intellectual development of the Greeks, a phenomenon which might have been rivaled among the Hindus but for the fact that their thinkers were priests, and their thought, in consequence, was narrowed and restricted. To the free thought of the writers of Greece on religious and philosophical subjects we owe the rapid decline of the old religions, and the clearing of a broad field for the sowing of the vital seeds of the Christian creed.

But with the outspread of the Christian faith through the Roman empire, and its acceptance by the emperors as the state religion, began a new stage in the history of the Western Aryans. With the Christian belief they accepted the Christian church, a closely organized priestly hierarchy which was destined to play an important part in the coming history of Europe. Lack of faith in the gods was succeeded by an ardent faith in God, doubt of immortality by an ardent belief in future existence, the slight pagan dread of the hereafter by a tormenting fear. Men's thoughts became shifted from the present into the future state of existence, and the authority of the priesthood grew rapidly as this new element of power fell into their hands. It was this that lay at the basis of the

Roman persecutions of the Christians. That a new form of religion had sprung up was a matter of little consequence to Rome, which had already swallowed and assimilated fifty foreign faiths. But that a new temporal power had arisen, a state within the state, a large body of people controlled by their bishops more than by the prefects, and yielding allegiance to God before the emperor, was a matter of vital importance. For the first time in history there was a threatened separation of the spiritual and temporal power, and this new rebellion must be crushed or it would crush the state. It would probably have been crushed had the emperors fully perceived their danger. As it was, their efforts to suppress it were spasmodic and ineffectual, and Christianity soon grew too strong for suppression. As a last resort the emperors adopted it, put themselves at the head of the church, and restored their power by a union of the state with the new religious faith. Before this state of affairs paganism declined with remarkable rapidity. Its life had died out long before and only its dry bones remained.

The history of the modern world began with conditions such as had never previously existed. In fact the effort of the Roman emperors to adopt and subordinate the Christian church but partly succeeded. This church was founded on a principle that could not admit of subordination. Most of the pre-existing churches had been founded on flexible philosophies. Christian theology was based on an arbitrary dogma, that of exclusive salvation and the criminality of disbelief. The theory of eternal tortures to every unbeliever was for the first time promulgated. It was the sternest and

most unrelenting of all creeds. The belief that all must think as the priests and bishops taught, or be eternally damned, was one that defied the fiercest fires of Roman persecution, and which had the fatal effect of checking the tide of free thought in Europe for nearly one thousand years. It caught heresy by the throat with a deadly grip, and nearly succeeded in choking all vitality out of the human mind.

Men controlled by such a doctrine were not likely to be swayed by the vacillating opinions of imperial despots. The church kept its organization intact, opposed heretical and accepted orthodox emperors, and continued as fully a state within the state as during the pagan period of the empire. All conformity was of the emperor to the church, not of the church to the emperor. The bishops firmly held the reins of the church, and their intestine conflicts continued as violently as if there were no emperor to be considered. The ancient unity had been finally broken. The church had become a separate organization from the state. The minds of men had fallen under different hands from those that ruled their bodies.

This is a fact of vital importance, and has had a controlling influence over the history of modern Europe. When Rome fell to pieces before the assaults of the barbarians its dismemberment was only partial. Of its two conjoined governments one only, the temporal, ceased to exist. The spiritual remained intact and with a wider dominion than ever. For the barbarian conquerors of the temporal power fell under its sway. Their lack of a powerful priesthood, and their warlike migration from their sacred groves into new

scenes and conditions of life, weakened their ancient prejudices and laid their minds open to the rapid influx of new ideas. They embraced Christianity in a mass, with an ease that showed how slight a hold their old faith had had upon them, and with a rapidity which prevented their comprehending the new doctrines. They became baptized pagans, professors of a faith which they were far from understanding, and with a vague sense of submission to some far-off and dimly realized spiritual potentate.

In a preceding chapter it was said that the Roman empire left three legacies to the succeeding barbarian kingdoms—the recollection of the imperial administration, the municipal institutions, and the church organization. The outcome of the first two of these was there considered; that of the third remains for consideration.

We need here say little about the internal dissensions of the church, the activity that was displayed within the narrow channel to which thought was confined, the numerous sects which arose in consequence, the fluctuations of opinion as to the absolute requisites of salvation, the criminations and recriminations, the consignment of whole bodies of fellow-Christians to eternal perdition for splitting a hair of the creed in the wrong direction, and the outcome of it all in the struggle of a few leading bishops for absolute control over the church. Rome, as of old, conquered. It was practical, while the Eastern churches were theoretical. The Greeks, the Syrians, the Egyptians, as of old, philosophized and struggled for the control of heaven. The Romans fought for the control of the earth. The



minds of the people, which formed the prize of the battle, were captured by the practical dogmas of Rome, which were full of views looking to the progress of man, while the Eastern churches wasted their strength in speculations concerning the nature of God.

This conflict, which finally narrowed down to a fight for supremacy among the three bishops of Rome, Constantinople, and Alexandria, ended in the triumph of Rome, so far as the new world of Europe was concerned. In the Eastern empire a reversion to ancient conditions occurred. The theological speculations eventually suppressed all secular learning. The emperors became ignorant and deeply superstitious. A close compact between the heads of church and state followed. The political history of Constantinople ended in the establishment of a despotism of the Asiatic type, in which the emperor was head of church and state, and the people submissive in mind and body. This retrogression has left its direct offspring in the autocratic government of modern Russia, in which state the Eastern church still exists, and where the emperor is actually, though not nominally, the head of the church establishment.

In Western Europe, under the spiritual dominion of the popes of Rome, history pursued a different course, which it is now our purpose to examine. To a considerable extent the history of this portion and period of the world consisted in conflicts between, and temporary compacts of, king, pope, and emperor, and in heretical revolts of the people, and efforts, successful or unsuccessful, to repress them. The history of modern Europe, in fact, arose largely from the disunion of

church and state, and from efforts of the theological party to prevent the development of free thought and the loss of sacerdotal power.

The condition of the church establishment in mediæval Europe is one that has no direct parallel in human history, though it bears remote resemblances to that of Brahmanic India. Europe in its temporal relations consisted of a congress of distinct states, often hostile to one another. In its spiritual relations it constituted a single state, under a despotic spiritual emperor, the Bishop of Rome. In the long conflict that succeeded between church and state the ignorance and superstition of the people grew greater rather than less, the despotism of the pope over the mind of the masses became more absolute; and finally the church gained for a time supreme authority, and forced the most powerful monarchs to bow to its decisions. But the papal authority was in great part mental, and no merging of the two forms of kingship succeeded. The monarchs continued fiercely rebellious to papal control. With growing knowledge the mental dominion of the priesthood became limited. Finally the divorce between the two great powers was fully achieved. To-day each has fallen into its proper position. The church has given up its old claim to temporal, the state to spiritual authority, and the long-disturbed harmony is once more restored.

This phenomenon in social evolution has had a momentous influence upon human history. Throughout the ages of ancient civilization church and state were closely united, and held absolute dominion over mankind. The birth of Christianity was the death knell

to this unity. The bonds of the ancient compact were rent asunder, and church and state broke into open war, the conflict ending at length in peace and disunion. Despotism died in the struggle. Those who took the side of the state broke loose from the despotism of the church. Those who fought for the church rebelled against the despotism of the state. The establishment of human liberty, both mental and physical, is largely a result of this separation of and long-continued battle between the two great governing forces of mankind.

It is well here to consider further the partial resemblance of which we have spoken between the political conditions of mediæval Europe and Hindustan. In both cases we find a vigorous sacerdotal body controlling the affairs of a spiritual empire, which is divided among numerous temporal sovereigns. In both all learning is in the hands of the priests, and the theory is prevalent that it is sacrilegious for the laity to meddle with sacred books or indulge in speculations on spiritual subjects. In both, literature is largely confined to theological conceptions. But with these resemblances there are important differences. In India the power of the secular rulers has remained in harmony with that of the priesthood. This, doubtless, has resulted from the lack of a hierarchal organization of the Brahmans. They being all equal, there has been no one to claim the position of high priest and to seek to establish autocratic temporal sovereignty. Harmony between church and state has continued through each confining itself to its native province, and the supremacy of the priesthood has arisen from its success

in restricting the thoughts of men to spiritual to the neglect of temporal affairs. The long continuance of this state of things is largely due to the caste organization. This, in its turn, could not have existed except in an hereditary priesthood; and thus the celibacy of the European clergy has helped to prevent European history from taking the course of that of India. The nearest Eastern approach to the European church establishment is the Buddhistic hierarchy of Thibet. There we find a celibate clergy open to all classes of the people, and a priesthood arranged in successive ranks, with a supreme dignitary who possesses both spiritual and temporal authority, and forms an Eastern counterpart of the mediæval pope. No conflict, however, has arisen between church and state, from the fact that the religion is one which could never vigorously control the human mind, and that the emperor of China has jealously hindered any dangerous development of the temporal authority of the Grand Lama.

The celibacy of the European clergy, and the fact that the priesthood was recruited from all the ranks of the people, intellect being the only requisite to election, had important influences upon mediæval history. The growth of a clerical aristocracy was greatly hindered. No caste could arise without heredity. The flow of all the active intellect into the ecclesiastical establishment gave it a supreme control over the minds of the superstitious populace. But this, at the same time, brought much heretical opinion into the bosom of the church, and gave rise to a seething spirit of revolt against the orthodox dogmas, which constantly showed itself in minor waves of rebellion, and

was the instigating spirit of the final and successful insurrection against priestcraft.

This constant inflow of new thought, like the flow of fresh water into a lake, prevented any stagnation within the body of the church. The European intellect by no means stood still. Public opinion as well as clerical opinion had a powerful influence, and during the centuries of despotic dominion of the church there were many stages of progress in religious thought. And the church, though opposing secular learning and science, was active for good in other directions. It exercised an important influence in opposition to human slavery. It sought to replace the code of force by that of law. It exerted itself to repress the reign of violence, and to promote justice and civilization, in a hundred ways. Its influence has been for bad and good. In its strenuous efforts to prevent the development of free thought, and in the terrible wars and persecutions carried on for this purpose, its influence has been an unmixed evil. In its efforts to improve the social condition of the masses it has exerted an immense influence for good. Taken for all in all, it has been a most powerful agent in the political progress of mankind.

When the Roman empire fell the world of human society almost went back into its original chaos. The municipal organizations remained, but their inter-connection was destroyed and their governments disorganized. The church alone continued intact, a compact government, based on the imperial model, with an absolute head, and successive ranks of inferior officers. It alone existed as order amid chaos, and it made a

vigorous effort to seize the fallen reins of power. The municipal institutions were sustained by the clergy, who alone possessed strength and organization, and the ability to fill official positions with credit. The barbarians were speedily converted, and the barbarian kings were called upon to assume the imperial dignity. The church hoped to shelter itself, as of old, under the wings of the throne.

This effort necessarily failed. It was impossible for a despotism to be established over the free-hearted Germans. The church, failing to obtain possession of the throne, made more successful efforts to gain control of the people. Christianity assimilated itself to paganism. Idolatry became prevalent in the form of image worship. Fetichism arose as the adoration of relics. Shamanism displayed itself in the production of miracles. Hosts of angels and devils were everywhere active. Legends that distanced the absurdities of Greek mythology were generally believed. Heaven was a few miles above and hell a few miles below the earth's surface. Priestcraft became a scarcely refined shamanism. This lowering of the church to the level of the barbarian intellect was inaugurated by Gregory the Great, who was elected to the papacy A. D. 590. It was continued by his successors. The church fell into a state of intellectual decrepitude, but in no other way could it have maintained its hold upon the minds of the people, who were also intellectually imbecile and pagans in belief.

In the eighth century there arose in the East the iconoclastic war between the emperors and the monks. The victory of the church was declared. Image

worship was sustained, despite the vigorous efforts of successive monarchs to overthrow it. The conflict extended to the West, where the worship of images met with less opposition. The church, as we may say, had swung downward to the level of the barbarian mind. It had become definitely paganized and idolatrous.

These efforts to maintain control over the minds of the people were aided by the establishment of monasticism. Great as was the influence of the clergy over the rude barbarian mind, that of the monks became still greater. Though the secular empire of Rome was dead, its theocratical empire was sustained by these various measures, and extended its dominion over the barbarian conquerors of the civilized South. Nor were its efforts confined to the control of the popular mind. It made as vigorous attempts to bring the throne into subjection to its will. The Merovingian dynasty of France had lost its vigor. A new dynasty was established by the aid of the church. Pepin, the son of Charles Martel, allied himself with the clergy and seized the throne. In return for the support lent him by the church, the new monarch made the pope a temporal sovereign, and gave political power to the clergy by seating them as members in the national assembly. Pepin defeated the Lombards, the enemies of the papacy, and assigned a portion of the conquered territory to the rule of the pope. Such was the origination of the papal claim to temporal sovereignty, which continued to exist for eleven hundred years, and has been but recently annulled.

France became the right hand of the church.

Many of the wars of Charlemagne were fought in the service of the pope. He forcibly converted the heathen Saxons, conquered Germany and Italy, and brought all Western Europe within the pale of orthodoxy. This movement was completed by the crowning of Charlemagne as "Emperor of the West" on Christmas day A. D. 800. The long effort of the church seemed finally gained. The autocratic Roman empire appeared to be re-established. All its subjects were faithful sons of the church. Its monarch was the sworn defender of the faith. The church once more rested in peace under the shadow of the throne.

The rapid disintegration of the empire of Charlemagne, after his death, destroyed the quietude of this papal supremacy. The church was once more thrown into the tide of European politics, but it entered the eddy this time with strong hands. It was in a position to seize the mastery of the Christian world. For the next important period in its political history we must advance to the year 1073 A. D., the date of the election of Hildebrand to the papacy, under the title of Gregory VII. This greatest of the popes made a vigorous effort to increase the political importance of the papal throne. The immorality which had crept into the church was energetically suppressed. The marriage of the clergy was denounced and the principle of celibacy permanently established. The pope sustained William the Conqueror in his invasion of England, with the hope of an extension of the papal influence in return. He resisted the Norman encroachments on the property of the church in Southern Italy. But the most important event of his life was his con-



flict with the German emperor on the subject of investiture. The appointment of clergymen directly by the emperors, without the approval of the pope, was a dangerous innovation, which, if permitted, would end in the destruction of the papal authority, and make the emperor virtual head of the church. With jealous prevision of the threatened danger Gregory firmly opposed lay investiture, and declared excommunication against all parties concerned.

From this arose the first open conflict for authority between a pope and a temporal sovereign. It ended in the temporary victory of the pope. The church reached, and for a time retained, the position at which it had so long aimed, that of acknowledged autocrat of the Christian world. The Emperor Henry was brought, a cringing penitent, to its feet, and forced to remain for three winter days in the snow, chilled and fasting, before the stern old papal monarch would consent to admit him to his presence, and yield him a grudging forgiveness.

Yet despite this partial success, the effort of Gregory to establish a theocratic empire in which the clergy should be the political magnates, and the pope the autocrat of Europe, failed, partly through the ill-judged haste with which he sought to push it forward. In after conflicts with Henry the pope declared kingship a wicked usurpation, an infraction of the rights of man. The time for the revenge of the humiliated emperor had come. He descended into Italy and conquered Rome, which city was afterwards fired and pillaged by the Norman and Saracen allies of the pope. Hildebrand was forced to retire, with his infidel hosts, from the ruined city, and died at Salerno, A. D. 1085.

Such was the end of the first earnest attempt to establish a theocratic empire in Europe. It failed in part only, for the influence of the church was greatly increased. Its authority was sustained and enhanced by a series of events which immediately afterwards began, the Crusades, which for centuries gave the popes the predominant power. During their continuance temporal concerns vanished from the thoughts of the military class of the continent. The whole people became filled with a spiritual frenzy. The families, the estates, the claims of the nobles were deserted and forgotten, the thrones of the princes were left vacant, and all the manly vigor of the West pressed forward in a mad rush to Palestine, in response to the call of the pope. Every man who took the cross ceased to be the subject of a civil ruler. He became a subject of the pope. Money flowed freely into Italy. The pope became the financial magnate of Europe. Domains were purchased by, or given to, the clergy. The church gained a strength and an influence such as it had at no previous time possessed. It was hoped by the projectors of the Crusades that all Europe would become united into a single political domain, under the spiritual control of the papacy.

This hope, fortunately, was not realized. The succeeding history of Europe is a history of repeated revolts against the papal power, by princes and people, and of a gradual weakening of this power, which had now reached its greatest height. The fierce and ambitious monarchs of the European states were not easily to be controlled, and their power over their people was by no means small. Occasionally they bent before the

papal authority, but new insurrections as often broke out. The greatest power of the church was reached in the first half of the thirteenth century. But even during this era of papal supremacy a reaction against priestly control clearly displayed itself throughout Europe, and the long war for spiritual freedom began.

This was the period of splendor and intellectual energy of the Saracen dominion in Spain. The learning of the Saracens outflowed through Europe. Ardent students from the European courts attended the Mohammedan schools and spread the knowledge gained far and wide. The intellect of the people began everywhere to awaken. The long restriction of literature to the clergy and to serious subjects ceased. The songs of the Troubadours and the metrical romances of the Trouvères broke out in France. The Minnesingers appeared in Germany. The absurdities of scholasticism lost their influence, and the thoughts of men turned from theological philosophy to the practical concerns of every-day life. The science of law and government began to emerge from the feudal chaos. Schools were established and ardently attended. The despotic reign of theology over the minds of men was at an end. The intellect of Europe was astir, and ready to cast off the monstrous dreams of its long mediæval slumber.

Inevitable results followed. The ruling dignitaries, who had been the last to submit to papal supremacy, were the first to rebel. The feudal nobility had never submitted. Even when the people and the monarchs were subdued the nobles proudly maintained their independence, and refused to be controlled in secular matters by the clergy. This rebellious spirit was now

manifested by the monarchs. At a somewhat earlier period the Duke of Ravenna in Italy, the Emperor Otho in Germany, Philip Augustus in France, and King John in England, had rebelled against and been abjectly subdued by the pope. Innocent III., elected in 1198, became the virtual ruler of Europe, before whose word the most powerful monarch was forced to bend. Frederick II., the Emperor of Germany, assailed the papedom at the head of an army of Saracens. For thirty years he sustained the contest in Italy. Pope after pope died, but new popes, as sternly bent on victory as their predecessors, succeeded. Frederick finally sunk in the combat, abhorred by all Europe for having dared to disregard the papal excommunication and to bring an infidel army to the conquest of the church.

This was the last great victory of the papacy in its conflict with the monarchs of Europe. Its influence over European finances precipitated the next conflict. Edward I. of England compelled the taxation of the clergy. They resisted at first, but were subdued by his shrewd measure of refusing legal protection to all who did not share the burdens of the State. Philip the Fair of France rebelled on the same plea. He was aided by the mendicant friars, who denounced the wealth of the church. A hot contest ensued, which ended in the complete victory of the king, and his removal of the papacy from Rome to Avignon in France, where it was under his control. The contest between the kings and the papacy reached its climax in the sixteenth century, when Henry VIII. of England suppressed the monasteries, seized their wealth, and finally broke completely loose from the Church of Rome. Its political

life in England was at an end. The people had grown heretical in opinion and supported the king.

Such a movement would have been impossible a century earlier. Before a king could take so decided a step, his people must have taken the step before him. The popular revolt against the authority of Rome, in fact, had begun long before, and had now attained extreme proportions; and one of the most frightful chapters in the history of the world is that of the effort to suppress this revolt, and stamp out the spirit of free thought. The weapons in this battle were not interdict and excommunication, but fire and fagot. Hundreds of thousands of men were burnt or fearfully tortured that Rome might remain supreme. Yet the effort signally failed, and Europe became mentally free. Men fought for their opinions with tenfold the energy they could have displayed in fighting for their estates, and from every fire that consumed a martyr two new heretics sprung.

We can but briefly glance at this fearful chapter of human history. The songs of the Troubadours, the vicinity and influence of the Saracens, the growth of secular learning, the birth of a spirit of inquiry, had spread heresy everywhere through the fair district of Provence, in the south of France. It was a fearfully punished heresy. A half million of men were turned loose to slaughter these criminal heretics, who had dared to think other thoughts than those of the priests, and a carnival of blood, torture, and horror swept those fair plains that made them for the time a hell upon earth. The sword, the rack, the fagot, and unmentionable tortures suppressed free thought with

the Albigenses, and the unholy soil where men had ventured to think for themselves was left almost a desert, peopled only by death and desolation.

This concerted slaughter had its only counterpart in the history of the Roman church in the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day, in France, in which the vice of unblushing treachery was added to that of midnight assassination. But the horror of these murders *en masse* was as nothing to the terrible tale of individual slaughters, which for centuries ravaged the fairest regions of the earth. In 1208 Innocent III., determined to check the growing spirit of mental revolt, established the Inquisition. If Satan himself had filled the papal chair he could scarcely have devised a more terrible instrument of human torture. In Spain alone, as we are told by Llorente, more than 31,000 persons were burned at the stake, and more than 290,000 less severely punished, under the auspices of the Inquisition. In the Netherlands, under the persecution of Charles V., it is said that 50,000 persons suffered death, and half as many under Philip II. Some authors put the numbers far higher. Everywhere throughout Christendom the reign of terror extended. Nor were these slaughters mere executions. They were attended with every torture that human malignity could devise. Death at length came, frequently by the horror of the slow fire, prolonging until the last possible moment the sufferings of those who had already endured days or months of mental agony. Those who escaped with their lives were torn by instruments of torture. And the suffering the victims left behind them was equal to that they endured. From every pulpit it was thun-

dered out that they had gone to eternal torment. An indescribable mental anguish filled the souls of millions of wives, children, and friends. The children of the victims were disinherited and proscribed. Every imaginable means of producing mental and physical agony was employed to check the growth of free thought. The Aztec human sacrifices to the terrible god of war, which so excited the horror of the Spanish conquerors, were as nothing in point of atrocity and of the misery engendered to the human sacrifices to the god of priestly vengeance which were taking place in their own land at home.

It might be imagined that such measures of repression would have utterly stamped out the mental rebellion of the European people, and secured the despotic imperialism of the church. They did so in Spain, which remained the faithful son of the pope, and went to sleep in the embracing arms of the priesthood; but all Europe outside of Spain continued awake and alert. In the other nations, fortunately, the persecution had been less virulent and sustained, and free thought made its way in spite of the rack and the fagot. In the German states heretical opinion had so widely spread that the priestly persecutions no longer had the strong support of the people. Here and there the revolt reached the point of armed rebellion against the church. This was particularly the case in Bohemia, where the treacherous slaughter of John Huss by the Council of Constance, in 1416, produced an outbreak of war which continued for fifteen years, and ended in the partial success of the party of religious reform.

In England the spirit of revolt against priestly despotism was yet more widespread. The Lollards, the followers of Wiclif, became so numerous, that at the opening of the fifteenth century the claim was made that half the people of England were Lollards. Wiclif died in his bed, despite the thunders of the church. Its influence had never been supreme in free-spirited England. In little more than a century after his death sectarian freedom of thought had grown so prevalent, despite every effort to repress it, that Henry VIII. was able to defy the power of Rome and establish a new church on English soil. It had been established by the people, however, before it was by the throne. Like Constantine of Rome, Henry of England but followed the pointing of the finger of public opinion.

The papal government, however, did not suffer the power to slip from its hands without a strenuous effort to retain it. In addition to the repressive measures of the Inquisition, Innocent III. tried other methods of confirming the dominion of the church over the minds of men. He instituted auricular confession, a formidable instrument of mental power. By it the priesthood gained the right to pry into the secrets of every heart, to place spies upon the actions of every man, woman and child, and to make the least heretical utterance in the privacy of the household the basis of a criminal prosecution.

An equally efficacious means of arresting the downfall of the priestly power was the authorization by Innocent of the orders of mendicant friars, the Franciscans and Dominicans. These orders increased with remarkable rapidity, and their barefoot hosts marched



through Europe begging for alms, and preaching to the people in their own tongues and with their own simple modes of thought. The pompous ceremonial, the Latin worship, were exchanged for simple addresses in the vernacular, which reached the heart and the understanding of every hearer. The friars thrust back for several centuries the threatened revolt of the lower classes. Only when they themselves joined in the rush for riches which they had long condemned, and became themselves immensely wealthy, did their influence vanish. Long before this time, however, heretical doctrines had been preached by many of the friars themselves, and they became advocates of a celebrated work, "The Everlasting Gospel," which was declared to have supplanted the New Testament. A sect arose from their midst, the Fratricelli, which the fires of the Inquisition proved inadequate to suppress, and which survived to help sustain the rebellion of Luther against the church.

This rebellion took place in the early part of the sixteenth century, three hundred years after the definite beginning of the revolt against the priesthood and the strenuous efforts of Innocent III. to arrest it. In those three centuries heresy had grown enormously, despite all the repressive measures of the church. Luther had half the people of Germany at his back when he burnt the pope's bull of excommunication in the presence of an applauding multitude. It was the old trouble, the effort to extort money from the people, that had caused the revolts of Edward I. and Philip the Fair, which now instigated the Lutheran revolution, and tore one-half of Europe permanently from the grasp of the papacy.

Thus slowly sunk the political power of the Roman church. It was not given up, however, without other energetic efforts. War replaced persecution. Spain hurled the Jews and Mohammedans from her soil, and made a vigorous effort to subdue her heretical subjects in the Netherlands and to conquer Protestant England. It was in vain. The Netherlands became free, physically and mentally. The "Invincible Armada," which was to conquer and convert England, went to the domain of the fishes at the bottom of the North Sea. In France civil wars arose between the Protestants and Catholics which, after a long and bloody struggle, ended in Catholic supremacy, and the final expulsion from the soil of France of thousands of her best citizens. Elsewhere throughout Europe the warlike struggle between Protestantism and Catholicism long continued. It was particularly displayed in the terrible Thirty Years' War, in which only the genius of Gustavus of Sweden hindered the utter overthrow of German Protestantism. This religious basis of European hostilities long continued, and only within recent times have the wars of the nations been free from the influence of sectarian bitterness. The French Revolution may be looked upon as the period in which secular fully replaced ecclesiastical interests in modern European conflicts.

We hardly need here repeat that a designed effort to retain political power was not the moving spring in the persecutions of the Roman church. At their foundation lay the fatal doctrine of the doom of all heretics to eternal torment. It was vividly felt that any degree of earthly torture was merciful if it would

save the inhabitants of this world from the fires of hell. The religion of fear was dominant upon the earth, and terror was the instrument employed to force mankind into the loving bosom of the church.

The dogma of the entire efficacy of faith, and that the belief of their particular ecclesiastical body was the sole means of salvation, existed as earnestly among each of the new sects as among the Catholics, and led to similar measures of repression of free thought. Persecution displayed itself among the Protestants in Switzerland, Scotland, England and other lands, and was less virulent than of old only from the greater prominence of the heretical sects and the influence of a growing objection to repressive measures in the opinions of the learned classes. The Presbyterians of Scotland were persecuted and tortured with much of the barbarous virulence of the old Inquisition, while Calvin consented to the burning of his adversary at the stake.

The downfall of the political supremacy of the Roman church was succeeded by an active effort to establish a Protestant despotism through the union of church and state. This was made by the Stuart kings of England. Henry VIII. had replaced the pope as the head of the church by his own sacred person. The power this gave him was not neglected by his successors, who sought to attain absolutism by its means. The doctrine of the divine right of kings was promulgated, and Charles I. made a determined effort, as spiritual and temporal magnate of the land, to gain autocratic authority, and found an Asiatic despotism on the fair soil of England.

The attempt was energetically made, and might have

succeeded but for one circumstance, the presence of rampant heresy. The sectarian revolt against Rome had not been made for the purpose of placing a new pope on the throne, and the rebellion against Charles was a double one, temporal and spiritual. Had the Church of England been the sole sect, the English government of to-day might be a spiritual autocracy. It was not only the free spirit but the free thought of the English people that rebelled, and that brought the despot to the block. Free thought gained the throne in Cromwell, and the only modern effort of a European monarch to found a theocratic despotism fell with the head of Charles I. of England.

The political power of the church is to-day virtually dead throughout Western Europe. National church establishments still exist, the people are taxed to support ecclesiastics, and the bishops retain seats in some European parliaments. Yet these are but the dregs of its once supreme political power, and in America even these dregs have vanished. The weak effort to place "God in the Constitution" is the last faint echo of that mighty voice which, emanating from the papal seat in Rome, once controlled the whole civilized world. The church as a political power is dead, and cannot be resuscitated. As a spiritual power it stands to-day higher than ever. The reign of love has replaced that of fear, good deeds are stronger than dogmatic creeds, and the God of Mercy has succeeded the God of Vengeance upon the high throne of heaven.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY.

**I**F we look at the world of the past through the moral spectacles of the present we are very apt to arrive at false conceptions of ancient moral conditions. It is not safe to erect a general standard of morality on the basis of the maxims of right and wrong which are now, and have been for many centuries, current in the world. Few or none of these maxims represent moral principles inherent in the mind of man. They grew up chiefly or wholly as the outcome of experience, and have retained their hold upon mankind through their importance in the preservation and development of human society.

Religion, as it has always heretofore been constituted, comprises two distinct elements, creed and morals. The first of these, the system of belief of each sect, is a product of thought development. It is the outcome of man's speculations on the problems of the universe. We have already traced the growth of these theistic ideas, from their earliest form in fetichism or other crude conceptions to their latest in the speculations of the German metaphysicians. Though thousands of years have been employed in this inquiry the world finds itself still in a maze of unproved, apparently unprovable, opinions, and men are now inclined to ignore all philosophical deductions, and turn to scientific experience as the only basis of truth.

The evolution of morals presents none of the long and baffling results of the evolution of creed. The leading principles of human conduct are few, simple, and incontrovertible. They were arrived at early in the history of human thought, and during thousands of years there have been few important additions to the precepts of right and wrong which were extant before the birth of history.

A religion, as above said, consists of creed and morals, and it is very doubtful if religious founders, as a rule, can be credited with much more than the creeds of their systems. Moral ideas generally have had a less direct origin. They have come imperceptibly into existence, and been simply added to the philosophies of the creed makers. This, it is true, cannot be affirmed of all religious reformers. Confucius, Gautama, and Christ undoubtedly gave new ethical ideas to the world. Confucius ignored creed and devoted his thoughts to the practical principles of human conduct. Christ ignored creed and devoted his thoughts to the fundamental principles of morality. For this reason his system of religion is the purest and loftiest ever given to man.

The axioms of morality which have been the solid foundations of all religious systems, and which will continue to be the essentials of religion in that coming future when faith in a dogma will no longer be held as necessary to salvation, are by no means inherent conditions of the human mind. They arose as results of human experience, though they were nearly all extant in the prehistoric period of the civilized world. We are satisfied that they could not have been of primitive

origin, from the fact that to-day they do not exist among the lower savages. These debased races seemingly entertain no idea of sin. They commit with pure innocence of evil intention a thousand acts which to us would be highly sinful. We cannot well accuse those of the sin of stealing whose sole idea of ownership is that whatever they can obtain possession of is rightfully theirs. Nor are they liars in any sinful sense to whom fancy is the exact equivalent of fact. The beastly sensuality of most savage tribes is indulged in with no thought of immorality. The slaughter or torture of an enemy is viewed as a virtuous rather than an evil deed. Even cannibalism is considered perfectly just and proper, and has been indulged in by some nations as a religious duty. There is nothing, indeed, to show that the idea of sinfulness exists in the mind of the lower savages, and the primitive moral code appears to be the following: That is right which is agreeable, that is wrong which is disagreeable, to the individual concerned. A striking instance of the savage conception of good and evil is given in the answer of the Bushman to the Christian missionary, who asked him to name a good and an evil action. He replied that it would be a bad action if some one should steal his wife, but a good one if he should steal some one else's wife.

To such an opinion we are led by the inquiry into the moral condition of savages. Even where there is a distinct religious belief it often has no basis in morality. Religion began with creed, and only later attained the dignity of morals. The idea of wrong, originally confined to injuries received from human beings,

was eventually extended to include the hurtful actions of unseen intelligences. That of right remained unchanged, to do whatever might be agreeable to the doer. The lack of conscience, or of any evident conception of sinfulness, displayed by existing savages, after thousands of years of gradual culture, leads naturally to the idea that primitive man was devoid of any sense of sin as attaching to human deeds, and that an era in which men had no thought of responsibility for their acts preceded the birth of morality.

Systems of morals were probably first advanced as systems of law, the moral dogmas of religious reformers being promulgated as rules for the conduct of men toward each other. They differ from political laws only in the fact that their infraction is punished by divine instead of human agencies. This, however, is only partly the case. Many evil acts are viewed as crimes against both God and man, and as punishable by both, the difference being that the legislator adjudges the human penalty, the religious teacher the divine one. Moral and political laws thus shade together, flowing from what is politically and temporarily to what is spiritually and eternally wrong. Infractions at one extremity are punished by human agencies alone. At the other extremity they are punished by divine agencies alone. Intermediately they are punished both by human and divine agencies. To steal, for instance, is accounted both a political and a moral crime, and is punished both in body and in soul. But throughout the whole history of human society the influence of moral laws has been rising and the necessity of political laws declining. The more men come vividly to



feel that immoral deeds or thoughts will be visited by a spiritual retribution, the less need is there of political restrictions; and the limitation of human actions by government becomes useless to the exact degree that they are limited by the growing sense of spiritual degradation in evil and of spiritual elevation in good deeds. In ancient times terribly severe laws were necessary to restrain the morally obtuse from evil deeds. Religion also dealt in threats of fearful future punishments. In modern times far milder laws are equally efficacious, and a large section of enlightened humanity hardly needs the restraint of legal or religious penalties. The impulses to evil deeds with them die unfulfilled, tried and punished at their birth before the spiritual tribunal which ever sits in the souls of all spiritually developed men.

But man began without either political or spiritual laws, and in the development of law it is most probable that political restrictions preceded moral ones. The growth of restrictive laws or customs was the true origin of human society. Men, from being simply mixed together, became combined together by the agency of law. No large social group could exist under the primitive theory that every man has the right to benefit himself by every means. Legal restrictions are the linking elements of social aggregates, and by a political society we mean simply a body of men bound together by laws. Restrictive maxims increase in number and diversity as societies grow more complex and closely organized, and to such maxims there is reason to believe that the growth of moral ideas is due. The individual man, at an early date, arrived at a one-sided idea

of the principle of wrong. Everything was wrong that was hurtful to himself. But he failed to apply this idea to his own actions, and discover that everything was wrong that was hurtful to his fellows. This second conception needed to be impressed on him by his fellows, and was doubtless an early outcome of the formation of social groups. In the earliest political aggregates the unwritten law must have been formulated that deeds that were hurtful to any member of the society were wrong. Man felt himself restrained by his fellows from the performance of certain actions, under the theory that they were wrongful deeds, a theory which he already held as regarded himself. But what a society as a whole believes, each of its members grows to believe, and a vague, conscientious scruple doubtless arose in aid of the more vigorous efforts of political bodies to restrain the evilly disposed. Possibly the theory of divine punishment of crime may have had its earliest origin in the partial inability of human power to discover and punish criminals.

We can merely glance at the origin of political and moral restraint. We cannot trace the steps of its gradual unfoldment. It must suffice to say that the complete sense of personal liberty, and the idea that the immediate benefit of the individual is the only requisite standard of human action, which probably animated early man, as a similar conception seems to animate the lower animals, was gradually diminished as society imposed more and more stringent laws of restraint, while a growing moral sense of the rights of others could not but accompany the growth of the legal sense. Many of the moral injunctions of the religious founders had

undoubtedly this origin. The commandments, "Thou shalt not lie, steal, kill," etc., were necessary for the protection of society. They, in all human probability, originated as political maxims, necessary rules of social existence, since no such dogmas or beliefs seem to exist among unorganized savages.

We have no intention, however, to affirm that all the precepts of morality had this origin. Some of them are such as would never have been devised by law-making bodies. Fear is the basis of political laws. The restraint is that of dread. Love is the basis of the purely moral laws. The restraint is that of affection and sympathy. And here we perceive a principle of morality which is inherent in the human mind, not unfolded, it is true, but germinally present. In this direction lay the true work of the great lawgivers of mankind. Human society could be depended upon to promulgate those axioms of right and wrong which apply immediately to the well-being of society. But the deepest intuitions of spiritually elevated natures were necessary to discover those basic principles of morality which underlie all the real ethical development of mankind. These are the noblest product of the greatest thinkers whom the world has yet produced. Side by side with speculations concerning the origin and destiny of all things arose the conception of the underlying principle of human duty, the lofty doctrine of brotherly love.

The fact that political laws or customs, whether specially devised or the result of long-continued habit, preceded ethical rules, seems clearly shown in the special moral ideas of various peoples. Among savages we

frequently find one of the rules of the moral code of civilization strictly adhered to, while all the others are broken without a thought of sinfulness. The widespread unchastity of savages is here and there replaced by a strict chastity, which in some cases is binding only upon married, in other cases upon all women. This chastity is particularly displayed by the Apache Indians, who in other respects are perhaps the most immoral and cruel of American savages. Some savages practice human sacrifice and cannibalism, which to others would be horrible crimes. Even among the Aztec Indians, who had attained many of the refined practices and moral ideas of civilization, human sacrifices to their deities, and cannibal feasts, were considered obligations of virtue. They were good deeds, worthy of reward by the gods, and no consciousness of sin attached to their performance.

Stealing is a general savage practice, except where the savages are so mentally obtuse as to have no desire for strange objects. Lying is also generally indulged in, often in so transparent and useless a manner as to indicate that no sense of criminality is attached to it. It seems a mere freak of the developing imagination. Yet strangely enough the aborigines of India, many of whom are in a very primitive stage of morality, frequently regard lying with abhorrence. Mr. Grant says of the Gonds, one of these tribes: "A true Gond will commit a murder, but he will not tell a lie." Prichard describes a similar tribe, the Sowrs, as in general a harmless, peaceable race, yet "so destitute of moral sense that, at the order of a chief, they will as readily kill a man as a beast."

The disregard of human life and suffering is in fact one of the most persistent forms of immorality which the history of mankind displays. Nations which possessed to some extent the minor virtues of generosity, hospitality, truthfulness, honesty, chastity, etc., have often shown themselves utterly regardless of human life, and have, in some cases, made murder and torture their favorite amusements. Strangely enough, this slaughter of human beings, which is to us the most terrible of all crimes, has been almost the last to enter into the category of the vices. Moral laws were promulgated against it in ancient times, but they long remained inoperative, except within the circle of the immediate family group or tribe. Until almost within the present century, human life seems to have been considered as of little more value than that of dogs or horses, even with civilized peoples. The severity of the penal code of most nations as late as the last century, the excesses of the French Revolution, the barbarities of wars, the horrible inhumanity shown in prisons, the brutality of the sports of the lower classes of the people, are among the evidences of this. If we go a few centuries further back, the treatment of criminals becomes simply atrocious, and the most frightful tortures were inflicted with a callousness that seems to show an utter disregard of human suffering.

This lack of feeling for humanity, which has persistently continued while the minor virtues have become strongly developed, is a strange fact, and goes far to indicate that human virtue, so far as its ordinary postulates are concerned, is more a result of education than of innate tendency. The truthfulness

of the aborigines of India, for instance, so distinct from the habits of savages generally, and existing as it does in connection with immorality in nearly every other direction, must have had some special origin, perhaps the teachings of a primitive lawgiver, which have become hereditarily engrained in the minds of the people. In like manner the Persian lawgiver laid such stress on the duty of truthfulness that this became the most prominent moral attribute of the Persian people, who held it in common with many immoralities.

This one-sidedness of moral development is a striking feature in the unfoldment of social customs, and goes far to discredit the doctrine of intuitive moral conceptions. The Hindu devotee is tender to a fault of the lives of animals, while he is often callous to human suffering. The same perverted condition is shown in the history of Egypt. In these cases virtue is a result of creed, not of moral evolution. The care for animal life in India has passed from the condition of a doctrinal to that of a moral duty, and the reckless slaughter of an insect is viewed as a sin of the deepest dye by men who indulge in practices which we would shrink from as exceedingly sinful.

This cursory examination of the moral history of mankind goes to indicate that rules of conduct are not inherent in the human mind, and that men become moral to the extent that they have been taught, or have learned through social evolution, the principles of right doing, and grow one-sided in their ideas of virtue from the fact that their education in this direction has been narrow and incomplete.

The duty of human sympathy, which in its nature appears to be at the foundation of moral usage, has lagged behind the other social virtues in its development. There must be some cause for this strange fact, and probably we may find this cause in the unceasing prevalence of war. Each group originally, each tribe secondarily, and each nation eventually, has ever been hostilely disposed towards other groups, tribes and nations. Outbreaks have been fierce and frequent, in which the utmost slaughter of opponents has been considered a praiseworthy act. Slaughter in war has been looked upon as no more sinful than slaughter in the chase, and wanton cruelties have been performed with the same callousness that the ardent vivisectionist may grow to display towards the sufferings of the lower animals. Such, undoubtedly, is one prominent cause of the long reign of inhumanity. The tortures practiced by the American Indians on their prisoners, from the thought of which we shrink with horror, had to them no taint of sinfulness. The terrible butcheries inflicted by the Mongol tribes on the inhabitants of Southern Asia were performed as calmly, and with as little sense of moral obliquity, as if they had been slaughtering sheep instead of men. The massacres performed by the Roman armies, even the hundreds of thousands of barbarians slain by the highly cultivated Cæsar, apparently did not arouse in their minds the sentiment of sinfulness or criminality. The terrible torments inflicted by the Inquisitors were to them virtuous, not sinful, deeds. In all these cases the victims were foes, and the prevalent theory of war hindered the growth of any feeling of humanity as applied to enemies. As the Romans felt

that it was a virtue to destroy enemies to their nation, so the Inquisitors believed that they were serving the cause of virtue by destroying enemies to their God.

This theory and practice, as applied to all foreign tribes, unquestionably had a brutalizing effect upon all mankind, and long hindered the growth of a sentiment of humanity. The virtues which could be confined in their exercise to the members of a single group, such as truthfulness, honesty, continence, hospitality, etc., met with no special check to their growth, and either developed naturally, or were practiced in response to the teachings of some religious reformer. But the sentiment of humanity, or the dogma "thou shalt not kill," met with a special check in the practices of war, which could not but reflect a brutalizing influence upon the whole people concerned, and tend to render them callous to human suffering in any shape or of any persons.

Doubtless there was a struggle between two influences: the feeling of tenderness towards family and friends, and of murderous hatred towards hostile strangers. These two feelings coexisted in all times, and still coexist with great numbers of mankind; but history presents us with one agreeable fact, namely, that the feeling of tenderness has strengthened and widened as social masses became larger and social ties closer, while that of inhumanity has decreased as the boundaries of hostility have been pushed back, and war has become a less frequent and less barbarous pursuit. Yet the fact remains that every war exerts a brutalizing influence not only upon the armies but upon the nations engaged in it, and that the growth of the sentiment of hu-



manity has been greatly retarded by the frequency and barbarity of the wars of the past centuries.

The Romans are looked upon as the most inhuman civilized people of the past. But they were the most warlike people of the past. There is, however, a special cause of Roman barbarity which can be found in the history of no similarly warlike nation. The period of the early emperors was a religious interregnum. The old religion was dead. The new religion was not accepted. All the walls of restraint to immorality and barbarity were thrown down. Neither political, social nor moral laws stood in the way of the immorally disposed, and a carnival of crime such as the world has not elsewhere known raged far and wide throughout the empire of Rome.

The sterner virtues existed among the cultured Romans, most of whom belonged to the philosophical sect of the Stoics. Patriotism was the one great duty of a Roman, the highest standard of virtue of a warlike people. Indulgence in sensual pleasures was forbidden in the Stoical precepts. Self-abstinence and uncomplaining endurance were viewed as the noblest of actions. The right of suicide to any one who had grown weary of life was unquestioned. He might be argued with, but no one thought of hindering him from disposing of his life as he saw fit. The duties of friendship were inculcated. Truthfulness was a virtue. Yet there was nothing in the Stoical precepts to forbid the incessant bloodshed of the Roman games. They inculcated the stern virtues only, none of the gentler ones.

Epicureanism rather than Stoicism was the philosophy of the lower classes and of the voluptuaries of Rome.

But it was a debased Epicureanism, in which the wildest sensuality replaced the more moderate indulgence in pleasure inculcated by the Greek philosopher. The fierce delight in human suffering and slaughter, and the disappearance of the social virtues, show to what a depth a people brutalized by war can fall when the political and religious restraints to immorality are removed.

There was one inciting cause to the indulgence of Roman brutality which greatly favored its increase. This was the system of slavery. An extensive section of the people lay beyond the pale of legal protection. Some slight social restraint may have existed, but it was not strong as applied to the enslaved captives of foreign wars. The slaveholders were free to do as they pleased with their slaves. Good treatment depended only on the native humanity or the pecuniary interests of the masters. Passion or cruelty proved often a stronger incentive, and there are many cases recorded of the most brutal treatment of slaves, ranging from the story of the fierce Roman ladies who thrust the long pins of their brooches into the bodies of their servants, to that of Vedius Pollio who fed his fish on the flesh of slaves. Yet apparently, as a rule, the slaves were treated with some degree of humanity. Hard as were the Romans in disposition they were not devoid of the natural feeling of sympathy for those with whom they were brought into intimate association, and of care for those who were entirely subject to their will.

The Roman cruelty was the direct result of the Roman wars. The victims of the amphitheatre were

captives, or slaves the descendants of captives, who in the old theory of war were entitled to no mercy, and criminals who were already condemned to death. Professional gladiators added to the sum of victims, willingly daring death for profit and honor. To these may be added the reputed foes of the state, religious sectarians, principally Christians, against whom a fierce prejudice was excited. And the Roman people, brutalized by war, educated into a love of bloody games, taught to regard these games as perfectly justifiable, and kept in idleness by the state, so that their lack of occupation added to their fierce craving for cruel excitements, demanded the sports of the amphitheatre with an energy which it would not have been safe for the emperors to check. It cannot be said, however, that either emperors or philosophers showed any disposition to interfere with these terrible sports. They were educated to consider the victims as wretches beyond the pale of humanity, and as only suffering the just penalty of their crimes, one of the chief of which was that they had dared to oppose the conquering arms of Rome.

The foregoing considerations may suffice to show that the principles contained in the ordinary moral apothegms are not inherent in the human soul, and that morality and virtue, at least in many of their phases, are results of education, not of intuition. Men cannot be said to sin when their actions are checked by no conscientious scruples, and what would be the most atrocious crimes or sins in one period or people, are innocent, justifiable, or even virtuous in the estimation of another period or people, with a different

standard of right and wrong. So far, therefore, we have discovered no instinct of morality, no intuitive outreach towards virtue in the human soul.

We have not, however, yet gone beyond the boundaries of the morality of fear. Punishment is an essential part of law, without which it would be inoperative. With political laws the dread is of physical pain or a loss of liberty; with social laws it is of mental pain, arising from the scorn, abhorrence, or aversion of others. In the case of religious or moral laws the penalty is of the same character, but is to be applied by the deities instead of by man, now in the present, now in a future life. Although the dread of penalty was the original restraining influence, it is not necessarily the only or the final one. Habit comes in to assist it. As soon as any act is believed to be sinful many people desist from it under the influence of conscientious scruples. Yet conscience cannot, with any sufficient warrant, be viewed as an inherent attribute, since it is applied, in different conditions of life, to so widely different actions, and manifests no trace of its existence in the lowest stages of human life. The debased savage displays no conscience. He seems controlled only by fear and desire. But conscientiousness, though thus apparently a result of education, grows to be one of the strongest controlling influences upon the human mind. The case of the atheist who suffered death at the stake rather than deny his belief is a striking illustration of this. He had no fear of future penalty for sin, nor hope of future reward for virtue, yet accepted an agonizing death rather than conceal his convictions, or depart from that strict truthfulness

which he had been taught that it was the moral duty of every man to sustain.

The one defective element in restrictive laws, so far as their moral side is concerned, is that they are variable in character and operation. They are the products of policy, not of natural instinct, and, as such, change to meet every change in human condition. We can imagine the existence of a code of laws so exactly adapted to every evil deed, and so deeply ingrained by habit in the human mind, as to constitute an almost perfect standard of belief and action. And yet it would remain the outgrowth of external relations, not of innate tendencies, the result of successive rules applied for the protection of individuals and societies, enforced by penalty or reward, and sustained largely by an unfoldment of the practical maxim that "honesty is the best policy."

From such legal restrictions arose the sentiment of duty, which has played a main part in the moral history of mankind. Legislators have taught that men owed certain duties to their fellows. Religious reformers have taught that they owed certain duties to the gods. Infraction of these duties would be visited with punishment. Observance of them would bring reward. Thus has arisen a greater part of the moral rules by which mankind have hitherto been governed. We do not say the whole, for it is necessary to admit that the highest morality has a very different basis from this, as we shall now proceed to consider.

The theories of morals, as usually propounded, all seek to make morality a unit. In the one set of theories, the intuitive, the principles of morality are consid-

ered to be inherent in the human soul and to unfold as the plant unfolds from its seed. In the other set, the inductive, morality is viewed as based upon selfishness, the desire to attain pleasure and avoid pain being, in this view, the moving principle of human actions. Each school, the intuitive and the inductive, makes a strong argument, which itself goes to indicate that each is based on a truth. But the two schools fail to discover that they are merely pulling at opposite extremities of the same chain, and that morality is not the unity which they seek to make it. It has its two halves, which unite centrally into one whole. We have so far considered its inductive side, the morality which flows from experience. We have yet to consider its intuitive side, the morality which unfolds from feeling. By so doing it seems quite possible to reconcile the conflicting systems of moral theorists, and to show that morality is dual, instead of single, its legal half being the product of reason and outer experience, its innate half being the product of feeling and inner development, yet both meeting and harmonizing, as reason and feeling harmonize in the mind.

Through all the laws of creed there runs the golden thread of a purer and higher moral principle, which is as natural as the others are artificial—the principle of love, which is the underlying element of innate morality. Love is an outgrowth of the emotional, not of the reasoning faculty of the mind, as in the case of the morality of duty. It represents an energy which is evident, in the germ or in the mature form, throughout all nature. It seems displayed in its undeveloped state in the inorganic world, as the energy of attrac-

tion. In the lower organic world it is also manifested as a vigorous attraction, that known as the sexual. In the higher animal world this attraction unfolds and grows complex. The sexes are united by bonds which are no longer of momentary duration, but which influence most of the actions of life. A secondary attraction arises, the parental; and a third, the tribal, or social. These attractions, or instincts, as they are justly named, are in no sense the product of reasoning. They are strictly emotional in character, and constitute bonds which the reason did not fasten, and which it would vainly seek to sever. Their results are, therefore, of a kind which counteracts the selfish considerations of personal safety. Mates will suffer pain or death for each other or for their offspring, as if these really constituted a part of themselves, and as if defence of each other was merely self-defence. The love bond, in fact, seems to consist in a partial loss of the sentiment of individuality. The love-attracted persons become one, not only metaphorically, but, in some slight sense, actually.

With the human race the question of morality is a much more complex one than in the case of the lower animals. Hundreds of influences affect the mind of man which are absent from the mentality of the brute kingdom, and the strongest natural tendencies are warped by the action of artificial, and often unnatural habits. The innate emotional attraction known as love affects man as it affects beasts, but not with the same singleness of energy. Its development is affected, and often checked, by an intricate maze of external conditions, which act upon both savage and civilized man.

Yet with every degree of social development, this, which we may call the sympathetic phase, develops also, and throughout all history we can trace the steps of its gradual unfoldment. As sympathy develops restrictive laws grow constantly less necessary, and the indications are that it will eventually become the chief controlling force in human actions, and the reign of love succeed the long reign of fear.

The primitive human group appears to have been the family. Its main linking element was affection, the sexual attraction between man and woman, and the parental attraction between parents and children. It was often crude. The wife is still, as a rule, an ill-treated drudge in savage tribes. Yet the attractive principle is displayed in the emotional fury with which the husband protects his wife and family from danger at any risk to his own life. The maternal instinct is a still stronger one. The mother acts as if the child were a part of herself. Danger or injury to it produces in her a mental agony the close equivalent of its physical pain, and an impulse, which has nothing to do with reason, forces her to endure suffering and peril in its protection.

The feeling which thus draws together the immediate members of the family is early extended to include more distant relatives, and a very ancient political or social compound was the group of kindred, who defended one another not only through the cold promptings of selfishness, but also through the warm instincts of sympathetic feeling. Love, like fear, has a widening influence upon the human mind. The objects upon which it is exerted grow more numerous as soci-



eties grow more complex. Its earliest forms, sexual love and parental love, are unfolded in the lower animals. In man these expand to include filial love, fraternal love, and love of beings more and more distantly connected. The feeling, however, weakens as it expands. Applied to larger groups, as to the members of a tribe, it becomes a sympathy, more or less strong according to circumstances. But in every case its intuitive character persists. Men will dare and suffer death for their fellows with no hope or thought of personal benefit. It is undoubtedly true that the desire for personal protection enters as a rational element into the influences which bind men into societies. The hope of personal advantage in other directions, and the pleasure of social intercourse, are also combining forces. Yet in addition to this rational there is an emotional element, a sympathetic attraction which draws men together and induces them to endure pain in aid of their fellows, which cannot be shown to arise from the promptings of selfishness. Attraction is one of the strongest forces in nature. It can nowhere be shown that consciousness takes part in its origin. We are conscious of its existence, but do not consciously call it into existence. Men and women "fall in love," they do not reason themselves into affection. As atoms combine through attraction into molecules, so do human beings combine into societies, by bonds of sympathetic affinity so strong as to produce, ideally, the "social organism" of M. Comte, and almost the "social tissue" of Mr. Leslie Stephens. The connection of man to his fellows seems, indeed, to have some analogy with that of the limbs to the

body. He feels in his own consciousness the suffering of those whom he loves ; not as received through his physical nerves, but through a plexus of unseen nerves which stretch from soul to soul ; and his endurance of pain and death in their defence is prompted by a feeling not perceptibly distinct from that which prompts him to act in self-defence.

Such may be the true nature of sympathy, an actual, not an ideal bond, an attraction which binds the members of a society as really as the atoms of a crystal or the molecules of a single human body are bound together, and which yields an emotional sensory connection not unlike in its results the sensory connection between the brain and the hand of an individual. It must be borne in mind that no attraction is complete in its effect. The atoms of a crystal preserve a considerable degree of independence of motion. Their individuality is only partly subordinated by attraction. Each of the cells of a human body lives a life of its own. The body is like a huge colony of single-celled animals, only partly subordinate and inter-dependent. The same principle applies to the members of a human society. Each is independent to a certain degree, and to this degree he works solely for his own interests. But each is also naturally limited in his independence by an attraction, which differs in force in different persons, or as exerted on different individuals, and to this degree he seeks to advance the interests of others. No one is wholly ruled by selfishness. None is wholly free from selfishness. All men, as all things, are controlled by two forces, one of which is a centripetal energy, which prompts action for the good of the individual, while the other is centrifugal in

character, and prompts action for the good of others. The former is in man largely, though by no means entirely, controlled by the reasoning faculties; the latter is strongly affected by the emotional; yet in both cases an unconscious impulse seems the primary moving force, while consciousness and reason come in as secondary controlling influences.

These considerations are certainly arguments in favor of the existence of an intuitive as well as an inductive morality, and lead to the conclusion that the moral development of man is partly a result of experience, tending to the maxim of political expediency, "the greatest good of the greatest number," and partly a result of an innate principle, which displays itself both in instinctive attraction and instinctive repulsion, but in which the repulsive diminishes and the attractive increases as society develops, and as men gain similar interests and tastes and are brought into more intimate association. This intuitive sympathy seems of the same nature, though not of the same strength, as the nerve sympathy between the extremities and the brain of a human body. It induces an instinctive shrinking from the pain of our fellows and an effort to protect them from danger, or to give them pleasure, in no evident respect different in character from the same actions when performed for our own benefit.

In considering the development of society the gradual outgrowth of this principle of sympathy becomes manifest. It is the real moral evolution. The rules of inductive morality are variable and sometimes conflicting. The principle of sympathy is invariable and harmonious in all its results. It needs no law for its enforcement

and no maxims for its promulgation. It grows in unconsciousness, and becomes innate in the very fibre of our being, while yet it is fully consonant with the utmost development of the intellect.

Earnest human sympathy was at first confined to the immediate family. Yet a less strongly felt attraction towards others of the same blood must have been early experienced. Kinship became the bond of attraction which combined men into larger and larger groups, as the clan, the horde, and finally the tribe grew up under the reality or fiction of unity of descent. The sympathy between the members of these primitive groups was a direct outgrowth and extension of the love between husband, wife and children. It was undoubtedly strengthened by the common ancestor worship, which kept alive the idea of community of blood. In the more developed societies this family bond was replaced by a territorial one. Yet the close limit of family connection did not die out in consequence. It remains to-day the most intimate link between human beings. It still underlies all political organizations, as it once composed all political organizations. But with the formation of territorial societies other links of sympathy sprang up between men. They became attached to each other as members of the same nation or denizens of the same city. The principle of patriotism arose. Sympathy widened. At first it excited men to defend their intimates who were in danger before their eyes. At last it excited them to defend their nation as a whole, by a patriotic impulse which fixed itself on no single person or minor group, but on the national mass as one.

We may consider the ancient workings of this prin-

ciple as manifested in Greece and Rome. In the former the principle of association but slowly developed. The Grecian people long continued divided into minor groups, often hostile to one another. Their tastes, their interests, and their institutions were diverse. Yet the members of each group felt the warmest links of sympathy for one another, and in spite of the hostilities of the minor states a certain degree of sympathetic connection bound all the Hellenes together, and inspired them with the most vigorous patriotism in self-defence against foreign aggression. Yet in the days of the greatest civilization of Greece the sentiment of human sympathy continued narrow. All peoples beyond the borders of Greece were outer barbarians, in whose pleasures and pains no interest was felt, and who might suffer the utmost misfortunes without producing a sympathetic stir in the Grecian heart. This, of course, does not apply to the noblest minds of Greece, but it was the sentiment of the general people. Even Aristotle taught that Greeks owed no more duties to barbarians than to wild beasts, and another philosopher was thought to be excessively sympathetic when he declared that his affections extended to the whole people of Greece.\*

A broad extension of this sentiment of sympathy was produced by the exploits of Alexander the Great. Through these the boundaries of Grecian exclusiveness were thrown down. Greece became an integral part of an immense empire. Patriotism lost its narrowness. Close association with foreign peoples yielded a conformity of tastes and desires, and the Greek became a

\* Lecky's "History of European Morals," vol. 1, p. 240.

citizen of the civilized world, and felt some sense of sympathy with all civilized individuals.

In Rome this sentiment of sympathy had a much slower growth. As we have already sought to show, the incessant wars of Rome hardened the people. They yielded, it is true, an intense patriotism, but patriotism is a narrow virtue. It tends to limit human sympathy, and to foster the spirit of hostility and callousness to the sufferings of all foreign people. The schools of philosophy which were current in Rome, the Stoical and the Epicurean, likewise tended to suppress the development of the sympathetic sentiments. Stoicism warred against the emotional side of human nature, and taught that it was the duty of every man to suppress his emotions. It inculcated a high standard of morality, but it opposed the growth of the softer virtues. Friendship and hospitality replaced love and charity. The reason replaced the feelings. Epicureanism tended equally to the suppression of sympathy, by its inculcation of pleasure as the highest good to be attained.

At a later period the ascendancy of Greek thought in Rome and the cessation of the wars of foreign conquest permitted the growth of a softer and wider feeling. The Romans became cosmopolitan in their affinities. The world of civilization was theirs, and all civilized men were brothers. Socrates had declared himself a citizen of the world. Cicero went further and taught the doctrine of the universal brotherhood of mankind. The same broad lesson was advocated by other philosophers, and in time the common people manifested some tokens of a widening feeling of sympathy, though its growth was very gradual.

The great religious reformers arrived intuitively at the dogma of universal love which only the slow process of education awoke in the philosophers of the world. Confucius approached it in his celebrated maxim, but his conception was not of the widest. Gautama was the first to declare it in its broadest extension. He taught the doctrine of universal charity, and of the brotherhood and equality of all mankind. But his creed was vitiated by the selfishness that permeated it. Men were taught that the greater their charity the greater would be their reward. They must work out their own salvation. There was the pain of transmigration to escape. There was the endless peace of Nirvana to attain. Charity to all men was the road to personal happiness. Gautama failed to reach the highest level of moral thought, and the influence of his system has been lowered by this innate imperfection.

It remained for Christ to enunciate this principle of morality in its simplest and highest form, that of universal sympathy and charity without thought of reward. "Love one another." On this lofty maxim Christ imposed no limitations. Love is not inculcated as a means of escaping penalty or of gaining reward, but of elevating the soul, expanding the nature, softening the feelings, and widening the sympathies of mankind, until the whole world shall become one family, and the cry for help from the remotest inhabitant of the earth shall awaken a responsive thrill of feeling in the heart of every human being.

This is an extreme ultimatum, but it is that to which the precepts of Christ point. It is a result which can only be fully attained in the far future of

human history. Yet man is working toward it. The teachings of Christ fell upon a world partly prepared for them, and ever since his advent mankind has worked on, in darkness and doubt, wandering widely from the true path, yet holding on to the idea of unconditioned love as the thread which must in time lead it out of the labyrinth.

In the whole history of the modern world, from the time of Christ to the present, we perceive the workings of a new thought, a simple yet all-sufficient moral principle which has lifted man to constantly higher levels despite himself. The element of the personal entered. It could not but enter. The sense of dread and hope of reward have been the strong moving forces in the development of the Christian world. But the element of the impersonal also entered. Human sympathy has constantly widened and deepened, the sentiment of brotherhood has extended to embrace more and more of mankind, and men have sacrificed their own comfort for the good of others with a generosity constantly less influenced by the selfish motive of a hope of reward.

This seed of brotherly love, implanted by Christ in human creeds, is still actively growing. We can perceive everywhere traces of its influence. Even in many of the wars of the modern world its workings are visible. Ancient wars were conducted solely on a selfish basis. Revenge, ambition, plunder, dominion, were their main incentives. But many modern wars have been prompted by an unselfish sentiment. The mass of the Crusaders, for instance, were driven forward by a feeling of impersonal devotion. Many of them, it



is true, had selfish aims, either of earthly domain or heavenly happiness. But doubtless a purely unselfish desire to serve God stirred thousands of devout hearts. Even the most terrible story of Christian history, that of religious persecution, was prompted by the same sentiment, the desire to save mankind from perdition. A similar sentiment is strongly manifested in the Mohammedan wars. It is the inspiring principle of the modern as compared with the ancient world. Human selfishness was the strongest impelling force in the old world, human sympathy has largely taken its place in the new world, of the history of mankind. Men have checked their own desires, diminished their own pleasures, curtailed their own comforts, out of pure feeling for the wants of their fellows. And this is the loftiest of all human sentiments, for it has an expanding influence upon the soul. It lifts it out of the narrow range of selfish instincts, widens it until it becomes an integral part of the soul of the world, and brings it into emotional sympathy with every living being.

Human sympathy has been extended by two causes, or in two directions. One of these is its outward extension, to embrace larger bodies of men. In this, war, commerce, and travel have been the efficient agents. The first has broken down the narrow walls of local prejudice, has formed extensive empires, and has established a community of tastes, beliefs and interests over immense provinces. The others have produced the same effect in a less forcible but equally efficient method, have brought all mankind into intimate acquaintance, and have so widely stretched the nerves of emotional

sympathy, that we can feel an instinctive thrill of pain at the suffering of a savage in the antipodes.

The other extension of sympathy has been downwards, from the strong towards the weak. The inequality in the condition of mankind has been one great cause of human suffering, and has most directly appealed to the feelings of the sympathetic. Slavery, the most general and persistent institution of the worlds of barbarism and semi-civilization, excited a constant outflow of human sympathy, and undoubtedly the close association of the strong with the defenceless must have had a softening influence upon the human soul. The slaves were beyond the reach of the law of force, but they were within that of the law of love. In this way the institution of human slavery has borne its share in the evolution of morality, and the autocratic will of the master has felt the strength of that instinctive bond which nature has stretched from soul to soul.

Slavery was more extensive and more cruel in Rome than anywhere else in human history. The laws against slaves were of extreme severity. The master was given the power of life and death over them, and if he was murdered every slave in his house, except the helpless, was put to death. The other hardening influences which tended to brutalize the Roman character aided to increase the ill-treatment of slaves, and there are many instances of extreme cruelty on record. Yet intimate association with a defenceless class could not but have its softening effect. In many cases slaves were treated with the greatest kindness, and warm affection existed between the master and his dependents. The severe laws were gradually miti-

gated by custom, and the manumission of slaves became in time so common that it had to be restricted by law. The freedmen eventually became a very numerous and important class in Rome. The annals of the empire contain many noble instances of slaves who suffered horrible tortures rather than betray their masters. In later Rome slaves were protected by the laws. A master could no longer kill, brutally punish, or sell a slave to the amphitheatre, without dread of punishment. Rome softened as it aged, and the relation between master and slave was one of the softening influences.

In Christian Europe the power of the clergy was strongly exercised towards the abolition of slavery. The principle of human equality, and still more the sentiment of brotherly love, worked in the interest of slaves. Over serfdom, which succeeded slavery, the priests seem to have had little direct influence. Yet the general effect of their humanizing teachings must have been to soften the harder elements of society, and to awaken that sympathy of the strong for the weak which has aided vigorously in the equalization of the social units.

Slavery within the present century has stood too directly in the way of the moral advancement of mankind to be longer tolerated. The sentiment against it has grown so dominant that in several countries it has been quietly abolished, while in the United States it has been brought to an end by force of arms. The American civil war is the only case on record where sympathy for the defenceless was the underlying cause of a conflict that lasted for years and threatened national disintegration. It is a striking illustration of

the intense vigor of moral influences in the modern world.

A second instance of this phase of moral advancement is seen in the gradual amelioration of the condition of woman. Human slavery has been two-fold, that of weaker to stronger individuals, and that of the weaker to the stronger sex. The latter began with the beginning of human existence, and still persists to a considerable degree. Brutality to wives is the almost universal tale of savage society. With the lowest of savages in a moral sense, the Australian, the women are treated with the utmost cruelty. Even with the highest savages they are forced to work for their lazy lords, against whose brutality they have little protection. The story of barbarian society gives instances in which women are much better treated, and are in some measure the equal of their lords, as with the ancient Germans. Yet among all the Aryan tribes the husband was an autocrat, and the wife and family slaves to his will. Their only appeal for protection was to his sympathetic feeling. There were no laws to defend them from his barbarity.

In the ancient civilizations the married woman continued a slave to her husband. In Greece she was closely secluded, and the only freedom of woman, as in the more barbarous ages, was confined to the unmarried and licentious. In Rome the laws gave the wife no defence from the power of her husband, but the law of public opinion supplied the place of political enactments, and the Roman matron had a great degree of personal liberty. For nearly the first time in the history of the world, in Rome the married woman

approached a social equality with man, and became an important member of society. In later Roman history marriage in a measure ceased to exist, and a close political equality of man and woman replaced the ancient political slavery. As there were no political rights, there were no political distinctions.

But it is in Christian society that we must look for the growth of true sympathy between man and woman, and the replacement of the sensuality of the past by the love of the modern world. To get a striking idea of the difference between ancient and modern times in this particular we need but compare the drama of the two periods. In the dramatic literature of Greece, which touches so many of the springs of human feeling, the element of love hardly enters. Hæmon, in the tragedy of *Antigone*, is perhaps the only lover in all Greek tragedy. But his love is the coldest of sentiments. An appeal to affection would have been wasted on a Greek audience, and he craves the life of his betrothed only on the plea of justice and public opinion. The drama of Rome is full of intrigue, but contains little of the spirit of love. But in the modern drama, on the contrary, the love of man for woman enters as the main element, to which all others are subordinate, while passionate avowals of affection, and a recognition of the natural equality of the sexes, which would have been treason to ancient ears, have become essential conditions of theatrical effect.

Christian society was hardly formed before an earnest of the future position of woman appeared in that worship of the Virgin Mary which for centuries was so prominent an element of the orthodox faith. She be-

came the Goddess of Pity, the deity of appeal, through whose aid the sterner nature of the male deities might be softened. Undoubtedly this lofty position given to woman in heaven must have improved her position upon earth, and the whole sex must have gained a higher social standing through their relations to the favorite deity of ordinary worship.

A second moving force in the rise of woman was the life of the castle, the growth of the feudal family. The feudal lord became isolated from his fellows to a degree which has no parallel in ancient history. In the family of the clan or the patriarchal group the head of the family lived in intimate association with his fellows. His relations with his wife and family formed only a portion of his intimacies. In the family of the city, likewise, the intimate connection of the citizens, and their many outdoor interests, checked the strengthening of family sympathies. The life of the feudal lord was very unlike these. He was a country magnate, supreme over a group of individuals with whom his lordly dignity prevented any intimate relations. His business abroad was principally war or the chase. He seldom met his social equals. His only centre of sympathy was in his family, and to his wife and children alone could he unbend, and seek the solace of affection in his troubles or of delight in his joys. Nowhere in the past did woman attain the social standing which she gained in Europe during the feudal period, and there can be no doubt that this improvement in domestic manners was greatly assisted, if it did not find its inciting cause, in the conditions of family life above indicated, that of the feudal hall of the Middle Ages.

The institution of chivalry was probably a direct

outgrowth of the relations of the feudal family. It was customary to send the sons of nobles to the castles of distinguished warriors, to serve as pages and squires, and eventually to acquire knighthood under the leadership of their warlike patrons. These noble youths were brought under the influence of cultured ladies, to whom their education in the courtesies of life was largely due, and whom they naturally grew to honor and respect. Woman became an important element in society, its main softening influence. Knightly gentleness and courtesy grew rapidly under these conditions, and though great brutality still prevailed, the general tone of society changed, and chivalrous respect for woman became one of the requisites of the knightly character. Woman, instead of being bought, stolen, or commanded, was courteously solicited. The sentiment of love became one of the ruling forces of society, and every warrior was impelled to the protection of a woman in distress by the growing feeling of sympathy for the defenceless and the sentiment of love and duty to the weaker sex. The Damon and Pythias of the ancient were succeeded by the Abelard and Heloise, and other noted lovers, of the modern world.

Chivalry never attained the perfection in practice which it did in theory. Yet it had a powerful influence upon the warring world, and through it grew a gentleness in the domestic and a courtesy in the other relations of life which have increased and widened steadily to the present time. The love sentiment of the modern world had its inciting cause in Christianity. It grew through the worship of the Virgin and the influences of the feudal family to its earliest culmination in chivalry. Woman

entered as the softening leaven into the rude society of that period. Since then the courteous treatment of a few knights has grown into the courtesy of the whole cultured world, and the desire to defend woman has expanded into a desire to elevate her. What began as pure sentiment has been broadened by a sense of justice as well as of courtesy. In these days men are earnest in the demand for their political and social rights, and the rights of woman are becoming a vital element in the situation. The right to an equal education and to equal industrial and political privileges with man is the demand of the most progressed women of the age, a demand which is warmly echoed by many cultured men, as the last step in that long effort at manumission from slavery which has continued since the first human family was formed. The Australian savage quiets his subordinate wife by knocking her down with a club, or thrusting his spear through her leg. In modern enlightened society this effective method is still extant in a measure, but is being replaced by the nobler sentiment of absolute equality of the rights of all human beings.

There are other elements in the moral evolution of modern times, to the most prominent of which a brief consideration may be given. In the mediæval period there were two classes who were treated with the utmost inhumanity, the criminals and the insane. The latter were hooted at and tormented in the streets when harmless, and brutally dealt with in prison cells when dangerous. The former, even before conviction, were treated with cruel harshness. To be confined in the common prison was to be subjected to every outrage, and the iron bolt that locked in the prisoner locked out humanity.



These evils were but slowly cured. The Mohammedans had hospitals for the insane many centuries ago, but the first Christian hospital for the insane was a product of the seventeenth century. The amelioration of prison discipline began still later. It was solely a result of modern moral evolution, being brought about by the humanizing of public opinion, as represented by men of specially ardent sympathies.

One of the most important features of recent morality is the rapid extension of the work of private charity. In this respect the modern world differs markedly from the world of the past. In the ancient nations organized private charity never existed, so far as evidence remains. Undoubtedly there was much almsgiving. Sympathy with distress is a feeling common even among barbarian peoples, and hospitality is one of the most widespread of the virtues. But this is principally eye-sight charity, a sympathetic feeling only for visible objects of want. In this form it still largely exists in enlightened communities, and is the main cause of mendicant imposture, and the diversion of charity from worthy to unworthy objects.

In the Christian world charity became almost a new discovery. The early clergy worked with unceasing energy to relieve distress, and much of the misery caused by the overthrow of the Roman empire, and the mediæval barbarism, was alleviated by their earnest application of the humane mandates of Christ. The spasmodic charity of the ancient world ranks far below this active and unceasing monastic benevolence, which, indeed, was not confined to the monastery, but extended to the castle, whose mistress earned the characteristic and lofty title of Lady, or "Loaf giver."

In the Roman world state charity had rendered private charity almost useless. The great mass of the Roman poor were slaves, and supported by their owners. Poor freemen were fed by gratuitous distribution of corn. Idleness of the lower classes succeeded, to a degree nowhere else paralleled. In the mediæval period the charity of the church replaced that of the state. Hosts of the visible poor were sustained by the bread distribution from the monastery and the castle. Yet, as in the ancient world, charity was mainly confined to eye-sight benevolence. The servile beggar was relieved. Those too proud to beg were neglected. Little discrimination was used, and mendicancy was everywhere encouraged by this impolitic alms-giving. The effect of such a method was to double the evils it sought to cure. Hosts of sturdy beggars walked the roads of Europe. Mendicant friars begged their way from town to town and from land to land. There was a carnival of beggary, and the utmost efforts of the benevolent were strained to relieve the distress their injudicious charity did so much to encourage. The result of indiscriminate alms-giving has always been to produce a caste of beggars, who multiply without prudence and increase without limit.

This mediæval form of charity is now being replaced by organized private charity, under a system in which discrimination goes hand in hand with benevolence. The spasmodic impulse of pity, momentarily aroused by the sight of a distressful face, is yielding to that continuous and nobler impulse which seeks out shrinking need, and, while desiring to relieve the worthy only, makes every effort to discover retiring worth.

State charities have in large measure proved a fail-

ure, through their unavoidable lack of discrimination. Administered by hired officials, without heart in their work and with little care to avoid imposture, they have probably done more harm than good. The poor-law of England, for instance, long acted simply to increase the number of mendicants, until beggary became a weight almost beyond the power of the government to sustain. Fortunately, organized private charity is rapidly taking the place of the poorhouse system, and may in time render it an unnecessary institution. The advantage of private charity is that it is administered by the charitable themselves, who, while eager to relieve all true distress, are equally desirous not to be victimized by imposture. In the modern system the growing purpose is to eradicate rather than to relieve want, and to strike at the root rather than at the branches of the evil. With its probable results, however, we are not here concerned, and wish only to indicate the extension of human sympathy involved, in which not only open distress, but unseen, retiring want stirs the benevolent impulses of the human heart.

This development of human sympathy is displayed not only in the extension of ordinary private charity, but also in occasional great gifts for charitable purposes, which are being yearly more freely made. One form of this mode of charity is of old origin—the giving by will. A far nobler form is of modern institution, the giving during the lifetime of the donor. The latter involves a real self-sacrifice, and is having a doubly valuable effect. It tends to widen the scope of humane impulses, and it is largely devoted to providing a fixed support for those helpless classes who have become unable to support themselves.

It must be borne in mind that in dealing with the needy we have two separate classes to consider: those who are capable of self-help, and those whom nature or accident has rendered incapable of self-support. These two classes require to be dealt with differently, the one to be given work, the other to be given permanent assistance. To these ends charity is now devoting itself. It seeks to give temporary aid to and provide labor for the strong, and to give permanent assistance to the disabled. To effect the latter purpose a multitude of institutions now exist, many supported by private subscription, many by endowment, in which almost every conceivable form of permanent disability is cared for. Institutions of this kind are rapidly on the increase, and the time seems approaching when, without necessity for aid from the state, the helpless will be adequately supported, the able set to work, and the mendicancy of the vigorous cease to exist.

In addition to these institutions, another very important form of benevolent endowment exists in the private establishment and support of schools. It is a less direct phase of the same principle. Those unable to provide themselves with a proper equipment for the battle of life are being freely aided by the charitable, and the intellectual tone of the community is being permanently raised by the benevolent extension of educational facilities.

The visible results of these efforts are of no greater importance than their mental consequences. Benevolence exerts, perhaps, its greatest good in its refinement of the soul of the giver and its awakening of charitable impulses in the community. The sentiment of

sympathy, the true basis of human morality, is being thus widened and deepened by exercise and example, and human selfishness becoming decreased, until the time promises to arrive when Christ's command will be realized upon the earth, and man will truly "love his neighbor as himself."

In that extraordinary outburst of intellectual energy in Greece which shortly preceded the Christian era, there was very slight indication of moral advancement. The Hellenes remained morally obtuse in the midst of their intellectual acuteness, and their souls were practically dead to the sufferings of human beings beyond the narrow limits of their rock-bound peninsula. In the modern epoch man has grown again intellectually acute, but with this there has been a remarkable expansion of the moral sentiment. Human sympathy has extended until it embraces the whole world in its grasp. A tale of suffering in Ireland or in India arouses feelings approaching in warmth those felt for suffering at home. Benevolence no longer contents itself with the relief of the wayside sufferer, but is linked by nerves of sympathy with all mankind. The sentiment of human brotherhood is being rapidly unfolded, and all men promise to become, in their needs as in their joys, members of one great family.

And the lower animals are being admitted as humbler members into this great family. Benevolence, in its downward glance, has brought within its ken a world of creatures which for ages were left almost beyond the range of human sympathy, and treated with a barbarity that failed to touch a chord in the heart of the great mass of mankind. Undoubtedly they were tenderly

cared for by the believers in metempsychosis, but this was as a religious duty, not as a humane obligation. Only within our own times has charity truly taken this lower world of sentient beings within its care, and cruelty to the helpless been decreased through sympathy instead of through doctrinal obligation.

We may briefly repeat here the hypothesis above advanced, that morality has a double origin, and embraces two essentially distinct constituents. In the one it is a product of man's external relations to his fellows and to his God. In this phase it is artificial and variable, and consists in a series of laws, adapted to the people and period of their promulgation, and presenting remarkable diversities in different ages of the world. In the other it is a product of man's internal relations to all living beings. In this phase it is natural and invariable. It flows from an attraction which exists throughout nature as its underlying law, and which binds the universe into one harmonious whole. In man this principle gains that unfolded state which we call sympathy, or to which we give the name of love in its most vigorous manifestations. It has but one law, that enunciated by Christ: "Love one another;" but this is a law which is universally applicable, and which can never be abrogated, for it represents a principle inherent not only in human nature, but in all nature. The promulgation of this law, if such we may call it, had a highly beneficial effect. It gave an element of humanity to mediæval barbarism which was greatly lacking in ancient civilization. Yet if the mandate had never been spoken the final result must have been the same, for the laws of nature do not

need to be put into words in order to come into action. That which arises from an innate principle must act, whether it be given verbal expression or not.

Human sympathy has existed in all ages of the world. A like sympathy existed in the animal world before man appeared. Originally, however, it was very narrow in its range. Throughout the history of mankind it has been unfolding. It is, as a rule, narrow yet, but it promises eventually to embrace all living things. It has grown enormously since the extension of commerce, of travel, and of other means of communication has brought all parts of the earth into close connection. And this growth will be tenfold increased when the same causes shall have lifted all mankind within the circle of civilization. The necessity of creed, of restrictive laws, of promises of future reward, grows less and less as sympathy becomes more expanded. Through all ages the ordinary laws of morality have been useful agents in restraining mankind from the exercise of evil passions and vicious desires. In this age of growing disregard of creed the principle of sympathy is acting as a most vigorous restraining influence. Man is growing to work for the good of his fellows because he is linked to his fellows almost as sensitively as his limbs are linked to his body, and moral action now flows more from a true rapport of souls than from the old selfish motive force of reward and punishment.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### THE UNFOLDMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS.

**I**T is no easy matter to separate the maxims of law from those of morals. In fact they are, as primitively evolved, precisely the same in form, and differ only in the penalty attached to their infraction. "Thou shalt not kill" is at once a legal and an ethical prohibition. So far as its penalty is inflicted by the hand of society it is a crime. So far as its penalty consists in mental suffering, here or hereafter, it is a sin. Thus there is usually nothing in the nature of wrongful human acts to separate them into crimes and sins. They are simply subject to a double penalty, and are viewed as crimes or sins accordingly as the penalty is inflicted by society upon the body, or by conscience upon the soul.

This distinction, it is true, does not completely hold good. There are restrictive laws whose infraction is not a sin, and may even be a virtue, in those cases where conscience does not sustain, or where it opposes the law. There are moral laws whose infraction is not a crime, since this does not affect the well-being of society, or not sufficiently so to call for legal restriction. Yet the principle holds generally good. The laws which are not sustained by the human conscience are those which are unjust to the whole or a portion of society. The ethical prohibitions which are not



sustained by law are those whose infraction injures only him who breaks them, or affects society too slightly to demand redress by the hand of man. Admitting these exceptions, it may be held as an axiom that nothing is prohibited by a just law that is not morally offensive to a sensitive conscience; nothing offends the rational and enlightened intellect that is not opposed to the best interests of society, although it may be in many cases too unimportant to be dealt with otherwise than by the unwritten laws of public opinion.

Morals, however, do not deal with penalties only, but with rewards as well. Religious creeds promise future delights to the virtuous. Whatever these delights may be, certainly a principal one of them will be the enjoyment of a satisfied conscience. This is what moral rectitude brings to the virtuous upon the earth, and with it the pleasure flowing from the approval of the most elevated society. But law has also its rewards. It gives protection in person and property to the law-abiding. The law is primarily devoted to the infliction of penalties, yet those who work for the best good of the community are often directly rewarded by society with the recompense of popular esteem and honorable and lucrative positions.

Such are the fundamental conditions of restraint of wrongdoing. They are single in nature, but double in penalty. When the punishment or reward comes from society, they are relegated to the domain of law; when it comes from conscience, or from the divine power, they are placed in the domain of morals; but absolutely they are the same. That which offends God

offends man, and is a just subject of both divine and human prohibition.

In reviewing the history of law these preliminary considerations become of importance. As society is at present constituted the necessity of law has been considerably reduced by the force of moral restriction. The day may come, at some period in the far distant future, when all necessity for law will cease, and the human conscience become the sole controlling force in society. The day was, at some period in the far distant past, when the necessity for law was absolute, since the human conscience was still in embryo. The history of the reign of law indicates the gradual change from the latter of these conditions to the former.

Primitive man, in his first social aggregations, was controlled in his actions by two forces. One of these was fear of reprisal for acts of aggression upon the community. The other was fear of injury by the unseen powers for lack of performance of his simple religious duties. He was thus controlled by a double fear, and was influenced also by some degree of sympathy with his intimates, the germinal phase of the highest morality.

For ages punishment for wrongdoing was little more than individual reprisal, but as societies grew close and complex certain legal restrictions upon the evil-disposed became necessary. These grew up naturally, not as written law but as public opinion, and in time an intricate set of traditional rules arose, adapted to the legal government of communities. Long ages passed ere the law-maker appeared. The

executive was an early member of society, but the legislator a very late one. Laws were imperceptibly evolved long before they were designedly made, and in many social groups of our own day the only code of laws is that which thus slowly grew out of the exigencies of past social conditions.

This state of affairs is by no means confined to savage or barbarous communities. It exists to some extent in civilized societies. It is particularly marked in China, that strangely conservative nation. The emperor of China is looked upon by his subjects as an officer divinely appointed to administer the ancient laws of the empire. If he fails to do so they consider themselves as released from allegiance to their derelict ruler. A continued disregard of these ancient laws would very likely produce a popular rebellion. The Chinese emperor is essentially an executive officer. His legislative function is greatly restricted. The laws with which he has to deal were made centuries before his birth, and have all the sacredness of antiquity.

Such a condition could not continue to exist in a progressing nation. It is only possible in a permanently conservative one. For the code of traditional laws thus constituted, though frequently minutely complex, is adapted to conditions often long past and vanished. Only a nation that has continued almost without change can be properly governed by such a code. Progressing societies need new regulations adapted to their every new condition.

Certain interesting complications have arisen from this fact. Men hold on to their traditions with great tenacity. They are also tenacious in their grasp on

old institutions; yet unavoidable changes take place in these, and much more rapidly than in beliefs and customs. Hence, the spectacle has frequently been presented of a community governed by a set of traditional laws in many respects strangely inconsistent with the existing social relations. These laws are often enforced despite their manifest absurdity, and even their injustice, for what is wise and just under one set of conditions may become absurd and injurious under another.

This is the danger which has arisen in the growth of every society, since all communities were governed during a long period of their development by traditional codes. A considerable degree of civilization became necessary before the legislator appeared, with his new laws adapted to new conditions. Previous to that period new laws only slowly grew up through absolute exigencies, and ill-adapted regulations died a very slow death. There are many tribes and communities to-day governed by such ancient codes of custom, some of which have become ridiculously inadequate to the purpose intended. Yet these are apt to hold their own when not actively injurious to the well-being of society, however absurd they may seem to those not "to the manner born."

Such ancient laws of custom were, for a long period, principally confined to matters affecting the good of the community as a whole. They largely related to property. As already described, ancient barbarous societies were principally communistic. Shepherd tribes held their flocks, and agricultural tribes their lands, in common. An assault on this property was an

assault on the whole community, and was repelled or punished by the community as a unit. Officers appointed by the assembly of the people executed its laws. But injuries inflicted upon an individual were differently dealt with. As in regard to landed property each man was a member of the village group, so in regard to his personal relations he was a member of a family group, and could call on any immediate relative to aid him in obtaining redress for bodily injury. In fact the original organization of social units, as members of a single family, long persisted in more complex communities, and still exists in some modern states. The vendetta, or family revenge, a direct survival of the oldest form of punishment for wrongdoing, is still practiced in many parts of the earth. In this system injury to any member of a family is equivalent to an act of war upon the whole assembly of kindred, and calls for reprisal not only on the immediate aggressor, but upon every member of his family.

It is remarkable how persistent this idea has been. As regards property a great degree of development has taken place in human relations, and the primitive family has been replaced by the modern state. But as regards personal relations the ancient family organization still exists in many localities, with scarcely a change from its old form. In certain regions, indeed, as we have already pointed out, it continues in its property relations. But its persistence as a defensive unit is much more widespread. The vendetta may be traced in many semi-civilized communities. It exists among the Corsicans, the Southern Slavonians, the Afghans, and the Bedouins, in much of its old form. It is com-

mon in Circassia, where it is the absolute duty of the nearest heir to avenge the murder of his kinsman, while every member of the murderer's family is held equally guilty. It can be traced, both in the past and the present, in many other localities, and is extant even in our own Southern States, as numerous instances of exaggerated family feuds attest.

The vendetta probably from the first existed side by side with the law of private revenge, which in many localities has outlived it. In the mediæval period this law cropped out as the "Wager of Battle," for many centuries a usual form of legal redress for personal injuries. The decline of the judicial combat was followed by the rise of the duel, a method of blood-revenge in which vaguely appear the chivalrous idea of honor and the old belief that God will defend the just cause. With the passing away of the mediæval period, it is true, there was no longer need to punish criminal assaults on person and property by the method of private revenge. The legal organization of society had grown strong enough to take charge of these. But there were many minor offences, personal slights and insults, of which the law took no cognizance, yet which were often bitter assaults on a delicate sense of personal honor. To the punishment of offences of this kind the duel was applied, and for centuries it held its own with a vigor equal to that of the older judicial combat. It is now rapidly dying out, in common with the vendetta, in civilized communities.

There has been a constant effort in communities to repress the vendetta and the law of private revenge. They are injurious to all forms of society, from the

interminable blood feuds to which they tend to give rise, and we find attempts to regulate and supersede them even among savages. The Australians, for instance, have organized a system of dueling, in which a fixed amount of bloodshed is held to compensate for a fixed degree of injury. More advanced tribes, which sanction personal revenge, take justice into their own hands where circumstances render it necessary. Yet even in this case the old principle is occasionally admitted, by the injured person being appointed to inflict the penalty imposed by the tribe. In some cases a person who has been robbed is permitted to seize all the property of the thief, who is prevented by the tribe from interfering. It is a decided step of legal development when the tribal officers themselves carry out the sentence.

The mediæval form of the system of personal redress, the "Wager of Battle," was not known in the ancient civilized world, so far as we are aware. The first historic mention of it is in a description by Livy of the customs of an ancient Spanish tribe. It probably prevailed in Germany in very remote times, though Cæsar and Tacitus make no mention of it. At any rate it became common immediately after the formation of the barbarian kingdoms, with the exception of the Anglo-Saxon. In ancient Germany the injured could either summon his foe before the assembly of the tribe, or call on his family and friends to aid him in getting satisfaction with axe and sword. In mediæval Europe the accused had the privilege of appealing from a judicial trial to the trial by battle, and in that barbarous age this method of settling feuds became very common.

No man who valued his honor could refuse to accept the challenge, if physically capable, and cases are on record in which even kings accepted challenges from aspirants to the throne. The "Champion of England," who still appears in processions, is intended to represent the old warrior whose duty it was to do battle with any one who disputed the right of the new monarch to the throne.

In the case of women, clergymen, and persons physically disabled, champions could be chosen to do battle by proxy. A very interesting description of this custom is given in *Ivanhoe*, in which the "Disinherited Knight" thus becomes a champion for Rebecca the Jewess. Yet women did not always seek a champion. They seem to have done battle for themselves often enough to give rise to fixed regulations for such a combat in the old German laws. To equalize the combatants the man was buried to his waist, his left hand tied behind him, and his right hand armed with a mace, while the woman was left free, and given for weapon a heavy stone, securely fastened in a piece of stuff. Among the curious instances of the judicial combat on record there is a celebrated one in which the battle took place between a man and a dog. It ended in the victory of the sagacious animal, which thus avenged the murder of its master.

The wager of battle was unknown in early England. It was first brought into that island by William the Conqueror. In France, where it had particularly flourished, it was suppressed in 1547. But the duel, its immediate successor, developed there enormously in the succeeding period. It increased, indeed, to such an extent that



Henry IV. during twenty-two years granted no less than seven thousand letters of pardon for duels fought in contravention of the royal edicts. This last relic of the barbaric blood wager is now rapidly dying out, yet it has manifested great vitality, particularly among military men, with whom force naturally tends to supersede law.

The right of private retribution crops out in all early history, and strongly affects all ancient codes of law. Mr. Kemble says that it is the root of all Teutonic legislation. It is especially indicated in early English law, which gives to each person the liberty to defend himself, his family and friends. And yet, as we have said, society early undertook to protect those who were unable or unwilling to defend themselves. The commonwealth at first interfered merely to keep order and see fair play. It gradually took the quarrel into its own hands. Traces of this change appear in early human records. The assembly of the village or tribe formed a court for the settlement of criminal offences. The idea of tribal law, in this its early form, was that of arbitration between the contending parties, and settlement by fine instead of by shedding of blood, if possible. Thus in the records of Iceland we learn that the right of private revenge was gradually lost, and the compensation for an injury was fixed by the consent of the parties, or by arbitrators. If this settlement was resisted the case might be brought before the *Thing*, or popular court, and a law judgment taken. If still resisted the criminal became outlawed. At first, indeed, the trial system was very defective and the fine imposed could not always be readily collected, so that outlawry was the principal expedient in the hands of the court.

The idea of imprisonment for crime did not exist in the early days of legislation. Punishment by bodily injury or by death was also obnoxious to the Aryan tribes. Only fine, or loss of property, remained, and if this was resisted the common practice of the court was to declare the prisoner out of the protection of the law. This was equivalent to giving him over to the old right of private revenge, which now might be administered by any member of the community.

The settlement of crimes by fine was widespread in old times, and signifies that society, in its evolution, generally arrived at this method of punishing illegal acts, through a disinclination to inflict bodily injury on free-men. It is still found in all tribes with whom the blood feud persists, as the Afghans, Bedouins, Slavonians, etc. It existed in most or all the early Aryan communities, the German, the English, the Irish, etc. In the infliction of the fine the old unity of the family continued, since, as appears in Irish and Saxon law, the whole family was held liable for its payment. In like manner the compensation for crime was divided among the members of the family of the injured person, on the principle that as they were held responsible for his crimes they were entitled to share in his pecuniary redress for injuries.

Certain interesting features of Saxon law grew out of this principle. Each man was required to have a surety for his good conduct. At first his relatives were held responsible for his deeds. Later laws bound men in tithings or hundreds. Each man formed one of a group of ten, who, being sureties for him, could force him to pay the penalty adjudged for his offences. The tithing was required to produce its members when summoned, to

exercise police duty, and to aid in paying the fine of the condemned. It was privileged to defend the accused, and to receive part of the compensation decreed.

Traces of this curious system are found in widely remote regions, and in all cases it probably sprang from the same original cause, the unity of the family as the first social organization. The individual was not yet recognized in law, only the group of kinsmen. The money payments in English and German law were minutely proportioned to the extent of the injury; so much for an arm, so much for a leg; wounds in every part of the body being specified and their price fixed. The difference in the ranks of society was strictly considered in these enactments, the serf, the freeman, and the earl receiving successively higher rates of payment for their injuries.

Of course the infliction of the fine as a penalty for crime was not the only or the universal mode of punishment. The old idea of the blood feud had its influence upon legislation, and from it arose in many regions the legal maxim that the criminal should receive a punishment equivalent in kind and in degree to the injury inflicted. We have this maxim clearly stated in the "eye for an eye, and tooth for a tooth" of Hebrew legislation. If the crime was a theft it should be punished by an equal loss of property. If it was a personal injury the like or an equal wound should be inflicted upon the criminal. This principle of redress exists even among low savages, and it is the basic principle of modern criminal legislation. The fine is still retained in some measure as a penalty for crime, but it has become of minor importance in civilized communities. It is inflicted for offences

to the community, but not usually to private individuals, and is applied to pay the costs of prosecution. Personal injuries to individuals are still punished on the old principle of physical redress. The modern imprisonment or execution represents a very ancient legal conception. When, however, societies first took the right of punishment out of the hands of individuals the prison did not exist. In fact the idea of imprisonment only slowly became a dominant one as the frail hut of the barbarian was replaced by the solid stone edifice of civilization. Originally penalties were inflicted at once, on the person or the property of the criminal.

This method of punishment has persisted, and has become the ordinary system of legal penalty, in several of the Asiatic nations. In China it presents itself in the customary torture of convicted persons. In this respect, as in so many others, China shows its conservatism, since it retains a method of punishment that was common in the ancient civilizations, but has vanished in modern Christian communities. In all the great ancient states suffering or death by torture was inflicted upon the condemned. Imprisonment, of course, existed, but there was little inclination to put the state to the expense of supporting criminals when the punishment might be at once inflicted upon their bodies. It is not necessary to detail the many horrible forms which this method of punishment assumed. Death by crucifixion, so common in the Roman empire, will suffice for an instance.

China is the only modern state in which the punishment by torture exists in any ordinary and diversified application. It is employed not only to produce death, but also for minor offences, and very slight crimes are

often barbarously punished in this manner. In Christian communities this method of redress of crimes never gained much prominence. Punishment by the stocks and by other physical inflictions for minor offences long prevailed, but serious crimes were usually settled by the short method of the axe or the rope, without preliminary torture. This, it is true, was not wholly the case. Very aggravated offences, such as assaults upon the king, or brutal murders, brought severer punishments, and the infliction of punishment by breaking upon the wheel, or more rarely by extended tortures, is occasionally recorded. For the most terrible examples of such punishments we must look to France. English law, though severe, has seldom been deliberately cruel.

It is a singular circumstance that death by torture in Christian nations has been largely restricted to offences against the church. The clergy have dealt with unbelief in a tenfold more brutal manner than society has dealt with crime, and we have the strange spectacle of the murderer dying the quick death of the gallows or the axe, while the heterodox thinker expires in agony over the slow fire. The same spectacle is also exhibited in the treatment of witchcraft, another form of offence against the church. Secular tribunals have been, as a rule, far more merciful than the courts of the church.

In more recent times the strongly-developed humanity of enlightened nations has put a total end to the torture of criminals. Fine, imprisonment, or death by the most painless methods, have replaced the barbarous inflictions of the past. In fact, a strong popular sentiment against death, or any infliction of suffering for crime, exists; the barbarities of prison discipline have been eradicated

in great measure; and the ancient theory that crime deserves punishment is beginning to vanish. It is now widely held that society must be protected, not that the wrongdoer must be punished. Imprisonment is intended to prevent the commission of other crimes, and to deter evil-disposed persons from similar offences, rather than as a punishment; and the tendency of prison discipline is towards the most humane treatment consistent with the fullest protection of society. It is singular that, while secular society is thus giving up the idea that crime deserves punishment, and is replacing it with the theory that the criminal is a mentally undeveloped or partially irrational person, who, like the insane, must be held in check by the kindly hands of his fellows, the church still clings to the theory of a barbarous age, that the sinful is deserving of a cruel future punishment, and that God retains the savage inhumanity out of which man is rapidly growing. It is true that this theory is no longer held by the most advanced churchmen, who now accept a belief similar to that held by legal science: that low mental conditions must be grown out of, here or hereafter, by the process of development; that the sinner, like the criminal, can rightfully be hindered from injuring others; but that God no more than man can justly inflict punishment for a misfortune of birth or education.

There is another phase of the subject of legal usage with which we must now deal, that of evidence. In the old system of blood revenge there was little attention paid to this. The injured family quickly fixed upon the criminal party, often wrongfully, no doubt, and proceeded at once to inflict the penalty. After the

establishment of courts a more deliberate process naturally came into play, and the question of deciding on the criminality of accused parties was usually the most difficult duty of the court. It has in our days become far the most difficult duty, but the problem was frequently settled in old times by a method that certainly had the merit of brevity and decisiveness, though scarcely of justice.

Ancient tribunals were little likely to possess the patience or the searching skill with which modern courts ferret out crime. In fact, they usually troubled themselves very little with the examination of the evidence, but turned the whole matter over to the decision of the heavenly powers, the courts of heaven being called upon to decide such cases as the courts of earth found too difficult. This was done by the widespread institution of the Ordeal, through which it was believed that God would miraculously intervene for the protection of the innocent and the exposure of the guilty. A common form of this in early Christian communities was the oath, by which, administered with great solemnity, the accused sought to clear himself from the charge of crime. He called upon heaven to punish him, if guilty of taking a false oath. In this custom the old family bond of unity was displayed, for the accused could demand of his kinsmen to aid him with their oaths in his defense. In some aggravated cases the oaths of fifty or even a greater number of persons were required. If obtained, the person was cleared, for it was held that such an appeal to heaven, if falsely made, could not fail to call down punishment upon the guilty.

Another curious form of appeal to heaven was that

of the *Corsned*. This was chiefly practiced by ecclesiastics, and consisted in the swallowing of a piece of bread or cheese, which had been previously laden with imprecations, and was given to the accused to eat along with the Eucharist. If guilty, it was believed that he could not swallow it. A noted case of this kind is that of Goodwin, Earl of Kent, who, in the reign of Edward the Confessor, when accused of the murder of the king's brother, appealed to the ordeal of the *Corsned*. The result was fatal to him, as he was choked in the effort to swallow it, perhaps as a result of nervous dread and mental disturbance.

The ordeal is by no means confined to Christian communities, but is practiced in many parts of the earth, under various forms. In Malabar, for instance, the accused is condemned to swim a large stream which is full of crocodiles. With the Western Africans the most important form of the ordeal is to swallow the *Mboundou* poison. Many persons die from drinking this to prove their innocence of sorcery. In Madagascar a like ordeal by poison was long practiced, and has been but recently abolished. It is estimated to have caused the death of three thousand persons yearly. Elsewhere the ordeal took still more curious forms. In Siam the accused and the accuser were placed together, and a tiger was let loose upon them. If one escaped, he was innocent. If both were killed, they were both guilty. The practice of the ordeal has been found among many other peoples, as in Japan, China, Pegu, the Siberian tribes, etc. In Hindustan it became greatly developed, and no less than nine kinds of ordeal were in use.



The most common of ordeals were those by fire and water, and these were the main forms used in Christian communities. According to Blackstone, the "Fire ordeal was performed either by taking up in the hand unburnt a piece of red-hot iron of one, two or three pounds weight, or else by walking, barefoot and blindfold, over nine red-hot plowshares, laid lengthwise at unequal distances." The party who escaped unhurt was innocent. Those hurt, and without collusion it was impossible to escape injury, were guilty.

Trial by water was of two kinds—by boiling and by cold water. In the first case the accused thrust his arm into a vessel of hot water. The arm was then bound up and sealed. If after three days no trace of the scald appeared, he was adjudged innocent. In the cold water ordeal the accused was flung into a stream. If he floated without swimming, he was guilty. If he sank, he was innocent, and was drawn out.

A curious form of the ordeal was the weighing of those accused of witchcraft. If found of very light weight, they were considered guilty. The ordeal of the bier was very ancient, yet it continued in use until the eighteenth century. In this the body of a murdered person was laid upon a bier, and the suspected party was obliged to touch it. If blood flowed at the touch, if foam appeared at the mouth, or if the body moved, the charge was considered to be proved.

These instances of the ordeal will suffice to show its general character. It was based solely on the idea that God would interfere by a miracle in favor of the innocent. It had the one merit of brevity in settling puzzling cases, but has doubtless caused the judicial murder

of many thousands of innocent persons, since it is safe to assert that God never took any part in the affair. We may add that the ordeal was earnestly opposed by the church, and was generally abolished in Europe in the sixteenth century. It has been replaced by the rational method of deciding the question of guilt or innocence by an accurate weighing of the evidence.

There was, however, another method of arriving at the truth of a criminal charge, quite as irrational as the ordeal, and which the church vigorously sustained. This was the method of torture. In fact the obtaining satisfactory evidence as to the perpetrator of a crime has always been the most difficult problem with which society has had to deal. Commonly only the criminal himself is able to give direct evidence, and his unsupported testimony is far too doubtful to be accepted. In the searching inquiry of modern courts collateral evidence aids in unraveling most crimes, but half-civilized tribunals were little likely to possess the skill or the patience thoroughly to weigh the attending circumstances. Two more expeditious methods suggested themselves. In the one God was called in to decide the mystery, by the ceremony of the oath or the ordeal. In the other an effort was made to force the truth from the criminal himself. Severe tortures were applied to the body of the accused, their severity increasing until he acknowledged his guilt. If he persisted in declaring his innocence he was often subjected to the most fearful suffering, with the purpose of extorting a confession of guilt.

In this absurd theory it was taken for granted that an acknowledgment of guilt thus obtained could be

relied upon. If the prisoner continued his denial he was subjected to punishment tenfold more agonizing than that of death, and the matter ended by the execution of those who were willing to confess anything to escape the torture, and in the frequent wrecking of the bodily strength of those firm enough to persist in the truth, or, as was doubtless often the case, in a lie. In its dealings with heretics the church applied the torture for a different purpose. Its object seemed to be to extort not the truth, but a lie. In short, the worthy and wise Inquisitors were ready to burn those who clung to the truth, and to release or less severely punish those who declared what was probably a falsehood. Comment on this extraordinary procedure is unnecessary.

The amount of horrible suffering which has been endured through these absurd methods of arriving at the truth of criminal accusations is almost incredible. They indicate a degree of human cruelty that is equally astonishing, if viewed in the light of the humane feelings which now exist. It is not unfolding reason alone that has eradicated these utterly ridiculous theories of court procedure, but moral evolution as well. Public sentiment to-day would certainly not permit the infliction of such savage tortures, even if their absurdity were not fully recognized.

The legal maxims gradually evolved in the development of society became in time, even in primitive communities, numerous and complex, and several codes of ancient law have been preserved, which are very useful as showing the political and industrial organization of the tribes or nations that held them. In India are the

well-known "Laws of Manu," together with fragments of probably more ancient law. The "Laws of the Twelve Tables" yield us the primitive Roman code. The "Salic Law" comes down to us from the barbarous age of Germany, and the "Brehon Laws" from early Christian Ireland. Other ancient codes might be mentioned, but these will suffice for examples.

There is one thing strongly manifest in most of these ancient codes, which is that no strict division had yet been made between sin and crime. They combine moral with legal restriction. In early Greek law, for instance, the criminal was looked upon as spiritually impure, and his crime as an offence against the gods. In fact it must be conceded that the earliest lawyer was at the same time a priest, and in affixing the penalties to crime he paid as much attention to divine as to civil punishments. In those early days, indeed, all intellect flowed inevitably into the ranks of the priesthood, which body included, as Sir Henry Maine says, "the only lawyers, the only priests, the only professors, the sole authorities on taste, morality, and feeling, the sole depositories of whatever stood in the place of a science."

In the oldest extant fragments of Hindu law crime seems to be viewed as an offence against the gods rather than against man, and the punishment is to be inflicted in the future state of existence. To escape this future retribution the culprit is ordered to perform severe penances. In one case the penitent is to walk on in a fixed direction until he drops dead. "For one great crime he is to extend himself on a red-hot iron bed, or to enter a hollow iron image, and having lighted a fire

on both sides, to burn himself to death. For the comparatively venial offence of drinking forbidden liquor a Brahman is to have boiling spirit poured down his throat." \*

These ridiculous requirements, which were certainly never conformed to, indicate an effort to prevent criminal actions by threats of divine vengeance. They arose from the same theory that gave rise to the ordeal, and were evidently the work of the priest. In fact the lawyer and the priest long continued identical, and in Middle Age legislation the lawyer priest is still visible, side by side with the lawyer who professes to be a layman.

Descending in Hindu legislation to the probably later "Law of Manu," it is found to combine civil and religious penalties. It contains a considerable sum of law, yet is essentially a book of ritual. In this respect it resembles Leviticus, the ancient Hebrew code. A still later legal work of India, the "Institutes of Narada," has got far beyond the sacerdotal level of Manu, and is a law-book pure and simple, or with but few traces of the influence of priestcraft.

The fact here adverted to is not confined to the cases mentioned. There is no system of recorded law, from China to Peru, which in its first form is not commingled with religious ritual and observance. This is less so in Roman law than elsewhere, yet even there ritualistic rules are present.

As we have already said, the earliest laws were the results of an imperceptible evolution. They grew out of the successive exigencies of societies, and were

\* Sir Henry Maine's "Early Law and Custom," p. 37.

often clung to with pertinacious obstinacy, even after they had become useless or injurious. This clinging to old ideas helped to perpetuate old customs. The difficulty of eradicating the antique system of land-holding has been in some countries insuperable. In India and Russia the ancient institution of the village community persists in the midst of modern governmental conditions. Both there and elsewhere we can trace its gradual disappearance, and the growth of the idea of private ownership in land, not by legal enactment, but by social evolution; yet only in Western Europe has this new idea fully superseded the ancient Aryan custom.

Thus it would appear that the legislator is a late product of civilization. Not wholly so, however, for it is probable that even in an early period some degree of legislation took place. The methods of this legislation are an interesting subject of inquiry, as indicating the manner in which the law-maker came definitely into existence. Undoubtedly in all ages new questions arose to which the old laws were inapplicable. In the village community, as at present existing, the village elder can only execute the old laws. He has no authority to make new ones. Yet the village assembly, to a certain extent, possesses this power, in regard to questions concerning which the old customs yield no precedent. By such occasional enactments to meet new situations the body of laws must have gradually augmented. But this assembly, the direct predecessor of the modern legislative body, existed only among the Aryans, and in the council of the North American Indians. Among the pastoral

progenitors of the earliest civilization there was no definite evolution of such a governing council, and thus the primitive empires were destitute of that essential element of political progress, a law-making representative body.

This is one main cause of the political stagnation of these empires. The people were not represented in the government. The despotic monarch was the only privileged law-maker. That he made laws can not truly be said. Arbitrary edicts were issued to cover every exigency of the administration, and some of these in time doubtless acquired the stability of laws, yet oftener they vanished with the exigency which gave them birth. These nations, in fact, were mainly governed by ancient customs, similar to those which compose the great body of Chinese laws to-day, and which even the emperor dare not interfere with. Such a body of ancient observances must have formed the chief controlling agency in all the primitive states, with the addition of an occasional edict from the sovereign, which was rather a temporary mandate than a law. Yet it is probable that one of the law-making influences of the present day existed in these early empires, that of judicial decisions. Courts existed, presided over by judges, one of whose duties it was to interpret the laws, and these interpretations, or special applications of old rules to new situations, gained the force of new laws, as they still do to-day. In fact, in modern times, the citation of judicial decisions is an important part of the legal machinery, and may have been still more so in the past, when the laws were not very definitely framed, and needed

many special interpretations. This influence of judicial decision was of minor importance in remote eras, when the conditions of society were still very simple, but it grew essential as the interests of communities became more complex, and the early simplified rules became inapplicable to the new situations which constantly arose.

When Aryan communities succeeded the more ancient empires, a new agency was added to the legislative machinery, that of the council, or village assembly. This expanded into the assembly of the tribe or nation, yet there is no historical indication that in ancient times it performed any distinctive legislative functions. Its work in its early stage was rather judicial than legislative, and it seemed, like the early judge generally, to have partly occupied the position of an arbitrator, to decide in the personal quarrels of the citizens of the community. It was the first vague movement from the custom of individual redress to that of communal protection of citizens. In the more advanced tribes the assembly became little more than the mouthpiece of the chief, as the authority of the latter superseded that of the people. Such appears to have been the case in Homeric Greece, in which the voice of the leader was of potential authority, though his proposals needed to be confirmed by the decision of the council and assembly.

In the records of all ancient societies, the leader or king had the power of a judge. In the Brehon laws of Ireland, as in the laws of India, the king appears as a judge. The same may be said of the Homeric chief. The judges of Israel were real judges as well as rulers. In India civil law first appears in connec-



tion with the ruling chief. In the most ancient Hindu law-books there is little reference to the authority of the king. In the later books it is treated of at length, and the legal judgment and punishment of offenders seems to have fallen into the hands of the monarch. This authority was probably gained by a process of steady usurpation, which dwarfed the power of the assembly, and threw all control into the hands of the ruler. We can trace the steps of a similar usurpation in the history of Europe. In the early courts of arbitration the decision of the judge, council or assembly was carried out by the executive officers of the community, and when the chief became a prominent person, by officers of his appointment. As his power grew the enforcement of justice fell mainly into his hands. These were the first steps toward the establishment of the royal judicial authority. At a later period the count, or king's deputy, assumed authority in the court, and dispensed justice in the king's name. As the king's court thus emerged, the ancient popular court died away. It disappeared largely from the trouble and expense of attending it, as communities grew larger. The people were very ready to have this onerous and profitless duty taken off their hands, and willingly relinquished it to the king. The same may be said of the old popular assembly, which declined more from the negligence of the people than from the usurpation of the king. The early liberties of mankind were simply given away through ignorance and lack of public spirit. Only the sharp spur of despotism has stirred up modern communities to the necessity of reclaiming the abandoned treasure of liberty.

As Maine points out, while the form of the early popular court was retained, its president relinquished his jurisdiction to the graf or count, the king's deputy. This was less the case in cities, in which the concentration of men enabled them more easily to perform their public duties, and in which there has been an unceasing disposition not only to retain the old rights of the citizens, but to assume new ones. The cities have been the true homes of freedom. Every overthrow of civic liberty has been by the aid of the country districts or of external enemies, and all modern movements to regain liberty were born in the cities, and flowed outward from these centres.

In consequence of the assumption of judgeship by the king certain interesting consequences arose, as indicated by Sir Henry Maine.\* The kings of Middle Age Europe seem to have been incessantly traveling from part to part of their kingdoms, probably for the purpose of administering justice. If they remained stationary their authority quickly decreased. Numerous instances of these royal journeys are on record, of which we may take one from as late a date as that of King John of England. Sir Thomas Hardy's "Itinerary of King John," which extends from 1200 to 1216, is a record of extensive annual journeys over the country, rapidly performed, and extending to every important place in the kingdom. Even Ireland was visited and widely traversed in these journeys, though it was then almost an impassable waste. It would seem, from this and other instances of the same character, that the king's civil supremacy was at first retained only by his personal exercise of the duties per-

\* "Early Law and Custom," p. 178 *et seq.*

taining to it, and that this system was but gradually replaced by the modern one in which the officials of the crown relieve the monarch of this onerous duty.

It follows almost necessarily that a considerable degree of law-making power fell into the king's hands in the performance of this judicial function. His power to enforce his edicts was much greater than that of the popular representatives, and he could venture to abrogate or change ancient customs which they would seldom dare to interfere with.

As yet, indeed, we have found no definite trace of a distinct law-making body. All the instances related are those concerning the exercise of the judicial function, to which the legislative power was attached as a minor portion of this function. The duties of the assembly, the chief, the king, and the count alike were mainly judicial and executive, and the evolution of law was left largely to take care of itself. The laws, as we have already stated, arose as a body of ancient customs, which were gradually added to by assembly, chief, or king, and by the decisions of judges when national courts became established, but their formation was largely left to chance. No idea of a distinct legislative body existed in the old world, and public opinion was probably the primitive legislator.

In the ancient Aryan democracies the formation of law became less a product of chance, and more of design. The assemblies of Greece undoubtedly made legislation a part of their duties, while special lawgivers occasionally arose, such as Solon and Lycurgus, who replaced the old laws of custom by new and definite codes, adapted to the new conditions of society. It is to Rome, however,

that we must look for the first regular and persistent evolution of law. Yet this evolution was not the work of a legislative body, but of a judicial officer, the Prætor. The "Law of the Twelve Tables" is the most primitive Roman code, and probably is made up of ancient customs, codified but not changed in the early days of the commonwealth. In this code the original function of the judge as an arbitrator is clearly indicated. These laws were the basis of all subsequent Roman legislation, but throughout the era of republican Rome they were frequently changed and adapted to new situations by a method known as the edict of the Prætor. The power possessed by the Roman Prætor, of modifying old and enacting new laws by simple edict, was the earliest system known of regular legislation, and proved one of the most powerful directing forces in the evolution of human society. By its aid law was kept constantly in harmony with the principles of equity, and a great body of laws was gradually produced, adapted to all the legal requirements of a complex civilized community.

Law, in anything approaching its modern sense, may almost be said to have been born in Rome. In this direction the practical Roman intellect was actively exercised, and the laws became more equitably adapted to the existing conditions of society than elsewhere appears in ancient history. The jurists of Rome were numerous and learned, and a great abundance of legal literature arose. To the old laws, consisting of the "Perpetual Edicts" of the Prætors and the decrees of the Senate, were added the imperial laws, largely the work of great jurists, to whom the authority of declaring the law had been confided by the emperors. Several collections of

these laws were made, of which far the most important was that ordered by Justinian, after his accession in 528 A. D.

The quantity of material with which his commissioners had to deal was immense, but was in a state of great confusion. They succeeded, however, after several years' labor, in reducing it to order, and produced several works, of which the most important is that known as the *Digest* or *Pandects*. This embraces over nine thousand extracts, taken from the various legal authors, and constitutes the most precious monument of legal literature which the world possesses. Both in the merit of its contents, and the great influence it has exerted and still exerts, it is the most important of all existing books of law.

After the formation of the barbarian kingdoms that succeeded the Roman empire, nearly all of them compiled their ancient laws. Several codes were thus formed, comprising the Burgundian, the Salic, the Ripurian, and those of the Visigoths, Lombards, Saxons, Bavarians, Germans and others. But these consisted merely of the laws of ancient custom above described, and were, as a general rule, unsuited to the changed organization of society. This, however, does not apply to the code of the Visigoths of Spain, which was of a different character, being a product of actual legislation. It was evidently the work of the clergy, and was probably largely controlled in its formation by the remnants of Roman culture and legal knowledge. In the other barbarian kingdoms the members of the different races, —the Romans, Franks, etc.,—were each judged by their own laws, but the Spanish law applied alike to the

whole community. The graduated fine according to rank, of the old barbarian laws, was replaced here by the just axiom that all men are of equal value in the eye of the law ; and in the judicial proceeding the ordeal, the oath, and the wager of battle were replaced by proofs established by witnesses, and a rational course of inquiry into the attendant facts, as in modern courts.

Ancient law was in no instance adapted to the best interests of the people as a whole. Even in republican Greece and Rome the bulk of the people were slaves, whom the law did not reach. For the establishment of the principle of legal justice to all the growth of a law-making body representing the people was necessary, and the regular evolution of such a body took place only in England, and belongs solely to modern history. In modern Europe there are practically two systems of law. The first of these is the Roman law, which is the basis of the Continental code. The second is the English law, which grew up on English soil with little influence from Rome, and is now followed by all English-speaking peoples.

In fact it was only in England that the Aryan assembly regularly unfolded into a representative legislature. On the continent the theory of the right of the people to parliamentary representation was maintained, but it was abrogated in practice by despotic force, and parliament only met at irregular and distant periods. Thus almost everywhere on the continent, though less so in Spain than elsewhere, the law-making power resumed its ancient condition. It had the great advantage of possessing the intricately-defined Roman law

as its basis, but new enactments were made mainly by the same processes as of old, those of occasional royal edict and judicial decision. Only within very recent times have there been regular legislative assemblies. As a natural consequence despotism grew more vigorous. The people were without representation. All new laws were made by the king or his representatives, and therefore in his interests, and that highest outgrowth of legal evolution, the establishment of political equality, was everywhere checked. Only by the violent method of revolution has popular representation at last been fully established.

In England a different evolution took place. The Aryan village assembly was never abrogated in this new home of the Saxons. And, while the judicial and executive functions passed into the hands of the king and his council, the legislative became the fixed duty of the parliament of England, the first distinctively legislative body that has ever existed. The English parliament was not at first a representative body. Its origin was in the Aryan assembly, which comprised all the freemen of the tribe. The theory that it was the right and duty of every freeman to form part of the assembly persisted long after the extension of the nation rendered it inapplicable, and the members of the Saxon assemblies represented their own private interests only. The rights of other citizens of the community were represented only in so far as their interests were identical with those of the members of parliament.

It was at a much later date that the members of the lower house became truly representative, through election by constituents. Those of the upper house

have never become representative. Each member of the Lords represents his own private opinions and interests only, without regard to other sections of the community, and this body directly continues the assembly of freemen of the Aryan village. The House of Commons originally represented but a minor portion of the community. For centuries its basis of representation has been growing steadily wider and the interests of the community as a whole have been more fully considered, while the liberty of the English people has increased with every new step in this breadth of representation. For the political condition of any people is closely dependent upon the character of its legislative body, and the more fully this represents the whole people the more completely must the political equality of mankind become established. The principle of trial by jury, the most distinctive feature of the English code, is that which brings it into clearest contrast with the continental system. It is the democratic legal method, as compared with the aristocratic method prevailing on the continent. There the judge at once tries and executes. In English law each man is tried by a jury of his peers, and the function of the judge is restricted to interpretation of the law, and adjudgment of a penalty in strict accordance with the verdict. In the theory of English law, as at present constituted, all differences of rank and position are abolished, and the absolute and equal jurisdiction of the law over every member of the community is established. That this theoretical condition has been reached in practice can not be so safely said.

In addition to the modern legislative methods, as



above adverted to, an older method still persists to an important extent. The judicial decision of legal cases has had a vigorous influence over the growth of modern law, and precedent rules as strongly in our courts as the letter of the law itself. In fact the cases with which the law has to deal are so varied that it is impossible for any statute to cover all their details, and judicial interpretation and decision becomes constantly necessary. Thus the literature of the law of precedent has grown steadily more voluminous, and threatens to become utterly unwieldy ere many more years elapse. What was of old a necessity may grow to be an intolerable evil if this tyranny of precedent is not dethroned.

As the final outcome of the evolution of legislative machinery it is necessary to refer to the Supreme Court of the United States, which serves as a balance wheel to the enactments of the American legislature, and acts to keep the statutes in exact accordance with the organic law of the land, as embodied in the Constitution; an instrument which, while not rigidly fixed, is adapted to prevent hasty and ill-considered change. This important tribunal, which has no parallel in the governmental systems of other nations, but has its counterpart in the Supreme Court of each State of the American Union, may be looked upon as the final development of the legal principle of judicial decision, and in its workings the judgment and experience of our ablest jurists become usefully available in the interpretation of the laws. It is a "governor" which might be wisely applied to all law-making machinery.

That law and justice are equivalent, however, can no more be fully affirmed of modern than of ancient

courts. Trial by jury and by evidence of witnesses are certainly better means of arriving at the truth than were the expedients of ordeal and torture. Yet the difficulty of probing mysteries and the vagaries of human judgment must cause frequent unjust verdicts, and there still occurs an occasional appeal from the decision of the court to the old blood revenge. In past times this appeal was frequently made, since legal injustice was rather the rule than the exception. There was one special source of the injustice of former court procedure, to which we may allude. The monarch of tyrannical proclivities, in a state which had passed beyond the phase of open despotism, usually found the legal machinery a ready and powerful aid in his purpose of enslaving the people, of which he was not slow to avail himself. As in more ancient times, when the people were subservient to the church, religion was made the agent of despotism, so in recent times, in which the people have become obedient to the law, the court has been frequently the agent of the despot. The most marked instance of this is the establishment of venal courts under Charles I., for the purpose of enslaving the people by the agency which they viewed as the bulwark of their liberties. It failed, as we are aware, and was one of the prominent causes of the Puritan Revolution.

Elsewhere there have been popular revolts against unjust courts or maladministration of law, of a different character. One of the most interesting of these is the celebrated *Vehm-Gericht*, or Secret Tribunal, which flourished in Westphalia in the Middle Ages. This court, which probably originated in a regular tribunal, became

in time an irregular and secret association for the trial of offenders who defied the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. Its members were composed of freemen and nobles, the Emperor was *ex-officio* Grand Master, and the Archbishop of Cologne, as Lord of the Land, was President. All its members were sworn to secrecy, the judges and officers all masked and muffled, and its sessions held at irregular places and intervals, originally under a tree in open day, but finally at midnight in secret chambers or underground caverns.

This tribunal exercised a wholesome restraint on the lawless barons of the period, for the offender was liable to be secretly summoned at any moment to appear before it and answer for his crimes. If he refused to obey the summons, or resisted arrest, he was given over to death, and each member of the society was bound to use every effort to slay him. The knife of the holy tribunal left in the corpse testified that this was no ordinary murder, but the work of the Holy Vehm. If tried and convicted little ceremony was used, but the culprit was hung on the nearest tree. This tribunal was at its highest power in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It became, as might be expected from its irresponsible character, the tool of evil men, and rapidly declined near the close of the last-named century. We have its virtual successor in the Lynch-law of to-day. The purpose of the latter institution is the same, that of administering justice in rude societies where the regular law is inefficient; and its result is frequently the same, that of administering injustice.

A brief reference to some other side issues of the "Reign of Law" is desirable. The inequality or the

inefficient administration of law has in all ages driven men into open revolt, and the outlawry adjudged by the most ancient courts became afterwards the deliberately assumed outlawry of fugitives from the oppressive jurisdiction of the law. Of the many instances of this the most interesting is that of the Saxon peasants of England, under the early Norman kings. Robin Hood's merry band has long filled a prominent place in legend and romance, and the popular endorsement of these bold outlaws shows clearly that men are as ready to support rebellion against the law as against the throne, when either becomes the instrument of tyranny.

Another set of outlaws, the brigands and pirates, who have made a considerable mark in history, have failed to win popular approval. Not rebelling against unjust laws, but deliberately declaring against any control of the law, they place themselves in the position of wild beasts, and can fairly be dealt with in the same manner by the law-abiding societies against which they formally make war. Fortunately piracy, which flourished so extensively in ancient history, has almost disappeared from the modern world, and brigandage is confined to a few half-governed mountainous districts, where it leads an expiring life.

One of the most important characteristics of modern life is the activity of legislation. As above said, it had little or no existence, as a separate function of government, outside of England and the small democratic states of Europe, until within a century past. And even in England its importance has steadily grown. For centuries the parliament had other law-making influences to contend with, and lived a life of constant battle. It

has now gained the victory and is gathering all the reins of legislation into its own hands. The increasing activity of the English parliament is shown in the fact that the chronological table of statutes of the past six centuries covers about three hundred pages, of which fully two-thirds are devoted to the legislation of the last hundred years. This increase arises partly from the widening of the domain of law, and its steady increase of control over the actions of citizens, but more from the great diversity of modern interests. It is true that very numerous actions are not dealt with by law, as many probably as in any stage of society, yet the steadily growing complication of society has needed a rapid multiplication of statutes to meet its varying requirements. Moreover, the ancient law-making powers are steadily diminishing in importance. The edict of the king has ceased to exist in all the advanced nations. And the influence of judicial interpretation and decision is losing its importance as a legislative power. In fact, the interpretation of statutes by judges, which was active and constant, and often arbitrary, in the past, is being exercised with more and more caution. The courts adhere to the literal meaning of enactments to a much greater extent than formerly, and avoid any addition to or interference with the statutes, except when their absurdity and self-contradiction render it necessary; while the legislatures are more than ever active in revising and perfecting their enactments, and in legislation to meet new exigencies. Thus the reign of law is growing with increasing rapidity, and the old reign of chance and force is passing away to a degree that is highly promising for the future good of mankind.

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